Edwards v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.
OPINION & ORDER: The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's Objections 86 and ADOPTS 82 Final Report and Recommendation; grants Defendant's 45 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Michael L. Brown on 9/15/20. (bjh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
Case No. 1:19-cv-00339
Michael L. Brown
United States District Judge
Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Leroy Edwards claims Defendant Publix Supermarkets,
Inc. fired him because of his race. The Magistrate Judge recommends
granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 82.) Plaintiff
objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”).
The Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections and adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R.
Defendant employs drivers to deliver groceries to its stores. Drivers
often make more than one delivery in a day. At the start of the day,
drivers go to Defendant’s dispatch office for their first delivery. (Dkt. 55
at 37:1–23.) Drivers may be able to select their first run from a list of
possible runs that dispatch provides, with selection by seniority. (Id.)
After completing their first deliveries, drivers return to the dispatch
office for additional deliveries, also called “second runs” or “return trips.”
Defendant has a policy — referred to as the “next-most-likely, on-time
delivery policy” — that controls the assignment of these deliveries. (Id.
at 43:8–44:11.) As part of this policy, the dispatcher assigns a delivery
to a returning driver after considering the number of remaining
deliveries for that day and the remaining hours that driver may work
pursuant to Department of Transportation requirements.
parties dispute whether drivers had any say in this process for second
deliveries. Plaintiff says drivers could choose them. (Dkt. 64 at 54:6–9.)
Defendant says dispatchers always made the decision. (Dkt. 55 at 43:8–
44:11.) Defendant, however, acknowledges its policy was loosely enforced
for some period of time. (Id.)
In early 2018, Defendant attempted to enforce its assignment policy
more thoroughly. (Id.) As part of this, it placed a flier in its dispatch
office to outline the requirements of the run-assignment policy. (Dkts. 55
at 43:8–44:11; 122.) Plaintiff claimed at summary judgment that he
never heard of this policy and never saw the flier in the dispatch office.
(Dkt. 57-1 ¶¶ 14–18.) But, as discussed below, the Magistrate Judge also
properly found that Plaintiff had already admitted these facts by refusing
to respond to Defendant’s Request for Admissions. (Dkt. 82 at 8 n.5.)
Plaintiff insists that drivers were always allowed a choice on their second
Plaintiff worked for Defendant for nearly thirty years. (See Dkt. 64
at 16:3–12.) He was well-liked. (Dkt. 57-2 ¶ 3.) In 2015, he had an
accident while making a delivery. (Dkt. 64 at 18:5–8.) While driving
near the interchange of Highway 285 and Georgia State Highway 400, a
car clipped the wheel of the truck he was driving causing him to lose
control. (Id. at 18:16–22.) His truck went over the highway divider and
hit a tow truck. (Id. at 19:2–4.) He was injured and continues to suffer
hip pain and symptoms of acute stress disorder. (Dkt. 57-2 ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff eventually returned to work as a driver. In April 2018, he
went to the dispatch office for a second run. A dispatcher assigned him
a delivery that required him to drive near the site of his previous
accident. (Dkt. 64 at 44:13–48:1.) Plaintiff told the dispatcher he felt
uncomfortable driving in that area, and the dispatcher gave him a
different delivery. (Dkt. 54 at 55:20–56:10, 61:8–10.) The dispatcher
then emailed a supervisor to ask whether he should do this again if
Plaintiff made a similar request. (Id.) The supervisor told the dispatcher
not to do so, as Defendant needed to enforce its run-assignment policy.
(Id.) Defendant claims this was the first time Plaintiff’s supervisors
learned Plaintiff did not want to drive near the scene of his prior accident.
(See Dkts. 55 at 27:2–16; 50 at 22:13–22; 54 at 59:3–60:8.) Defendant
says they were previously aware. (Dkt. 57-1 ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff later spoke with Shannon Horne, one of his supervisors.
Defendant says Mr. Horne reminded Plaintiff of the need to follow the
next-most-likely, on-time delivery policy.
(See Dkt. 50 at 25:3–25.)
Plaintiff claims Mr. Horne asked him why he refused a run, and he told
her he had not done so. (Dkt. 64 at 48:2–24.)
In May 2018, Plaintiff came to the dispatch office to seek a second
run. (Dkt. 57-1 ¶ 25.) The dispatcher assigned him a run near the
285/400 interchange. (Id.) Plaintiff claims it was the same route he had
been allowed to avoid before. (Dkt. 57-1 ¶ 25.) Plaintiff told David
Bullard, a lead person in dispatch, that he felt uncomfortable taking that
run. (Dkt. 53 at 36:4–37:6.) Mr. Bullard called Charles Williams, the
head of the dispatch department. (Id.) Mr. Williams, Mr. Bullard, and
Plaintiff spoke on the phone for half an hour. (Dkt. 55 at 58:19–60:19.)
They talked about Plaintiff taking a different route to get to the store.
(Id.) Plaintiff suggested taking a run that did not go near the 285/400
Mr. Williams rejected that idea.
Based on the
conversation, Mr. Williams determined that Plaintiff refused to complete
his assigned run: “Even when presented with multiple options, [Plaintiff]
refused all options that were given to him to complete that trip.” (Id. at
79:10–20.) Defendant fired Plaintiff the next day for insubordination.
(Dkt. 57-1 ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, alleging he was fired because of his race. (Dkt. 45-3 at 130.)
After that claim was denied, Plaintiff sued.
originally brought multiple claims, the only claim currently before the
Court is his Title VII unlawful termination claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2. The Magistrate Judge found that, although Plaintiff made a prima
facie showing of unlawful termination, Defendant presented legitimate,
insubordination), and Plaintiff failed to show that reason was pretextual.
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant’s motion for
Standard of Review
When a party objects to an R&R, the district court must review de
novo any part of the Magistrate Judge’s disposition that is the subject of
a proper objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). “Parties
filing objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation must
specifically identify those findings objected to.” Marsden v. Moore, 847
F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988). If an objection fails to identify the
specific findings or a specific basis for the objection, a court need not
consider it. See id.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court
“shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a
reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it is “a legal
element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might
affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642,
646 (11th Cir. 1997).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden
of showing a court, by reference to materials in the record, that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact that should be decided at trial.
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). A moving party
meets this burden merely by “ ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the
district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The movant, however,
need not negate the other party’s claim. Id. at 323. In determining
whether the moving party has met this burden, a court must view the
evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir.
Once the movant has adequately supported its motion, the
nonmoving party then has the burden of showing that summary
judgment is improper by coming forward with specific facts showing a
genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Ultimately, there is no “genuine [dispute] for trial”
when the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the nonmoving party. Id. But “the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there
be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48. The
court, however, resolves all reasonable doubts in the favor of the nonmovant. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).
III. Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Factual
Plaintiff makes four objections to the Magistrate Judge’s statement
of the facts. First, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s supervisors
were unaware before April 2018 that Plaintiff did not want to drive near
the scene of his prior accident. (Dkt. 82 at 9.) The Magistrate Judge cited
deposition testimony in which Plaintiff’s supervisors (Charles Williams,
Shannon Horne, and Leonard Harris) testified the April 2018 incident
was the first time they learned Plaintiff had concerns about driving over
the 285/400 interchange. (Dkts. 50 at 22:23–23:2; 54 at 60:4–8; 55:27:14–
16.) Plaintiff claims his supervisors knew he did not feel comfortable
driving near the scene of his accident. He cites his own deposition and
the depositions of Michael Bullard, a dispatch supervisor, and Robert
Porter, a former Publix driver.
In the cited portion of Mr. Bullard’s deposition, the witness
discussed the May 2018 conversation he had with Plaintiff and Mr.
Williams. That testimony shows Mr. Williams had some knowledge in
May 2018 about Plaintiff’s concerns with driving near the 285/400
interchange. But Mr. Williams’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s concerns in May
2018 is consistent with him learning of them in April 2018. So, Mr.
Bullard’s testimony and the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation are
consistent. Plaintiff also testified that he felt uncomfortable taking the
route that took him near 285/400 interchange. (Dkt. 64 at 46:14–18.) His
testimony does not show his supervisors knew of his reservations.
Mr. Porter’s testimony, however, may contradict the supervisors’
accounts. Mr. Porter testified that “everybody in dispatch knows and
knew that [Plaintiff] did not go over 400/285.” (Dkt. 66 at 29:16–19.) It
is unclear that Plaintiff’s supervisors are encompassed within the
employees in dispatch to whom Mr. Porter was referring, especially given
the supervisors’ testimony that they were unaware.
In fact, his
testimony appears to refer to the dispatchers, not supervisors. Even so,
read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court considers that
Plaintiff’s supervisors knew Plaintiff was uncomfortable with the
285/400 interchange before April 2018.
Second, the Magistrate Judge found that Shannon Horne spoke to
Plaintiff about the April 2018 incident and reminded him of the need to
follow Defendant’s process for taking the next-most-likely, on-time
delivery. Plaintiff objects, claiming the conversation consisted only of Mr.
Horne accusing Plaintiff of refusing a run. (See Dkt. 64 at 48:2–17.) Both
Mr. Horne and Mr. Williams testified that Mr. Horne told Plaintiff in that
conversation of the need to follow the policy. (See Dkts. 50 at 25:14–25;
55 at 31:3–8.)
In Plaintiff’s deposition, however, he described that
conversation as Mr. Horne asking him why he refused a run and him
responding that he did not refuse it. (Dkt. 64 at 48:2–24.) Plaintiff’s
deposition does not directly refute Mr. Horne’s and Mr. Williams’s
accounts. But still, construed most favorably to Plaintiff, there is a
dispute over whether Mr. Horne told Plaintiff about the need to follow
Third, the Magistrate Judge found that in May 2018, after Mr.
Bullard and Plaintiff called Mr. Williams to discuss the run near the
285/400 interchange, Mr. Williams viewed Plaintiff’s behavior as an
impasse. (Dkt. 82 at 12.) The Magistrate Judge stated that Mr. Williams
warned Plaintiff he could face discharge.
Plaintiff claims Mr.
Williams only told him that he could face “ramifications,” not discharge.
The Court makes little of this objection — a ramification could be
Still, when relevant, the Court holds in mind whatever
distinction exists there.
Last, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff failed to show
another driver, Matthew Davidson, refused to take runs near a location
in which he had been in an accident. Plaintiff claims Mr. Porter, the
former driver, testified that Mr. Davidson refused to take runs in the area
near his own accident. (Dkt. 66 at 78:6–15.) This objection speaks to the
Magistrate Judge’s finding that Mr. Davidson was not similarly situated
to Plaintiff, an element of a prima facie unlawful termination claim. The
Magistrate Judge also found, however, that another driver, Dick Reckon,
was similarly situated to Plaintiff, meaning Plaintiff stated a prima facie
case. If the Court accepts Mr. Reckon as similarly situated to Plaintiff,
then the Court determining whether Mr. Davidson was similarly situated
would not change the analysis either way. Since the Court below accepts
Mr. Reckon as similarly situated, the objection regarding Mr. Davidson
Plaintiff claims Defendant fired him because of his race in violation
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
With no direct evidence of
discrimination, a court applies the three-part McDonnell Douglas test.1
See Benjamin v. SNF Holding Co., 602 F. App’x 758, 762 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Under
this framework, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of
discrimination. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266
(11th Cir. 2001).
If made, the defendant can provide legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for why it took the employment action. Id.
Upon the defendant showing these reasons, the plaintiff can show
defendants’ reasons are pretextual. Id.
A plaintiff can also survive summary judgment by presenting a
“convincing mosaic” of intentional discrimination. See Smith v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2001). The Magistrate
Judge found Plaintiff failed to do so and Plaintiff did not object to that
finding. This Court also does not think that Plaintiff has shown a
convincing mosaic of intentional discrimination.
Prima Facie Case
To make a prima facie Title VII discrimination case, a plaintiff must
show “(1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was subjected
to an adverse employment action, (3) that she was qualified to perform
the job in question, and (4) that her employer treated ‘similarly situated’
employees outside her class more favorably.” Lewis v. City of Union City,
Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2019). Defendant does not contest
the first three factors, conceding that Plaintiff is part of a protected class;
was subjected to an adverse employment action; and could perform the
The Eleventh Circuit discussed the standard for similarly situated
employees in Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1226–28. The Eleventh Circuit stated
that a plaintiff must show comparators that are similarly situated in “all
material respects.” Id. at 1227. Similarly situated comparators
will have engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct)
as the plaintiff; will have been subject to the same
employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff; will
ordinarily (although not invariably) have been under the
jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff; [and] will
share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history.
Id. at 1227–28 (citations omitted).
The Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff offered one similarly situated
comparator, Dick Reckon. The Magistrate Judge looked to testimony
showing Mr. Reckon would refuse to take assigned runs and management
did not terminate him as a result. (Dkt. 64 at 82:4–7; 66 at 72:6–16.) The
Magistrate Judge reasoned Defendant employed Mr. Reckon; subjected
him to the same policies as Plaintiff, including not being able to choose
his second run; and allowed him to refuse an assigned run without facing
As a result, Plaintiff and Mr. Reckon were
similarly situated. No party objects to this finding and the Court adopts
Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons
The Magistrate Judge found Defendant presented a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for firing Plaintiff – his refusal to accept an
assigned run on May 8, 2018.
The Magistrate Judge reasoned that
Defendant prohibits employees from not following a supervisor’s
Under Defendant’s run-assignment policy, dispatchers
Plaintiff also submitted other potential comparators. This Court does
not discuss those comparators because Plaintiff’s claim proceeds
assigned drivers runs. Defendant fired Plaintiff for breaching that policy.
Put another way, Mr. Williams told Plaintiff to take a run and Mr.
Williams thought Plaintiff refused to take that run. Plaintiff claims
Defendant’s explanation is “unworthy of credence,” or illegitimate,
because he never refused to take a run.
At this stage, however, a
defendant’s burden is only to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason, not to show that reason is why it fired the plaintiff. See Combs
v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]o satisfy
this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible
evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that
the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory
evidence.” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
Defendant has met that burden by offering Plaintiff’s
insubordination as a reason.
Since Defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating Plaintiff, Plaintiff must show Defendant’s reasons
To establish pretext, a plaintiff must show the
defendant’s given reasons were not the real reasons for the employment
action. See Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1290
(11th Cir. 2005). In other words, a plaintiff must “cast sufficient doubt
on the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a
reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct.”
Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff may do so “either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” Id. at 1543 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. Under the latter
approach, Plaintiff must show “such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find
them unworthy of credence.” Jackson, 405 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Combs,
106 F.3d at 1538).
Responding to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
offered four reasons why his purported termination for insubordination
was pretextual: (1) Defendant required employees to attend a diversity
training; (2) many African American drivers have resigned since
Plaintiff’s termination; (3) Defendant tasked Mr. Williams with its “dirty
work”; and (4) African American employees were afraid to disclose acts
of racial bias for fear of retaliation. The Magistrate Judge rejected these
assertions as either unsupported or irrelevant. She found Defendant’s
holding a diversity training does not show racial bias or that it fired
Plaintiff because he is African American. Neither do Plaintiff’s claims
that numerous African American drivers have resigned since his
termination or that African American employees were allegedly afraid to
disclose acts of racial bias. And the Magistrate Judge found that Mr.
Williams’s alleged motivations do not show Defendant fired Plaintiff
because of his race.
The Magistrate Judge also noted evidence that undercut Plaintiff’s
contention that Defendant fired him because of his race. For instance,
Plaintiff stated that he did not believe the dispatcher assigned him the
run in May 2018 because of his race. (Dkt. 64 at 120:5–21.) Plaintiff also
testified that Defendant permits African-American drivers to circumvent
the run-assignment policy without being fired. (Id. at 88:7–89:3.) The
Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff may have shown that some
dispatchers would allow drivers to circumvent Defendant’s modified
policy. But that does not mean Defendant fired him because he is African
American or that Defendant disciplines African American drivers more
severely than other drivers. Plaintiff did not specifically object to these
findings. The Court agrees with them and adopts them.
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings.
(1) he was not insubordinate; (2) the policy was never in effect; and
(3) there were other disciplinary actions available short of termination.
Plaintiff is either wrong or his objections do not show pretext. First,
Plaintiff claims he never refused the run in May 2018 and that he offered
to make the delivery through another route. But ultimately, whether
Plaintiff refused the run does not matter.
The inquiry is whether
Defendant believed Plaintiff had been insubordinate.
See Rojas v.
Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002) (“We are not interested in
whether the conclusion is a correct one, but whether it is an honest one.”);
Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“That the employee did not in fact engage in misconduct reported to the
employer is irrelevant to the question whether the employer believed the
employee had done wrong.” (citing Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977,
980 n.2 (11th Cir. 1989))). Mr. Williams testified that Plaintiff refused
the run. Plaintiff presents no evidence that Mr. Williams did not believe
Plaintiff had been insubordinate. In fact, Plaintiff even admits that Mr.
Williams told him there would be ramifications for not taking the run.
Plaintiff’s claim thus fails.
What is more, Plaintiff also has the obligation to show
discrimination was the real reason Defendant fired him.
Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A reason is not
pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” (citations and
quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff has presented no such evidence in
his objections. The evidence submitted with his response to the motion
for summary judgment also fails. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s objection.
Second, Plaintiff argues the updated policy was never in effect. The
Court finds scant evidence to support this claim. Plaintiff points to
Robert Porter’s testimony, but he left six months before Defendant
reasserted the policy. Plaintiff also cites his own testimony in which he
said drivers could choose their second run. (Dkt. 64 at 54:6–9.) But other
evidence shows Defendant did not give drivers this authority.
Williams testified that the next-most-likely, on-time delivery policy was
in effect. (Dkt. 55 at 43:12–17.) And, Defendant’s first requests for
admission stated that the updated policy was posted in March 2018.
Plaintiff did not respond to that request for admission and so they are
considered admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) (“A matter is admitted
unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request
is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection.”).
The Court acknowledges Plaintiff tried to challenge this fact at summary
judgment. But, he had already admitted it by refusing to respond to the
request for admission. The Magistrate Judge properly found this fact
admitted. (Dkt. 82 at 8 n.5.)
Even if Plaintiff had raised an issue of material fact as to whether
the policy was in effect, at bottom it does not matter. The issue is whether
Defendant fired Plaintiff because of his race. Whether the policy was in
effect is irrelevant as to whether Mr. Williams believed Plaintiff to be
insubordinate. Plaintiff admits that the dispatch office assigned him a
run that he did not complete. (Dkt. 64 at 99:10–14.) He admits that he
had a conversation with Mr. Williams and Mr. Bullard about that run.
(Id.) Mr. Williams testified that he found Plaintiff to refuse to take the
run, and Plaintiff presents no evidence to show that reason to be false or
to show the actual reason was his race. (Dkt. 55 at 79:10–20.) The Court
rejects Plaintiff’s objection.
disciplinary steps short of firing him. But it is not a court’s job to weigh
the wisdom of termination versus some other consequence. See Damon
v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.
1999) (“We are not in the business of adjudging whether employment
decisions are prudent or fair.
Instead, our sole concern is whether
unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment
decision.”). The Court rejects Plaintiff’s objection.
Really, the Magistrate Judge put it just right: “The foundation of
Plaintiff’s pretext argument is that he was a hard-working, dependable
employee who deserved the right to choose his preferred route, and that
Defendant’s arbitrary enforcement of its run-assignment policies led to
his unlawful dismissal based on his race.” (Dkt. 82 at 29–30.) Plaintiff
has not shown that his termination and his race were connected. Flowers
v. Troup Cty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Put
frankly, employers are free to fire their employees for a good reason, a
bad reason, reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as
long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” (quotation marks
and citation omitted)). As a result, his claim fails.
The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Dkt. 86) and
ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 82).
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
SO ORDERED this 15th day of September, 2020.
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