Lee v. Unknown

Filing 117

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 116 Motion for Discovery and Motion for Hearing. This action remains CLOSED. Further frivolous filings in this action will be summarily denied. Signed by Judge Steven D. Grimberg on 9/23/2024. (tas) Modified on 9/23/2024 to edit docket text (tas).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
MARY FORE LEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No.
1:19-cv-04353-SDG

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Mary Fore Lee’s motion for
expedited discovery and an evidentiary hearing [ECF 116]. She also seeks recusal
of undersigned. For the following reasons, Lee’s motion is DENIED. This case
remains CLOSED.
I.

Background
On June 15, 2021, the Court granted Defendant State Farm’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings, entered final judgment in State Farm’s favor, and
directed that this case be closed. 1 On June 23, Lee filed several requests for waiver
of service addressed to various city and county governments, as well as the FBI. 2
The Court directed that Lee’s requests be stricken from the docket. 3 A few months

1

ECF 107; ECF 108.

2

ECF 110.

3

ECF 111.

later, on November 22, Lee filed a Rule 60 motion to vacate the Court’s June 15
Order, claiming that she had been deprived of the opportunity to fully and fairly
present her case and that fraud was committed against the Court because State
Farm and its counsel concealed information. 4 Those arguments repeated
contentions Lee had previously raised. 5 The Court denied the motion. 6 On
September 19, 2023, Lee filed the instant motion for discovery and a hearing, and
requesting recusal. 7
II.

Recusal
A district court is usually required to rule on a recusal motion before

addressing merits arguments because, if recusal is warranted, the court is
generally not permitted to take any action concerning the merits. Daker v. Warren,
No. 20-12296, 2023 WL 4560224, at *3 (11th Cir. July 17, 2023) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court first addresses Lee’s arguments for recusal.
Lee attributes the Court’s purported bias to her “race, socioeconomic status,
and being a female.” 8 She further contends the Court failed to treat the statements

4

ECF 113.

5

See generally ECF 107 (June 15, 2021 Order).

6

ECF 115.

7

ECF 116.

8

ECF 116-1, at 4.

in her complaint as true because it characterized them as allegations, claims, or
contentions. 9 However, she has stated no factual basis for these assertions.
There are two federal statutes applicable to requests for recusal:
28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. The Court addresses each in turn.
A.

Section 144

“To warrant recusal under § 144, the moving party must allege facts that
would convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists.” Christo v. Padgett,
223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). Lee’s motion, however, lacks any facts that can
support her claim of bias. She contends the Court was “belittling toward [her]”
and “expressed low expectation of [her] capabilities,” 10 but she does not identify
anything specific demonstrating that the Court engaged in such conduct. She has
not described any facts that show bias because of her race, economic status, or sex.
Nor can the characterization of statements in a pleading as “allegations”
reasonably be construed as exhibiting bias, since that is precisely what a pleading
is supposed to do.
B.

Section 455

The analysis applicable under § 455 is largely the same as that for § 144. A
judge must only recuse under § 455 when “an objective, fully informed lay

9

Id. at 3.

10

Id. at 3.

observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” Christo,
223 F.3d at 1333. As noted above, Lee has not identified any facts that would cause
an observer to reasonably question the Court’s impartiality. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a);
United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[D]isqualification
should follow if the reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would
harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.”).
Lee has not shown that recusal is appropriate under either § 144 or § 455.
C.

Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing

Lee’s substantive claims were long ago dismissed with prejudice and she
elected not to appeal. There is nothing pending on which Lee is entitled to seek
discovery and no basis for an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, to the extent Lee’s
motion is based on Rule 60(b)(3) because of purported fraud, 11 it is untimely. Such
motions cannot be brought more than a year after the entry of judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The motion is Lee’s attempt to once again rehash arguments the
Court has already rejected. 12 That Lee disagrees with the Court’s disposition of her
claims is not a reason that can justify the relief she seeks.

11

See, e.g., ECF 116, at 1, 12.

12

See, e.g., ECF 107, 115.

III.

Conclusion
Lee’s motion [ECF 116] is DENIED. This action remains CLOSED. Further

frivolous filings in this action will be summarily denied.
SO ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 2024.

Steven D. Grimberg
United States District Judge