Frushtick v. FeroExpress Inc. et al

Filing 112

OPINION AND ORDER granting 81 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting 82 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting 83 Motion to Exclude. The Court ORDERS the parties (and Bankers) to meet and confer in a serious, good faith effort to resolve this case within the next thirty (30) days. At least some of these discussions must be in person. Signed by Judge Michael L. Brown on 3/18/2022. (dob)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
Nathaniel David Frushtick and
Julie Solomon Frushtick,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 1:18-cv-2891-MLB

v.
FeroExpress Inc. and Frantisek
Sepesi,
Defendants.
________________________________/

OPINION & ORDER
In 2017, Defendant Frantisek Sepesi drove a truck into the back of
Plaintiff David Frushtick’s vehicle. Mr. Frushtick and his wife (Plaintiff
Julie Solomon Frushtick) sued Defendant Sepesi and his trucking
company (Defendant FeroExpress Inc.) for negligently causing the
accident. Mrs. Frushtick also asserted claims for punitive damages and
attorneys’ fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.

Defendants now move for

partial summary judgment on Mrs. Frushtick’s claims.

(Dkt. 82.)

Plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist carrier (Bankers Standard Insurance
Company), though not a named party to this action, also moves for partial

summary judgment on Mrs. Frushtick’s claims. (Dkt. 81.)1 Finally,
Plaintiffs move to preclude Defendant Bankers’s expert, Hanada Cox,
from offering expert testimony. (Dkt. 83.) The Court grants all three
motions.
I.

Summary Judgment Motions
A.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party
moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing a
court, by reference to materials in the record, that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357
F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party then has the

An uninsured motorist carrier is “obligated to compensate its insured
for actual losses caused by [an] uninsured motorist.” GEICO Indem. Co.
v. Whiteside, 857 S.E.2d 654, 668 n.25 (Ga. 2021). The idea is to “place
the injured insured in the same position as if the offending uninsured
motorist were covered with liability insurance.” Id. “[O]nce an uninsured
motorist insurance carrier is served in a civil suit against an
uninsured/underinsured motorist,” as Bankers was here, “it is afforded
the right to file defensive pleadings, conduct discovery, and contest issues
of liability, damages, or coverage.” Am. Fam. Connect Ins. Co. v. Neema,
2021 WL 6926688, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2021).
1

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burden of showing that summary judgment is improper by coming
forward with “specific facts” showing a genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Ultimately,
“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Salinero v. Johnson & Johnson, 995 F.3d 959, 964 (11th Cir. 2021).
B.

Discussion

Defendants and Bankers each move for summary judgment on
Mrs. Frushtick’s claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. In
response, Mrs. Frushtick says she is “withdrawing her claim for punitive
damages.” (Dkt. 90 at 3.) So Defendants and Bankers are entitled to
summary judgment on that claim. Mrs. Frushtick also says she “do[es]
not allege that [her] O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 claim for attorneys’ fees may be
recovered against . . . Bankers.” (Dkt. 90 at 7.) So Bankers is entitled to
summary judgment on that claim as well. The only disputed issue is
whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mrs.
Frushtick’s claim for attorneys’ fees.
“O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 establishes three grounds for an award of fees:
bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, and unnecessary trouble and expense.”

3

McGee v. Patterson, 746 S.E.2d 719, 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).2 “Bad
faith . . . implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known
duty through some motive of interest or ill will.” Wachovia Bank of
Georgia, N.A. v. Namik, 620 S.E.2d 470, 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). The
bad faith “must relate to defendant’s act in th[e] transaction itself prior
to this litigation, not to the motive with which it defended the litigation.”
Driggers v. Campbell, 543 S.E.2d 787, 791 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
“A recovery for stubborn litigiousness or causing unnecessary trouble
and expense is authorized if no bona fide controversy or dispute exist[s].”
Id. “A bona fide controversy exists when there is a dispute of law or fact,
on liability or amount of damages, or on any comparable issue.” Coggon
v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 2019 WL 2564571, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2019); see
Hart v. Walmart Stores E. L.P., 2017 WL 6733970, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Dec.
29, 2017) (“[I]f there is a genuine fact dispute on liability or damages, a
claim under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 need not be submitted to the jury.”).

O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 provides: “The expenses of litigation generally shall
not be allowed as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has
specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the defendant
has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the
plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.”

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Defendants have introduced evidence suggesting that they did not
cause the accident in bad faith and that a bona fide controversy exists
about their liability. For example, Defendant Sepesi testified he has a
clean driving record, Plaintiffs’ expert testified Defendant FeroExpress
passed a safety audit just weeks before the accident, Defendant Sepesi
testified it was Mr. Frushtick who caused the collision by “suddenly
stopp[ing] his vehicle on a green signal,” and Mr. Frushtick testified
there are no aggravating factors warranting punitive damages in this
case. (See Dkt. 82-1 ¶¶ 9–20.) This shifts the burden to Mrs. Frushtick
to “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Mrs. Frushtick has not met that
burden. She has not controverted Defendants’ evidence or introduced
any other evidence in the manner required by Local Rule 56.1. See
LR 56.1, NDGa.; Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008)
(compliance with Local Rule 56.1, which the Eleventh Circuit holds in
“high esteem,” is “the only permissible way . . . to establish a genuine

5

issue of material fact”). So she has not established a genuine issue for
trial, and summary judgment is appropriate.3
II.

Daubert Motion
A.

Legal Standard

“Expert testimony may be admitted into evidence if: (1) the expert
is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to
address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions

Mrs. Frushtick’s brief does cite her expert, David Dorrity. (Dkt. 90 at 6
& n.1–3.) But evidence cited only in a brief cannot create a genuine issue
for trial. See LR 56.1, NDGa. And Mrs. Frushtick has not even tried to
meet her burden to show that Mr. Dorrity’s opinions are admissible
under Daubert, even after Defendants argued (at length and with some
force) that they are not admissible. (See Dkt. 82-2 at 12–14.) So the Court
will not consider Mr. Dorrity’s opinions in its resolution of Defendants’
motion. See Cardenas v. State Farm Lloyds, 2021 WL 4733074, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2021) (“[A] plaintiff that fails to respond to a motion
to exclude an expert fails to satisfy their burden to prove their expert’s
testimony is admissible.”); In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d
1195, 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (“Mr. Mintzer’s proposed expert testimony
will be excluded because plaintiffs have made no attempt to demonstrate
its admissibility.”); Mark Principi v. Survivair, Inc., 2005 WL 5961991,
at *5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2005) (excluding expert opinion because
“Defendant wholly fails to respond to Plaintiff’s [Daubert] argument”);
see also United States v. Gary, 2010 WL 1375411, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
30, 2010) (excluding expert testimony “[s]ince there has not been a
responsive pleading filed in opposition to the relief requested by the
[Daubert] motion”); Weitlauf v. Parkway Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 544716, at
*2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2008) (“Since the plaintiff did not file a response to
the [Daubert] motion, she has clearly failed to carry her burden to prove
the admissibility of Mr. Weitlauf’s expert testimony.”).
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is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in
Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the
application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”

City of Tuscaloosa v.

Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998). “The party
offering the expert has the burden of satisfying each of these three
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” Rink v. Cheminova, Inc.,
400 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court must conduct a
“rigorous inquiry” into each element to “ensure that speculative,
unreliable expert testimony does not reach the jury under the mantle of
reliability that accompanies the appellation expert testimony.” Rink v.
Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, “the
admission or exclusion of expert testimony is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1294
(11th Cir. 2004).
B.

Discussion

Bankers has retained Hanada Cox to offer expert testimony about
the reasonable value of Mr. Frushtick’s post-accident medical care in
Georgia. Plaintiffs move to exclude this testimony on the grounds Ms.

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Cox is unqualified, her methodology is unreliable, and her opinions are
unhelpful. The Court agrees that Ms. Cox is unqualified. So Plaintiffs’
motion is granted.
In her expert report, Ms. Cox opines that “the approximately
$556,548.36 in [Mr. Frushtick’s] billed charges is excessive and that the
reasonable and customary value of [his] past medical care . . . is estimated
to be $158,176.45.” (Dkt. 87-1 at 7.) The methodology underlying this
conclusion can be divided into two parts.4

First, Ms. Cox reviewed

Mr. Frushtick’s medical bills, identified the applicable “medical code” on
each bill (i.e., the universal numerical code for the medical service being
billed), and made sure those codes were accurate. (Dkt. 87-1 at 102–103.)
Second, Ms. Cox used the codes in conjunction with other data to assign
a “reasonable and customary value” to the services billed. (Dkt. 87-1 at
4–7, 102–103.) Exactly how she used the codes depended on the service.
For professional services, Ms. Cox identified the Current Procedural
Terminology (“CPT”) code on the bill and then looked up a national “fee”
for that code in three publications: Usual and Customary of Wasserman’s

Bankers and Ms. Cox are often unclear about their methodology. To the
extent there are errors in the Court’s description of that methodology, the
responsibility for those errors lies with Bankers and Ms. Cox herself.
4

8

Physicians’ Fee Reference, PMIC’s Medical Fees, and Optum’s National
Fee Analyzer. (Dkt. 87-1 at 4.) Ms. Cox pulled the 75th percentile fee
from all three publications and picked the median of the three. (Dkts.
87-1 at 4; 85-3 at 47.) She then identified a “geographic modifier” in the
publications and applied that modifier to the median figure to calculate
“the local Reasonable Value.” (Dkt. 89-1 at 352–353.) For outpatient
services, Ms. Cox identified the Ambulatory Payment Classification
(“APC”) code on Mr. Frushtick’s bill and then looked up a national fee for
that code in data published by the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) in the Federal Register. (Dkts. 85-3 at 42; 87-1 at 4; 891 at 354.) She then identified a “geographic modifier” in other HHS data
and applied that modifier to the national fee to come up with an
appropriate local fee. (Dkts. 85-3 at 44–45; 89-1 at 354.) For inpatient
services, Ms. Cox identified the Diagnosis-Related Group (“DRG”) code
on the bill and then plugged that code—along with other information—
into an HHS formula published in the Federal Register. (Dkts. 85-3 at
67–74; 87-1 at 5; 89-1 at 355.) This generated a “global value.” (Dkt. 871 at 5.) “Geographic specificity [was then] determined by the IDME
(Indirect Medical Education) factors and Wage Index” as published in the

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Federal Register. (Dkt. 89-1 at 355.) Finally, for anesthesia charges,
Ms. Cox used the following formula: “[base units + time units + modifying
units] x conversion factor = anesthesia charge.”

(Dkts. 87-1 at 4.)

Ms. Cox identified the CPT code on Mr. Frushtick’s bill and used that
code to look up the applicable “base units” in Optum’s National Fee
Analyzer and in data from the American Society of Anesthesiologists.
(Dkt. 87-1 at 4.) She also used the CPT code to determine the “modifying
units” (though she does not really explain how). (Dkt. 87-1 at 4.) She
ascertained the “time units” from the bill itself. (Dkt. 87-1 at 4.) And she
used the CPT code to look up the applicable “conversion factor” in HHS
data published in the Federal Register and in data from the American
Society of Anesthesiologists. (Dkts. 85-2 at 81–83; 87-1 at 4.) Finally,
she applied a “geographic modifier” published by the HHS to generate an
appropriate fee for the Atlanta area. (Dkt. 85-2 at 83–84.)5

Ms. Cox also purported to calculate reasonable fees for other, less
significant charges in Mr. Frushtick’s medical bills. (See, e.g., Dkt. 87-1
at 5 (describing Ms. Cox’s approach to “pharmaceuticals” and “durable
medical equipment and supplies”).) The parties have not focused on
these charges. Neither does the Court. Ms. Cox also conducted a
“comparative analysis . . . for outpatient and inpatient services [in the
Atlanta area] based on data obtained from American Hospital Directory.”
(Dkt. 87-1 at 106.) But this analysis was “informational” only; it simply
5

10

Ms. Cox may be qualified to perform the first part of her analysis
(assigning the right codes). But Bankers has not shown she is qualified
to perform the second part (using those codes to determine a reasonable
fee). Bankers claim she is qualified because she is a certified professional
coder, previously worked as a director of medical billing at two internal
medicine practices in Maryland and Virginia, and currently works as an
expert medical billing witness for a litigation consulting company. (Dkt.
89 at 7–9; see Dkt. 87-1 at 199.) But, on the record before the Court, none
of these things make Ms. Cox “the type of person who should be
testifying” about the value of Mr. Frushtick’s medical services based on
the methodology she employs here. Moore v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 995
F.3d 839, 852 (11th Cir. 2021). And that means she is not “qualified to
testify competently regarding the matters [s]he intends to address.” City
of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 562.
Ms. Cox is a certified professional coder. But that simply means
she can “transform[] descriptions of [medical] services or items into
universal numerical medical codes.” (Dkt. 89-1 at 352; see Dkt. 85-2 at

provided “a comparative of what’s in [her] report.” (Dkt. 85-2 at 47.)
There is no evidence it actually affected her opinions. So the Court does
not elaborate on it here.
11

93–96; 85-3 at 13–14.) It does mean she can quantify the value of those
services, much less in the way she purports to do that here. (Dkt. 85-3 at
15–16.) Ms. Cox’s prior experience as a medical biller is also insufficient.
Although she established fee schedules and negotiated third-party payer
contracts as part of her billing work, she did so for different medical
services and in different states than those at issue here. And Bankers
cites no evidence showing she billed anyone based on the kind of
valuation methodology she employs here. Ms. Cox does appear to have
replicated her methodology while working as a medical billing expert in
other litigation. (See Dkt. 85-3 at 20–29.) But “experience developed as
a professional expert witness is not sufficient” to qualify as an expert.
29 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid.
§ 6264.1 (2d ed. Apr. 2021); see Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc.,
878 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t would be absurd to conclude that
one can become an expert simply by accumulating experience in
testifying.”). Only experience “obtained in a practical context” counts.
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6264.1.
Castellanos v. Target Corp., 568 F. App’x 886 (11th Cir. 2014)
supports the Court’s conclusion that Ms. Cox is unqualified. In that case,

12

an expert sought to testify about the reasonable value of plaintiff’s
inpatient care based on the same DRG formula Ms. Cox employs here.6
Like Ms. Cox, the expert was a certified professional coder,7 had worked
in a healthcare provider’s billing department,8 had helped establish a
“rate structure” for healthcare provides,9 and often served as an expert
witness on the value of medical services.10 Unlike Ms. Cox, the expert
had also worked in the relevant geographical area and, as a consultant,
had helped several insurers with valuation issues during the claims
process.11 The trial court still excluded the expert because, although she
was “qualified to talk about billing codes,” defendant had not shown she
was qualified to “testify as to the reasonableness of the charge.”12 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, saying “the trial judge did not abuse her

Castellanos v. Target Corp., 0:11-cv-62467-KMW (S.D. Fla. June 21,
2012), ECF No. 76-6 at 3–6.
7 Id. (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2012), ECF No. 94-5 at 1.
8 Id. (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2012), ECF No. 85-1 at 18–19.
9 Id. (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2012), ECF No. 76-5 at 3.
10 Id. (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2012), ECF No. 76-6 at 7; id. (S.D. Fla. July 9,
2012), ECF No. 85-1 at 6–7, 14–15.
11 Id. (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2012), ECF No. 76-5 at 2–4.
12 Id. (S.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2012), ECF No. 142-2 at 3, 8; id. (S.D. Fla. June
10, 2013), ECF No. 168 at 19; see also Castellanos, 568 F. App’x 886
(oral argument audio at 2:33–3:01, 6:47–7:14 (noting the trial judge
ultimately excluded the expert as unqualified)).
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discretion, especially given the expert’s broad lack of knowledge of the
background and underpinning of the information in the DRG on which
the expert relied considerably.” Castellanos, 568 F. App’x 886. The
expert was qualified to opine that “the medical services billed did not
reflect medical services actually delivered according to the treatment
records.”

Id. at 886 n.2.

But she could not testify about “the

reasonableness of charges for medical services, assumed to have been
delivered.” Id.
Our case is strikingly similar to Castellanos. In addition to the
commonalities noted above, Ms. Cox—like the Castellanos expert—also
has a “lack of knowledge” about important aspects of her methodology.
For example, although she relies on a “geographic modifier” pulled from
other sources, she does not know how that modifier is calculated or on
what it is based. (Dkts. 85-2 at 44–46; 85-3 at 44–45.) She does not
understand the DRG formula she purports to apply. (Dkt. 85-3 at 75–
76.) It is not even clear whether she knows what the DRG formula is
designed to calculate.13 Ms. Cox also relies on a 75th percentile “fee”—

(See Dkts. 85-3 at 71 (“[T]he DRG is the reimbursement or the—the
reasonable value.”), 74 (suggesting the DRG analysis refers to “what

13

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published in Wasserman’s, PMIC’s, and Optum’s—that she knows little
about. She does not know what the published “fee” actually represents
or how it is calculated (which is “the main reason [she] use[s] three
different sources instead of just relying on one”). (Dkts. 85-2 at 67–70;
85-3 at 46–47.) She does not know whether it refers to an amount billed,
an amount paid, or something else.

(Id.; see also Dkt. 89-1 at 353

(suggesting the fee “represents 75% of the specific community as charging
and/or accepting this amount or less for the same service” (emphasis
added).) She simply “guess[es] you could interpret . . . the word ‘fee’ for
a charge.” (Dkt. 85-2 at 67.) And then, in particularly garbled testimony,
she suggests it might be some unspecified “combination of what is billed
and what is paid.” (Dkt. 85-2 at 67–68.) The 75th percentile fee is one of
the most important inputs—perhaps the most important input—in Ms.
Cox’s opinion. That she does not know what it means demonstrates—in

hospitals, facilities, doctors are billing and getting paid for their
services”), 74–75 (“Q. . . . [T]hey use that [DRG] calculation to determine
reimbursement amounts, right? A. Reasonable—yeah, or the—exactly,
okay, or it’s the reasonable value or the average value of a certain service.
. . . Well, it’s probably not the exact word. It’s like national average, local
average, you know, and depending on what kind of—whether we’re
looking at a hospital bill or a doctor bill, yeah, so they’re all in different
categories.”); 89-1 at 355 (“The DRG system is . . . . based upon the actual
costs to facilities and health care providers”.).)
15

the words of Castellanos—a troubling “lack of knowledge” about data “on
which [she] relied considerably.” 568 F. App’x 886. If the expert was not
qualified in Castellanos, it is hard to see how Ms. Cox is qualified here.
Even worse for Bankers, our case has aggravating factors that
Castellanos did not.

For one thing, Ms. Cox has repeatedly

misrepresented her credentials to this Court. Her CV says she graduated
from Montgomery College with an associate’s degree. (Dkt. 85-2 at 250.)
She testified to the same effect in her deposition. (Dkt. 85-2 at 115–116.)
But that was false. She never graduated. She admitted as much in
another case. (Dkt. 92-3 at 20–21.) Troublingly, she did not then amend
her misrepresentations in this case; instead, she repeated them in a
supplemental report. (Dkts. 87-1 at 199; see Dkt. 89-1 at 359.)14 “If
[Ms. Cox] would lie about her academic credentials, there is no reason to
believe that she would not provide erroneous and/or misleading valuation
testimony if she believed it would benefit her client.” In re WRT Energy

14Defense

counsel repeated this untruthfulness in its briefing even
though Ms. Cox admitted she had not graduated long before Bankers’s
briefing here. (Dkt. 89 at 12-13.) And, even when identified as a lie by
Plaintiffs, defense counsel did not notify the Court of the error. Plaintiffs
chalk this up to Ms. Cox not having been candid with defense counsel.
Perhaps.
16

Corp., 282 B.R. 343, 371 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2001) (declining to consider
expert testimony because the expert lied about graduating from Stanford
University).
Another aggravating factor is that courts have repeatedly
precluded Ms. Cox from offering the kind of valuation testimony she
wants to present here. These courts have made the same distinction as
this Court (and Castellanos): “Ms. Cox is qualified to identify
discrepancies with the medical treatment provided and the medical codes
used for billing. She is not qualified to testify on the reasonable value of
the medical expenses incurred by Plaintiff.” (Dkt. 101 at 5 (2020 Georgia
state court case); see also Dkt. 92-4 at 7 (2020 Florida state court case)
(applying Daubert standard and finding “[Ms. Cox] is most certainly
qualified to testify as to any billing mistakes, inconsistencies or coding
errors—if those were issues in this case. However, this Court does not
find, nor does the case law support, that a medical coding specialist is
qualified to testify regarding the usual and customary billing rates for
medical procedures.”).)15 That other courts have barred Ms. Cox from

In response to Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Ms. Cox’s testimony,
defense counsel alleged “at no time has [Ms. Cox] been disqualified under

15

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offering valuation testimony bolsters the Court’s conclusion that she
should be barred from doing so here.16

Daubert or had any of her opinions excluded.” (Dkt. 89 at 12.) That
apparently was not true when said. The Florida order cited above was
entered seven months before counsel’s representation. In it, the court
expressly stated Ms. Cox’s testimony would be excluded “on the basis that
she is not qualified to render the proposed expert testimony, her
testimony is not relevant, and her testimony is not based upon reliable
principles or methodology.” (Dkt. 92-4 at 9.) It is hard to understand
how defense counsel could make the representation they did. And even
when Plaintiff identified the untruthfulness, counsel said nothing by way
of an explanation. Maybe defense counsel can blame Ms. Cox again, but
they should know the facts.
16 Since then, several other courts have excluded her testimony. See also
Anderson v. Bagheri, 2020 WL 5666779, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sep. 4, 2020)
(“Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Testimony and Opinions of Defense Expert
Hanada Cox is . . . . GRANTED as to . . . Cox’s proffered opinions
regarding the reasonableness of medical bills.”); Martinez v. Flexdrive
Services LLC, 2020 WL 9439568, at *1 (Tex. Dist. July 20, 2020) (“[T]he
affidavits of Hanada Cox, CPC, are excluded and Hanada Cox, CPC, is
not permitted to testify in this matter.”); Allen v. Brooks, 2020 WL
6537327, at *1 (Tex. Dist. May 29, 2020) (“[T]he Counter-Affidavit of
Hanada Cox, C.P.C. . . . is stricken in its entirety.”); see also Shakeri v.
Gable, 2021 WL 454500, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 2021) (“Plaintiff’s
Motion to Exclude Testimony and Opinions of Defense Expert Hanada
Cox, CPC is GRANTED.”).
18

All in all, Bankers has not met its burden of showing Ms. Cox is
qualified to opine on the reasonable value of Mr. Frushtick’s medical
care. So Ms. Cox’s testimony is excluded.17
III. Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Bankers Standard Insurance Company’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 81), GRANTS Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 82), and GRANTS
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Purported Expert Testimony of Hanada
Cox (Dkt. 83). The Court ORDERS the parties (and Bankers) to meet
and confer in a serious, good faith effort to resolve this case within the

Even if Ms. Cox were qualified, the Court would still exclude her
testimony on reliability grounds. Defendant Bankers has not shown her
opinions are “supported by appropriate validation” or that they are
“properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative.” United States
v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2004). The Court is
particularly unimpressed by defense counsel’s attempt to use a vague “To
Whom It May Concern” letter—dated years before this litigation—to
show Ms. Cox’s “methodology has in fact been peer-reviewed and deemed
to be industry standard.” (Dkts. 89 at 22; 89-1 at 382.) The two-page
letter is wholly conclusory, we know nothing about its context, and it does
not even identify the methodology it purports to approve. (Dkt. 89-1 at
382–383.) The Court adds this to its concerns with defense counsel’s
candor and preparedness. It is a rare occurrence when counsel makes
three bold statements (education, acceptance, and peer review), all of
which end up being untrue. The Court will not permit this nonchalance
for the truth to continue and looks forward to some explanation by
Defendant Bankers.

17

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next thirty (30) days. At least some of these discussions must be in
person.
SO ORDERED this 18th day of March, 2022.

(1

1

MICH"K E L L. B R O W N

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