Jason v. Onuoha et al

Filing 13

OPINION AND ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 10/23/17. (jkl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DANIEL CHIGBU JASON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:17-CV-1982-TWT

EMEKA ONUOHA, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER

This is a defamation action. It is before the Court on the Defendants Emeka
Onuoha and Henry Emezie’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10] for lack of personal
jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10]
is GRANTED.
I. Background
This case originates out of the allegedly defamatory statements the Defendants
made about the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff, Daniel Chigbu Jason, is an attorney in
Georgia.1 The Defendant Emeka Onuoha is a resident of Texas, and the Defendant

1

Compl. ¶ 1.

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Henry Emezie is a resident of North Carolina.2 Jason, Onuoha, and Emezie are all
immigrants from the town of Nkwerre in Nigeria and are members of a group called
the Nkwerre Aborigines Union.3 Members of the NAU reside all over the world and
maintain a group messaging thread on the messaging app “WhatsApp” in order to
keep in touch.4 Jason, Onuoha, and Emezie are also members of the NAU’s American
chapter, the NAU-USA.5 The members of the NAU-USA also share several group
social media forums on the internet site Yahoo! that are separate from those
maintained by the NAU.6
On April 16, 2017, the Defendants wrote and published a statement in which
they accused the Plaintiff of, among other things, misappropriating the funds of the
NAU-USA while he was one of its officers.7 The Defendants allegedly published this
statement on various websites and social media platforms, including the Yahoo!
forums and the WhatsApp group chat.8 The Plaintiff denies the actions alleged in the
2

Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.

3

Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.

4

Id. at ¶ 10.

5

Id. at ¶ 12.

6

Id. at ¶ 13.

7

Id. at ¶ 15.

8

Id. at ¶ 16.

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statements, and alleges that he has been severely harmed by their publication. The
Plaintiff asserts only one substantive claim against the Defendants for defamation.9
The Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
II. Legal Standard
“In the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in which
no evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of jurisdiction over the movant, nonresident defendant.”10 The plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case by presenting “enough evidence to withstand a motion
for directed verdict.”11 A party presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for
directed verdict by putting forth “substantial evidence . . . of such quality and weight
that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might
reach different conclusions . . .”12 The facts presented in the plaintiff’s complaint are
taken as true to the extent they are uncontroverted.13 If, however, the defendant
submits affidavits challenging the allegations in the complaint, the burden shifts back

9

Id. at ¶¶ 23-28.

10

Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988).

11

Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990).

12

Walker v. NationsBank of Florida, 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir. 1995).

13

Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1207 n.10 (N.D. Ga.

1995).
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to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.14 If the plaintiff's
complaint and supporting evidence conflict with the defendant's affidavits, the court
must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.15
III. Discussion
The Defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal
jurisdiction. “A federal court sitting in diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry in
determining whether personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction must (1)
be appropriate under the state long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”16
The Georgia long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part:
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
nonresident or his or her executor or administrator, as to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or
possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he
or she were a resident of the state, if in person or through an agent, he or
she: (1) Transacts any business within the state; (2) Commits a tortious
act or omission within this state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; (3) Commits a tortious
injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state if the
14

Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Intern., Inc., 593 F.3d
1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010); Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269
(11th Cir. 2002).
15

Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514.

16

Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1257–58 (quoting United Techs. Corp. v.
Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)).
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tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered in this state....17
Both parties incorrectly argue that Georgia caselaw allows courts to simply bypass
statutory analysis and proceed directly to analysis under the Due Process Clause. As
the Eleventh Circuit has correctly pointed out, Georgia’s long-arm statute actually
“imposes independent obligations that a plaintiff must establish for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction that are distinct from the demands of procedural due process.”18
Thus, a defendant must have not only the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due
process, but must also fall under one of the specific provisions of the long-arm statute
in order for this Court to have jurisdiction.19
The Plaintiff alleges the Defendants are subject to this Court’s personal
jurisdiction only under subsection (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9–10–91.20 Under this provision,
courts have jurisdiction over a defendant if he (1) commits a tortious injury in

17

O.C.G.A. § 9–10–91.

18

Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1259.

19

Id. at 1260 (“It is beyond cavil that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
in Georgia requires a court to find that at least one prong of the long-arm statute is
satisfied.”).
20

Compl. ¶ 7b (the Plaintiff’s Complaint contains a typo, as there are two
paragraphs labeled “7.” To avoid confusion, the Court has labeled the second of these
¶ 7b).
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Georgia, and (2) “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered in this state...”21 The Plaintiff has completely failed to allege that the
Defendants satisfy the second prong. The only acts the Defendants are accused of
committing are the allegedly defamatory posts that occurred on one occasion.22
Though the posts were accessible by residents of Georgia, they cannot be said to
demonstrate a “persistent course of conduct” in this state.
Thus, the Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing that this Court has
jurisdiction because the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that the Defendants
have sufficient ties to Georgia under subsection (3) of Georgia’s long-arm statute.
This Court, therefore, does not have personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, and the
Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10] is
GRANTED.

21

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3).

22

Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.

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SO ORDERED, this 23 day of October, 2017.

/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge

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