Crawford et al v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al

Filing 5

OPINION AND ORDER dismissing this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 10/2/17. (ddm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DONOVAN EARL CRAWFORD
and CLAUDINE ELENA
CRAWFORD,
Plaintiffs,
v.

1:17-cv-3830-WSD

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the required frivolity review of Plaintiffs
Donovan Earl Crawford and Claudine Elena Crawford’s (“Plaintiffs”) “Complaint
of Irrepairable [sic] Damage Planned by Defendants” [3] and “Notice and
Application for Emergency Preliminary Injunction” [4], which the Court construes
liberally and together as Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
I.

BACKGROUND
On October 26, 2015, Plaintiffs filed in the Superior Court of Fulton County,

Georgia, a petition seeking to enjoin Defendants from foreclosing on their home.
([4] at 3).

On October 6, 2016, the Fulton County Superior Court dismissed Plaintiffs’
petition. (Id.). Plaintiffs appealed.
On September 8, 2017, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Fulton
County Superior Court order dismissing Plaintiffs’ petition. (Id. at 4).
On September 18, 2017, Plaintiffs moved, in the Georgia Court of Appeals,
for reconsideration of its September 8th order. (Id.).
On September 29, 2017, Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed in this Court an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and their Complaint. In it,
Plaintiffs summarize the proceedings in state court and seek to enjoin Defendants
from foreclosing on their home “on the grounds that an injunction is needed until
the application for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals in the State of Georgia
is determined.” (Id. at 2).
On September 29, 2017, Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker granted
Plaintiffs’ IFP Application and directed the Clerk of Court to submit this action to
the Court for review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. ([2]).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard

A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if at any time the
court determines the action is frivolous or malicious or that it fails to state a claim

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on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). “Failure to state
a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc.,
366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Review for frivolousness, on the other hand, “‘accords judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” See
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A claim is frivolous when it “has little or
no chance of success,” that is, when it appears “from the face of the complaint that
the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are

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‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with the threshold
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth
Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). “Even though a pro se
complaint should be construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must state a claim
upon which the Court can grant relief.” Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F. Supp. 2d 26,
28 (D.D.C. 2007). “[A] district court does not have license to rewrite a deficient
pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiffs’ Complaint is rambling and convoluted, and the Court is unable to
discern a viable cause of action. Plaintiffs assert that, because the Georgia Court
of Appeals’ September 8th Order “overlooks Plaintiffs’ factual representations”
and “misconstrues the applicable statutes, Plaintiffs respectfully requests [sic] that
this Court grants an injunction (pending the outcome of the hearing to prevent

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damage to the Plaintiffs).” ([4] at 25). That Plaintiffs believe they will succeed on
the merits of their motion for reconsideration does not support that they are entitled
to enjoin foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs’ Complaint essentially challenges the
Georgia Court of Appeals’ September 8th Order, and the Court lacks jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to grant Plaintiffs the relief they seek. See
Doe v. Fla Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2001) (Federal district courts
“generally lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision.”) (citing D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) & Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief
can be granted, and this action is required to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2).1
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

1

The Court notes further that Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not allege any basis
for the Court’s jurisdiction and it fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (complaint must include “a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”). Dismissal is
warranted for this additional reason.
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SO ORDERED this 2nd day of October, 2017.

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