Progressive Mountain Insurance Company v. Mobile Maintenance On The Go, LLLP et al

Filing 94

ORDER granting 87 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court hereby DECLARES that Petitioner does not owe Respondents any coverage obligation with respect to any claim arising from the October 21, 2018 accident because Helene Julien is not an insured under the terms of the Policy. Petitioner shall refile the motion for default judgment as to Mobile Maintenance within ten days of this Order. Signed by Judge J. P. Boulee on 6/17/2022. (anc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
PROGRESSIVE MOUNTAIN
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:20-CV-1665-JPB

MOBILE MAINTENANCE ON THE
GO, LLLP, HELENE JULIEN and
JESSE ESPINOZA,
Respondents.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Progressive Mountain Insurance
Company’s (“Petitioner”) Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 87].
This Court finds as follows:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the instant case, the parties dispute whether an insurance policy, issued by
Petitioner to Mobile Maintenance on the Go, LLLP (“Mobile Maintenance”),
provides coverage for injuries sustained by Helene Julien (“Julien”) following a
2018 car accident involving an uninsured motorist. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment on April 17, 2020, and an Amended Petition for Declaratory
Judgment on June 1, 2020, against Mobile Maintenance, Julien and Jesse

Espinoza.1 [Doc. 1]; [Doc. 11]. Petitioner moved for default judgment as to
Mobile Maintenance on October 21, 2020. [Doc. 28]. On February 17, 2021,
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 40]. Jesse Espinoza and
Julien (together, “Respondents”) then filed a motion to withdraw admissions—
some of which formed the basis of Petitioner’s summary judgment motion—on
February 26, 2021. [Doc. 46]. On February 10, 2022, the Court granted the
motion to withdraw admissions and denied without prejudice Petitioner’s motion
for summary judgment.2 [Doc. 85]. Petitioner filed a Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment on February 18, 2022. [Doc. 87].
FACTUAL HISTORY
The Court derives the facts of this case from Petitioner’s Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts, [Doc. 87-2]; Respondents’ Response to Petitioner’s
Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, [Doc. 89]; and Petitioner’s Reply to
Respondents’ Response to Petitioner’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute,
[Doc. 92-1]. The Court also conducted its own review of the record.

1

Petitioner initially named Brandon Donald, the uninsured motorist, as a respondent, but
the claims against him were dismissed without prejudice upon consent of the parties on
March 25, 2021. [Doc. 66].
2
Also on February 10, 2022, the Court denied without prejudice Petitioner’s motion for
default judgment as to Mobile Maintenance, explaining that Petitioner could refile the
motion pending the adjudication of the merits of the case with respect to the other
respondents. [Doc. 86].
2

The Local Rules of this Court require a respondent to a summary judgment
motion to include with its responsive brief “[a] response to the movant’s statement
of undisputed facts.” N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 56.1(B)(2)(a). The Local Rules make clear
that the Court will deem each of the movant’s facts admitted unless the respondent
refutes or objects to the fact or shows that the fact is either immaterial or
unsupported by the record.3 Further, in accordance with the Local Rules, this
Court will not consider unsupported facts. The Court will, however, use its
discretion to consider all facts the Court deems material after reviewing the record.
For the purpose of adjudicating this Motion, the facts are as follows.
Mobile Maintenance is a family cleaning business operated by Julien, Jesse
Espinoza (Julien’s daughter) and Javier Espinoza (Jesse Espinoza’s husband). In
March 2015, United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”) issued an
automobile insurance policy to Jesse Espinoza4 that covered two vehicles. [Doc.

Respondents responded to many facts by stating that they “could not recall” certain
details. See, e.g., [Doc. 89, p. 11] (“Respondents cannot recall how all payments were
made but deny they requested a business policy.”). The Local Rules set forth three
distinct bases for objecting to a fact; an inability to remember a given fact, absent more,
is not one of them. Consequently, where Respondents claim an inability to recall a fact,
the Court will deem it admitted.
4
At some point between 2015 and the filing of this case, Jesse Espinoza changed her
name from “Jesse Julien.” Although some documents were signed by “Jesse Julien,” the
Court refers to “Jesse Espinoza” for the sake of clarity. Additionally, her name appears
as both as “Jesse Espinoza” and “Jessie Espinoza” throughout the filings. The Court will
use the former spelling, which appears on the docket.
3

3

89, pp. 7–8]. Later, in 2016, Jesse Espinoza completed a vendor agreement for
Mobile Maintenance to clean apartments owned by AMLI, listing Mobile
Maintenance as the vendor. Id. at 9–10. That agreement required Mobile
Maintenance to obtain at least $1,000,000 in automobile liability insurance. [Doc.
84-3, p. 4]. Jesse Espinoza thus asked USAA to increase the coverage limits on
the policy that was issued in 2015. [Doc. 88, p. 3]. USAA was unable to increase
the policy limits and referred Jesse Espinoza to Petitioner, who issued a
commercial automobile policy with the necessary coverage.5 Id. at 4.
At issue here are the terms of the policy from Petitioner (the “Policy”) that
provided coverage from January 18, 2018, to January 18, 2019,6 for a 2007 Dodge
Ram, and specifically, whether those terms extend coverage to Julien. [Doc. 89, p.
2]; [Doc. 40-2, p. 3]. Around 10:52 PM on October 15, 2018, in Gwinnett County,
Georgia, a Honda Civic—driven by Brandon Donald, an uninsured motorist—

Petitioner received limited information about Jesse Espinoza’s prior insurance coverage
when she applied for a policy. Petitioner received the number of the USAA policy, dates
of coverage and the bodily injury coverage limit, see [Doc. 89, p. 12], but was not
provided with information about the nature of the USAA policy or the name of the
insured party, [Doc. 84-10, pp. 6–7]. When deposed, Petitioner’s 30(b)(6) representative
testified that “an application was submitted through [a USAA agent] requesting a
commercial auto policy issued to Mobile Maintenance on the Go.” [Doc. 84-10, p. 57].
That representative also explained that Jesse Espinoza requested a certificate of
insurance, which can only be issued under a commercial automobile policy. Id. at 52.
6
It appears that the subject Policy was a renewal of a prior policy issued by Petitioner.
See [Doc. 84-5, p. 68].
5

4

struck Julien when she was walking from the grocery store to her daughter’s house.
[Doc. 89, pp. 1–2]. Julien sustained severe injuries in the accident. Id. at 6. On
October 2, 2020, Julien filed suit against Brandon Donald in the State Court of
Gwinnett County and served Petitioner as the purported underinsured motorist
carrier.7 Id. at 7; see [Doc. 40-3].
The Policy named Mobile Maintenance as the insured, and premium
payments for the Policy were made via electronic transfers from Mobile
Maintenance’s bank account. [Doc. 89, pp. 2, 10–11]. When applying for the
Policy, Jesse Espinoza represented that the vehicle to be insured was used only for
business purposes. Id. at 6.
Two sections of the Policy are relevant to this action: the Uninsured
Motorist Coverage Endorsement and the Medical Payments Coverage
Endorsement (the “Endorsements”). The Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Endorsement stated that Petitioner would
pay for damages, other than punitive or exemplary damages, which an
insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured auto because of bodily injury or property damage:
7

The record shows that Jesse Espinoza and Javier Espinoza were the named insureds on
a GEICO automobile insurance policy that was in effect from June 7, 2018, to December
7, 2018. See [Doc. 84-8, p. 3]. Accordingly, that policy—which provided $50,000 in
uninsured motorist coverage—was effective at the time of the October 15, 2018 accident.
See id. In fact, Julien received $50,000 under the GEICO policy in settlement of the
claims arising from the accident. See [Doc. 84-9].
5

1.
2.
3.

[s]ustained by an insured;
caused by an accident; and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an
uninsured auto.

Id. at 4. The Uninsured Motorist Coverage Endorsement provided the following
definition of an “insured”:
if the named insured shown on the declarations page is a corporation,
partnership, organization, or any other entity that is not a natural
person:
(i)
any person occupying an insured auto or temporary
substitute auto; and
(ii) any person who is entitled to recover damages covered by
this endorsement because of bodily injury sustained by a
person described in (i) above.
Id. The Medical Payments Coverage Endorsement provided coverage for expenses
due to bodily injury “sustained by an insured; . . . caused by an accident; and . . .
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle or trailer.” Id.
at 5. The Medical Payments Coverage Endorsement defined “insured” as follows:
“if the named insured shown on the declarations page is a corporation, partnership,
organization, or any other entity that is not a natural person, [an ‘insured’ is] any
person occupying [the] insured auto, temporary substitute auto, or a trailer while
attached to an insured auto.” Id. at 6.
In the Motion before the Court, Petitioner seeks a declaratory judgment that
it owes no obligation to Julien, while Respondents claim that Julien is entitled to

6

coverage under the Policy’s Uninsured Motorist Coverage Endorsement and
Medical Payments Coverage Endorsement.
ANALYSIS
A.

Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a “court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A material fact is
any fact that “is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law
which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d
642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). A genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Ultimately, “[t]he basic issue
before the court on a motion for summary judgment is ‘whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Allen, 121 F.3d at
646 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing
that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, “and in deciding whether the
movant has met this burden the court must view the movant’s evidence and all

7

factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Id. After the movant satisfies this initial burden, the nonmovant bears the
burden of showing specific facts indicating that summary judgment is improper
because a material issue of fact does exist. Id. However, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of
evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be
enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v.
Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
If the record taken as a whole cannot lead “a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is ‘no genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)).
B.

Claim for Declaratory Relief
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Julien is

not an “insured” under the terms of the Policy and is thus not eligible for coverage
under either the Uninsured Motorist Coverage Endorsement or the Medical
Payments Coverage Endorsement. Respondents concede that Mobile Maintenance
is the named insured on the Policy. However, they contend that this was an error
and that they intended to procure a personal policy in the name of Javier Espinoza
(who is not a party to this action) or Jesse Espinoza—in which case Julien, as a

8

relative of the insured, would receive coverage—rather than a commercial
automobile policy insuring Mobile Maintenance. Below, the Court considers the
Policy’s terms as applied to this case before turning to the parties’ respective
intentions.
Under Georgia law, “insurance is a matter of contract, and the parties to an
insurance policy are bound by its plain and unambiguous terms.” Richards v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561, 563 (Ga. 1983). Therefore, “as with any
contract,” the Court begins “with the text of the contract itself.” Reed v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 667 S.E.2d 90, 92 (Ga. 2008). If the contract is unambiguous, the
Court’s role “is simply to apply the terms of the contract as written, regardless of
whether doing so benefits the carrier or the insured.” Id. Courts have “no legal
authority to disregard” policy language that is unambiguous. Cotton States Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Hipps, 481 S.E.2d 876, 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). Finally, “contract
disputes are well suited for adjudication by summary judgment because
construction of contracts is ordinarily a matter of law for the court.” Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Somers, 591 S.E.2d 430, 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
The parties in this case do not dispute that Mobile Maintenance is the named
insured on the Policy, nor do they dispute that only an “insured” party is eligible
for uninsured motorist coverage and medical payments coverage. The parties also

9

do not contest the language that appears in the Policy: to qualify as an “insured”
for the purposes of the Endorsements when the named insured is a partnership (like
Mobile Maintenance), a claimant must have been “occupying an insured auto or
temporary substitute auto” at the time of injury. [Doc. 89, p. 4]; see also id. at 6.
Julien was indisputably a pedestrian when she was struck by an uninsured motorist
and thus falls outside the applicable definition of “insured.” The plain terms of the
Policy, then—by which this Court is bound—preclude her from recovering any
benefits under the Endorsements. Respondents have not argued, and the Court
does not perceive, that any ambiguity exists in the language at issue. See Ace Am.
Ins. Co. v. Wattles Co., 930 F.3d 1240, 1252 (11th Cir. 2019) (“If the policy
language is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be enforced according to its
plain terms.”); see also Hipps, 481 S.E.2d at 878 (“It is well settled that where no
ambiguity in a policy of insurance exists, the courts must adhere to the contract
made by the parties even if it is beneficial to the insurer and detrimental to the
insured . . . .”). The Policy’s language clearly and unambiguously dictates that
Julien is not an “insured” and is thus ineligible for coverage. Petitioner has shown
that no genuine issue of fact exists as to the terms of the Policy, and thus the
burden shifts to Respondent to establish that a dispute of fact precludes summary
judgment.

10

Although Respondents admit that the Policy exists, that it was issued to
Mobile Maintenance and that it contains the language above, they nonetheless
argue that they intended to procure a personal insurance policy in the name of
Jesse Espinoza or Javier Espinoza. Had they done so, Respondents contend, Julien
would be covered under the Policy as a “relative” of the “named insured.”8 [Doc.
40-2, pp. 39, 46].
Respondents’ arguments on this point are unavailing. As the facts show, the
Policy was issued to Mobile Maintenance, premiums were paid from Mobile
Maintenance’s account and Jesse Espinoza represented that the vehicle (a 2007
Dodge Ram) under the Policy would be used only for business purposes.
Nonetheless, Respondents claim that because the 2007 Dodge Ram is titled in
Javier Espinoza’s name, Petitioner could not have intended to provide coverage for
this vehicle as to Mobile Maintenance only. Georgia courts, though, have rejected
the argument that the owner of a vehicle necessarily equals the insured party on a
policy for that vehicle, finding this position “untenable.” Pa. Lumbermens Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Haney, 375 S.E.2d 293, 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). The fact that the

8

If the named insured on the Policy is a natural person, the Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Endorsement defines “insured” as including “a relative.” [Doc. 40-2, p. 39]. Similarly, if
the insured party is a natural person, an “insured” under the Medical Payments Coverage
Endorsement includes “any relative when struck by a land motor vehicle of any type or a
trailer while not occupying a motor vehicle.” Id. at 46.
11

covered vehicle was titled to Javier Espinoza does not mean that he is
automatically the named insured or that the parties intended as such.
Although Respondents admit that Mobile Maintenance is the named insured,
they claim that this fact “does not demonstrate that the intent of the [P]olicy was
not to afford the coverage to [Javier] Espinoza and his resident relatives.” [Doc.
88, p. 10]. Respondents rely heavily on Purcell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 310
S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), to support their position, but the facts of that case
are easily distinguishable. In Purcell, the plaintiff was the sole proprietor of a
business, Purcell Radiator Service, who purchased an insurance policy for the
business’s vehicle. Id. at 531. After the plaintiff’s wife was injured by an
uninsured motorist when she was a pedestrian, the insurer claimed that it owed no
coverage because the wife was not a “family member” of the insured—i.e., of
Purcell Radiator Service. Id. However, the Georgia Court of Appeals “reversed a
judgment for the insurer, holding that since Purcell Radiator Service was a sole
proprietorship, it was not a distinct entity, but merely a trade name used by Mr.
Purcell.” Pa. Lumbermens, 375 S.E.2d at 294. Importantly, Georgia courts have
subsequently distinguished Purcell from insurance disputes involving other kinds
of legal entities. See id. at 295 (“An essential difference between [Purcell] and the
present case is that the named insured in this case, a corporation, is a distinct entity

12

which is capable of being insured in an insurance policy.”); Bernard v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 426 S.E.2d 29, 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing Purcell and
explaining that “[a] sole proprietorship was distinguished from a corporation on the
basis that the former is not a distinct entity”). Respondents have not argued that
Mobile Maintenance, a limited liability limited partnership, is not a distinct legal
entity, and the terms of the Policy clearly contemplate that a partnership can serve
as a named insured.
Respondents also cite Purcell for the proposition that an ambiguous
contractual provision should be interpreted in favor of the insured party. See
Purcell, 310 S.E.2d at 533 (“Where a provision in a policy is susceptible to two or
more constructions, the courts will adopt that construction which is most favorable
to the insured.” (quoting Greer v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 253 S.E.2d 408, 409 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1979))). Yet Respondents identify no language in the Policy that is
susceptible to multiple interpretations. In the absence of ambiguous language, the
Court need not reach the issue of adopting a certain construction.
Finally, Respondents contend that an issue of fact exists as to whether they
intended to “convert” the USAA policy into a commercial policy when they
applied for coverage from Petitioner. [Doc. 88, p. 13]. Again, Respondents cite to
Purcell: “The construction placed upon a [contract] by the parties thereto, as

13

shown by their acts and conduct, is entitled to much weight and may be conclusive
upon them.” 310 S.E.2d at 533 (alteration in original) (quoting Copenhaver v.
United Am. Inv. Co., 101 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957)). Despite
Respondents’ contention, the facts do not support a conclusion that the parties’
intention was to simply “switch” the USAA policy to Petitioner. When Jesse
Espinoza applied for the Policy, she indicated that the covered vehicle would be
used only for business purposes. Further, Jesse Espinoza acknowledged that
Petitioner issued a policy in the name of Mobile Maintenance after she provided
the vendor agreement and requested a policy that complied with its terms. See
[Doc. 84-5, p. 58]. She never contacted Petitioner to ask why the Policy was in the
name of Mobile Maintenance, despite renewing the Policy. See id. at 68. As to
Petitioner, its intent could not have been to issue a personal automobile policy in
this instance: Petitioner does not offer any personal automobile policies with
coverage limits of $1,000,000. See [Doc. 87-1, p. 3].
Further, the law weighs against Respondents’ position about their supposed
intent. “The general rule is that insureds are chargeable with knowledge of the
contents of their policies.” Se. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Empire Banking Co., 498 S.E.2d
282, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). Insured parties “are presumed to know [the
policy’s] conditions if they intend to rely upon its benefits, or else they must find

14

out those conditions.” Hipps, 481 S.E.2d at 878. As such, Jesse Espinoza is
presumed to know the Policy’s terms, including who qualifies as an “insured”
under its provisions.
As the foregoing analysis shows, the plain language of the Policy dictates
that Julien is not eligible for coverage under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Endorsement or the Medical Payments Coverage Endorsement. Respondents have
not identified any language in the Policy that is so ambiguous as to require this
Court to interpret it, and the facts do not support Respondents’ claim that they
intended to procure a policy other than the one at issue in this case. Accordingly,
Petitioner has shown that it is entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Court hereby DECLARES that Petitioner does not owe Respondents
any coverage obligation with respect to any claim arising from the October 21,
2018 accident because Helene Julien is not an “insured” under the terms of the
Policy. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 87] is
GRANTED. Petitioner shall refile the motion for default judgment as to Mobile
Maintenance within ten days of this Order.

15

SO ORDERED this 17th day of June, 2022.

16