Watkins v. The State Board of Pardons and Paroles et al
Filing
6
OPINION AND ORDER adopting Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker's Final Report and Recommendation 4 and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. on 6/27/18. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
SEGRAL SEVILLE WATKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:18-cv-770-WSD
THE STATE BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLES et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker’s Final
Report and Recommendation [4] (“Final R&R”) recommending that this action be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I.
BACKGROUND
On February 20, 2018, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint [1]
seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the members of the Georgia Board of
Pardons and Paroles (the “Parole Board”) and an unidentified “Subject Matter
Expert” (“SME”) on parole guidelines. (See generally [1]). Plaintiff alleges that
the SME prepared a parole document showing Plaintiff’s risk factors and
calculating his risk score for parole. ([1] at 3). “With cruel intention,” the SME
allegedly falsely stated in the document that Plaintiff was not employed at the time
of his arrest. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the SME’s false statement regarding his
employment adversely impacted his risk score and recommendation regarding
parole. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that, had the recommendation been made based on
his correct employment status, he would have received parole after nineteen
months imprisonment, in April 2017. (Id.). Instead, the Parole Board used the
document prepared by the SME and determined that Plaintiff should tentatively be
paroled after twenty-two months’ imprisonment, in July 2017. (Id.). Plaintiff
seeks $1.2 million “for lost time and painful hardship” and “to be released from
prison with no parole or probation.” (Id.).
On March 8, 2018, the Magistrate Judge screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and
issued her Final R&R, recommending that this action be dismissed under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The parties did not file objections to the Final R&R.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Frivolity Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
A federal court must screen “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss the complaint if it
is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,”
or if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous, and must be dismissed, where it
“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091,
1100 (11th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must
comply with the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir.
2005). “Even though a pro se complaint should be construed liberally, a pro se
complaint still must state a claim upon which the Court can grant relief.”
Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F. Supp. 2d 26, 28 (D.D.C. 2007). “[A] district court does
not have license to rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
B.
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
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1112 (1983). A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and
recommendations to which objections have not been asserted, the Court must
conduct a plain error review of the record. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093,
1095 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984). The parties did not file
objections to the Final R&R, and the Court thus reviews it for plain error.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s central claim is that he was wrongfully denied a shorter parole
term based on a false representation to the Parole Board relating to his employment
status at the time of his arrest. A Georgia state prisoner does not, however, have a
liberty interest in parole, and he may not pursue a claim in federal court alleging
that the Parole Board’s exercise of its discretion to deny him parole was a violation
of his due process rights. See Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a Georgia prisoner's due process claim regarding his parole
determination was “foreclosed” because “a Georgia inmate has no liberty interest
in parole”). A due process claim is viable only if the Parole Board takes flagrant or
unauthorized action that causes a prisoner harm. Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d
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1437, 1441 (11th Cir. 1991). The Parole Board may not “rely on knowingly false
information in their determinations.” Id. at 1442.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a
viable due process claim for “at least two reasons.” ([4] at 4). The Magistrate
Judge first found that Plaintiff did not allege facts to support a finding that the
Parole Board knew the SME used false information to prepare its recommendation.
(Id.). The Magistrate Judge noted that “[t]he claim fails for that reason alone.”
(Id.); see also Dixon v. State Bd. of Pardons and Parole, No. 1:01-cv-599-JEC, at
*3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 2001) (dismissing under § 1915A claim that parole board
relied on false information to deny parole where prisoner’s allegations did not
support a finding “that the Board knew the information was false”).
The Magistrate Judge next found that the allegations in the Complaint do not
support a finding that the false information the SME allegedly reported caused
harm to the Plaintiff. ([4] at 5). Although Plaintiff alleges he could have been
paroled approximately four months prior to his recommended parole date, he was
not even paroled at his recommended parole date. (Id.). Plaintiff provides no
explanation for the Parole Board’s action, or allegations supporting a finding that
Plaintiff is still in prison and has not been paroled based on the alleged false
employment information the SME used in his report. (Id.); see also Gravitt
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v. Snow, No. 1:90-cv-1023-CAM, 1990 WL 477403, at *7 (N.D. Ga.
Nov. 27, 1990) (“Moreover, if there is no indication that the Board relied
dispositively on the false information in its parole determination, then plaintiffs’
claim must fail.”) .
The Magistrate Judge noted finally that, “even if Plaintiff had stated a viable
claim, he cannot obtain the relief he seeks” because “Defendants are immune from
monetary damages.” That is, “the individual members of the Parole Board are
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a suit for damages.” Fuller v.
Ga. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff’s claim for release from confinement is similarly misplaced. A claim for
relief from confinement must be raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
after exhausting state remedies, not in a § 1983 action. Priser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 487-90 (1973) (holding that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a
state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement); see also
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
The Court finds no plain error in the Magistrate Judge’s findings or
recommendation, and therefore adopts the Final R&R and finds dismissal of this
action warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker’s Final
Report and Recommendation [4] is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED this 27th day of June, 2018.
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