Shanks v. Carolyn W. Colvin
Filing
14
ORDER and OPINION AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final judgment in the Commissioner's favor. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan J. Baverman on 3/15/2018. (btql)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
JESSICA SHANKS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
:
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, :
:
1
:
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
1:17-cv-00483-AJB
O R D E R A N D O P I N I O N2
Plaintiff Jessica Shanks (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to
section 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial
review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“the Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income
1
Nancy A. Berryhill was the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
beginning January 23, 2017. However, her acting status ended as a matter of law
pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et seq. Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(d), a public officer who sues or is sued in an official capacity may
be designated by official title rather than by name. Since Ms. Berryhill no longer is the
Acting Commissioner, the Clerk is DIRECTED to identify Defendant by the official
title rather than by name.
2
The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (See Dkt. Entries dated 3/10/17). Therefore, this Order constitutes a final
Order of the Court.
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Benefits (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act.3
For the reasons below, the
undersigned AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on July 20, 2012, alleging disability
commencing on September 30, 2011. [Record (hereinafter “R”) 213]. Plaintiff’s
applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. [See R101-08]. Plaintiff then
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). [R109-11]. An
evidentiary hearing was held on July 22, 2014. [R31-67]. The ALJ issued a decision
on September 19, 2014, denying Plaintiff’s application on the ground that she had not
3
Title II of the Social Security Act provides for federal Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”). 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq., provides for Supplemental Security Income Benefits for the
disabled. Unlike Title II claims, Title XVI claims are not tied to the attainment of a
particular period of insurance eligibility. Baxter v. Schweiker, 538 F. Supp. 343, 350
(N.D. Ga. 1982). Otherwise, the relevant law and regulations governing the
determination of disability under a claim for DIB are nearly identical to those
governing the determination under a claim for SSI.
Wind v. Barnhart,
th
133 Fed. Appx. 684, 690 n.4 (11 Cir. June 2, 2005) (citing McDaniel v. Bowen,
800 F.2d 1026, 1031 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986)). Thus, in general, the legal standards to be
applied are the same regardless of whether a claimant seeks DIB, to establish a “period
of disability,” or to recover SSI, although different statutes and regulations apply to
each type of claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (establishing that the judicial provisions
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) are fully applicable to claims for SSI). Therefore, to the extent
that the Court cites to DIB cases, statutes, or regulations, they are equally applicable to
Plaintiff’s SSI claims.
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been under a “disability” from the application date through the date of the decision.
[R17-28]. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council (“AC”), and the AC accepted
Plaintiff’s request for review and denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits on July 28,
2016, making the AC’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.4 [R4-12].
Plaintiff then initiated her action in this Court on January 23, 2017, seeking
review of the Commissioner’s decision. [Doc. 1]. The answer and transcript were filed
on May 31, 2017. [See Docs. 6, 7]. On August 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a brief in support
of her petition for review of the Commissioner’s decision, [Doc. 11], and on September
1, 2017, the Commissioner filed a response in support of the decision, [Doc. 12].5 The
matter is now before the Court upon the administrative record, the parties’ pleadings,
and the parties’ briefs, and it is accordingly ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1383(c)(3).
4
The AC adopted significant portions of the ALJ’s decision. For
simplicity’s sake, where the Court refers to the AC’s decision and portions of the ALJ
decision adopted by the AC, the Court will refer to the decision maker as “the
Commissioner.”
5
Plaintiff did not file a reply brief, and neither party requested oral
argument. (See Dkt.).
3
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II.
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment or impairments must result
from anatomical, psychological, or physiological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such
severity that the claimant is not only unable to do previous work but cannot,
considering age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial
gainful
work
that
exists
in
the
national
economy.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).
The burden of proof in a Social Security disability case is divided between the
claimant and the Commissioner. The claimant bears the primary burden of establishing
the existence of a “disability” and therefore entitlement to disability benefits.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a). The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to
determine whether the claimant has met the burden of proving disability. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a); Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Apfel,
4
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190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). The claimant must prove at step one that he is
not undertaking substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At
step two, the claimant must prove that he is suffering from a severe impairment or
combination of impairments that significantly limits his ability to perform basic
work-related activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, if the
impairment meets one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404
(Listing of Impairments), the claimant will be considered disabled without
consideration
of
age,
education,
and
work
experience.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is unable to prove the
existence of a listed impairment, he must prove that his impairment prevents
performance of past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five, the
regulations direct the Commissioner to consider the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant
can perform other work besides past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
The Commissioner must produce evidence that there is other work available in the
national economy that the claimant has the capacity to perform.
Doughty,
245 F.3d at 1278 n.2. To be considered disabled, the claimant must prove an inability
to perform the jobs that the Commissioner lists. Id.
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If at any step in the sequence a claimant can be found disabled or not disabled,
the
sequential
evaluation
ceases
and
further
inquiry
ends.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). Despite the shifting of burdens at step five, the overall
burden rests on the claimant to prove that he is unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity that exists in the national economy. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2;
Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other
grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5), as recognized in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd.,
921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991).
III.
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A limited scope of judicial review applies to a denial of Social Security benefits
by the Commissioner. Judicial review of the administrative decision addresses three
questions: (1) whether the proper legal standards were applied; (2) whether there was
substantial evidence to support the findings of fact; and (3) whether the findings of fact
resolved the crucial issues. Washington v. Astrue, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296
(N.D. Ga. 2008); Fields v. Harris, 498 F. Supp. 478, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980). This Court
may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). If
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s factual findings and the
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Commissioner applies the proper legal standards, the Commissioner’s findings are
conclusive. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (11th Cir. 1997); Barnes v.
Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam);
Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Bloodsworth
v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
“Substantial evidence” means “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it must be
enough to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury. Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Hillsman, 804 F.2d at 1180; Bloodsworth,
703 F.2d at 1239. “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [the Court]
must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as
unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131
(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Even where there is substantial evidence to the contrary
of the ALJ’s findings, the ALJ decision will not be overturned where “there is
substantially supportive evidence” of the ALJ’s decision.
Barron v. Sullivan,
924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). In contrast, review of the ALJ’s application of legal
7
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principles is plenary. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995); Walker,
826 F.2d at 999.
IV.
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
The Commissioner made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
July 20, 2012, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2.
The claimant has the following severe impairments: borderline
intellectual functioning, cerebral palsy, seizures, post-traumatic
stress disorder [(“PTSD”)], schizoaffective disorder, dysthymic
disorder,[6] and sciatica (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
3.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
...
4.
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity
[(“RFC”)] to perform less than a full range of light work as defined
in 20 CFR 416.967(b). She is able to lift/carry up to 20 pounds on
an occasional basis, and 10 pounds frequently. She can stand/walk
6
Dysthymia is a mild form of chronic depression that lingers for long
periods of time, sometimes years. Those who suffer from dysthymia are usually able
to function adequately, but seem consistently unhappy.
WebMD,
Dysthymia
(Mild,
Chronic
Depression),
http://www.webmd.com/depression/guide/chronic-depression-dysthymia (last visited
3/13/18).
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up to four hours in an 8-hour workday, and she can sit for up to six
hours in an 8-hour workday. The claimant can push/pull up to
20 pounds. The claimant is unable to climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds; however, she is able to climb ramps and stairs on an
occasional basis. She is able to perform balancing, stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling activities on a frequent basis.
The claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors,
dust, and gases, and she must avoid working near moving
machinery, heights, and any workplace hazard. The claimant is
able to perform simple, routine, repetitive type tasks. She is limited
to work with only occasional changes in the work setting, and only
occasional interaction with the public and co-workers. The
claimant is unable to work in a fast-paced, high production work
environment.
...
5.
The claimant has
(20 CFR 416.965).
no
past
6.
The claimant was born on February 11, 1992 and was 20 years old,
which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date the
application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
7.
The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in
English (20 CFR 416.964).
8.
Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant
does not have past relevant work experience (20 CFR 416.968).
9.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform
(20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
9
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relevant
work experience
...
10.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, since July 20, 2012, the date the application
was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
[R7-10, 19-23].7 The Commissioner based the adverse disability finding on vocationalexpert testimony that a person of Plaintiff’s age, education, and work history, with the
above RFC, could work as a silver wrapper, garment sorter, or paper pattern folder.
[R23].
V.
CLAIM OF ERROR
Plaintiff raises a single claim of error: that the ALJ and AC ignored or
misconstrued the opinion of consultative psychological examiner Steven Snook, Ph.D.,
that Plaintiff would likely have trouble adapting to the stress of a work environment
and thus that the Commissioner reversibly erred in finding that Plaintiff retained the
RFC to work in other than a fast-paced, high-production work environment. [Doc. 11
at 8-14].
7
In its decision upon review of the ALJ’s decision, the Appeals Council
found that Plaintiff had a severe impairment of borderline intellectual functioning rather
than intellectual disability, adopted the ALJ’s other factual findings and rationale, and
adopted the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled. [R7-10]. This recitation
of the Commissioner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law therefore relies on the
ALJ’s recitation, amended to incorporate the AC’s findings of severe impairments.
[Compare R19-23 (ALJ decision) with R7-10 (AC decision)].
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Plaintiff presented to Dr. Snook for a consultative psychological evaluation on
November 2, 2012.8 [R528-533]. Plaintiff told Dr. Snook that she had graduated from
Metter High School with a special-education diploma in 2010. [R529]. She also
reported that her mother was emotionally and physically abusive; her oldest brother
molested her when she was nine or ten years old; she had been raped by an adult male
cousin at age sixteen; and DFACS had removed Plaintiff from the household at age
sixteen. [R529]. Dr. Snook noted that Plaintiff appeared depressed and anxious during
the examination. [R532]. Dr. Snook also noted that testing indicated that Plaintiff’s
intellectual abilities were within the Extremely Low range, with a Full Scale IQ score
of 60, but he found that Plaintiff’s verbal skills and adaptive functioning were
consistent with Borderline capabilities. [R532].
Following examination and testing, Dr. Snook diagnosed PTSD, major
depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate, and borderline intellectual functioning;
deferred diagnoses of cerebral palsy, acid reflux, seizures, and asthma to Plaintiff’s
physician; opined that unemployment, limited social interaction, and history of
childhood sexual abuse may affect the diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of Plaintiff’s
8
Psychometrist Debbie Geisel, MA, also contributed to Dr. Snook’s
evaluation. [R528-33].
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mental disorders; and assigned a GAF score of 55.9 [R532]. Dr. Snook also opined that
based on Plaintiff’s performance during the evaluation, she appeared capable of
understanding and remembering simple but not detailed instructions; that based on her
slowed processing speed as observed during the evaluation, she “may have difficulty
sustaining concentration, pace and persistence to permit the timely completion of
assigned tasks”; that based on her tendency to isolate and difficulties with anxiety,
Plaintiff “may have difficulty interacting with supervisors, coworkers, and the public”;
and that “[g]iven the chronicity[10] of her mental health concerns[,] she would likely
have trouble adapting to [the] stress of a work environment.” [R533].
On January 10, 2013, state-agency physician Spurgeon Cole reviewed the record
and issued an opinion of Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity. [R96-98].
Based on the record, Dr. Cole opined that Plaintiff could understand and remember
9
The Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) is a numeric scale
(0 through 100) that considers psychological, social, and occupational functioning on
a hypothetical continuum of mental health illness. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders 32-34 (4th ed., Text Revision, 2000). A GAF score between 51
and 60 indicates “[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech,
occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).” Id. at 34.
10
“Chronicity” refers to the state of being chronic. Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary, Chronic (10th ed. 1999).
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simple directions but would have difficulty understanding and remembering detailed
instructions; could carry out simple directions but would have difficulty carrying out
detailed directions reliably; and would have episodic difficulty maintaining pace and
attendance. [R98]. Dr. Cole also opined that Plaintiff should not have frequent or
prolonged contact with the public, co-workers, or supervisors; that new procedures
should be introduced slowly; and that Plaintiff could use assistance making realistic
plans for the future. [R98]. Dr. Cole further stated that none of the limitations were
substantially limiting. [R98].
The Commissioner assigned “great weight” to the opinions of Dr. Snook and
Dr. Cole, finding that they were “consistent with the medical evidence and the
testimony.” [R7-8, 19-20]. The Commissioner further explained that in crafting the
RFC, she had considered Plaintiff’s testimony that she was able to use public
transportation, socialize with others via her cell phone and text messaging, babysit for
young cousins, perform household chores, play billiards and basketball, use a computer,
read at a sixth-grade level, and follow the plot of detective shows on television;
Plaintiff’s “articulate and mentally sharp” demeanor at the hearing; high-school records
noting that Plaintiff was “capable of solving simple addition and subtraction problems
and some very basic multiplication problems without assistance”; and medical records
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showing that Plaintiff had “very little mental health care,” which the Commissioner
took to indicate that Plaintiff’s condition was not severely limiting. [R20-22].
Additionally, the Commissioner stated that the residual functional capacity accounted
for the limitations described by Dr. Snook and Dr. Cole. [R22].
Plaintiff contends that the AC erred in its consideration of Dr. Snook’s opinion.
[Doc. 11 at 5-14]. She first cites legal authority providing that the Commissioner must
consider the limiting effects of all of the claimant’s impairments—severe and
non-severe—together when determining the residual functional capacity. [Id. at 7].
She then argues that the when the Commissioner assigned great weight to Dr. Snook’s
opinion as a whole, yet limited the RFC merely to work in other than a fast-paced, highproduction work environment, the Commissioner selectively disregarded Dr. Snook’s
opinion that Plaintiff would likely have trouble adapting to the stress of a work
environment and thus abdicated her responsibility to consider the limiting effects of all
of Plaintiff’s impairments when determining the RFC. [Id. at 7-11]. Plaintiff further
contends that Dr. Cole’s opinion did not directly address whether Plaintiff could handle
the stress of a work environment and therefore did not contradict Dr. Snook’s stress
opinion, [id. at 11-12]; argues that even if the opinions were in conflict, the
Commissioner could not have credited Dr. Cole’s opinion over Dr. Snook’s opinion
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without explaining why he credited a reviewing opinion over an examining opinion, [id.
at 11-12]; asserts that the rest of the record indicates the severity of Plaintiff’s mentalhealth impairments but does not discuss limitations in a work environment, [id. at 1213]; and avers that trouble adapting to the stress of a work environment precludes all
work, not merely work other than fast-paced, high-production work, [id. at 9].
The Commissioner, in response, argues that the AC’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. [Doc. 12 at 6-14]. She contends that an individual’s ability to
adapt to the demands or “stress” of the workplace is an RFC determination delegated
to the ALJ/AC, to be made after review of the medical assessments, the medical reports,
the descriptions and observations of the claimant’s limitations by the claimant and
others, and all of the other relevant evidence of record. [Id. at 7-8 (citing Castle v.
Colvin,
557 Fed.
Appx.
849,
853-54
(11 th
Cir.
Feb.
18,
2014);
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(d)(2), 416.945(a)(3), 416.946(c); Social Security Ruling
(“SSR”) 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *5-6)]. She contends that the ALJ therefore
properly accounted for the stress opinion when he arrived at the RFC after expressly
considering Dr. Snook’s opinion; Dr. Cole’s opinion, which took into account
Dr. Snook’s evaluation as well as the other evidence in the record, [R91-92]; Plaintiff’s
testimony that she was able to engage in a wide range of activities, including
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performing household chores, babysitting, watching television, playing billiards and
basketball, using a computer, and sending text messages, [R22, 43-49]; and Plaintiff’s
“articulate and mentally sharp” demeanor during the hearing, [R22]. [Doc. 12 at 8-11].
The Commissioner also argues that this Court and others have found that a claimant’s
difficulty in coping with stress was adequately accounted for by limiting the RFC to
unskilled work, with limited contact with the public and co-workers and only
occasional changes in the work setting, in other than a fast-paced, high-production work
environment. [Id. at 11-12 (citing Sullivan v. Colvin, 519 Fed. Appx. 985, 989
(10th
Cir.
Mar.
13,
2013);
Holguin
v.
Comm’r
of
Soc.
Sec.,
Case
No. 1:15-cv-00753-SAB, 2016 WL 2654326, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2016); Owens
v. Colvin, Civ. Action File No. 1:13-cv-01931-AJB, 2015 WL 5311078, at *10-13
(N.D.
Ga.
Sept.
11,
2015)
(Baverman,
M.J.);
Lafond
v.
Astrue,
No. 6:12-cv-6046(MAT), 2013 WL 775369, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013))].
Finally, the Commissioner contends that the opinions of Dr. Snook and Dr. Cole are not
in conflict and that the ALJ did not err in assigning them both “great weight,” as both
opinions stated that Plaintiff was capable of understanding and remembering simple but
not detailed instructions, [R98, 533], that Plaintiff had limitations in the ability to
perform activities within a schedule, [R97, 533], and that Plaintiff had social
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limitations, [R97-98, 533]: in essence, that Plaintiff was capable of mental functioning,
albeit with limitations. [Doc. 12 at 12-13].
Plaintiff’s arguments supply the Court precious little with which to work. She
did not file a reply brief and therefore made no attempt to counter the Commissioner’s
arguments or distinguish the authority cited by the Commissioner. (See Dkt.).
The few legal principles Plaintiff relies upon in her opening brief also provide
scant support for her case. It is uncontroversial that the Commissioner must consider
each impairment that a claimant has and consider the impairments in combination in
evaluating the claimant’s disability. See, e.g., Vangile v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
695 Fed. Appx. 510, 513-14 (11th Cir. July 13, 2017); Jones v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991); Walker v. Bowen,
826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987). “This duty applies even when the impairments
considered separately are not severe.”
Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
680 Fed. Appx. 822, 827 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 2017) (citing Hudson v. Heckler,
755 F.2d 781, 785 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985)). “[W]here a ‘claimant has alleged a multitude
of impairments, a claim . . . may lie even though none of the impairments, considered
individually, is disabling.’ ” Hudson, id. (quoting Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635
(11th Cir. 1984)). Examination of the Commissioner’s decision reveals, however, that
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the ALJ did expressly acknowledge Dr. Snook’s finding that Plaintiff “would have
difficulty dealing with stress in the workplace.” [R20].
Plaintiff’s argument additionally disregards the Commissioner’s rules for
evaluating allegations and opinions of stress. The Commissioner defines stress as
“[t]he reaction to the demands of work.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 at *6. The
Commissioner also acknowledges that because “mental illness is defined and
characterized by maladaptive behavior, it is not unusual that the mentally impaired have
difficulty accommodating the demands of work and work-like settings,” and that
“[d]etermining whether these individuals will be able to adapt to the demands or
‘stress’ of the workplace is often extremely difficult.” Id. at *5. Administrative
adjudicators are therefore directed to thoroughly evaluate the individual claimant’s
ability to adapt to the demands of such stress, considering such things as whether the
characteristics of the claimant’s particular mental illness may affect her ability to meet
the demands of work. Id. at *6. “Any impairment-related limitations created by an
individual’s response to the demands of work . . . must be reflected in the RFC
assessment.” Id. In other words, the adjudicator is tasked with assessing vocational
limitations caused by the claimant’s particularized ability to tolerate stress. See
Lancellotta v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 806 F.2d 284, 285 (1st Cir. 1986)
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(explaining that it is the Commissioner’s role to make “findings on the nature of the
claimant’s stress, the circumstances that trigger it, or how those factors affect his ability
to work”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.946(c) (providing that when a case is pending at the
Appeals Council, the final responsibility for assessing a claimant’s RFC rests with the
administrative appeals judge at the Appeals Council); see also Lewen v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 605 Fed. Appx. 967, 968-69 (11th Cir. June 4, 2015) (finding that the ALJ
sufficiently accommodated limitations in the claimant’s ability to deal with stress or
maintain a regular schedule where the ALJ limited her to simple tasks and unskilled
work with little interaction with the public and supervisors; there was no indication that
the RFC limitations did not fully accommodate the doctors’ opinions that the plaintiff
might have difficulty dealing with stress, concentrating, or maintaining a schedule; and
there was no indication the doctors, by opining that the claimant might have difficulty
dealing with stress, concentrating, or maintaining a schedule, meant that the limitations
would limit the claimant’s ability to work a full work day/week); Owens,
2015 WL 5311078 at *13 (finding that the ALJ had adequately accounted for the
claimant’s inability to cope with stress by incorporating a limitation into the RFC that
the claimant could not perform fast-paced production work and limiting his contact
with the public).
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The “residual functional capacity is the most [a claimant] can still do” despite the
physical
and
mental
limitations
resulting
from
her
impairments.
20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1); accord Kent v. Acting Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin.,
651 Fed. Appx. 964, 966 n.2 (11th Cir. June 7, 2016); Sanchez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
507 Fed. Appx. 855, 858 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2013). The administrative adjudicator is
required to consider all of the relevant evidence, including medical assessments,
medical reports, and descriptions and observations of a claimant’s limitations by the
claimant and others. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).
Viewing the administrative decision against this legal framework, the Court is
not persuaded that the Commissioner ignored or misinterpreted Dr. Snook’s opinion of
Plaintiff’s ability to tolerate stress. After expressly recognizing that Dr. Snook found,
among other things, that Plaintiff would have difficulty dealing with stress in the
workplace, the Commissioner stated that she generally assigned “great”—though not
controlling—weight to Dr. Snook’s opinion. [R20]. The Commissioner then went on
to consider Dr. Cole’s mental RFC assessment, which took into account Dr. Snook’s
evaluation as well as the other evidence in the record, [R91-98]; Plaintiff’s testimony
that she was able to use public transportation, socialize with others via her cell phone
and text messaging, babysit for young cousins, perform household chores, watch and
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follow the plot of detective dramas on television, play billiards and basketball, use a
computer, send text messages, and read at a sixth-grade level; school records indicating
that Plaintiff is capable of solving simple addition and subtraction problems and some
very basic multiplication problems without assistance; Plaintiff’s “articulate and
mentally sharp” demeanor during the hearing; and Plaintiff’s receipt of very little
mental care, which the Commissioner found to indicate that Plaintiff’s condition was
not severely limiting. [R20, 22]. Taking all of this evidence into account, the
Commissioner then went on to fashion the RFC to accommodate adverse circumstances
identified by Dr. Snook as likely to cause Plaintiff to have difficulty meeting the
requirements of work: specifically, the ALJ accommodated Plaintiff’s comprehension
problems; the concentration, persistence, and pace issues caused by Plaintiff’s slow
processing speed; and Plaintiff’s social limitations, [R533], by limiting Plaintiff to
simple, routine, repetitive-type tasks, with only occasional changes in the work setting,
only occasional interaction with the public and co-workers, and no fast-paced
production work, [R21].
Plaintiff does not point to any other sources of stress the mental RFC failed to
accommodate, nor does she raise any argument that the record was underdeveloped or
that it was improper for the Commissioner to rely on any of the evidence cited in the
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administrative decision in reaching the RFC. [See generally Doc. 11].
Plaintiff
therefore supplies the Court with no basis for finding that the Commissioner failed to
apply the proper legal standards, support her findings of fact with substantial evidence,
or resolve crucial issues. See Washington, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (setting forth the
limited scope of judicial review). Accordingly, the undersigned finds no basis for
reversal in Plaintiff’s arguments. See Outlaw v. Barnhart, 197 Fed. Appx. 825, 827 n.3
(11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2006) (per curiam) (holding that a claim was waived where its
proponent did not supply an argument or provide a citation to authority about the
claim); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 Fed. Appx. 767, 770 (11th Cir. May 12, 2006)
(holding that only the arguments asserted before the district court were preserved for
appeal) (citing Jones, 190 F.3d at 1228).
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the
Commissioner.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final judgment in the
Commissioner’s favor.
IT IS SO ORDERED and DIRECTED, this the 15th day of March, 2018.
AO 72A
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