Element Management v. Thornton

Filing 7

OPINION AND ORDER adopting Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller's Final Report and Recommendation 3 , overruling Defendant's Objections and Responses to Report and Recommendation Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) 5 and remanding this case to the Magistrate Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. on 6/11/18. (ddm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ELEMENT MANAGEMENT, as
agent for Grove at Stone Brook
Apartments
Plaintiff,
v.

1:18-cv-460-WSD

MELINDA THORNTON,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller’s Final
Report and Recommendation [3] (“Final R&R”), which recommends remanding
this action to the Magistrate Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia. Also before the
Court are Defendant’s Objections and Responses to Report and Recommendation
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) [5] (“Objections”).
I.

BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2018, Plaintiff Element Management, as agent for Grove at

Stone Brook Apartments (“Plaintiff”) initiated a dispossessory proceeding against
Defendant Melinda Thornton (“Defendant”), in the Magistrate Court of Gwinnett

County, Georgia (the “Gwinnett County Action”).1 On January 30, 2018,
Defendant, proceeding pro se, filed an IFP Application [1] and Notice of Removal
[1.1] seeking to remove the Gwinnett County Action. Defendant seeks removal on
the grounds that Plaintiffs violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ([1.1] at 1-2).
On February 1, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued his Final R&R,
recommending that this action be remanded to the Magistrate Court of Gwinnett
County for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 16, 2018, Defendant
filed her Objections.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard

After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1112 (1983). A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
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The property at issue is located at 1405 Beaver Ruin Road, Apt. 905,
Norcross, Georgia 30093. ([1.1] at 3). The Magistrate Court of Gwinnett County
assigned the matter Case No. 18M00641. (Id.).
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objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and
recommendations to which objections have not been asserted, the Court must
conduct a plain error review of the record. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093,
1095 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984). If a petitioner does not
specifically object to any of the Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendations,
the Court reviews the report and recommendation for plain error. Id.; see also
Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988). Because Defendant’s
Objections lack specificity, the Court reviews the Final R&R for plain error.
B.

Analysis

Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether
subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any
party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006). The Eleventh Circuit
consistently has held that “a court should inquire into whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings. Indeed, it is well
settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). “Federal courts exercise limited jurisdiction
and generally can hear only actions that either meet the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction or that involve a federal question.” Kivisto v. Kulmala, 497 F. App’x

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905, 906 (11th Cir. 2012). Diversity jurisdiction exists where the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 and the suit is between citizens of different states.
28 U.S.C § 1332(a). “[F]ederal-question jurisdiction may be based on a civil
action alleging a violation of the Constitution, or asserting a federal cause of action
established by a congressionally created expressed or implied private remedy for
violations of a federal statute.” Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir.
1998). “The removing party bears the burden of proof regarding the existence of
federal subject matter jurisdiction.” City of Vestavia Hills v. Gen. Fidelity Ins.
Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).
The Magistrate Judge found “Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff asserted
any federal claims in this action or that a federal question is otherwise presented on
the face of the complaint.” ([3] at 4). “Instead, the [Magistrate Judge found the]
underlying action—in which Plaintiff seeks to dispossess Defendant from the
subject premises—arises under state law.” (Id.). The Magistrate Judge concluded
that “[b]ecause Defendant has not shown that the original complaint contains a
federal claim or otherwise presents a federal question, she has not established that
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, so removal is improper.”
(Id.). The Court finds no plain error in the Magistrate Judge’s findings and
recommendations.

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III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller’s Final

Report and Recommendation [3] is ADOPTED.
IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Objections and Responses to
Report and Recommendation Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) [5] are
OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the
Magistrate Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia.

SO ORDERED this 11th day of June, 2018.

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