Coalition for Good Governance et al v. Raffensperger et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT filed by Aileen Nakamura, B. Joy Wasson, Elizabeth Throop, Coalition for Good Governance, Rhonda J. Martin and Jeanne Dufort. (Filing fee $400.00, receipt number AGANDC-9610605) (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(eop) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/commonly-used-forms to obtain Pretrial Instructions and Pretrial Associated Forms which includes the Consent To Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate form.

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 1 of 132

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE,
RHONDA J. MARTIN, JEANNE DUFORT,
AILEEN NAKAMURA, B. JOY WASSON,
AND ELIZABETH THROOP,

Civil Action File No.

Plaintiffs,
v.
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his official
capacity as the SECRETARY OF STATE of
the STATE OF GEORGIA, and REBECCA
N. SULLIVAN, DAVID J. WORLEY,
MATTHEW MASHBURN and AHN LE, in
their official capacities as members of the
Georgia State Election Board,
Defendants.

COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Coalition for Good Governance (“Coalition”), Rhonda J. Martin,
Jeanne Dufort, Aileen Nakamura, B. Joy Wasson, and Elizabeth Throop bring this
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for immediate and permanent
prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against the State of Georgia’s
Secretary of State, Brad Raffensperger, and State Election Board Members

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Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley, Matthew Mashburn and Ahn Le, all in their
official capacities.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1.
This lawsuit seeks immediate changes to the State of Georgia’s in-person
and absentee mail ballot voting systems and procedures to protect the right to vote
during the COVID-19 pandemic, including a three-week postponement of the June
9, 2020 election to June 30, 2020. These changes must be put in place now, both
to protect the June and August elections and also to anticipate the November 2020
general election. Only by acting now can the Defendants assure the orderly
conduct of upcoming elections without disenfranchising citizens.
2.
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to ravage the State and the Nation. As
of April 20, a reported 733 Georgians have died of the disease, 181 in just the
previous five days. Another 3,550 have been hospitalized – many in serious
condition fighting for their lives. Over 18,947 Georgians have tested positive for
COVID-19, but because Georgia has only tested a small fraction of citizens, the
actual number of infected citizens is likely many times more.

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3.
According to projections, pandemic conditions in Georgia will continue
throughout the period in which Georgia will be preparing for and conducting the
June 9 election. Based on its current projections, the Institute for Health Metrics
and Evaluations at the University of Washington warns that it will not be safe to
relax social distancing in Georgia until after June 15, 2020, and even then only if
Georgia has containment strategies in place, such as testing, contact tracing,
isolation, and contained limitations on the size of gatherings.
4.
The Nation recently watched in despair as all branches of government in
Wisconsin failed to take action under similar circumstances to address the impact
that the pandemic was having upon the election there. As a result, Wisconsin
voters’ constitutional rights were violated and the legitimacy of the election
undermined.

Unless injunctive relief is granted immediately, Georgia citizens

will find themselves in the same position as Wisconsin citizens: unable to vote in
person without exposing themselves to the virus; unable to vote absentee by mail
because the State has not planned for and is not equipped to accurately process and
count the anticipated deluge of absentee mail ballots.

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5.
Georgia voters must not be forced to choose between their own personal
safety and exercising their fundamental right to vote, as were voters in Wisconsin.
“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of
representative government.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). Inherent
in the right to vote freely is the right to vote without risking health and safety,
particularly where appropriately tailored election procedures can eliminate or
substantially mitigate such risks. Defendants, therefore, have the affirmative
obligation to take all steps necessary to ensure that every Georgia citizen qualified
to vote may vote in-person or by mail ballot without being forced to expose
himself or herself to unnecessary risks of contracting or spreading COVID-19.
6.
In response to the pandemic, federal, state, county, and local officials have
undertaken measures to slow the spread of the coronavirus, including school and
business closures, mandated social distancing, and orders to shelter-in-place.

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The central purposes of these protective measures are to limit contact between
persons and to minimize exposure to surfaces that may be contaminated with the
coronavirus.
7.
Almost everything that is typically required to be done to prepare for and
conduct elections is at odds with social distancing and minizing contact with
contaminated objects and surfaces. In-person voting by its very nature features
large numbers of people in close contact with each other with a high degree of
interpersonal interaction. In-person voting as it is currently conducted in Georgia
requires voters and approximately 8,000 pollworkers to touch commonly used
physical objects and surfaces which, under the circumstances of a public election,
are almost certain to become contaminated by the virus that spreads this highly
contagious disease. There is no effective way to keep these objections and
surfaces clean. Pollworkers themselves are particularly vulnerable because they
are often over 70 years old, are forced into close contact with each other and
numerous voters, and must touch many surfaces and objects that will almost
certainly become contaminated with the virus.

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8.
Unless in-person voting is carefully planned, regulated, and diligently
managed, and unless significant changes are made to how people vote in Georgia,
voting in Georgia will remain dangerous to voters and pollworkers for the
foreseeable future. If voting remains dangerous, voters will be forced to choose
between their personal safety and exercising their fundamental right to vote. Those
who do choose to vote will be severely burdened by the risk to their personal
health that must be paid as a sort of “poll tax” for exercising their right to do so.
9.
In addition, if election officials are unable to recruit a sufficient number of
pollworkers prepared to take the risk of such conditions, there is a great danger that
the State will disenfranchise voters by improperly and hastily closing poll
locations, limiting early voting, creating long lines, or limiting the hours during
which people may vote. Without new controls and system transparency, mail
ballot voting in volumes never before experienced in Georgia will result in lost or
delayed applications and ballots and in improperly rejected or accepted ballots.
Further, unless voting is widely perceived to be safe well in advance of the
election, there are myriad ways that the vote will be suppressed or manipulated by

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those who will take advantage of the pandemic, or the confusion created by the
pandemic, for unfair political gain.
10.
The integrity and legitimacy of the upcoming elections will not be
maintained if the protection of constitutional rights is left to the State — other than
postponing the elections to June 9, none of the General Assembly, the Governor,
the Secretary of State, and the State Election Board has taken any meaningful
action to protect the health of the election officials, pollworkers, and voters who
will participate in upcoming elections. (The Secretary did mail absentee ballot
applications to all Georgia registered voters, but incorrectly mailed 625,000 of the
applications to the voters’ residential addresses, instead of their mailing addresses.)
11.
Plaintiffs bring this action to compel the Defendants to take immediate
action to ensure that Plaintiffs’ rights to vote and to receive equal protection are
not violated by the failure of the State to address the dangers presented by the
pandemic. Plaintiffs seek an order requiring a three-week postponement of the
June 9 election to June 30, coupled with a number of operational changes
necessary to ensure that public health is better during the conduct of the election.

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With respect to in-person voting, Plaintiffs seek an order requiring the replacement
of touchscreen ballot marking devices with simple hand marked paper ballots and
disposable pens, as well as certain other measures to give local officials options to
provide more flexible and safer voting conditions. With respect to absentee mail
ballot voting, the Plaintiffs seek an order requiring the Defendants to take steps to
make it more practical for voters to receive and to cast absentee mail ballots and to
ensure that all eligible mail ballots are properly counted, and ballots proven to be
ineligible are rejected. Plaintiffs also seek to require safer working conditions for
in-person and absentee mail ballot election workers, thus enabling counties to
recruit such workers in sufficient numbers to staff upcoming elections adequately
while also reducing the risk of transmission of disease.
12.
Separately, Plaintiffs also seek relief relating to three improper actions that
the Secretary has already taken during the pandemic: first, to reverse his position
and count all valid absentee ballots received before by June 9, 2020; second, to
correct the information on voters’ My Voter Page to accurately reflect status of
absentee ballot applications and ballots; third, to require the Secretary to mail

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approximately 625,000 absentee ballot applications to the correct mailing
addresses.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13.
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over each of the claims raised in
this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), § 1343
(jurisdiction over civil rights actions), § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction), § 2201
(jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief) and § 2202 (jurisdiction to grant relief
ancillary to declaratory judgment).
14.
Venue lies in the Northern District of Georgia pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because some of the offices of the Defendants are in Fulton
County and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
Plaintiffs’ claims occurred and are threatened to occur in this judicial district.

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PARTIES
A.

Plaintiffs
15.

Plaintiff Coalition for Good Governance (“Coalition”) is a non-profit
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Colorado. (Other
information about Coalition, its Georgia membership, and the other Plaintiffs,
including their standing, is set forth in Part X, below).
16.
Plaintiff Rhonda Martin is a member and director of Coalition. Ms. Martin
is a registered voter in Fulton County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in
upcoming elections.
17.
Plaintiff Jeanne Dufort is a member of Coalition and registered voter in
Morgan County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in upcoming elections.
18.
Aileen Nakamura is a member of Coalition and a registered voter in Fulton
County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in-person in upcoming elections.

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19.
B. Joy Wasson is a member of Coalition and a registered voter in DeKalb
County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in upcoming elections.
20.
Elizabeth Throop is a member of Coalition and a registered voter in DeKalb
County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in upcoming elections.
B.

DEFENDANTS
21.

Defendant Brad Raffensperger is sued for prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Georgia.
Secretary Raffensperger is also the Chairman of the State Election Board, which is
responsible for the promulgation of election rules and regulations. Secretary
Raffensperger has the authority to call the State Election Board into session for the
consideration and adoption of emergency or permanent election rules.
22.
Secretary Raffensperger is a state official subject to suit in his official
capacity because his office “imbues him with the responsibility to enforce the law

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or laws at issue in the suit,” Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011),
specifically the election laws in the State of Georgia.
23.
State Election Board Members Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley,
Matthew Mashburn and Ahn Le (together with the Secretary, the “State Board
Members”) are also sued in their official capacities. Acting through the State
Board, the State Board Members collectively have the duty to promulgate rules and
regulations to obtain uniformity in election practices, as well as the legality and
purity of all primaries and elections, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(1), and to formulate,
adopt, and promulgate such rules and regulations, consistent with law, as will be
conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(2).
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
A.

Government Responses to the Pandemic
24.

The first American died of COVID-19 on February 29, 2020, in Washington
State. Two weeks later, on March 13, 2020, President Trump issued national
emergency declarations. Governor Kemp declared a state emergency on March 14

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and, on April 8, extended it to May 13. These declarations came weeks after
individual jurisdictions had closed schools or imposed local “shelter in place”
regulations.
25.
Though the particular measures and regulations relating to the pandemic
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in general these measures include the
following requirements:
• Prohibition on public gatherings of more than 10 people;
• Closure of all non-essential businesses and organizations;
• Closure of all schools, colleges and universities;
• Closure of restaurants for in-restaurant service;
• “Shelter in place” regulations requiring people to stay at home;
• Social distancing requirements or recommendations for individuals to
stay at least six feet apart;
• The need for individuals to wear protective masks in public.

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B.

The State Is Failing to Responsibly Address the Impact of the
COVID-19 Pandemic Upon Elections
26.

The June 9 election currently includes the originally scheduled March 24
Presidential Primary, a small number of originally scheduled March 24 special
elections, the statewide primaries for state and county offices originally scheduled
for May 19, and other special elections such as state office vacancy elections called
recently such as State Senate District 4.
27.
On March 14, the Secretary postponed the March 24, 2020 presidential
primary from March 24 to May 19, citing his authority under O.C.G.A § 21-2-50.1
to do so. Early voting was announced to begin April 27, with voting system
programming and public voting system testing to take place in early April. It soon
became obvious that postponing the Election Day only to May 19 was inadequate
as County officials could not open offices or recruit pollworkers. Additionally, the
Secretary had missed hard deadlines for building the May 19 ballots so that
counties could proof and release them for timely printing. For weeks, the
Secretary resisted calls to postpone the election again, including from the Speaker
of the House of the Georgia General Assembly, taking the position that he had no

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authority to do so. As the Speaker explained, the Secretary’s position that he had
no legal authority to postpone the election again was incorrect.
28.
On April 9, the Secretary announced a postponement of the May 19
elections for three weeks, to June 9. As explained in greater detail below, given
the ongoing pandemic, and the continuing difficulty of recruiting pollworkers, the
Secretary should have postponed the election until at least June 30.
29.
Though early voting for the June 9, 2020 election will begin on May 18 with
staff-intensive preparations beginning approximately May 4, the Secretary has
made little effort to address what essential changes to elections are necessary to
make it safe for voters, election officials, and pollworkers to participate in the
upcoming elections that are to be held during the pandemic.
30.
The Secretary has also not responded to urgent requests to address the
impact of the pandemic on Georgia’s elections. On March 23, Coalition wrote the
Secretary copying the State Board describing in detail necessary reforms that are

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similar to those addressed in this Complaint. (See Exhibit A). The Secretary has
not acknowledged or responded to this letter.
31.
The Secretary also has completely failed to address the singular danger to
public health that is posed by the State’s new touchscreen ballot marking devices
(BMDs). The coronavirus will survive on the surfaces of touchscreen BMDs for
days, and using the BMDs for in-person voting will obviously enable the
transmission of the COVID-19 virus.
32.
On April 6, 2020, concerned voters and organizations, including the
Plaintiffs, submitted a formal request to the Secretary for a reevaluation of the
health risks posed by the BMDs during the pandemic. (A true and correct copy of
the Reexamination Request, submitted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.24, and its
relevant supplemental information, are attached hereto as Exhibit B). The
Secretary has not responded to the Reexamination Request and there is no
indication that he will take any serious action to address the issues raised by the
Request.

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33.
Beyond authorizing the use of mail ballot dropboxes, neither the Secretary
nor the State Election Board has made any attempt to issue guidance or emergency
rules to safeguard the polling places and election offices. The Centers for Disease
Control has issued a publication providing guidance for improving public health
and safety in elections entitled “Recommendations for Election Polling Place
Locations – Interim Guidance to Prevent Spread of Coronavirus Disease (COVID19) (attached as Exhibit C). Defendants are not taking this or other expert advice
to heart, and they have taken none of the essential steps required to keep elections
in Georgia safe during the pandemic.
34.
For example, the Secretary should have anticipated that pollworkers would
need masks. He did not. This left Cobb County in the position of having to post a
request on the internet for public donations of personal protective equipment for
pollworkers. (A true and correct copy of Cobb County’s internet posting is
attached hereto as Exhibit D).

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35.
On April 6, in the Secretary’s only press conference to address the COVID19 crisis, the Secretary, without any evidence, praised the touchscreen BMDs as
safe and effective, stating that they represent a “good thing” that should not be
changed. Rather than outlining any plan for relief or guidance to county election
officials, the Secretary stated that he would appoint a voter fraud task force of law
enforcement officials to investigate “all instances of uncured signature
mismatches” on mail ballot envelopes and “unaccounted for votes from multiple
voters sharing the same address.” These measures have nothing to do with
mitigating the health risks posed by conducting an election during a pandemic.
Existing laws already govern how so-called signature mismatches are supposed to
be cured, and there is no evidence that deliberate forgeries cannot be investigated
by existing law enforcement personnel. And, of course, there is nothing fraudulent
in sharing a home with another voter. Dedicating additional resources to prevent
mail ballot voter fraud does nothing to address or mitigate the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic upon Georgia voters. The Secretary’s inclination to focus on
matters completely distinct from the public health challenge at hand speaks

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volumes about the need for the Court’s intervention to avoid chaotic and
unconstitutional elections during an unprecedented global pandemic.
36.
The State Election Board has also not addressed the impact of the COVID19 pandemic upon Georgia elections. On April 15, 2020, Secretary Raffensperger
led a long-scheduled meeting of the Board. During the public comment period,
citizens, including Plaintiff Jeanne Dufort, expressed grave concerns about voting
safety, pleading with the Board to address the dangers the COVID-19 pandemic
presents to public health in the polling places. The Board did not, however,
address the concerns raised. Instead, the only pandemic-related action that the
Board took was to authorize mail ballot drop boxes as an emergency rule. The
same was true for the Board’s seven-hour March 11, 2020 meeting: despite formal
requests from Coalition for it to do so, the Board did not address any ways to
mitigate the impact of COVID-19 upon elections in Georgia.
37.
The State Election Board has the duty to “formulate, adopt, and promulgate
such rules and regulations, consistent with law, as will be conducive to the fair,
legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections.” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(2).

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Under the Secretary’s leadership, the State Election Board is not fulfilling this
duty.
38.
County election boards cannot be expected to step into the role that must be
filled by the Defendants. In fact, if a county election board were to take
independent action to modify election procedures to mitigate the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on a local scale, it is highly likely that the county would be
restrained or punished by the State Election Board for doing so. For example,
earlier this year the Athens-Clarke County Board of Elections made the decision to
replace touchscreen BMDs with hand marked paper ballots because the county had
concluded that it was “impossible or impracticable” to use BMDs without violating
voters’ state constitutional and statutory rights to absolute right ballot secrecy. In
March, the State Election Board initiated formal action against the Athens-Clarke
County Board of Elections for making this independent decision, by levying fines
and threatening further action. Unless counties are ordered to do so by the
Secretary or by the Board, local election superintendents will be unable to take
steps to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic upon elections.

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39.
For its part, the General Assembly’s session is suspended and leadership
appears disinclined to reconvene to address the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on
the conduct of the upcoming elections.
C.

The Course of the Pandemic and Upcoming Elections
40.

It is extremely difficult to project the course of the pandemic in Georgia and
nationwide because so little is known about the coronavirus or about how any
easing of current restrictions may prolong the pandemic’s spread or accelerate its
reemergence. And, even if Georgia’s population generally were to become
relatively free of COVID-19, “hot spots” can emerge or reemerge in a particular
community that may mandate extraordinary and essential protective measures.
41.
Even in ordinary times, for elections to proceed in an orderly manner, and
for citizens to be able to know sufficiently well in advance how, when, and where
they can vote, the rules and procedures for voting must be established weeks in
advance of any particular election. In addition, for purposes of establishing the
rules and procedures for voting, the time of an election is not Election Day itself,

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but is, rather, the period of time beginning no later than the day when the State
must begin mailing ballots to citizens and military voters overseas, which is
currently 45 days prior to Election Day, and extending through Election Day itself.
42.
Because of the uncertainty of the course of the pandemic, the length of the
election period in advance of an Election Day, and the need for election officials,
election workers, and voters to know well in advance of the election how, when,
and where to vote, rules and procedures to protect the right to vote during the
present pandemic must be implemented immediately.
43.
The actions required to protect the right to vote during the pandemic fall into
three major categories. First, as averred below in Part V, to ensure that the more
than month-long process of preparing for and conducting the election does not fall
within the period in which Georgia is still fighting the pandemic, the June 9
election should be moved at least to June 30. Second, as averred below in Part VI,
substantial changes must be made to in-person voting to make it more safe,
including most obviously the replacement of the touchscreen BMDs with hand
marked paper ballots. Third, as averred below in Part VII, a number of changes

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must be made to absentee mail voting so that the State can accurately and securely
process the foreseeably massive increase in mail voting that will be caused by the
pandemic. Fourth, as averred below in Part VIII, the Secretary must remedy
several specific recent failures that threaten to disenfranchise absentee voters in the
upcoming election. Together the changes averred to be necessary in Parts V, VI,
VII and VIII will be referred to as the Pandemic Voting Safety Measures.
44.
As averred below in Part IX, although all Georgia voters’ constitutional
rights will be infringed if Defendants do not undertake the Pandemic Voting Safety
Measures, the failure to do so will have a disparate and particularly severe impact
upon the elderly, the health-compromised, and those Georgians living in rural
areas.
CONDITIONS ARE UNSAFE TO HOLD THE ELECTION ON
JUNE 9, 2020
45.
This action seeks to postpone the June 9, 2020 election at least until June 30,
2020 in order to protect pollworkers and to allow voters to vote without fear for
their personal health and safety. Early in-person voting for a June 30, 2020

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election would be required by statute to begin on June 8, 2020. (O.C.G.A. § 21-2385(d)(1)(B).
46.
Though Election Day itself is not presently set to occur until June 9, labor
intensive preparation for the election should already be underway. Ballots must be
proofed, printed, and readied for mailing 49 days in advance. (O.C.G.A. § 21-2384(a)(2). Workers must be recruited, hired and trained weeks in advance of inperson Early Voting, which for the June 9 election starts on May 18, 2020. Voter
records must be updated. Servers, voting machines, and tabulators must be
programmed, tested, transported, secured, and set up in early voting polling places.
47.
State and local governments are already under enormous stress to fight the
COVID-19 pandemic with skeletal staffs and do not have the time or resources to
take all the actions necessary to conduct an orderly election. Worse, even without
the pandemic, this election features the largest new voting system implementation
in the Nation’s history.

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48.
Unless the June 9 election is postponed, all of the foregoing required
preparations will need to occur while the COVID-19 pandemic continues to ravage
the State of Georgia.
49.
The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of
Washington (“IHME”) publishes projections on the course of the COVID-19
pandemic for each State and many countries and updates those projections every
several days.
50.
According to IHME’s best information, through April 17, 2020, 667
Georgians had died because of COVID-19. IHME projects that, for the balance of
April, up to another 2,028 Georgians could die of the disease.
51.
For May, IHME projects that the death toll in Georgia will continue to
mount, rising by up to 1,295 more lives.

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52.
For purposes of weighing the burden on the right to vote of holding the
currently scheduled election during the pandemic, the most important figure is the
high-end figure in the range of the projections; that is, for example, 1,295 deaths
for the period of May 1 through June 1, 2020. IHME’s projections are widely
acknowledged to be among the best available, but IHME itself acknowledges that
large uncertainty intervals occur because of limited and conflicting data. Because
of these sources of uncertainty, IHME recommends that government officials “pay
attention to the full range of values in our forecast, especially the upper values.”
53.
Crucially, IHME’s projections assume that Georgia’s current social
distancing regulations will remain in effect until June 15, 2020, permitting Georgia
to enter a containment period. However, on April 20, the afternoon of this filing,
Governor Kemp announced that various businesses will be permitted to reopen this
week, despite the staggering number of daily COVID-19 related deaths. Within
the 24 hours prior to this filing, 44 more deaths were reported in Georgia due to
COVID-19. Indeed, IHME estimates that 34 Georgians will die of COVID-19 on
April 27, the day that the rules will start to be relaxed. Experts have warned that it

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is too early to reverse government mandated social distancing. Only four days ago
on April 16, Governor Kemp warned that the peak of infections and deaths “keeps
moving away” into the future. Since the State is relaxing these life-saving
measures so early, it is even more important to postpone the upcoming election
because it is much more likely that the pandemic will remain in full force longer
than anticipated.
54.
In addition, the accuracy of IHME’s local projections depend upon the
accuracy of the number of locally reported deaths caused by COVID-19. IHME
uses the number of reported deaths and an estimated fatality rate to estimate the
number of active infections, which in turn drives the projections for the duration
and severity of the disease. The overall projections, therefore, are highly sensitive
to the reported number of deaths. But in Georgia there is substantial evidence that
the number of deaths is underreported and, if this is the case, the duration and
severity of COVID-19 will be far worse that IHME currently is projecting.
55.
The IHME projections are for the entire state; the conditions in any
particular county will almost certainly be better or worse, or much better or much

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worse, than the average for the state as a whole. Thus, while the “average” county
may be projected to suffer only its share of the statewide projected number of
deaths, the conditions in many counties will be much worse. The per capita death
rate in Dougherty County, for example, is 15 times the state average. And the
variance is not just with small counties; the death rate in Chatham County is just a
quarter of the rate of the State overall, but it could easily exceed the statewide rate
in weeks to come as COVID-19 spreads into the area.
56.
It is not possible to project which counties will be experiencing more than
the statewide average of deaths during the election period and, more important, it is
not possible to postpone the election for just those counties. But it is possible to
project, to a near certainty, that for far too many counties, the COVID-19
pandemic will continue in full force through the June 9, 2020 election. This
foreseeable course of events places an unacceptable burden on the right to vote.
57.
Moving the date of the election from June 9 will also give the Secretary and
the counties time to correct the problems associated with the Secretary’s mailing of
absentee ballot applications. In an attempt to partially address the impact of

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COVID-19 pandemic, the Secretary of State on or about April 6, 2020 mailed
absentee ballot applications to all active Georgia registered voters. Rather than
using voters’ mailing addresses, however, the Secretary used residential addresses.
This was an inexcusable mistake by either the Secretary or the mailing vendor –
the database includes a mailing address for each voter when it is different than the
residential address for this very purpose. As a result of this error, approximately
625,000 Georgians were not sent absentee ballot applications at their correct
addresses. Worse, the counties that have been hit the hardest by the COVID-19
pandemic are also rural counties in which the highest percentage of registered
voters use a mailing address, not a residential address. If the election is postponed
to June 30, these voters will have the additional time necessary to obtain and
submit absentee ballot applications, receive absentee ballots, and vote by mail.
58.
The Secretary surveyed county election boards in early April to determine
their staffing expectations before announcing the delay to June 9. The results were
alarming and supported a delay far beyond June 9. For example, Lee County
disclosed that it had lost almost 50% of its pollworkers. (Exhibit E)

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59.
Separately, the Jackson County Election Board, recognizing both the
impossibility of operating polling places safely and the loss of pollworkers,
submitted a resolution to State Officials seeking to convert this election to an all
mail-ballot election to safeguard the upcoming elections. (See Exhibit F).
60.
Richard Barron, Fulton County’s Election Director, told WAOK radio on
April 14 that his office had 100,000 pieces of absentee ballot application mail to
process, including the wrongly addressed undeliverable applications sent to
residential addresses.
61.
In a video, Cobb County Elections Director Janine Evelar described the
crushing workload caused by having to process an enormous increase in absentee
ballot applications, the lack of supplies, and an inadequate number of pollworkers.1

1

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apQiy4nxkGw&feature=youtu.be

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62.
These chaotic conditions will not be resolved before the intense preparation
activities necessary to support the June 9 elections begin. More time is needed for
election officials to meet the challenges posed by the pandemic and exacerbated by
the Defendants’ inaction. Although election officials bear these burdens directly,
their collective inability to successfully conduct the upcoming elections will
indirectly result in severe burdens on Georgia voters.
63.
Moving the date of the upcoming election is not prohibited by federal law
(unlike the date of the Presidential election in November, which may only be
moved by Act of Congress). Many States have already postponed their primary
elections until well into the summer in order to protect voters. Some have pushed
their state and federal primaries into July, including New Jersey (July 7), Louisiana
(July 11), and Alabama (July 14). Kentucky, New York, and Virginia have
postponed their States’ primaries until June 23. North Carolina postponed its
Congressional District 11 runoff to June 23.

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64.
Georgia law gives the Secretary the discretion to move this election again
(from its current date of June 9) because of the ongoing national emergency.
(O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50.1). In addition, moving the election to June 30, 2020 will not
require moving the currently scheduled August 11, 2020 runoff elections. Military
and overseas voters can also receive ballots for the August 11 runoff in a timely
fashion with the more compressed June 30 election schedule.
65.
Not moving the election from June 9 to at least June 30 threatens to
unreasonably burden Plaintiffs’ right to vote because it will force voting during
pandemic conditions and because election officials will be unprepared to conduct
in-person elections or process absentee mail applications and ballots in an orderly,
accurate, safe, and secure manner.
CHANGES TO IN-PERSON VOTING
A.

Touchscreen Ballot Marking Devices Must be Replaced by Hand
Marked Paper Ballots
66.

Prior to the onset of the pandemic, the State of Georgia was in the process of
implementing the first statewide use of a new voting system featuring touchscreen

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ballot marking devices (BMDs) supplied by Dominion Voting Systems. This is the
largest and most complex voting system conversion ever attempted in the Nation.
To date, the new system has only been used in about 225 Georgia polling places.
In the next election, the new system will be used for the first time in 2,075 other
polling places, a singularly challenging endeavor that unavoidably will require an
enormous amount of training, debugging, and complex installation work. This
daunting work is made more complex by the loss of thousands of experienced and
trained pollworkers due to the pandemic, and the need to safeguard those who are
assigned to those labor-intensive tasks of voting system preparations.
67.
BMDs are plagued with serious constitutional defects that are being
challenged in other litigation. See Curling v. Raffensperger, No. 17-cv-29898-AT
(N.D. Ga.). For example, like other electronic touchscreen voting systems,
election results generated by BMDs are not auditable because they leave no record
of a voter’s selection that itself is not generated by a computer which may be
defective because of malfunctions, misprogramming, or malicious interference. In
addition, the large size of the touchscreens, and the large font they use to display
voters’ choices, exposes voters’ choices to other voters, pollworkers, and the

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public in violation of constitutional and statutory provisions guaranteeing voter
privacy.
68.
Even if touchscreen BMDs survive the constitutional challenges pending in
the other case, the coronavirus pandemic has rendered communal touchscreen
devices such as BMDs completely unsuitable as a mode of safely recording votes
because such devices pose an unacceptable and irremediable risk to the health of
voters and pollworkers. The same is true for the touchscreen electronic pollbooks,
such as the State’s PollPads, which the State uses to check-in voters.2
69.
According to the March 15, 2020 Rapid Expert Consultation on SARS-CoV2 Surface Stability and Incubation for the COVID-19 Pandemic published by The
National Academy of Sciences, the coronavirus survives “up to 24 hours on
cardboard and up to 2-3 days on plastic and on stainless steel.”

2

The amount of touching that is required to use and vote on a BMD is seen in a short video
produced by the Secretary. https://bit.ly/2zbTpOd

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70.
Virtually every component of the BMD touchscreen system and PollPad that
voters touch is plastic, steel, or cardboard, and voters and pollworkers will touch
each of these surfaces multiple times for each ballot cast. Multiple voters and
pollworkers will operate each machine in quick succession during the course of inperson voting.
71.
Every step in the BMD voting process presents an opportunity to spread or
be infected by COVID-19 and there is no practical means of keeping the
touchscreen components clean. This health threat alone will discourage people
from voting (and potentially from working) in the polling places.
72.
BMD touchscreens themselves cannot be kept clean unless, at a minimum,
they are thoroughly cleaned after very voter. However, according to Dominion,
their touchscreens should first be powered down before cleaning is performed.
After the touchscreen is turned off, the pollworker will need to carefully clean the
screen with a special disinfectant. If the screen is not dry when it is used again, the
screen may fail to reliably translate the next voter’s touch into the intended election

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choice. The screen, therefore, will need to be completely dry before it is powered
up and used again. Rebooting takes time. The additional staff and time required in
the polling place for such extra effort is infeasible and impractical in the context of
the present pandemic and further increases the time for human interaction.
73.
The BMD touchscreens were not manufactured to be cleaned after every use
and have never been tested to determine whether, or for how long, they will
withstand such scrubbing.
74.
Touchscreen system manufacturers warn that if pollworkers do not clean the
screens very carefully, the screens or other system components will be damaged
and the unit will have to be taken out of service. It can be anticipated that voters,
fearful of touching the screen, will bring their own sanitizing solutions for cleaning
the screen before use, much as many people now do when they take an airline seat
or a shopping cart. The blue privacy panels surrounding the touchscreens when
configured in the manner recommended by the Secretary will not permit the
pollworkers to observe voters attempting to clean the screens themselves.

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75.
The process of powering down a BMD voting machine, cleaning the screen,
letting it dry, and powering it up again after each voter is so time consuming and
labor intensive that the effort, even if executed to perfection, will inevitably derail
the in-person voting process and disenfranchise voters. More likely, the effort will
be attempted but, with inadequate staff, not executed to perfection and voters will
be exposed to the virus and disenfranchised because of system malfunctions and
interminable delays. It also is highly unlikely that additional pollworkers could be
recruited for this dangerous work, particularly given that there already is a
pollworker shortage.
76.
In addition, the BMD system voting process, particularly with the incessant
cleaning and associated delays, will intensify close person-to-person contact
between and among voters and pollworkers – exactly the kind of close personal
contact that social distancing and other public health measures are designed to
curtail.

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77.
The handling of 33,000 BMD touchscreen units and over 40,000 auxiliary
components also poses an unacceptable risk to election workers, vendors,
technicians, and other election officials in other respects. To prepare for an
election, election workers must program each touchscreen BMD using removeable
memory cards. After machines are programmed, each of the 33,000 machines must
be tested in public for proper programming in a Logic and Accuracy Test (LAT),
which is required by statute. The public testing will occur during a time when the
State’s stay-at-home restrictions will prevent the public and authorized poll
watchers from observing and verifying these tests. The LAT that each of the
State’s 33,000 touchscreen BMDs must undergo is an extremely time-consuming
process that requires close personal contact among election staff and the public and
continuous contact with potentially infected surfaces. In addition, each BMD
touchscreen along with its printer and battery back-up unit, and 33,000 plastic
“privacy” screens, must be manually unpacked, transported, and installed by teams
in each of the State’s 2,300 polling locations, frequently in tight spaces.

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78.
The danger of the BMDs to Georgia’s 8,000-plus pollworkers and other
election staff is a separate humanitarian concern, but it will directly contribute to
causing voter disenfranchisement and will reduce election integrity and security.
Unless there is an environment and process that actually protects voters,
pollworkers, and other election staff, election superintendents will be unable to
recruit and train workers in sufficient numbers to staff the 2,300 polling locations
and process mail ballots in a manner to assure adequate voter polling place access
and a secure and fair election. Superintendents will be required to choose between
taking short-cuts and loosening security controls, or closing polling locations,
limiting early voting, limiting voting hours, or taking other actions that will
directly and indirectly burden voters in their exercise of the right to vote.
79.
To insist that voters use touchscreen BMDs for in-person voting is an
unreasonable burden on the right to vote because that requirement forces voters to
choose between their personal safety and exercising their right to vote and because
the State has a reasonable and available alternative: replacing BMDs with hand

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marked paper ballots, which can be counted by the new already installed Dominion
scanners and tabulation system.
80.
Because of the risk that the State would be unable to implement the new
BMD system in time for 2020 elections, on August 15, 2019, the District Court in
Curling v. Raffensperger ordered the State to develop a backup plan using handmarked paper ballots instead of BMDs and to pilot that backup plan in selected
November 2019 elections. (No. 17-cv-2989-AT, Doc. 579 at 146). Cobb County
successfully piloted using hand marked paper ballots, with new Dominion optical
scanners and tabulators, in the November 2019 elections. This already-prepared
backup plan can feasibly be deployed statewide to address the dangers posed by
the coronavirus.
81.
Using hand marked paper ballots will be far safer and far easier than using
BMDs for multiple reasons. Paper ballots may be issued to voters in sanitary,
disposable envelopes and privately marked by the voter using a single-use
disposable marker on a single use disposable writing service such as stiff
cardboard. The voter can cast the paper ballot into a secure ballot box or scanner.

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Using hand marked paper ballots will eliminate the pollworker labor hours needed
to educate voters on the complex, new BMD voting system, and to assist voters in
the polling place, which involves considerable close personal interaction. Using
hand marked paper ballots will greatly accelerate the process of polling place
voting and therefore will reduce lines and will help mitigate the dangers posed by
person-to-person contact.
82.
Using paper ballots instead of BMDs has the collateral benefit of allowing
polling locations to physically accommodate more voters voting simultaneously
with a safe distance between them, with less (or no) down time due to equipment
failures or cleaning delays. This will allow a faster flow through the polling place,
thus reducing the voters’ time spent in line and minimizing their exposure to other
voters.
83.
Using hand marked paper ballots also will allow secure drive-up or
“curbside” voting as polling locations, with accommodations for those who need to
come into a polling place.

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84.
The enormous amount of time saved by not having to program, set-up, test,
transport, and install the 80,000 plus BMD components, and by not having to clean
the BMDs after every use, will dramatically reduce the number of pollworkers
needed to staff a polling location, thereby reducing the difficulty of engaging a
sufficient number of pollworkers. Saving on the cost of thousands of labor hours
will aid counties that are experiencing massive budget shortfalls because of the
pandemic.
85.
There is no good reason to use BMDs rather than vastly safer and less
expensive hand marked paper ballots. The State already uses hand marked paper
ballots for provisional and absentee mail ballot voting; eliminating BMDs will
simply require that the State order more printed paper ballots. Switching to hand
marked ballots greatly simplifies checking in voters before they vote because the
PollPad need not create a smartcard for activating the touchscreen BMD. No
change of procedures is required for scanning and tabulating the ballots cast.

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86.
Using hand marked paper ballots is the most widely accepted voting method
in the nation and is universally recommended by election security experts. Hand
marked paper ballots are used across the nation in approximately 112,000 precincts
covering 133 million registered voters.
87.
The State of Georgia’s requirement that all in-person voters must use BMDs
during the pandemic is unconstitutional because it constitutes a severe,
unreasonable, and completely unjustified burden on the right to vote. Plaintiffs are
entitled to injunctive relief requiring the Secretary to cause upcoming elections in
Georgia, including the June 9, 2020 election (whether moved to June 30 or not), to
be conducted using hand marked paper ballots.
88.
BMDs should continue to be used for voters requiring assistive technology,
if no better alternatives are proposed by the Secretary. After every use of the BMD
touchscreens, the touchscreen should be powered down and thoroughly cleaned by
vendor-approved disinfectant cleaner.

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B.

Other Required Changes to In-Person Voting during the
Pandemic
89.

In addition to using hand marked paper ballots instead of touchscreen
BMDs, other changes to in-person voting must also be made to keep voting
reasonably safe for voters and pollworkers during the course of the pandemic.
These other changes include the following.
1.

Early Voting
90.

Each early voting location should operate (as they do today) as a “vote
center” in which any eligible voter in the county may vote.
91.
Early voting polling place managers should be appointed as absentee ballot
clerks as authorized by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385 to issue absentee mail ballot packets
that the voter may take home to mark to avoid more time and human interaction in
the polling place.
92.
Superintendents should be authorized to operate early voting centers at their
option during the weekend and on the Monday prior to Election Day or any portion

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of Election Day, provided that doing so does not interfere with accurately updating
pollbooks for Election Day voting.
93.
At the county superintendent’s option, early voting locations should be
authorized to open at any time after an adequate supply of printed ballots are
available for use, subject to the statutory minimum required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2385 (d)(1).
2.

Curbside voting
94.

To reduce the number of voters inside polling locations, each county should
provide at least one curbside early voting location where voters may vote in-person
from their automobile by being issued a paper ballot, disposable pen, and
disposable stiff cardboard support sheet, or may drop off completed mail ballots.
For counties with over 100,000 registered voters, one additional curbside voting
location should be available for every 100,000 voters or fraction thereof. Curbside
voting is a proven alternative long used in some states for senior citizens or voters
with disabilities. Curbside voting polling locations would be provided in addition
to traditional Election Day polling locations. Curbside voting protects both voters

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and pollworkers because voters remain in their cars and social distancing is
maintained with other voters. Automobile window glass also provides additional
protection.
3.

Mobile Pop-up Polling Places
95.

Superintendents, at their option, should be authorized to use well-marked
official county-owned vehicles such as buses or vans to create temporary “pop up”
early voting locations where appointed absentee ballot clerks can issue and accept
paper absentee ballots, although voting should not occur inside the enclosed
vehicle. The Secretary should issue guidelines for the secure and safe operation of
such pop-up early voting sites.
4.

Ballot Security and Chain-of-Custody
96.

Georgia law currently allows counties either to scan paper ballots at the
polling locations or to transport the ballots to the superintendent’s office for central
count scanning at their option. (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-485). The Secretary should issue
guidelines for use of central count scanning, including ballot security and chain-of-

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custody protocols to provide counties with guidelines to use traditional secure
ballot boxes rather than scanners at polling places as may be appropriate.
5.

Electronic Pollbooks
97.

Electronic pollbook component PollPads should be optional for use, and
each county should be authorized to determine whether their use is required for
paper ballot issuance. PollPads which require pollworker and voter touching
should not be used if the county can rely on less touch-intensive laptop epollbooks
used currently in early voting. It is imperative that electronic pollbook information
be accurate and updated, and properly backed up by updated paper copies in the
polling place, to avoid excessive time required for the pollworker and voters
interacting to resolve discreprancies. BMD touchscreen manual activation (in lieu
of plastic smart cards) by the poll manager should be used in the case of voters
who require BMD voting for assistive technology.
6.

Voter ID and Check-in
98.

In lieu of the voter signing the voter certificate for in-person voting,
pollworkers should be authorized to administer and document oral oaths by the

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voter containing the same content as the written oath. This reduces the handling of
hundreds of thousands of pieces of paper, pens, and related equipment.
99.
To reduce the touching of surfaces by multiple people, a voter should be
authorized to present a legible disposable paper copy of their photo identification
(such as driver’s license) as sufficient for personal identification either in-person or
mail-in voting.
7.

Personal Protective Equipment and Workspace Shields
100.

Pollworkers and support staff must be supplied by the Secretary at the
Secretary’s expense with a sufficient supply of the kinds of personal protective
equipment (“PPE”) recommended by the Georgia Department of Public Health,
including CDC-approved masks and protective gloves.
101.
In-person voters who enter enclosed polling locations or lines forming on the
outside of the polling locations must be directed to wear masks (except for
curbside voting locations.) Single-use disposable masks should be supplied by the

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county for voters who do not wear their own masks. The State should reimburse
the counties’ costs for the masks.
102.
Pollworkers should be directed to work behind clear plastic barriers to issue
ballots and assist voters. The barriers should be supplied by the election
superintendent and the cost reimbursed by the State. An example is at Exhibit G.
In consultation with the Georgia Department of Public Health, Secretary
Raffensperger should issue guidelines for minimum specifications for the plastic
shields and provide at least one source of supply.
103.
The Secretary should order the county superintendents to mark off distances
on the polling place floor and outside the polling place where lines form and
require that voters remain at least six feet from each other.
CHANGES TO ABSENTEE MAIL VOTING
A.

Conditions Causing Need for Changes
104.

Because of the health risks of in-person voting, the necessity and demand for
voting by absentee mail ballots will foreseeably continue to increase dramatically.

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If this demand is not satisfied in a timely, efficient, and secure manner, the
COVID-19 pandemic will further disenfranchise Georgians and threaten the health
and safety of voters, pollworkers and election staff.
105.
In its recent elections, the State of Wisconsin experienced a five-fold
increase in the number of mail ballots requested and cast. Wisconsin was not
prepared to process that many absentee ballot applications or ballots. Thousands
of Wisconsin voters who timely submitted applications for absentee ballots did not
receive the ballots in time to mail them back prior to election day. By the time
officials realized that widespread disfranchisement was occurring, it was too late
for the elected officials or the Courts to provide an adequate remedy. Many of
those voters then had no alternative but to vote in crowded polling places.
106.
In the past, only 5% of Georgians have voted by mail, but with the
pandemic that percentage is expected to grow by more than ten-fold. On April 16,
the Atlanta Journal Constitution reported that there are a record 395,000
applications for mail ballots only 9 days after the Secretary sent applications to all

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active voters. The State of Georgia, like Wisconsin, is not prepared to process the
coming massive increase in mail ballot voting.
107.
A large percentage of mail absentee voters will be new to the process and
unfamiliar with the State’s rules, which can be difficult to follow under even ideal
conditions. In addition, there is every indication that the U.S. Mail in Georgia will
continue to be much slower than normal, as it was in advance of the Wisconsin
elections. In addition, because of COVID-19, state and county election offices that
are ordinarily equipped to answer questions about absentee mail voting are already
understaffed and will be completely unable to handle the coming deluge of
questions and paperwork. Therefore, a more resilient mail ballot process is
necessary to protect voters’ rights.
108.
There already is evidence that the Secretary is not prepared for what will be
a massive increase in absentee mail ballot voting. (Three specific examples of
recent failures by the Secretary relating to absentee mail ballot voting are described
separately in Part VIII, below).

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B.

Modifications Required to Absentee Ballot Processing
109.

Given the unprecedented increase in demand for absentee mail voting, and
the State’s current inability to administer absentee mail voting efficiently and
securely, there is substantial risk that Georgia citizens will be disenfranchised
unless the following changes are made to Georgia’s absentee mail voting practices
and procedures:
• Voters should be permitted to return completed mail ballots at any
polling place, present their identification, and have the ballot accepted
for counting, without the risk of signature rejection or postal delays.
• All 2020 mail ballot applicants should be permitted to make a onetime application for mail ballots all elections for the remainder of the
election cycle.
• As soon as printed ballots are available, voters should be permitted to
obtain mail ballots at the offices of the absentee ballot clerks to reduce
wait times, polling place crowds, and officials’ administrative
workload.

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• At the county superintendent’s option, absentee ballot clerks in any
polling location should be authorized to securely issue mail ballot
packets to the voter and determine and document his or her eligibility
at the time of issuance by referencing the voters’ photo identification.
• Absentee mail ballots post-marked no later than Election Day and
received up to three days after Election Day should be accepted as
timely cast. Additionally, ballots arriving by mail on the day after
Election Day without a postmark should be accepted as timely cast.
• Absentee ballots cast by voters covered by the Uniformed and
Overseas Citizen Voting Act (“UOCAVA”) should be accepted as
timely received if the ballot arrives prior to the final day for the
superintendent’s certification of election results, which is the second
Friday following the election. (O.C.G.A. §21-2-493(k)).
• Voters should be permitted to present their affidavit to cure discrepant
signatures or provisional ballots prior to the final day for the
superintendent’s election results certification, which is the second
Friday following the election. (O.C.G.A. § 21-12-493(k)).

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• Election office scanning of mail ballots should be authorized to begin
on 7 am Monday prior to Election Day, but no tabulations (partial or
complete) should permitted until the county polls have closed on
Election Day.
• The majority of a county-level bi-partisan review panel should
approve the rejection of any mail ballot signature prior to notifying
the voter for signature curing.
• The Secretary should require all counties to participate in the
Secretary’s daily public reporting of early voting and mail ballot
voting including signature rejection processing to assist voters and
candidates in monitoring ballot acceptance progress.
• Authorized poll watcher and public observation protocols should be
established for oversight and voter protection for all mail ballot
issuance, acceptance, and tabulation operations.

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SECRETARY’S FAILURES TO PROPERLY PROCESS ABSENTEE
BALLOTS
110.
In addition to the necessity to change election practices and procedures
generally going forward, the Secretary must also remedy several specific actions
that threaten voter disenfranchisement in the upcoming election.
111.
On or about April 6, 2020, the Secretary reportedly mailed to all active
registered Georgia voters the mail ballot applications for the May 19, 2020 election
(formerly March 24 election; now being held on June 9). Rather than addressing
the ballot applications to the voters’ mailing addresses, however, the Secretary
mailed applications to voters’ residential addresses. This caused up to 625,000
registered voters to not receive their undeliverable applications. This error was
inexcusable: the information in the Secretary’s database for each registered voter
shows a residential address and, if different, a mailing address.
112.
Despite knowing of this failure for at least two weeks, the Secretary has not
informed the press or the voters of this failure. Hundreds of thousands of voters do
not know that they should have received a ballot application. Voters in rural areas

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who frequently do not have home mail delivery are particularly victimized by the
Secretary’s mistake. There are only limited ways for rural voters to obtain primary
election information or ballot applications because small county election offices
are closed during the pandemic, and often have only limited information on their
websites that would not include a downloadable ballot application.
113.
This failure has had a particularly severe impact upon rural counties that
have been hit the hardest by the pandemic. For example, rural Randolph County
has COVID-19 related death and infection rates that are well over ten times the
state average. Over 23% of the voters in Randolph County do not receive election
mail at their residential address, but have mailing addresses. Only 76% of the
homes in Randolph County have internet access that would provide an alternative
to obtaining and submitting a ballot application. Randolph County is but one
example of rural counties that have been disadvantaged by the Secretary’s failure
to send ballot applications to the voters’ mailing addresses.

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114.
For all voters to have an equal opportunity to complete a ballot application
request, the Secretary should promptly send ballot applications to those voters
whose mailing address is different than their residential address.
115.
Additionally, the Secretary printed the wrong county email return address on
some applications. In other instances, county officials were not informed of the
technical requirements for email submissions and their servers are rejecting the
large files containing photographs of the ballot applications. In yet other instances,
the voters’ application attachments are not opening in the existing systems. All of
these failures and errors ultimately cause significant delays that require extension
of time for officials and voters to correct.
116.
Another confounding example of the Secretary’s apparent willingness to
disenfranchise absentee voters without cause has arisen because of how the
Secretary is handling absentee ballots that voters received for what was the March
24, 2020 election (which included the Presidential Preference Primary) (“the
March Ballots”). On March 14, 2020, before those absentee ballots were due to be

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returned, all March 24 elections were moved to May 19, 2020; the Election Day
was later changed to June 9, 2020. Before the election was moved from May to
June, the Secretary mailed absentee ballot applications to the residential addresses
of all active voters, including those who had already received a March Ballot.
Absentee ballots that are issued in response to these applications (“June Ballots”)
will be of two types. For voters whose records indicate that no March 24 ballot
was voted by March 24, the mail ballot to be issued will include races that were
originally scheduled for March 24 (including the Presidential Preference Primaries)
and races that were originally scheduled for May 19 (including the primary for
U.S. Senate and a State Supreme Court seat). For voters whose records show that
a ballot was returned for the March election, the mail ballot to be issued will
include only the races that were originally scheduled for May 19.
117.
Each change to the Election Day changed the due date for receiving absentee
ballots. On or about March 16, 2020, however, the Secretary informed the press
that completed March Ballots that were received after March 24 would be
cancelled. The Secretary has now changed those instructions by instructing
county officials to cancel completed March Ballots if not received by March 24

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and if the voter requests a June Ballot. Therefore, March Ballots received after
March 24 will be cancelled whether or not the voters actually received or returned
a June Ballot. But many applications are improperly processed or not received and
many voters will not understand that by requesting but not casting a June Ballot his
or her March Ballot will be cancelled. This plainly unfair and unconstitutional
disenfranchisement could be avoided if the Secretary ordered the opposite: that is,
only cancel a March Ballot if a completed June Ballot with March races included is
received from the same voter. The Secretary must be ordered to instruct the county
superintendents to count all March ballots received by the June 9 Election Day (or
any new date of the election) if duplicate votes are not submitted.
118.
The Secretary not only is failing to keep voters informed, he is affirmatively
instructing county officials to misinform the public. For example, absentee ballots
for the June 9, 2020 election will not be printed and issued until the week of April
20. The Secretary, however, ordered superintendents to record dates of March 31
and April 6 as the date that these yet-to-be-mailed ballots were issued. These
incorrect dates now appear on voters’ My Voter Page records on the Secretary’s
website. This has confused voters, including some Coalition members, who

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mistakenly believe that their ballots have been lost in the mail. Additionally, as of
last week, the Secretary had posted April 21, 2020 as the date that many voters’
ballots were issued, although that date had not arrived, and there is no assurance
that the ballot will be issued on that date. This has confused voters, including some
Coalition members, who assumed that the April 21 date was a typographical error
and an earlier date was intended, causing them to be concerned that their ballots
have been lost. The Secretary should be required to instruct the superintendents to
correct the date of issuance records so that voters can track the progress of their
ballot requests.
119.
The Secretary’s insensitivity to providing equal voting opportunities to
communities of color and protection of all voters was further displayed in his
failure to create a dual language ballot application in Gwinnett County, which is
the subject of unrelated litigation, Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials
v Raffensperger, No. 20-cv-01587-WMR, (N.D. Ga.).

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DISPARATE IMPACT OF DEFENDANTS’ INTENDED CONDUCT
UPON THE ELDERLY, HEALTH-COMPROMISED AND
GEORGIANS LIVING IN RURAL AREAS
A.

The Elderly
120.

It is well understood that COVID-19 is particularly dangerous for older
voters. In Georgia, people 65 years and older make up only 13% of the population
but as of April 16 account for 67% of Georgia’s deaths from COVID-19. This
dramatic difference in the vulnerability of older voters to COVD-19 has a
substantial impact on how and when to conduct elections for many different
reasons.
121.
It is fundamentally unfair to conduct an election in a public health
environment in which it will be dramatically more difficult for older voters to vote
safely.
122.
Older voters, including some Coalition members, are likely to have
disproportionately greater difficulty in finding alternatives to voting in-person than
younger voters will. Many will have never voted by mail and many others will not

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familiar enough with, or even have access to, the internet for locating ballot
applications or tracking mailed ballots. County offices which might otherwise be
available to help or answer questions are already understaffed and stretched to the
limit and are asking that voters not call them about ballots.
123.
Older Georgians staff Georgia’s elections. The estimated age for
pollworkers is about 70. Unless elections are conducted at a time and in a manner
that is safe, it is unrealistic to expect that counties will be able to recruit sufficient
pollworkers and, even if they are recruited, it is inhumane to have them working in
an environment that is not as safe as possible.
B.

Health-Compromised
124.

The COVID-19 pandemic also is particularly dangerous for those who have
existing medical conditions, such as chronic lung disease, cancer, immune
deficiencies, poorly controlled HIV or AIDs, obesity, diabetes, chronic kidney
disease and liver disease. The vast majority of people who die from COVID-19
have underlying conditions such as these.

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125.
It is fundamentally unfair to conduct an election in a public health
environment in which it will be dramatically more difficult for voters with these
conditions to vote safely.
C.

Georgians Living in Rural Areas
126.

The COVID-19 pandemic has hit rural counties in Georgia particularly hard.
In Dougherty County, for example, 91 people have died of the disease – more
deaths than in any other Georgia county and far more deaths relative to population
than any state in the country, including New York, the current epicenter of the
outbreak. Nearby Randolph County is also experiencing a catastrophic event,
suffering a fatality rate thirty times higher than the state average. Sumter and
Terrell Counties report infection and fatality rates far surpassing Atlanta’s or even
New York’s, and press reports indicate that actual deaths caused by the disease are
likely higher than reported.
127.
Rural counties, already hard-pressed to address the immediate public health
emergency, are particularly ill-equipped to prepare for, staff, and conduct an

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election, particularly given the complex transition to an entirely new voting
system.
128.
In addition, many citizens in rural counties do not have access to the internet
or to other infrastructure or communication channels that would facilitate
alternatives to dangerous in-person voting.
129.
Dozens of traditional precinct polling places in Southwest Georgia are small
concrete structures measuring 300 to 400 square feet with no running water.
Attached as Exhibits H, I and J are photographs of polling places in Colquitt and
Sumter Counties. Social distancing is impossible in such close quarters, and
disinfecting polling places and hand washing is far more difficult with no running
water.
130.
It would therefore be particularly unfair and unconstitutional to require
citizens in these hard-hit communities to vote without first taking the Pandemic
Voting Safety Measures described above.

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STANDING
A.

Coalition
131.

Coalition has organizational standing on its own behalf and associational
standing on behalf of its members.
132.
Coalition is a membership organization with a membership that consists of
individuals residing in Georgia and across the United States. Individuals become
members of Coalition by providing their contact information and indicating a
desire to associate with the organization. Members donate money, contribute time,
and share information and intelligence with the organization to the extent they are
able and wish to do so. Members receive informational communications from
Coalition and can benefit from Coalition’s facilitation of members’ individual
participation in civic activities that are germane to the organization’s purpose, such
as poll watching, auditing election results, and publishing opinion pieces.
Members utilize Coalition as a resource to answer a wide range of voter questions
about voting rights, voting processes, open meetings law, public records law,

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recalls, petition processes, election legislation, and how to challenge election issues
they encounter.
133.
Coalition’s purpose is to preserve and advance the constitutional liberties
and individual rights of citizens, with an emphasis on preserving and protecting
those private rights of its members that are exercised through public elections.
134.
Coalition serves its purpose in multiple ways, including by providing
information and education to its members; by serving as a non-partisan educational
and informational resource for the public, press, campaigns, candidates, and
political parties; by monitoring nationwide developments in election law and
technology; by providing speakers for events at educational institutions; by
providing commentary from its leadership on election issues; by collaborating in
voting rights and election integrity initiatives with other nonpartisan nonprofits and
academics; by developing and sharing research and investigation of reported
election problems with the press, public and other members of the electionintegrity community; and by facilitating the engagement of members and

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prospective members as non-partisan participants in the electoral process through
poll watching, attendance at public meetings, and other civic activities.
135.
Coalition, acting on its own behalf, has organizational standing because it
has been and will be directly harmed by having to divert its own scarce personnel
and resources to counteract Defendant’s unconstitutional failure to address the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic upon elections in Georgia, including paying for
fees to lawyers for advice and representation, litigation expenses, potentially
consulting expert fees, travel expenses and related costs, and the diversion of
approximately 75% of the time of Coalition’s Executive Director Marilyn R.
Marks since February 2020 to address the issues raised in this Complaint, time that
the Executive Director would otherwise have devoted to Coalition’s work in North
Carolina and Colorado and other work in Georgia, including educating voters on
the moving of the election and the impact on the ballot content, educating the
public and officials about North Carolina’s unconstitutional voting equipment,
secret ballot violations, and advocating for North Carolina legislative changes
relating to those issues. These diversions of resources will continue if Defendants
engage in their intended conduct alleged in this Complaint.

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136.
Coalition, acting on behalf of its members who are threatened with imminent
injury-in-fact, including the Member Plaintiffs previously identified and other,
non-plaintiff members who would have standing to sue in their own right, also has
associational standing to bring the claims for prospective relief stated herein.
Coalition has a number of Georgia-based members who are eligible Georgia voters
who prefer to vote on election day in the polling place, along with other members
who prefer to vote by paper mail ballot.
137.
Some Georgia-based Coalition members have experienced confusion and
frustration, fearing that their ballots have been lost because of the inaccurate
information posted by the Secretary related to ballot application issuance and mail
ballot transmission on the Secretary’s My Voter Page. Others are concerned
because of the lack of information posted on their My Voter Pages about whether
their ballot application or completed ballot transmitted days or weeks ago has been
received. Many county offices are closed and unavailable to answer questions on
ballot status. Some counties are so overwhelmed by the staff shortage and

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paperwork overload that they have asked voters not to call the election office about
their ballot applications.
138.
Coalition is diverting resources in assisting voters and voting rights groups
in counties which had a high percentage of voters who were victimized by the
Secretary’s ballot application mailing error.
B.

Individual Plaintiffs
139.

Plaintiff Rhonda Martin is a member and director of Coalition. Ms. Martin
is a registered voter in Fulton County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in
upcoming elections. Ms. Martin has served as a poll watcher in numerous counties
authorized by a state political party, and expects to serve as a pollwatcher again in
2020 elections. Ms. Martin would prefer to vote in person in the polling place on or
close to Election Day using a hand marked paper ballot, or to hand deliver a mail
ballot to a Fulton County election office. However, because of the pandemic and
her concern about the transmission of disease, on April 6, she applied for a mail
absentee ballot for the May 19/June 9 election, and emailed that request to Fulton
County. Because of the pandemic she plans to return the voted ballot through the

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United States Postal Service. As of the date of this filing, she has not received the
requested mail ballot and her My Voter Page does not show the receipt of the
emailed ballot application. Ms. Martin does not know whether her application was
lost or whether submitting another application would increase confusion or subject
her to risks of disfranchisement or legal jeopardy.
140.
Plaintiff Jeanne Dufort is a member of Coalition and registered voter in
Morgan County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in upcoming elections. Ms.
Dufort generally prefers to vote on a hand marked paper ballot and hand deliver it
to her county election office because she does not wish to vote on a touchscreen
machine. However, at times, because of scheduling necessities, she has voted on
touchscreen machines in her home precinct. Ms. Dufort requested a mail ballot via
email on April 3 and her application was entered the next business day, April 6 on
her My Voter Page. The My Voter Page site soon reflected a ballot issuance date
of April 6. However, on approximately April 19 the MVP site was changed to
report a ballot issue date of April 21. As of the date of this filing, Ms. Dufort has
not received her mail ballot.

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141.
When Ms. Dufort receives her mail ballot, depending on her evaluation of
the health risks, she will determine whether to continue her standard process to
hand deliver the ballot, or to mail it. However, the Morgan County Elections
Office is now closed to the public, so mail is currently the only option.
142.
Ms. Dufort has been appointed as an authorized poll watcher and expects to
be appointed as such again during 2020. Ms. Dufort is the First Vice Chair of the
Morgan County Democratic Committee and in that capacity helps recruit, assign,
and instruct poll watchers for the Committee for purposes of witnessing and
verifying steps in the conduct of the Morgan County elections, and ensuring
through the poll watching process that the interest of Democratic candidates and
Morgan County voters are protected in the ballot acceptance, processing, and
counting processes.
143.
Aileen Nakamura is a member of Coalition and a registered voter in Fulton
County, State of Georgia, who would prefer to vote in-person at her home precinct
in upcoming elections if a safe location and secure voting process were offered.

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She has not applied for a mail ballot because she is waiting to assess the state of
the pandemic closer to Election Day and polling place conditions at the time of the
elections.
144.
Ms. Nakamura has served both as public election observer to help ensure the
fairness and accuracy of Georgia elections and as an authorized poll watcher for a
candidate in a non-partisan election. She plans to serve as an election observer or
poll watcher in remaining 2020 elections.
145.
B. Joy Wasson is a member of Coalition and a registered voter in DeKalb
County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in upcoming elections. Because of
her concern about the safety issues in the polling places and the mail ballot
application and ballot processing times, on April 6, 2020, Ms. Wasson requested a
mail ballot via email for the June 9 election. She has received no response, and her
My Voter Page record does not show receipt of the application.
146.
Ms. Wasson has served as a poll watcher appointed by political parties to
protect the rights of voters and to verify elements of the elections she was assigned

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to observe. She plans to serve as a poll watcher in remaining 2020 elections but is
apprehensive about the health risks that she will be exposed to if she does so.
147.
Elizabeth Throop is a member of Coalition and a registered voter in DeKalb
County, State of Georgia, who intends to vote in upcoming elections. Ms. Throop
voted in person during early voting in the March 24 Presidential Primary Election
prior to its postponement. Given the potential dangers of voting in the polling place
during the June 9 election and the potential delays in mail ballot processing, Ms.
Throop promptly applied for a mail ballot for the June 9 election, and My Voter
Page shows that her mail ballot was issued on April 21. But Ms. Throop has not
received her ballot and does not know when to expect it.
148.
Ms. Throop has served as a poll watcher appointed by political parties to
protect the rights of voters and to verify elements of the elections she was assigned
to observe as a watcher. She plans to serve as a poll watcher in remaining 2020
elections but is apprehensive about the health risks that she will be exposed to if
she does so.

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149.
Each of the named individual Plaintiffs identified above, if required to vote
in person without the Pandemic Voting Safety Measures in place, will be
irreparably harmed because of the dangers posed by the COVID-19 pandemic,
including but not limited to the exposure to other voters and to contact with
physical surfaces that are likely to be contaminated with the virus. In addition,
each of the named individual Plaintiffs identified above, if required to vote
absentee by mail, will be irreparably harmed because, without the Pandemic
Voting Safety Measures in place, there is a substantial likelihood that absentee
mail ballot applications will not be processed in a fair, timely and accurate manner
and absentee mail ballots will not be processed in a fair, timely manner. In
addition, regardless of the method by which the individual Plaintiffs end up voting,
they will be irreparably harmed if, because the Pandemic Voting Safety Measures
are not in place, other Georgia voters are disenfranchised.
150.
Plaintiffs Throop and Wasson, along with other Coalition Members, are
residents of DeKalb County and have a great interest in the county sheriff’s race on
the March Ballot and the June Ballot. Similarly, Plaintiffs Martin, Nakamura,

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Throop, and Wasson, along with other Coalition members, are residents of the City
of Atlanta which is conducting a referendum on sales tax that appears on the
March Ballot and the June Ballot. If some voters’ March Ballots are wrongfully
cancelled when they submit an application for, but do not return, a June Ballot,
these Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed because the result of the vote for the
county sheriff and the City referendum will not be accurate.
COUNT I: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Violation of State Law - Infringement of the Fundamental Right to Vote in
Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Guarantee of Due Process
151.
Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 150.
152.
Inherent in an individual’s fundamental right to vote is the right to vote
without endangering their own or others’ safety. This is a fundamental right of
individuals protected by the United States Constitution and incorporated against
the State by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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153.
By holding elections during the COVID-19 pandemic without taking actions
to protect voters’ safety, including the Pandemic Voting Safety Measures described
above in Parts V, VI, VII and VIII, Defendants will knowingly burden severely
and infringe upon the fundamental right to vote of the Member Plaintiffs and
Coalition’s members and will injure Coalition by causing it to divert resources and
personnel form other ongoing projects.
154.
These severe burdens and infringements caused by Defendant’s actions and
inaction, and failure to take the Pandemic Voting Safety Measures, are not
outweighed or justified by, and are not necessary to promote, any substantial or
compelling state interest that cannot be accomplished by other, less burdensome
means.
155.
In violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Defendants are acting under
color of state law.

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156.
The threatened injury to Plaintiffs’ rights is irreparable and imminent, and
Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. Plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to an
injunction requiring Defendants to take the Pandemic Voting Safety Measures.

COUNT II: EQUAL PROTECTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Claim for Relief from Threatened Violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s
Guarantee of Equal Protection
(Seeking Prospective Injunctive Relief
Against Defendants in their Official Capacities)
157.
Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 150.
158.
Defendant Raffensperger has set Election Day for June 9, 2020, and intends
to require Georgia’s county election superintendents to conduct, and Georgia’s
voters (including individual Plaintiffs and other individual voters who are members
of Plaintiff Coalition) to participate in, certain required election activities in

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accordance with the statutory election calendar that results from Defendant
Raffensperger’s selection of June 9, 2020, for Election Day.
159.
Defendant Raffensperger intends to require county election superintendents
and voters to conduct and participate in their required election activities without
himself instituting reasonable measures that will mitigate voters’ risks of exposure
to COVID-19, to the extent reasonably possible.
160.
Defendant Raffensperger’s intended adherence to his selected Election Day
of June 9, 2020, as well as his intention not to institute reasonable mitigation
measures, will foreseeably cause certain identifiable groups of Georgia voters to be
treated differently than other, similarly situated voters in the same election.
Specifically:
• Elderly voters who vote in-person on Election Day using BMDs will
be exposed to a much higher chance of dying from COVID-19
contracted during the in-person voting process than will younger inperson voters.

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• Voters who have certain underlying health conditions that are known
to be aggravating co-morbidities for COVID-19 who vote in-person
on Election Day using BMDs will be exposed to a much higher
chance of dying from COVID-19 contracted during the in-person
voting process than will voters who do not have such health
conditions.
• Elderly voters and voters with health conditions who seek to avoid the
severe health risks of in-person voting by opting to vote by mail, by
contrast, will be exposed to a realistic likelihood that they will cast a
less effective vote than in-person voters because of the substantial
risks that either (i) mail ballot applications will not be timely
processed and no ballot will be received, (ii) mailed ballots will be
misdirected, misdelivered, or delayed beyond the permissible period
for ballots to be received due to overload of the postal system during
the current pandemic, or (iii) mailed ballots will be erroneously
rejected by election officials without the voter being afforded an
adequate opportunity to timely cure the rejection.

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• Voters who prefer to vote in-person but who are forced to cast a ballot
by mail in order to safeguard their health will be differentially
burdened, relative to in-person voters, because Georgia’s procedures
for voting by mail require voters to complete and submit a mail-ballot
application in advance of Election Day and then to mail the completed
ballot or deliver it in-person. Both of these steps are inherently
burdensome even without taking into account that they will require
some voters to leave home at least once during the pendency of
physical distancing advisories in order to reach public mailing or
voting facilities.
161.
Defendant Raffensperger’s intention to engage in conduct that will
foreseeably subject similarly situated voters to unequal health risks, solely in order
to adhere to an Election Day set for June 9, 2020, is arbitrary and capricious
because a later Election Day would permit an orderly election to be held while also
exposing discrete groups of vulnerable voters to less severe health risks.

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162.
Defendant Raffensperger’s intention to engage in conduct that will
foreseeably subject similarly situated voters to unequal health risks is
fundamentally unfair because voters should not be required to jeopardize their
health in order to exercise their fundamental right to participate in selfgovernment.
163.
Defendant Raffensperger’s intention to engage in conduct that will
foreseeably subject similarly situated voters to unequal health risks differentially
imposes a profound burden upon the fundamental right to vote, federal
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and association, and Georgia
constitutional right to vote. These unequal burdens arising from Defendant
Raffensperger’s intended conduct will foreseeably lead to a suppression of the
votes cast by members of the affected groups of voters because individual voters
can reliably be presumed to favor the preservation of their own individual health
and safety over their desire to exercise the franchise in this single upcoming
election.

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164.
One or more of (i) the individual Plaintiffs or (ii) other individual Georgia
voters who are members of Plaintiff Coalition is among the identifiable groups of
elderly and health-vulnerable voters that will be differentially subjected to health
risks as a result of Defendant Raffensperger’s intended conduct.
165.
Defendant Raffensperger’s threatened conduct is neither justified by a
legitimate governmental interest nor properly tailored to serve such an interest.
166.
Defendant Raffensperger’s threatened conduct will violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
167.
Defendant Raffensperger’s threatened conduct will violate the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine by forcing certain affected voters to suffer
deprivation of their constitutional right to equal protection as a condition of being
able to exercise their fundamental constitutional right to vote.

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168.
Defendant Raffensperger will commit the foregoing violations in the course
of acting under color of state law.
169.
If an injunction does not issue against Defendant Raffensperger’s intended
conduct, Plaintiffs (and Coalition’s Georgia-based members) will suffer the
violation of their constitutional right to equal protection and other irreparable
injuries for which there is no adequate legal remedy.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
1. Issue an order directing Defendants to undertake all of the Pandemic
Voting Safety Measures immediately;
2. Issue any declaratory relief necessary for the effectiveness of the
injunctive relief requested;
3. Retain jurisdiction to ensure Defendants’ ongoing compliance with the
Orders entered by the Court in this case;

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4. Grant Plaintiffs their reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses
incurred in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
5. Grant Plaintiffs such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
This 20th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Bruce P. Brown
Bruce P. Brown
Georgia Bar No. 064460
BRUCE P. BROWN LAW LLC
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE
Suite 6
Atlanta, Georgia 30306
[phone]

/s/ Robert A. McGuire, III
Robert A. McGuire, III
Pro Hac Vice Pending
ROBERT MCGUIRE LAW FIRM
113 Cherry St. #86685
Seattle, Washington 98104-2205
[phone]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Complaint has been prepared in
accordance with the font type and margin requirements of LR 5.1, using font
type of Times New Roman and a point size of 14.
/s/ Bruce P. Brown
Bruce P. Brown
Georgia Bar No. 064460
BRUCE P. BROWN LAW LLC
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE
Suite 6
Atlanta, Georgia 30306
[phone]

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E
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Coalition for Good Governance
March 23, 2020
The Honorable Brad Raffensperger
Georgia Secretary of State
214 State Capitol
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
Via email [e-mail]
Re: Recommendations for 2020 Elections
Dear Secretary Raffensperger:
The Coalition for Good Governance (CGG) proposes the following urgent actions that
you and the Georgia State Election Board (“SEB”) can take to ensure the security and
integrity of, and broad voter participation in, the 2020 elections in view of the
coronavirus threat. Though CGG is an adversary to your office and the SEB in litigation
challenging the constitutionality of Georgia’s Dominion Voting System, Curling v.
Raffensperger, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 8, 2017), we submit the
following requests and recommendations to you not as litigation adversaries, but as
interested members of the voting public. We hope that you and the SEB will consider
these suggestions with open minds in order to serve our shared interest of protecting
millions of Georgians.
We are happy to discuss any of these requests and recommendations at your convenience.
A. Count All March 24 Mail Ballots
We understand that counties have been instructed not to count March 24 election mail
ballots received after March 24, although the official election date has been moved to
May 19. Voters may not desire to request another ballot to vote in the more complex
May 19 primary. For example, a DeKalb County voter may wish to vote only on the
March 24/May 19 sheriff’s race and now may still have an unvoted mail ballot. The voter
should not be required to apply for a new ballot when he or she has an unvoted ballot for
the sheriff’s race that is now moved to May 19. Please reconsider the decision not to
count such ballots that arrive after March 24 and, instead, count all ballots arriving on
or before May 19, the new official Election Day to avoid voter confusion,
disenfranchisement and excessive paperwork for administrators.

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B. BMDs—An Unsafe System for the Foreseeable Future
The Dominion Ballot Marking Device system is unsafe from a public health perspective
while the coronavirus threat continues to ravage Georgia communities.
Georgia statutes require that a voting system be “safe and practicable” prior to
deployment. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300(a)(2). The Secretary of State is required to make a
determination of whether the voting system can be used “safely and accurately.”
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.24(b). Upon re-examination, the Secretary’s determination can
change as to its ability to be used in safe operation by electors. O.C.G.A. § 21-2379.24(c).
The Dominion BMD system cannot be used safely during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
system requires intense and labor-intensive Logic & Accuracy Testing in the election
office, followed by the labor-intensive steps of transporting system components to
polling places. The systems then must be installed in the polling places, which also
involves concentrated team contact, considerable equipment handling, and extensive
staff presence in the polling places. The system’s components (including touchscreens,
PollPads, styluses, and smart cards) all require significant and repeated physical
touching and handling by both voters and workers, as well as considerable team
interaction (for operation, instruction, and assistance) between poll workers and voters.
All supplies and components of the system must be cleaned to the CDC’s exacting
specification after every individual voter’s use in the current environment. This health
and safety requirement cannot be met given the delays that such steps would impose on
voters in the polling places and the widespread labor and cleaning supply shortages.
Further, Dominion recommends that the touchscreens be powered down for cleaning,
which would cause a long delay for rebooting after every voter and massively increase
the risk of system failure.
A far simpler, more health-conscious solution would be to replace the BMDs with hand
marked paper ballots, which could be delivered in a single box to each polling place.
Disposable pens or golf pencils (for 2020 only) could be used to mark ballots. Minimal
handling of equipment would occur if officials were to use “central count” options for
hand marked paper ballots as referenced by O.C.G.A § 21-2-485, a process in which
voters could cast their paper ballots into a “dumb” precinct ballot box for centralized
scanning at the elections office. This alternative would involve fewer personnel and less
handling, as well as permitting voters to spend less time in the polling place.
Many thousands of labor hours would be saved by using hand marked paper ballots
instead of BMDs, which would relieve pressure to staff the large number of posts
currently anticipated to be necessary at a time when labor will be difficult to find.

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For the foregoing reasons, we urge you to decertify the BMD components of
the Dominion Voting System for use in the immediately upcoming 2020
elections because the system is unsafe under the circumstances that will
likely prevail at the time these elections are conducted.
We believe that combined with flexible mail ballot and early voting options permitted by
state law, hand marked paper ballots can provide the basis for an orderly and safe
election in May, July, and November if diligent hygiene is maintained with lean crews.
We offer a number of suggestions below that would facilitate the use of hand marked
paper ballots to conduct these and any other elections that will be held during the
remainder of the current national public health emergency.
1. If officials are concerned about the accuracy of hand marked ballot style issuance
in early voting because of the number of potential ballot styles, they should
conduct a simple manual check with a sign-off by the poll worker “checker.” This
simple manual effort would save hundreds of hours and avoid the risks that will
otherwise be imposed by the need to set up and use BMDs for automated ballot
issuance.
2. Voters should not be required either to sign or to use styluses to touch PollPads.
(Nor should voters including voters with disabilities requiring assistive BMD
technology be required to handle smart cards.) Either signatures should be
waived this year, or else paper pollbooks should be used, since these can be
signed with disposable golf pencils or disposable pens.
3. Voters should be permitted (but not required) to bring their own printed-athome, signed polling place applications to vote, thereby reducing human
interactions and time spent in the polling place.
4. Given the potential for disruptions of online services and the foreseeable
difficulties of locating technical help promptly in such an event, the SEB should
require election superintendents to use a paper pollbook backup of elector
information that has been updated to reflect all early voting (i.e., the “certified
electors list” in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-401(b)). The paper backup should be used to
adjudicate discrepancies, and voters eligible to vote according to the paper
backup list should not be forced to vote a provisional ballot.
C. Voting Method Expansion and Alternatives
1. Permit acceptance of mail ballots at early voting locations and home precinct on
election day. The State Election Board (“SEB”) is aware of CGG’s proposals (in
partnership with the Georgia Libertarian Party and Georgia Constitution Party as
well as others) submitted November 22, 2019, for voters to be permitted to drop
off mail ballots to be accepted for later counting after showing identification in
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the polling places in order to avoid subjecting themselves to mailing and
signature-rejection risks. These proposals should be adopted.
Additionally, for ballots received without identification (such as when a person
delivers a family member’s ballot), polling locations could be used as drop-off
(not approval/verification) locations. We urge the SEB to quickly adopt a
mandatory rule consistent with current law permitting the appointment of
absentee ballot at expanded locations. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-382.
Accept completed mail ballots at curbside. Early voting centers, precinct polling
places, central offices, and temporary pop-up drive-through locations should be
established to accept and approve mail ballots. A drive-through drop-off
could be set up in each polling place’s parking lot and could be staffed until late
evening. Poll workers could use iPad-like tablets with absentee ballot lists to
check off ballots as returned after reviewing the photo identifications of the
voters. Absentee ballot clerks should be appointed at each of these stations under
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-382.
2. Curbside voting. Many states effectively use curbside voting, which permits
eligible voters to receive paper ballots in their cars, vote on a clipboard, and
return the ballot in a secrecy sleeve to the poll worker. Georgia should make use
of similar methods. Disposable cardboard sheets could be used instead of
clipboards. Sleeved ballots could be dropped into a locked ballot box without poll
workers handling the ballots.
3. Drive-through window voting at banks. Banks should be asked to participate by
permitting their drive-through windows to be used as ballot acceptance stations
on election day. Ballots can be issued to or collected from such facilities if proper
controls are put into place.
4. Early voting hours. In Georgia’s generous three-week period of early voting,
differing hours (not necessarily more hours) should be offered, with at least some
locations offering hours that extend until late evening on certain days, in order to
help reduce the sizes and densities of polling place crowds during the day.
5. Polling place locations. For purposes of the May and July elections, polling places
should be temporarily moved to nearby (closed) schools so that large
gymnasiums and cafeterias can be used for in-person voting. Larger spaces mean
more room to spread out equipment, voting stations, poll workers, and voters—
all of which help people comply with the CDC’s social distancing
recommendations.
6. Facilitating mail balloting.
a. The SEB should require all counties to accept online email or faxed absentee
ballot applications, with a required short issuance period.

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b. All voters should have the option to submit a one-time request for mail ballots
that would cover all 2020 elections and related 2021 runoffs.
c. Current mail ballot application forms should be updated and simplified to
explain methods of submitting the applications and clarify which voters are
eligible to apply for multiple elections in one request.
d. Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots should be accepted as a fail-safe voting
method if the voter has not obtained a mail ballot in time for mailing or
casting (for 2020 only).
e. Establish pop-up absentee ballot clerk locations (i.e., “additional sites” under
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-382) in precinct polling places and government buildings in
order to issue mail ballots in person. Ballots could be taken home to be
completed and subsequently returned by mail or in-person delivery.
f. Announce that there will be no enforcement of prohibition of voting mail
absentee ballot on election day. (O.C.G.A. §21-2-385(a)) Many voters like to
vote on election day and personally deliver their mail ballots. Some counties
are recently warning voters not to vote their mail ballots on election day.
7. Mail Ballot Processing.
Certain changes to mail ballot processing will be warranted to effectuate the
above proposals while also preserving secrecy of the ballot and minimizing any
risks of voter disfranchisement.
a. Clear instructions must be printed on mail ballot inside secrecy envelopes to
explain the purpose of the envelope, its mandatory use, and requirement of
ballot secrecy.
b. Your office should emphasize that county election officials must comply
strictly with mail ballot protocols for secrecy. CGG’s poll watchers have
observed voter privacy being compromised by election officials in small
communities during the opening and processing of mail ballots.
c. Voters should be permitted to enclose a black and white copy of their photo
identification to substitute for signature verification checks and thereby to
avoid the rejection-and-cure process. (Enclosing identification must be
accomplished in a manner that protects ballot secrecy and provides for
redaction of personally identifying information afterward.)
d. Mail ballot acceptances and rejections should be required to be posted by all
counties daily, as most counties do routinely. Third parties require this
information to help voters track ballots and cure discrepancies.

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D. Mail Ballot Security
Certain additional security measures will be required in order to effectuate the above
proposals. We recommend the following steps.
1. Create strict prohibitions against ballot harvesting. Mail ballot coercion, fraud,
and vote buying are all exacerbated if community groups, labor unions, religious
organizations, etc., are permitted to collect ballots. The SEB should enact clear
rules prohibiting such harvesting, including punitive fines.
2. Adopt strict and transparent chain of custody documentation. In order to have
public confidence in the election, the poll workers, poll watchers, and the parties
they represent must be able to verify the chain of custody of mail ballots and their
supporting documents. Clear rules should be promulgated by the SEB to ensure
that such documents are mandatory, that there is certainty of compliance, and
that poll watchers are afforded the ability to independently verify chain of
custody for mail ballots and accompanying documentation.
E. Transparency
Given the massive changes to voting methods that will be required in order to avoid
exacerbating the public health threat posed by SARS-Cov-2 and COVID-19 (whether or
not you and the SEB adopt any of the above recommendations), increased transparency
measures—especially in mail balloting—are going to be essential to preempt doubts
about the integrity of the upcoming elections. Accordingly, we offer the following
additional suggestions that are aimed at ensuring voter confidence in this difficult
period.
1. Poll watcher access to mail ballot operations. County officials should be
instructed that all operations and processes of mail ballot issuance, acceptance,
rejection, scanning, and tabulation should be open to visual access and
verification by authorized poll watchers. An appropriate number of poll watchers
should be permitted, in order to allow for rotation of poll watchers over the
expanse of days and hours in which election operations occur.
2. Poll watcher review of ballot issuance or voter rejection. State law and ballot
issuance practices should be amended to permit authorized poll watchers to
verify the accuracy of ballot styles issued to the voter to reduce errors in ballot
issuance or the rejection of the voter from voting in the polling location.
Verification of accuracy can be conducted with reference to an electronic record
in the possession of the poll watcher, such as via an iPad. Permitting poll
watchers to conduct such a check should not impede the voting process in any
way. Conducting such checks is a routine function of poll watchers in other
jurisdictions. These checks help to minimize, if not avoid, instances of
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unintentional disfranchisement of voters, inappropriate provisional balloting,
and inaccurate ballot style issuance.
3. Political Parties/Bodies Working Group. We recommend that all political parties
and registered political bodies be asked to join a working group to meet weekly
(by virtual means) with you, preferably in a publicly broadcast meeting, to
facilitate the exchange of information and ideas through the conclusion of the
2020 elections and runoffs in January 2021. This mechanism would provide a
transparent vehicle for you to use to ensure that you may conduct any necessary
ongoing problem-solving with the input of civic entities capable of speaking for a
broad and hopefully representative cross-section of all Georgia voters. The
political parties, in particular, could play a helpful public role, if they were
involved in such a working group, by facilitating the widespread communication
to the public and candidates of accurate information about ongoing decision
making.
The above suggestions are a partial list of changes that we urge all Georgia officials to
consider, given the grave public health risk facing Georgia at this moment and given the
ever-present need to facilitate safe and secure voting. The Dominion BMD Voting
System is particularly ill-suited to the current situation because it adds unnecessary
risks and financial costs to a fragile election environment. Given Dominion’s failures to
comply with the terms of the contract with respect to compliance with federal and state
election laws, including secret ballot laws, we urge you to consider requiring that
Dominion refund the cost of the BMD touchscreen components, which would likely
generate a refund to the State of $65 to $75 Million.
We are happy to discuss this with you at your earliest convenience.
Respectfully,

Marilyn Marks
Executive Director
Coalition for Good Governance
[e-mail]
704 292 9802
cc:
State Election Board Members
Vice-Chair Rebecca Sullivan [e-mail]
Ahn Le [e-mail]
David Worley [e-mail]
Matthew Mashburn [e-mail]
March 23, 2020

Recommendations for 2020 Elections

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Staff:
Germany, Ryan [e-mail]
GA Secretary of State Elections Division [e-mail]

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E
X
H
I
B
I
T

B

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 96 of 132

April 6, 2020
The Honorable Brad Raffensperger
Georgia Secretary of State
214 State Capitol
Atlanta, GA 30334
(via email)
Re: Request for reexamination of certain voting system components
Dear Secretary Raffensperger:
The COVID-19 public health crisis demands that certain high-touch components of the
Dominion voting system be reevaluated for their implications for public safety, given the
number of plastic and metal surfaces that must be handled multiple times by voters, poll
workers, and support staff. The reexamination should be conducted with primary input
from infectious disease experts and public health experts. Therefore, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.24, the undersigned electors of the State of Georgia, and
organizations representing thousands of other electors, hereby request an immediate
reexamination of certain components of the Dominion Voting System (EAC Certification
Number DVS-DemSuite5.5-A) (“Dominion System”), specifically the Ballot Marking
Device Version 5.5.10.30, and the Knowink PollPad system.
Specific components of present concern:
--PollPad electronic pollbook units, including the stylus;
--Voter access smart cards; and
--Ballot marking devices’ touchscreens.
The attached Exhibit A is a graphic developed to demonstrate the risk of the virus
spreading on voter-touched surfaces. By contrast, paper pollbooks, voter applications,
hand marked paper ballots, and disposable pens can greatly reduce the number of
potentially contaminated surfaces that workers and voters must touch.
We ask that recognized infectious disease experts and public health experts lead in
conducting the reexamination of the components and that the following facts be
considered:
--Paper alternatives are readily available and do not require a comparable level of
staff, vendor, and voter handling or human interaction. Poll workers can issue
paper ballots in envelopes or paper sleeves from behind plexiglass shields.
--Use of the BMD components (touchscreens, printers, battery backups) adds
approximately 80,000 unnecessary pieces of equipment to test, transport, install,

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 97 of 132

clean, secure, maintain, and return to inventory after the election.
--In addition, use of the BMD components requires handling at least 100,000
plastic smart cards intended for reuse by voters and staff.
--Touchscreen use requires thousands of precious hours of staff and technician
programming and testing, requiring teamwork in close quarters. Hand marked
paper ballots do not require this labor-intensive work.
--Dominion recommends that BMD touchscreens be shut down for cleaning,
which will greatly increase voter wait times in crowded polling places if
touchscreens are cleaned—as they should be—between every use. Poll worker
shortages will reduce the ability to ensure that thorough cleaning is consistently
performed.
--Transporting 80,000 additional components to polling places adds to handling
inside trucks and polling places. Installation of these 80,000 integrated but
unnecessary components in the polling place also requires considerable human
interaction in tight spaces.
--Touchscreens must be placed in locations near electric receptacles, which
causes the voting stations to be placed close together. Paper ballot voting stations
can be placed farther from each other.
--Touchscreens cannot be used for safer voting methods like curbside voting,
while paper ballots can easily be used in many such approaches.
The above considerations are certainly not all of the facts that should be taken into
consideration in the reexamination of the unsafe components.
We enclose at least the statutory minimum ten (10) signatures of duly registered
Georgia electors who seek this reexamination. The undersigned voters hereby state that,
given the current public health crisis, certain components of the Dominion System fail
to meet the statutory requirement that the voting system devices are safe for use by
Georgia electors (O.C.G.A. 379-2-379.24 (b) and (c)). Additionally, the BMD
touchscreens and PollPad units fail to comply with the statutory requirement that the
components be “safely transportable.” (O.C.G.A. 21-2-379.22 (10).
We the undersigned do not agree to pay the published reexamination fee for the needed
reexamination. We believe that any costs for this reexamination should be minimal and
are necessary expenditures of the Secretary’s office. This is a matter of urgent public
health importance and merits your immediate action. We reiterate our request that the
evaluation be conducted primarily by infectious disease experts and public health
experts.
Please let us know of you have questions concerning our request.

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 98 of 132

Respectfully submitted,

Cam Ashling, Chair
Georgia Advancing Progress PAC
(as an individual and on behalf of the organization)
Atlanta, GA 31126
[e-mail]
404-759-1782

Marilyn Marks
Executive Director
Coalition for Good Governance
(on behalf of its Georgia members)
[e-mail]
704-292-9802
Ryan Graham, Chair
Libertarian Party of Georgia
(as an individual and on behalf of the organization)
[e-mail]
Ricardo Davis, Chair
Constitution Party of Georgia
(as an individual and on behalf of the organization)
[e-mail]
Ryan Barrett, Chair
Newton County Democratic Committee

(as an individual and on behalf of the organization)
[e-mail]

Jeanne Dufort,
1st Vice Chair, Morgan County Democratic Committee
(as an individual and on behalf of the organization)
[e-mail]
Madison, GA
Rutledge Forney, MD
Atlanta, GA
Allen L. Dollar, MD, FACC, FACP
Emory Chief of Cardiology, Grady Memorial Hospital

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 99 of 132

Associate Professor of Medicine
Division of Cardiology
Emory University of School of Medicine
Corey Greenwald, MD
Atlanta, GA
Christy Blanchford, MD
Covington, GA
Karl Woodworth
Emory University Medical Librarian (retired)
Newborn, GA
Chris Hodges
Councilwoman, Madison GA
Shea Roberts
Candidate for Georgia House District 52
Sandy Springs, GA
Marvin Lim
Candidate for Georgia House District 99
Norcross, GA

Priscilla G. Smith
Candidate for Georgia House District 34
Kennesaw, GA
Linda Woodworth
Chair, Newborn Area Heritage Association
Newborn, GA
Elizabeth Throop
Atlanta, GA
Joy Wasson
Atlanta, GA
Rhonda J. Martin
Atlanta, GA
Aileen Nakamura
Sandy Springs, GA
Isabel, Fernando, Sophia, and Lucia Gambino
Atlanta, GA

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 100 of 132

Megan Missett
Atlanta, GA
Kathryn Grant
Valdosta, GA
Linda Kaminski
Canton, GA
Cissy Hanemayer
Madison, GA
Aaron Ruscetta
Decatur, GA
Cc:
Kathleen Toomey, Commissioner of Public Health
State Election Board Members
Rebecca Sullivan
Ahn Le
T Matthew Mashburn
David Worley
Attn: Ryan Germany
[e-mail]
Kevin Rayburn
[e-mail]

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 101 of 132

SAFE VOTING DURING THE
COV I D - 1 9 PA N D E M I C
APRIL 2020

DR. JOIA MUKHERJEE
MARK RITCHIE
RON FEIN
SUSAN GREENHALGH
COURTNEY HOSTETLER

A R E P O RT BY F R E E S P E E C H F O R P EO P L E
www.freespeechforpeople.org

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 102 of 132
Safe Voting During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Introduction
The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus (“novel coronavirus”), which causes the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”), has been spreading throughout the
United States since approximately January 2020. There is currently no cure or
vaccine for COVID-19. As of this writing, there are more than 360,000 reported
cases of COVID-19 in the United States, with cases in all fifty states, the District
of Columbia, and U.S. territories. More than 10,000 people in the United States
have died from COVID-19. Unfortunately, both of these numbers are expected to
increase dramatically over the next several months. On March 29, 2020, Dr.
Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, predicted that millions of Americans would be infected and 100,000200,000 would die. 1
As the novel coronavirus spirals out of control, it has become clear that our
traditional Election Day practices are not suited for a pandemic. In response,
some states have already begun to postpone primary elections. But elections—
the foundation of our democracy—must be held, and we must make legal and
policy changes now to ensure a safe, accessible, and trustworthy election in
November.
This report summarizes best practices for safe voting in the 2020 elections, based
on the generally accepted best practices for infectious disease control (including
for the novel coronavirus in particular) as of this date. 2 As explained in more
detail below, we recommend that every state and jurisdiction take the following
actions:
• Make vote-by-mail easy. All voters should have the opportunity to vote by
mail, or to complete their ballots at home and drop them off at a drivethrough or walk-through drop-off location. The processing of mail-in
ballots must be handled in a way that protects poll workers from virus
transmission.
1 Susan

Milligan, “Fauci: U.S. Coronavirus Deaths Could Near 200,000,”
https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-03-29/anthony-fauci-uscoronavirus-deaths-could-near-200-000 (Mar. 29, 2020).
2 The information in this report reflects best practices as of this writing. As knowledge of this
virus is rapidly evolving, it is likely that, over time, this understanding will evolve.
1

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Safe Voting During the COVID-19 Pandemic

• Minimize person-to-person contact at polling places. Early voting should
be expanded as much as feasible, to help limit the number of people who
must vote on any one day, and the number of polling places should be
increased. Voters should not be required to wait in long lines to vote.
Polling places should be configured to allow at least six feet of distance
between all voters and poll workers.
• Minimize contact with commonly-used surfaces. Polling places should be
designed to ensure that voters are not required to touch common surfaces
that are not disinfected. All voting-related equipment must be cleaned and
disinfected regularly. Paper ballots are safer than voting machines and less
likely to spread the novel coronavirus because fewer people must handle
each ballot. The use of voting machines should be absolutely minimized,
and used by only those voters who require them for accessibility purposes.
• Design and manage polling places to protect the most vulnerable
populations. The location and staffing of polling sites should be carefully
arranged to protect the most vulnerable populations, including older
adults.
Epidemiology of the novel coronavirus
The novel coronavirus is thought to spread mostly person-to-person through
respiratory droplets produced by an infected person who sneezes or coughs
within approximately a six-foot radius of another person or who touches and
object that is then touched by another person.
However, the novel coronavirus can also be spread through surfaces or objects. If
the novel coronavirus is present on a surface or object, a person may contract
COVID-19 by touching that surface or object, and then touching their mouth,
nose, or eyes. Other coronaviruses, including Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) coronavirus and the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) coronavirus, have been found to persist on glass for 4-5 days, and to
persist on plastic for up to 6 days, with one coronavirus strand surviving on plastic
for up to 9 days. 3 An early study on the aerosol and surface stability of the novel

3 G. Kampf

et al., “Persistence of Coronaviruses on Inanimate Surfaces and Their Inactivation
With Biocidal Agents,” 104 J. of Hospital Infection 246 (Mar. 2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2020.01.022.
2

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Safe Voting During the COVID-19 Pandemic

coronavirus has determined that the novel coronavirus can remain viable on
plastic for up to 3 days. 4
In both cases, individuals infected with the novel coronavirus can shed the virus
while appearing asymptomatic.
The novel coronavirus and the voting process
While voting practices vary widely, many aspects of common voting processes in
the United States pose a high risk of transmitting the novel coronavirus. Because
individuals can spread the novel coronavirus through person-to-person contact,
any dense grouping of people might result in person-to-person spread of COVID19.
At many polling places, voters waiting to vote must stand in line with other
voters, often indoors and in confined spaces, sometimes for extended periods of
time. Once inside the polling location, the typical “flow” involves interacting with
a poll worker to check in; proceeding to a semi-private voting booth or area that
may be quite close to another voter’s voting booth; and then interacting with
another poll worker to check out. All of these offer opportunities for an infected
voter or poll worker to transmit the novel coronavirus directly to others.
Additionally, the novel coronavirus may be shed onto voting machines, voting
booths, and other materials required for voting. The novel coronavirus could
remain present on those materials for hours or days unless they are properly
sanitized using disinfectants that are approved by the CDC for rendering the virus
inactive.
Infectious disease control best practices for elections
The best practices to control the spread of the novel coronavirus in the voting
process are based on the following principles:
a. Minimizing person-to-person contact via social distancing.
4

Neeltje van Doremalen et al., “Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared
With SARS-CoV-1,” Letter to the Editor, New England Journal of Medicine (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://bit.ly/2Uibd28.
3

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Safe Voting During the COVID-19 Pandemic

b. Minimizing contact by multiple people with commonly used
surfaces.
c. Frequently disinfecting commonly used surfaces.
d. Protecting the most vulnerable populations, including older
adults.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) issues and updates
guidance on mass gatherings and large community events.5 As of this writing,
the CDC recommends that all U.S. events of 10+ people should be cancelled or
held virtually. Many states and cities have imposed similar or even more stringent
measures. Government authorities may revise these measures over time for
various reasons. But from the perspective of infectious disease control, expert
medical consensus is unlikely to change its view that minimizing large gatherings
will be essential for months to come.
The CDC also issues and updates guidance specific to election polling locations. 6
The following best practices and recommendations are drawn from and reflect
CDC and other expert medical guidance, as well as the professional expertise and
judgment of Free Speech For People’s advisor on infectious disease control in the
voting process, Dr. Joia Mukherjee.
Voting by mail
All voters should have the opportunity to vote by mail, or to complete their
ballots at home and drop them off at a drive-through or walk-through dropoff
location. Voters should be able to request mail-in ballots up to the day before the
election, to increase the likelihood that individuals who are diagnosed with
COVID-19 or have been exposed to the novel coronavirus do not vote in person,
and to ensure that individuals who wish to reduce their exposure to infection can
do so. Envelope closures for mail-in ballots should use “no-lick” sealing methods
such as pressure-sensitive gum.

5 See

CDC, “Interim Guidance: Get Your Mass Gatherings or Large Community Events Ready
for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/downloads/Mass-Gatherings-Document_FINAL.pdf (revised Mar. 29, 2020).
6 See CDC, “Recommendations for Election Polling Locations,”
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html
(revised Mar. 27, 2020).
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Secure remote ballot marking options should be offered for voters with
disabilities. Voters with disabilities may not be able to mark a vote-by-mail ballot
at home. Jurisdictions should offer remote accessible ballot marking systems
that allow a voter to access a ballot electronically on her computer or device and
use assistive technology to mark and print a paper ballot. These systems should
always conform to recommendations from the National Institute of Standards
and Technology to protect ballot privacy and security and not transmit any vote
selection information over the Internet.7
The processing of mail-in ballots must be handled in a way that protects poll
workers from virus transmission. Processing locations must be set up to ensure
that poll workers maintain a distance of six feet from one another. Poll workers
should be provided with protective equipment, and be able to practice hand
hygiene frequently in accordance with CDC guidance.8 Envelopes should be
opened in a manner that does not require poll workers to touch the envelopes’
adhesive. Finally, tabulation equipment must be routinely sanitized in
accordance with the vendor’s guidance.
In-person voting
It may be impossible or not preferable for some voters to vote by mail. Therefore,
all efforts must be made to ensure that voting locations are as safe and sanitary
as possible.
Minimizing person-to-person contact at polling places
Density of people at polling sites must be reduced. This involves several
measures to spread voters out in both space and time.
Early voting should be expanded as much as feasible, to help limit the
number of people who must vote on any one day, and the number of polling
places should be increased. On Election Day itself, voting hours should be
expanded, and voters should be encouraged to come during off-peak hours when
7

Computer Sec. Res. Ctr., Nat’l Inst. of Sci. & Tech., “Security Best Practices for the Electronic
Transmission of Election Materials for UOCAVA Voters” (NISTIR 7711),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/IR/nistir7711.pdf (Sept. 2011).
8 See CDC, “When and How to Wash Your Hands,” https://www.cdc.gov/handwashing/whenhow-handwashing.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
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possible. Where possible, “curbside voting” (in which voters can vote without
leaving their vehicles) should be made available, especially for voters with
disabilities or who may be ill. Election officials should increase the number of
available polling places, to ensure that fewer individuals are required to visit each
polling location.
Voters should not be required to wait in long lines to vote. If short lines must
form, voters must be able to maintain 6 feet of separation between one another.
Voters should not be turned away at the polls to avoid long lines. Instead, long
lines should be avoided by taking precautions recommended above, including
expanded vote-by-mail, early voting options, and increasing the number of
polling places to avoid dense crowds, as well as expanding the simultaneous
voting capacity at polling places.
Polling places should be configured to allow at least six feet of distance
between all voters and poll workers. In particular, voting booths must be
configured to place at least 6 feet of separation between voters. The voting
process should be set up to require only minimal interaction between voter and
poll worker. Finally, voters and poll workers should be discouraged from bringing
non-essential visitors such as minor children or grandchildren with them to the
polls.
Minimizing contact with commonly used surfaces
Polling places should be designed to ensure that voters are not required to
touch common surfaces that are not disinfected. Poll workers should wear
surgical gloves and masks while handling ballots, pens, and other voting
equipment. Poll workers should change their gloves and masks and wash their
hands regularly.
Polling locations should provide alcohol-based hand sanitizer (at least 60%
alcohol) for use both before and after voting. Sanitizer should be placed near the
entrance, at registration desks, near the exits, and at other visible, frequently
used locations. If possible, polling places should be located near publicly
accessible bathrooms, which should be frequently re-stocked with ample soap
and disposable paper towels.

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All voting-related equipment must be cleaned and disinfected regularly. CDC
guidance advises that poll workers must “[c]lean and disinfect voting-associated
equipment (e.g., voting machines, laptops, tablets, keyboards) routinely.”9
However, the CDC does not define “routinely.” From a public health standpoint,
the best practices are as follows:
• For any equipment that is used repeatedly but by only one individual (e.g.,
a poll book that is used by only one poll worker for an entire shift), disinfect
at least once per hour.
• For any equipment that is directly touched by multiple voters or other
individuals (e.g., voting machines or assistive technology), disinfect after
each individual’s use.
Paper ballots are safer than voting machines and less likely to spread the
novel coronavirus because fewer people must handle each ballot. Where
possible, voters should be given their own disposable pen to mark the ballot and
their own disposable writing surface. If not possible, each pen and writing surface
must be thoroughly disinfected after each use.
Unfortunately, most voting machines are difficult to clean or sanitize properly in
the middle of an election. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission has collected
and published manufacturers’ recommended practices for cleaning some
electronic voting machines. 10 They are difficult to properly clean, in many cases
require specialized instruction or materials, and have small parts.
Several manufacturers warn that common disinfectants, or departing from the
recommended cleaning technique, could damage the equipment. For example,
Election Systems & Software (“ES&S”) warns that poll workers must be careful to
not touch the sensors on the edges of the screen, “scratch touch screens,” or

9 See

CDC, “Recommendations for Election Polling Locations,”
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html
(revised Mar. 27, 2020).
10 See Election Assistance Comm’n, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resources,”
https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/coronavirus-covid-19-resources (last visited Apr. 6,
2020).
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allow moisture to “linger[] on the external surface.”11 ES&S also warns poll
workers not to apply cleanser directly to the screens, or to use too much cleaner
on the cloth, or else the equipment may become “damaged during cleaning.” 12
As another example, Dominion Voting lists just six approved branded cleaning
products for its touchscreen-based voting machines. 13
In normal times, these products might all be readily available, but in the current
situation, election officials might be unable to obtain them in sufficient
quantities. They would then face the dilemma of either inadequately disinfecting
the voting machines (which could then become disease vectors) or using
unapproved products, possibly damaging expensive and hard-to-replace
equipment in the middle of an election.
In many cases, manufacturers’ recommended cleaning guidelines—which may be
reasonable in normal circumstances—are inconsistent with the twin public health
mandates of frequent cleaning and avoiding buildup of long lines during a
pandemic. For example, Dominion Voting warns that its touchscreen-based
voting machines must be powered down before cleaning, noting that “[m]oist
wipes may alter the touch sensitivity of screens until the moisture is removed.
Additionally, some screen buttons may be inadvertently activated during wipe
down.”14 Powering down a voting machine before cleaning, and then restarting it
after cleaning, takes time, especially because many machines will require a
special administrator login after rebooting. Similarly, MicroVote cautions that
after cleaning its Infinity electronic voting machine, poll workers must “[a]llow

11 ES&S, “Best

Practices – Voting System,” at 1-2,
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/coronavirus/ESS_BestPractices_Cleani
ng_Disinfecting.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
12 Id. at 3.
13 Dominion Voting, “Customer Notification: COVID-19 (‘Coronavirus’) Information,” at 4 (Mar.
9, 2020),
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/coronavirus/DVS_CoronavirusCleaning
Notice_030920.pdf.
14 Dominion Voting, “Customer Notification: COVID-19 (‘Coronavirus’) Information,” at 1 (Mar.
9, 2020),
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/coronavirus/DVS_CoronavirusCleaning
Notice_030920.pdf.
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ample drying time after cleaning before operation.”15 If sanitized after each
voter’s use, consistent with infectious disease control best practices, these
cleaning practices could lead to long lines that may create an increased risk of
person-to-person transmission.
Furthermore, manufacturers’ recommended cleaning practices are often highly
specific, with cautions regarding any deviations. ES&S, for example, specifies
that a “trained poll worker” must clean the machines. 16 Poll workers, whether
paid or volunteer, are generally only lightly trained (e.g., a single two-hour
training) and it is unreasonable to expect flawless execution.
This could result in two distinct failure modes. First, a poll worker might fail to
clean a voting machine adequately, rendering it a continued potential source of
surface-to-voter transmission. Second, a poll worker might inadvertently deviate
from the cleaning instructions and damage a machine. This will reduce polling
place capacity and thus lead to longer lines, creating an increased risk of personto-person transmission.
Consequently, the use of voting machines should be absolutely minimized,
and used by only those voters who require them for accessibility purposes.
The machines will still have to be sanitized according to manufacturer and health
authority instructions after every voter’s use, but by minimizing the number of
voters who use these voting machines, this will be much less often than if most or
all voters were required to use them.
There is a collateral public health benefit to reducing the usage of these voting
machines. In many cases, polling places can physically accommodate more
voters voting simultaneously on paper ballots than on voting machines, with less
(or no) down-time due to equipment failures. This would enable a faster flow
through the polling place, thus reducing time spent in lines and exposed to other
voters.
15 MicroVote, “Cleaning and

Disinfecting Infinity Voting Equipment,”
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/coronavirus/MicroVote_CleanSanitize.
pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
16 ES&S, “Best Practices – Voting System,” at 1,
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/coronavirus/ESS_BestPractices_Cleani
ng_Disinfecting.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
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Protecting the most vulnerable populations
The location and staffing of polling sites should be designed and managed to
protect the most vulnerable populations. Polling sites should be relocated away
from senior centers or residential facilities. Election officials should recruit extra
poll workers to facilitate a more expeditious voting process and to account for
potential absences due to sickness or prudent self-isolation. There is expected to
be a large pool of recently-unemployed workers, many of whom are in lower-risk
groups for serious infection, who could be recruited for this important civic task.
Poll workers who are at higher risk of serious infection should be given
opportunities to serve in areas that do not involve engaging directly with voters,
such as processing vote-by-mail ballots.
Conclusion
This year is the first federal election since 1918, and the nation’s first-ever
presidential election, conducted during a major global pandemic. In the midst of
such a pandemic, we must have a president, governors, and mayors who have
the consent of the governed. That requires a free, fair, and safe election. The
recommendations in this report reflect best practices for ensuring a safe,
accessible, and trustworthy election. Election officials should begin
implementing these recommendations now, and continue to consult with public
health experts to devise plans that limit transmission of the novel coronavirus
without interfering with voters’ ability to cast their votes. Our democracy
demands no less.

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Safe Voting During the COVID-19 Pandemic

About the Authors
Dr. Joia Mukherjee is a physician, clinical researcher, and educator trained in
Infectious Disease, Internal Medicine, Pediatrics, and public health at the
Massachusetts General Hospital and the Harvard School of Public Health. She is
an Associate Professor of Medicine at the Brigham and Women’s Hospital in the
Division of Global Health Equity and in the Department of Global Health and
Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School. She founded and directs the Masters
in Medical Science in Global Health Delivery at Harvard Medical School. Dr.
Mukherjee mentors residents in the Global Health Equity program at the
Brigham and Women’s Hospital and fellows from Children’s Hospital and other
Harvard teaching hospitals. She teaches infectious disease, global health
delivery, and human rights to health professionals and students from around the
world. She is the author of Introduction to Global Health Delivery: Practice, Equity,
Human Rights, a textbook published in 2017 by Oxford University Press. Dr.
Mukherjee’s academic scholarship focuses on the treatment of HIV, TB, mental
health and the strengthing of health systems in impoverished settings. She is
also a sought-after teacher in human rights. Since 2000, Dr. Mukherjee has
served as the Chief Medical Officer of Partners In Health, an international
medical charity with programs in the United States, Haiti, Rwanda, Lesotho,
Malawi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Peru, Mexico, Russia, Kazakhstan and the Navajo
nation. As Chief Medical Officer of PIH, Joia coordinates and supports PIH’s
efforts to provide high quality, comprehensive health care to the poorest and
most vulnerable. She advises various grassroots organizations throughout the
world and has consulted for the World Health Organization and other
international agencies on health systems strengthening, human resources for
health, the treatment of HIV, and the treatment of drug resistant tuberculosis in
impoverished settings. She has won numerous awards for her teaching and
health delivery work, and holds four honorary degrees. She is a graduate of the
University of Minnesota Medical School and also earned a Masters of Public
Health from the Harvard School of Public Health. Dr. Mukherjee is a member of
the Free Speech For People Board of Directors.
Mark Ritchie served as Minnesota’s Secretary of State from 2007-2015, including
a term as president of the National Association of Secretaries of State. He
currently serves on the U.S. Election Assistance Commission's Board of Advisors,
appointed by Senator Amy Klobuchar. His time as Secretary of State was
characterized by efforts to enhance voter knowledge and participation and the

11

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expansion of a wide range of services for Minnesota businesses, organizations,
and residents. He graduated with a B.S. from Iowa State University and a
master’s degree in Public Affairs from the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities.
Ron Fein is the Legal Director for Free Speech For People. Mr. Fein previously
served as Assistant Regional Counsel in the United States Environmental
Protection Agency’s New England office, where he received the EPA’s National
Gold Medal for Exceptional Service. Earlier, Mr. Fein clerked for the Honorable
Kermit Lipez of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the
Honorable Douglas Woodlock of the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts. He graduated Order of the Coif from Stanford Law School
and summa cum laude from Harvard College.
Susan Greenhalgh is the Senior Advisor on Election Security for Free Speech For
People. Ms. Greenhalgh has previously served as vice president of programs at
Verified Voting and at the National Election Defense Coalition, advocating for
secure election protocols, paper ballot voting systems and post-election audits.
Recognized as an expert on election security, she has been an invited speaker at
meetings of the MITRE Corporation, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, the Mid-West Election Officials Conference, the International
Association of Government Officials, the Election Verification Network and the
E-Vote-ID conference in Bregenz, Austria. She is a frequent source for reporters
from The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Politico,
USAToday, Associated Press, National Public Radio and other leading news
outlets. She has appeared on CNN and MSNBC’s The Rachel Maddow Show, and
various other television news shows. She has a B.A. in Chemistry from the
University of Vermont.
Courtney Hostetler is the Counsel for Free Speech For People. Previously, Ms.
Hostetler served as staff attorney for South Coastal Counties Legal Services,
where she helped low-income clients recover damages for wage theft and
employment discrimination, and obtained special education services for
traumatized children. Ms. Hostetler also worked at Zalkind Duncan & Bernstein
LLC and ACLU Massachusetts, where she focused on eliminating discriminatory
discipline practices in public schools. Prior to attending law school, Ms. Hostetler
managed the Close Up Foundation’s national youth voting program and worked
as a research analyst for the Genocide Intervention Network. Ms. Hostetler

12

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Safe Voting During the COVID-19 Pandemic

clerked for the Honorable James L. Dennis of the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Ms. Hostetler graduated with a J.D. from Yale Law School, an
M.Phil from Oxford University, and a B.A. from Colgate University.
About Free Speech For People
Free Speech For People works to renew our democracy and our United States
Constitution for we the people. Founded on the day of the Supreme Court’s
Citizens United ruling, Free Speech For People envisions a democratic process in
which all people have an equal voice and an equal vote. We fight for free and fair
elections, for reliable and secure voting systems, and for the bedrock principle
that, in a democracy, all voters must have their votes properly counted. To learn
more, please visit our website: www.freespeechforpeople.org.

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Encourage moving election polling locations away from long term care facilities and facilities
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Updated EPA COVID Disinfectant link.

Background
There is much to learn about the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) that causes coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19). Based on what is currently known about SARS-CoV-2 and about similar
coronaviruses, spread from person-to-person happens most frequently among close contacts (within
about 6 feet). This type of transmission occurs via respiratory droplets. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2
to persons from surfaces contaminated with the virus has not been documented. Transmission of
coronavirus in general occurs much more commonly through respiratory droplets than through
contact with contaminated surfaces. Current evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2 may remain viable
for hours to days on surfaces made from a variety of materials. Cleaning of visibly dirty surfaces
followed by disinfection is a best practice measure for prevention of COVID-19 and other viral
respiratory illnesses in election polling locations.

Purpose
This guidance provides recommendations on the routine cleaning and disinfection of polling location
areas and associated voting equipment (e.g., pens, voting machines, computers). It suggests actions
that polling station workers can take to reduce the risk of exposure to COVID-19 by limiting the
survival of the virus in the environment. This guidance will be updated if additional information
becomes available.
De!nitions:

Election Polling
Locations

Community settings (e.g. polling locations, households, schools, daycares, businesses)
encompass most non-healthcare settings and are visited by the general public.

FAQs for Event

First Responders and Law
Enforcement

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Community- and FaithBased Organizations

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Cleaning refers to the removal of dirt and impurities including germs from surfaces. Cleaning
alone does not kill germs. But by removing them, it decreases the number of germs and
therefore any risk of spreading infection.

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Homeless Population

Encourage voters to use voting methods that minimize direct contact with other
people and reduce crowd size at polling stations.
Encourage mail-in methods of voting if allowed in the jurisdiction.

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Correctional and
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Actions for elections o"cials in advance of election day

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Retirement Communities

Disinfecting kills germs on surfaces. Disinfecting works by using chemicals to kill germs on
surfaces. This process does not necessarily clean dirty surfaces or remove germs. But killing
germs remaining on a surface after cleaning further reduce any risk of spreading infection.

+

Tribal Communities

Encourage early voting, where voter crowds may be smaller throughout the day. This
minimizes the number of individuals a voter may come in contact with.
Encourage drive-up voting for eligible voters if allowed in the jurisdiction.
Encourage voters planning to vote in-person on election day to arrive at o#-peak times.
For example, if voter crowds are lighter mid-morning, advertise that in advance to the
community.

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Laboratories

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Communication
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Encourage relocating polling places from nursing homes, long-term care facilities, and
senior living residences, to minimize COVID-19 exposure among older individuals and
those with chronic medical conditions.

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Consider additional social distancing and other measures to protect these individuals
during voting.

Preventive actions polling workers can take
Stay at home if you have fever, respiratory symptoms, or believe you are sick

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Practice hand hygiene frequently wash hands often with soap and water for at least 20
frequently:
seconds. If soap and water are not readily available, use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer that
contains at least 60% alcohol.

Updates

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updates about COVID19, enter your email
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Practice routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces: including tables, doorknobs,
light switches, handles, desks, toilets, faucets, sinks, etc.
Disinfect surfaces that may be contaminated with germs after cleaning: A list of
products with EPA-approved emerging viral pathogens claims & is available. Products with
EPA-approved emerging viral pathogens claims are expected to be e#ective against the virus
that causes COVID-19 based on data for harder to kill viruses. Follow the manufacturer’s
instructions for all cleaning and disinfection products (e.g., concentration, application method
and contact time, use of personal protective equipment).

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Clean and disinfect voting-associated equipment (e.g., voting machines, laptops,
tablets, keyboards) routinely Follow the manufacturer’s instructions for all cleaning and
routinely.
disinfection products.
Consult with the voting machine manufacturer for guidance on appropriate disinfection
products for voting machines and associated electronics.

Spanish
Communication
Resources

Consider use of wipeable covers for electronics.
If no manufacturer guidance is available, consider the use of alcohol-based wipes or
spray containing at least 70% alcohol to clean voting machine buttons and touch
screens. Dry surfaces thoroughly to avoid pooling of liquids.

Social Media Toolkit
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Preventive action polling stations workers can take for themselves and
the general public
Based on available data, the most important measures to prevent transmission of viruses in
crowded public areas include careful and consistent cleaning of one’s hands. Therefore:
Ensure bathrooms at the polling station are supplied adequately with soap, water,
and drying materials so visitors and sta# can wash their hands.
hands..
Provide an alcohol-based hand sanitizer with at least 60% alcohol for use before or
after using the voting machine or the !nal step in the voting process. Consider placing the
alcohol-based hand sanitizer in visible, frequently used locations such as registration desks
and exits.
Incorporate social distancing strategies, as feasible.
feasible.Social distancing strategies
increase the space between individuals and decrease the frequency of contact among
individuals to reduce the risk of spreading a disease. Keeping individuals at least 6 feet apart
is ideal based on what is known about COVID-19. If this is not feasible, e#orts should be
made to keep individuals as far apart as is practical. Feasibility of strategies will depend on
the space available in the polling station and the number of voters who arrive at one time.
Polling station workers can:
Increase distance between voting booths.
Limit nonessential visitors. For example, poll workers should be encouraged not to bring
children, grandchildren, etc. with them as they work the polls.
Remind voters upon arrival to try to leave space between themselves and others.
Encourage voters to stay 6 feet apart if feasible. Polling places may provide signs to help
voters and workers remember this.
Discourage voters and workers from greeting others with physical contact (e.g.,
handshakes). Include this reminder on signs about social distancing.

Recommendations for processing mail-in ballots
Workers handling mail in ballots should practice hand hygiene frequently
No additional precautions are recommended for storage of ballots

References
Community Mitigation Guidance for COVID-19 Response in the United States:
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Community Preparedness and Outbreak Response
Handwashing: Clean Hands Save Lives
Protect Yourself & Your Family
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Page last reviewed: March 10, 2020
Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of Viral Diseases

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RESOLUTION ENCOURAGING STATE LEADERS TO ALLOW VOTING
EXCLUSIVELY BY MAIL IN THE UPCOMING MAY ELECTION

Whereas elections for the postponed Presidential Preference Primary, as well as nonpartisan elections and party primaries, are rapidly approaching; and
Whereas all registered voters have a right to vote guaranteed by the Georgia
Constitution1; and
Whereas the Coronavirus (aka COVID-19) has been rapidly spreading throughout
Georgia, the United States, and the world2;
Whereas Georgia residents are under a Shelter in Place order imposed by Governor
Kemp through April 30th, 20203; and
Whereas Georgia public schools have been physically closed for the remainder of
the 2019-2020 school year, limiting students to on-line instruction only4;
and
Whereas, the Coronavirus appears to be easily spread from person to person5; and
Whereas, scientists are proposing that an absolute minimum distance of six feet apart
be maintained between persons to prevent spread of the virus6; and
Whereas, despite the best preparations for a live, in-person vote, the six-foot rule
and adequate sanitation cannot be maintained; and

1

Article II, Section I, Paragraph II of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983.

2

https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3

https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/breaking-kemp-extends-shelter-place-order-georgia-throughapril/TsMutJJldcp9FTb3QTD00J/
4

https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-education/schools-closed-until-fall/r7QgK2idaQ0681UafbW3XP/

5

https://www.livescience.com/covid19-coronavirus-transmission-through-speech.html

6

https://www.livescience.com/coronavirus-six-feet-enough-social-distancing.html

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Whereas, the average age of a poll worker in Georgia is 70 years old7; and
Whereas, the Centers for Disease Control advises that older adults are at higher risk
of developing complications from the virus, including death8; and
Whereas, fearing for their own safety, roughly half of Jackson County’s trained poll
workers have withdrawn from participating in the upcoming election; and
Whereas, the Georgia constitution provides that the State Government shall protect
the citizens of this State9; and
Whereas, the Board of Elections and Registration of Jackson County wants to protect
all citizens (including poll workers, elections office staff, custodians,
EMTs, sheriff’s deputies, all of their families, and everyone involved in
the voting process) while ensuring the right to vote; and
Whereas, the continual moving of election dates creates a financial burden on
taxpayers through their county and state taxes; and
Whereas, the Georgia Secretary of State has mailed an absentee voter request form
to every registered voter in the State of Georgia10; and
Whereas, every voter may request an absentee ballot for mail-in voting by returning
the request via fax, mail, e-mail, or in-person11; and
Whereas, local voter registration offices keep track of the request being made, the
ballot being sent, and the ballot being returned, thus providing
accountability to the voter that his or her vote is received and counted; and

7

https://www.gpbnews.org/post/could-coronavirus-affect-georgia-s-elections

8

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-adults.html

9

Article I, Section I, Paragraphs II and VII of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983.

10

https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/voters-mailed-absentee-ballot-request-forms-for-maygeorgia-primary/hc0FkOo85uVCALbWvQUo9L/
11

https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/Elections/absentee_voting_in_georgia

Case 1:20-cv-01677-TCB Document 1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 124 of 132

Whereas, voting by mail in the current COVID-19 pandemic is the only guaranteed
method to protect voters, poll workers, and others involved in the voting
process;
NOW, therefore, be it resolved that the Board of Elections and Registration of
Jackson County, for the safety and wellbeing of the citizens of Jackson County
and of Georgia, hereby urge Governor Brian Kemp, Lt. Governor Geoff
Duncan, House Speaker David Ralston, and Secretary of State Brad
Raffensperger to provide that the upcoming election be conducted entirely by
mail.
SO AUTHORIZED AND RESOLVED this 8th day of April, 2020.

____________________________
Eric C. Crawford
Chairman

____________________________
Theressa Tate
Member

____________________________
Erma Denney
Member

____________________________
Judy McNichols
Member

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