Goodman v. The Housing Authority of DeKalb County et al
Filing
89
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff's 72 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART Defendants' 73 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, as well as her claim under the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff's fourth claim for discrimination on the basis of disability. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 8/17/18. (jkl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ANGELA GOODMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:17-CV-504-TWT
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF
DEKALB COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action under the Fair Housing Act. It is before the Court on the
Plaintiff Angela Goodman’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 72]
and the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 73]. For the following
reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 72] is
GRANTED, and the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 73] is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Background
The Plaintiff, Angela Goodman, is a Georgia resident who participates in
the Defendant Housing Authority of DeKalb County’s Section 8 Voucher
Program. She has been a participant of the program for over fifteen years, and
until January 19, 2017, resided in a five-bedroom house in Lithonia, Georgia
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with her eight children.1 This case stems from the Housing Authority’s efforts
to terminate Ms. Goodman from the Section 8 program in the fall of 2016.
From the time Ms. Goodman moved into the house in 2012, she
experienced many problems at the Property, including sliding doors that did not
lock, an oven that did not work, and a refrigerator that failed to keep food cold.2
Ms. Goodman complained to her landlord repeatedly about the various problems
at the Property, but the landlord often failed to make repairs timely or
correctly.3 In one particular example, the landlord defectively installed new
kitchen cabinets such that one drawer would consistently knock into another
when it was opened, causing the open drawer to be knocked off its tracks.4 When
Ms. Goodman complained about the drawer, the landlord never properly fixed
it.5
On September 2, 2016, an inspector from the Housing Authority’s
inspection contractor conducted an annual inspection of Ms. Goodman’s home,
and issued a report the following day.6 The inspector listed eighteen repairs in
1
Pl.’s Statement of Mat. Facts ¶ 2; Def.’s SMF ¶ 4.
2
Pl.’s SMF ¶ 10.
3
Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
4
Id. at ¶ 14.
5
Id. at ¶ 15.
6
Id. at ¶ 30.
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total, including eight repairs designated as “tenant charges.”7 A “tenant charge”
means those repairs the inspector believes to be the tenant’s responsibility. The
tenant charges included: an outlet cover that was missing, two smoke detectors
that needed new batteries, private locks on two of the bedrooms, a door that was
off its hinges, a front storm door that was missing a handle and had cracked
glass, and the broken kitchen drawer mentioned above.8 Three of these tenant
charges were designated as “24-hour emergency repairs,” meaning those repairs
that created an imminent hazard and needed to be repaired immediately. These
included the missing outlet cover, and the two non-operational smoke detectors.9
The report explained that the Housing Authority would abate its portion of the
rent if the repairs were not completed in a timely manner, but did not contain
any notes or indications as to why any of these items were listed as tenant
charges.10 The report also included a telephone number to call in case Ms.
Goodman had “questions regarding the letter or the inspection results . . . .”11
7
Id. at ¶ 31.
8
Id.
Id. at ¶ 34. There were technically four separate line items listed
as 24-hour Emergency Repairs on the September 3rd report. See Sept. 3, 2016
Report, at 2 [Doc. 5-14]. However, as the inspector explained in his deposition,
one of these line items – “there is not a smoke detector installed on each floor of
the unit” – shows up any time there is any problem with a smoke detector,
regardless of whether that specific line item is relevant to that particular
inspection. Greenberg Dep. 45:17 - 46:25 [Doc. 85-4].
9
10
Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 32, 35.
11
September 3, 2016 Inspection Report, at 1.
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On September 6, 2016, the inspector returned for a re-inspection of the
emergency repairs, but no one was home; he then issued the report the following
day.12 On September 13, 2016, the Housing Authority issued a proposed
termination to Ms. Goodman, listing two violations: (1) missing the reinspection, and (2) damage beyond normal wear and tear.13 On September 19,
2016, Ms. Goodman requested an informal hearing on the proposed termination,
explaining that she missed the inspection because of her son’s medical condition,
and noted that she had completed the repairs she was responsible for breaking
or altering, namely the broken outlet cover and the private locks on the
bedrooms.14
On September 30, 2016, the inspector conducted a re-inspection of the
Property, and issued a report on October 3, 2016.15 This new report noted that
four items previously listed as tenant charges still were not repaired, including
the broken kitchen cabinet, the missing handle and broken glass on the storm
door, and a smoke detector that still needed a new battery.16 Ms. Goodman
replaced the batteries in both smoke detectors in front of the inspector, but one
12
Pl.’s SMF ¶ 36.
13
Id. at ¶ 37.
14
Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.
15
Id. at ¶ 40.
16
Id. at ¶ 41.
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still did not work.17 Four items that had been previously listed as landlord
charges also remained unrepaired, including an inoperable stove and leaking
refrigerator.18
On November 3, 2016, the Housing Authority held an informal hearing
on the proposed termination of Ms. Goodman’s Section 8 voucher.19 No
inspectors from the Housing Authority’s inspection contractor were present at
the hearing, nor was Ms. Goodman’s landlord or property manager.20 The
Housing Authority’s sole witness was Kentrye Cornelious, the Housing Choice
Voucher Compliance Officer, who had no firsthand knowledge of the Property.21
The only witness at the hearing who did have such knowledge was Ms.
Goodman.22 At the hearing, she testified that the front door glass had always
been cracked since she moved in, and that she did not break it.23 The Housing
Authority’s only evidence to the contrary was the three inspection reports.24
17
Id. at ¶ 44.
18
Id. at ¶ 42.
19
Id. at ¶ 51.
20
Id. at ¶¶ 58-60.
21
Id. at ¶¶ 53, 57.
22
Id. at ¶ 61.
23
Id. at ¶¶ 64-65.
24
Id. at ¶ 55.
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On November 17, 2016, the Hearing Officer issued a decision upholding
Ms. Goodman’s proposed termination from the Section 8 program, relying solely
on the three inspection reports from September 3, September 7, and October 3,
2016.25 The decision stated that she was terminated because “[t]he items that
initially failed continued to be in failed status due to Ms. Goodman’s failure to
repair the items. Ms. Goodman failed to provide true and accurate information
regarding the repairs, thus causing a third inspection to be performed to no
avail.”26 After the hearing, however, the Property did pass inspection on
November 23, 2016.27
Despite this, on December 1, 2016, the Housing Authority notified Ms.
Goodman that her housing assistance was being terminated, and that the last
payment to her landlord would be January 1, 2017.28 The Housing Authority
also terminated its contract with Ms. Goodman’s landlord for the landlord’s
failure to repair the many defects that had been noted in the inspection
reports.29
After the new year, Ms. Goodman’s landlord filed an eviction case against
her for failure to pay rent, and in order to avoid an eviction on her record, Ms.
25
Id. at ¶ 70.
26
Housing Authority Decision, at 6 [Doc. 5-23].
27
Def.’s SMF ¶ 45.
28
Pl.’s SMF ¶ 72.
29
Id. at ¶ 79.
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Goodman agreed that she would move out by January 19, 2017.30 She filed this
action in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, which the Housing Authority
removed to this Court. Upon removal, Ms. Goodman moved for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, which the Court granted on
February 23, 2017, after conducting a hearing. The Court’s Order directed the
Housing Authority to immediately reinstate Ms. Goodman’s Section 8 voucher
and to provide her with all other benefits to which she is entitled under the
program until the case could be fully adjudicated.31
In her Complaint, Ms. Goodman alleges numerous claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the Housing Authority and its Executive Director in his official
capacity, including for violations of her due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, violations of the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f, and its implementing regulations, violations of the Housing Authority’s
Administrative Plan, and violations of her right to a reasonable accommodation
for her son’s disability under 29 U.S.C. § 794, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131. She also alleges violations of the Due Process Clause of the Georgia
Constitution. She seeks declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory remedies, in
addition to attorney’s fees. Ms. Goodman now moves for partial summary
judgment on all of her claims but her discrimination claim. Separately, the
30
Id. at ¶ 82.
31
February 22, 2017 Order on Pl.’s Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj.
[Doc. 6].
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Housing Authority moves for summary judgment on all of Ms. Goodman’s
claims.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions,
and affidavits submitted by the parties show no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.32 The
court should view the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant.33 The party seeking summary judgment
must first identify grounds to show the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.34 The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the
pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
material fact does exist.35 “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing
party’s position will not suffice; there must be a sufficient showing that the jury
could reasonably find for that party.”
III. Discussion
A.
Violations of the Due Process Clause and the Housing Act of 1937
In four of her five complaints, Ms. Goodman alleges that the Defendants
violated her procedural due process rights guaranteed under the United States
32
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
33
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
34
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
35
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
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and Georgia Constitutions, as well as the federal Housing Act of 1937 and its
implementing regulations for terminating her without good cause. Georgia
courts seem to suggest that the Georgia Constitution implies its own causes of
action.36 42 U.S.C. § 1983, meanwhile, guarantees a private right of action
against any state actor who abridges “any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the [federal] Constitution and laws . . . .”37 “Private individuals may
bring lawsuits to enforce not only constitutional rights but also rights created
by federal statutes” and regulations.38 Although violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment have been consistently recognized as a viable basis for Section 1983
actions, Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence involving Section 1983 and the Housing
Act of 1937 has been more of a mixed bag.39
In Basco, described in more detail below, the Eleventh Circuit found in
favor of plaintiffs “alleging deprivations of their right to procedural due process
36
See, e.g., Atlanta City School Dist. v. Dowling, 266 Ga. 217, 218
(1996) (discussing procedural due process guarantees of United States and
Georgia Constitutions together, but only discussing applicability of Section 1983,
which does not apply to the Georgia Constitution).
37
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)).
38
39
See, e.g., Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 2008)
(finding in favor of participants “alleging deprivations of their right to
procedural due process under 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) and (6), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.”). But see Lane v. Fort Walton Beach Housing Authority, 518 Fed. Appx.
904, 914 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that at least some aspects of the Housing Act
of 1937 do not provide a federal right enforceable via Section 1983).
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under 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) and (6), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”40 However, when
the court did so, it did not specify whether it was finding in their favor on
constitutional grounds, statutory grounds, or both. A few years later, the
Eleventh Circuit said in an unpublished opinion that the Housing Act of 1937
and its implementing regulations do not establish rights enforceable under
Section 1983, and it evaluated Basco solely as a constitutional case.41 Other
courts have done the same.42 Given these subsequent opinions, the Defendants
are entitled to have the Plaintiff’s claims which rest solely on the Housing Act
and its implementing regulations dismissed.
When it comes to her constitutional due process claims, however, Ms.
Goodman rests on much more solid ground. The central requirements of the Due
Process Clause are notice “and opportunity for a hearing at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.”43 The implementing regulations of the Housing
Act of 1937 satisfy this requirement by providing Section 8 participants the
opportunity to challenge termination of their vouchers in an informal hearing.44
40
Basco, 514 F.3d at 1180.
41
Lane, 518 Fed. Appx. at 910-15.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Fort Walton Beach Hous. Auth., No.
3:11CV506-MCR/EMT, 2012 WL 10688344, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2012)
(granting preliminary injunction in housing case and evaluating Basco as a
constitutional due process case).
42
43
Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir.
44
See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555.
2011).
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Ms. Goodman does not challenge the constitutional sufficiency of these
procedures. Rather, she argues that the Housing Authority did not satisfy these
requirements in practice by impermissibly relying on hearsay evidence, by
failing to provide her with the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, by
improperly shifting the burden of persuasion onto her, and by basing its decision
on insufficient evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar situation in the Basco case
mentioned above. In that case, the plaintiffs’ Section 8 voucher was terminated
based on the presence of an unauthorized resident in their home.45 The plaintiffs
challenged the termination at an informal hearing, but the housing authority
upheld the termination based solely on two police reports from earlier incidents
that occurred at the plaintiffs’ property.46 The first report stated that one of the
plaintiffs “gave a sworn statement to the police indicating that his stepdaughter
had run way with a man named ‘Emanuel Jones,’ ‘who’s staying at the house.’”47
That statement, however, was not contained in or attached to the report.48 The
second police report listed the alleged unauthorized guest as an eyewitness to
a crime, and listed the plaintiffs’ home as his address.49 In addition to these two
45
Basco, 514 F.3d at 1179.
46
Id. at 1180.
47
Id. at 1179.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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police reports, the hearing officer also stated that he upheld the decision on
account of the plaintiffs’ inability to prove that the guest did not actually live at
the home, as the housing authority’s administrative plan established that “the
burden of proof that the individual is a visitor rests on the family.”50
The plaintiffs eventually challenged the decision in court, alleging
violations of procedural due process under 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 and the Due
Process Clause. The plaintiffs argued that the hearing officer relied on
impermissible hearsay evidence, unlawfully shifted the burden onto them, and
relied on insufficient evidence. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court’s grant of summary judgment after avoiding the hearsay question,
but finding in favor of the plaintiffs on their other two arguments.51 The court
held that, when seeking to terminate a Section 8 voucher, due process requires
that housing authorities bear “the burden of persuasion and must initially
present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case” that the termination
is justified.52 The court ultimately found that, assuming the police reports were
admissible, they were sufficient to establish that there was a guest in the home,
but they said nothing about how long he had been there. Thus, the court found
that the termination of the plaintiffs’ Section 8 voucher was improper.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1183-84.
52
Id. at 1182.
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Like the Basco court, there is no need to address Ms. Goodman’s hearsay
arguments in this case, because the Housing Authority’s case falls apart under
its own weight. Even assuming arguendo that the inspection report were
properly admitted, they do not carry the Housing Authority’s burden of
persuasion.
24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i) states that the Housing Authority is justified
in terminating assistance at any time “[i]f the family violates any family
obligations under the program,” as described in Section 982.551, which includes
among other things, the family’s duty to maintain certain Housing Quality
Standards. The Housing Quality Standards, contained in Section 982.401 et
seq., set certain minimum standards that dwelling units must meet in order to
participate in the Section 8 program. Included among these standards is the
requirement that “each dwelling unit must have at least one battery-operated
or hard-wired smoke detector, in proper operating condition, on each level of the
dwelling unit . . . .”53 Responsibilities for maintaining HQS are divided between
owners and families. Owners are generally responsible for “maintain[ing] the
unit in accordance with HQS,” while families are responsible for, among other
things, any breach of the HQS that is “caused by . . . any member of the
household or guest damag[ing] the dwelling unit or premises (damages beyond
53
24 C.F.R. § 982.401(n)(1).
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normal wear and tear).”54 If a breach of the HQS “caused by the family is life
threatening, the family must correct the defect within no more than 24 hours.”55
In this case, the Housing Authority terminated Ms. Goodman’s Section
8 voucher for HQS violations for damage beyond normal wear and tear. The
alleged damages “caused by” Ms. Goodman and her family were the four
outstanding “tenant charge” items noted in the October 2016 inspection report,
namely: a broken kitchen cabinet, a missing handle and broken glass on the
storm door, and the “24-hour emergency repair” of a smoke detector that still
needed a new battery.56
Assuming that these are violations of HQS – the non-operable smoke
detector most likely is, though the others are questionable – there is absolutely
no evidence in the record that any of these items were caused by Ms. Goodman.
Indeed, the Hearing Officer never even addressed this question in her decision,
stating during her deposition that “[i]t was never any question of whether she
damaged it . . . It was an outstanding item. I didn’t look at how it was damaged
or if she damaged it. It was an outstanding tenant item.”57 Nor did she even ask
whether the items listed as “tenant charges” were actually the tenant’s
responsibility, as she testified “I cannot answer why [a “tenant charge”] is a
54
Id. at § 982.404(b)(1) (emphasis added).
55
Id. (emphasis added).
56
Pl.’s SMF ¶ 41.
57
Hill Dep. 64:2-4, 16-19.
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tenant responsibility. I’ll just adhere to the items that are listed under tenant
responsibility. That’s an HQS question.”58
The problem with these statements is that the entire basis of the Housing
Authority’s authorization to terminate a Section 8 voucher on “damage beyond
wear and tear” grounds depends specifically on whether the tenant caused the
damage.59 Without a determination that Ms. Goodman or her family caused the
smoke detector to not work, or the drawer to be broken, the Housing Authority
cannot say it had authority to terminate her from the program on these grounds.
Had the Hearing Officer even bothered to address this question, she
would have seen that the evidence on the record suggests just the opposite. Ms.
Goodman testified that the storm door had always been broken since she moved
in,60 and that the kitchen drawer was broken as a result of installation defects
on the part of the owner.61 Furthermore, Ms. Goodman replaced the battery in
the remaining inoperable smoke detector in front of the inspector, and it still did
not work.62 The only witness who could have plausibly offered evidence to the
contrary was Kentrye Cornelious, the Housing Choice Voucher Compliance
58
Id. at 57:11-14.
59
24 C.F.R. § 982.404(b)(1) (stating that the family is responsible for
a breach of the HQS “caused by” a member of the household damaging the
premises).
60
Id. at ¶¶ 64-65.
61
Id. at ¶ 14.
62
Id. at ¶ 44.
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Officer, who had no firsthand knowledge of the Property. And the inspection
reports which listed these items as “tenant’s charges” never articulating why
they were Ms. Goodman’s responsibility.
The Court, therefore, finds that the Housing Authority erred in
terminating Ms. Goodman’s Section 8 housing voucher by relying on evidence
that was “legally insufficient to establish a prima facie case” that Ms. Goodman
caused the damage to the Property.63 Consequently, Ms. Goodman is entitled to
summary judgment on her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, as well
as her claim under the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution.64
However, because the Housing Authority has testified numerous times that it
based its decision solely on the damage to the Property, and not on the missed
inspection, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s
fourth claim for discrimination on the basis of disability.65
63
Basco, 514 F.3d at 1183.
See Cherokee Cty. v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n, Inc., 255
Ga. App. 764, 767 n.1 (2002) (stating that “[t]he due process guarantees” under
the United States and Georgia Constitutions “are substantively identical.”).
64
65
The Housing Authority initially stated that it terminated Ms.
Goodman for (1) missing her re-inspection, and (2) for damage beyond normal
wear and tear. The Hearing Officer, however, upheld this decision solely on the
grounds that Ms. Goodman had an opportunity to fix the items mentioned in the
inspection reports, but failed to do so, without citing any particular regulation.
The Housing Authority has repeatedly asserted that it based its final decision
solely on the repair allegation; it excused the missed inspection because Ms.
Goodman’s son was hospitalized. See Hill Dep. 26:8-18; Cornelious Dep. 51:1524.
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [Doc. 72] is GRANTED and the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 73] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
SO ORDERED, this 17 day of August, 2018.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge
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