PSB Property Management, LLC v. Woodson
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER adopting Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller's Final Report and Recommendation 2 and remanding this action to the Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 10/2/17. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
PSB PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:17-cv-3207-WSD
TELISA WOODSON, and All Other
Occupants,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller’s Final
Report and Recommendation [2] (“R&R”), which recommends remanding this
dispossessory action to the Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia.
I.
BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2017, Plaintiff PSB Property Management, LLC (“Plaintiff”)
initiated a dispossessory proceeding against Telisa Woodson (“Defendant”) in the
Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia.1 The Complaint seeks possession of
premises currently occupied by Defendant and seeks past due rent, fees and costs.
On August 24, 2017, Defendant, proceeding pro se, removed the Clayton
County Action to this Court by filing her Notice of Removal and an application to
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No. 2017CM19101.
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). In her Notice of Removal,
Defendant does not assert a basis for this Court to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over this action. (Notice of Removal [3]).
On August 28, 2017, Magistrate Judge Fuller granted Defendant’s IFP
Application. ([2]). The Magistrate Judge then considered, sua sponte, whether
there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over the action removed. The Magistrate
Judge found that federal subject matter jurisdiction was not present and
recommended that the Court remand the case to the Magistrate Court of Clayton
County. The Magistrate Judge found that the Complaint filed in Magistrate Court
asserts a state court dispossessory action and does not allege federal law claims.
The Magistrate Judge also considered whether the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The Magistrate Judge found that
Defendant failed to allege any facts to show that the parties’ citizenship is
completely diverse, or that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The
Magistrate Judge concluded that the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over
this matter and that this case is required to be remanded to the state court.
There are no objections to the R&R.
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II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject or modify a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams
v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1112
(1983). A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and
recommendations to which objections have not been asserted, the Court must
conduct a plain error review of the record. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093,
1095 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984).
B.
Analysis
Defendant does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not present a federal question and that the amount in controversy
does not exceed $75,000. The Court does not find any plain error in these
conclusions. It is well-settled that federal-question jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint and
that the assertions of defenses or counterclaims based on federal law cannot confer
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federal question jurisdiction over a cause of action. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank
v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002). The record also does not show that
Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of different states, or that the amount in
controversy exceeds the statutory threshold of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a);
Carter v. Butts Cty., Ga., et al., 821 F.3d 1310, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Steed v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 843, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009))
(“[U]nder Georgia law, ‘[w]here former owners of real property remain in
possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at sufferance,’” and are
thus subject to a dispossessory proceeding under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50, which
“provide[s] the exclusive method by which a landlord may evict the tenant”); Fed.
Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Williams, Nos. 1:07-cv-2864-RWS, 1:07-cv-2865RWS, 2008 WL 115096, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2008) (“[A] dispossessory
proceeding under Georgia law is not an ownership dispute, but rather only a
dispute over the limited right to possession, title to property is not at issue and,
accordingly, the removing Defendant may not rely on the value of the property as a
whole to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.”).
Because the Court lacks both federal question and diversity jurisdiction, this
action is required to be remanded to the Magistrate Court of Clayton County. See
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28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller’s Final
Report and Recommendation [2] is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the
Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia.
SO ORDERED this 2nd day of October, 2017.
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