Hinson v. Lyft, Inc.
ORDER GRANTING 16 Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Litigation. It is further ORDERED that this action is STAYED and shall be ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending completion of arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement in this case. The parties shall notify the Court upon completion of arbitration, and either party shall have the right to move to reopen this case to resolve any remaining issues of contention. Signed by Judge Mark H. Cohen on 2/26/21. (jpa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
CIVIL ACTION FILE
This case comes before the Court on Defendant Lyft, Inc. ("Lyft")'s Motion
to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Litigation ("Mot. to Compel") [Doc. 16]
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
Lyft owns and operates a ridesharing service that has employed hundreds of
drivers in the state of Georgia. Compl. [Doc. 1] ^ 8; see also Decl. ofNeil Shah in
Supp. ofLyft's Mot. to Compel (Sept. 17, 2020) ("Shah DecL") [Doc. 16-2] H 3
(stating that Lyft is a "mobile-based ridesharing marketplace platform" that
connects riders seeking a destination with drivers willing to drive them to those
destinations). To access Lyft's services, both riders and drivers (known as "users")
must create a registered profile, which requires that the user "consent to the Terms
of Service Agreement, and supply information such as the individual's first and
last name, email address, and phone number." Shah Decl. ^ 4. Drivers also must
agree to an additional "driver addendum." ]A ^ 5. Lyft periodically updates its
Terms of Service Agreement, and in doing so requires all users to re-consent to the
updated document in order to continue using Lyft's services. Id ^ 6. For example,
after a new update, a driver with a registered profile cannot offer a ride unless he
accepts the newly updated Terms of Services Agreement. I(L ^ 9. Two such
updates occurred on August 26, 2019, and November 27, 2019. Id, ^ 7, 10.
Plaintiff Fitzgerald Hinson ("Hinson") alleges that he has been a driver for
Lyft since 2019. Compl. ^ 7, 20. According to Lyft's business records, Hinson
first agreed to Lyft's Terms of Sendce on July 23, 2016, and he accepted them
again on August 26, 2019, on October 19, 2019, and finally on November 24,
2019. ShahDecl.1p6. Hinson accepted the November 27, 2019, updated Terms
of Service on June 9, 2020. ]A ^ 17. He accepted the Terms of Service several
more times throughout 2020, most recently on August 7, 2020. Id.
A. The Lyft Terms of Service Agreement
Lyft's November 27, 2019, Terms of Service Agreement includes a
disclaimer on the first page that states:
PLEASE BE ADVISED: THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS
PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN HOW CLAIMS BETWEEN YOU
AND LYFT CAN BE BROUGHT (SEE SECTION 17 BELOW).
THESE PROVISIONS WILL, WITH LIMITED EXCEPTION,
REQUIRE YOU TO SUBMIT CLAIMS YOU HAVE AGAINST
LYFT TO BINDING AND FINAL ARBITRATION ON AN
INDIVIDUAL BASIS, NOT AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASSMEMBER
IN ANY CLASS, GROUP OR REPRESENTATIVEACTION OR
PROCEEDING. AS A DRIVER OR DRIVER APPLICANT, YOU
HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPT OUT OF ARBITRATION
WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN CLAIMS AS PROVIDED IN
Lyft Terms of Service (Nov. 27, 2019) ("Nov. Terms of Service") [Doc. 16-2
at 11-53] at 1. Section 17, titled "Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Agreement"
(the "Arbitration Agreement") provides that the user and Lyft "mutually agree" "to
resolve any dispute by arbitration," and that the agreement to arbitrate is governed
by the FAA. Id. § 17(a). The Arbitration Agreement applies to "all Claims,"
which is defined to include "any dispute, claim or controversy . . . arising out of or
relating to," in relevant part, (1) "any city, county, state or federal wage-hour law
. . . ," (2) "compensation, break and rest periods, [and] expense reimbursement
. . .", and (3) "any claims arising under the ... Fair Labor Standards Act." Id.
Moreover, the Arbitration Agreement provides that "[a] 11 disputes concerning the
arbitrability of a Claim (including disputes about the scope, applicability,
enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration Agreement) shall be
decided by the arbitrator, as expressly provided below." Id.
B. Procedural History
On May 22, 2020, Hinson filed his Complaint on behalf of himself and other
current or former drivers for Lyft, based on Lyffc's alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. See Compl. ^ 1. Hinson
alleges that Lyft has been classifying its drivers improperly as "independent
contractors" instead of "employees," and thereby avoiding its obligations to pay
drivers expense reimbursements, minimum wages, overtime pay, and other
benefits. IcL ^ 1-5. Hinson alleges that the drivers are not independent
contractors because, among other reasons, they lack the discretion and autonomy
that independent contractors have. Id ^ 2, 20-115. In the single count of the
Complaint, Hinson alleges that Lyft has engaged in a pattern and practice of
violating the FLSA with respect to him and all similarly situated Lyft drivers who
have performed services for Lyft from May 22, 2017, until the present, by failing
1 The Arbitration Agreement within the November Terms of Service contains a list
of five limited exceptions to the Arbitration Agreement that are not relevant here.
See Nov. Terms of Service § 17(g); Mot. to Compel at 6 n. 2.
to pay overtime wages and failing to record all of the time said drivers have
worked for Lyft. Id, ^ 116-31.
On September 25, 2020, Lyft filed its Motion to Compel asking the Court to
compel Hinson to arbitrate his claim against Lyft on an individual basis in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement. Mot. to Compel. Anticipating that
Hinson would attempt to invoke the exemption for "transportation workers" in § 1
of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1, Lyft contends that the exemption does not apply to Lyft
rideshare drivers because they predominantly provide local services, transport
passengers rather than goods, and are not engaged in interstate commerce. Lyft's
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Compel ("Lyft's Mem.") [Doc. 16-1] at 1-4,
8-22. Hinson responds by asserting that § 1 of the FAA does apply because he is a
transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce even if most of his rides are
intrastate in nature. PL'S Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Compel ("PL'S Opp'n") [Doc. 24]
at 2-5. Hinson also contends that the § 1 exemption applies to the transportation of
passengers as well as goods. Id. at 5-6. Finally, Hinson argues that if the FAA
does not apply to him, then the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable. Id. at 6-9.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The FAA "reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract." Id. Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in. .. a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2. "The FAA thereby places arbitration agreements on an equal footing
with other contracts, and requires courts to enforce them according to their terms."
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (citations omitted).
There is an "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution,"
and courts are to construe "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues . . .
in favor of arbitration." Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 801 F. App'x 723, 725 (11th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 626, 631 (1985)); see also Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital Svs., LLC, 827
F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2016) (same). The FAA "provisions manifest a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (quotation omitted); see also Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that the FAA's "federal
policy favoring arbitration" requires that courts "rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate."). Therefore, "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration" and "any doubts concerning the
scope ofarbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercur/ Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
However, the FAA exempts from its coverage "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The Supreme Court has held that § 1's
residual clause—"any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce"—applies only to "contracts of employment of transportation workers."
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001) (resolving a
circuit split over whether § 1 applied to all employment contracts engaged in
interstate commerce or only to contracts involving transportation workers engaged
in interstate commerce). The Supreme Court also has stated that "a court should
decide for itself whether § 1's 'contracts of employment' exclusion applies before
ordering arbitration." New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019).
"A plaintiff challenging the enforcement of an arbitration agreement bears
the burden to establish, by substantial evidence, any defense to the enforcement of
the agreement." Inetianborv. CashCall, Inc, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1362 (S.D.
Fla. 2013) (citing Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (11th Cir.
There is no dispute that the Arbitration Agreement requires a Lyft rideshare
driver to arbitrate all FLSA claims, including the one brought by Hinson in this
case. The principle question for the Court to decide is whether Hinson and the
class ofLyft drivers he seeks to represent are members of a "class of workers
engaged in ... interstate commerce" such that they would be classified as
transportation workers that are exempt from the FAA's arbitration provisions
under § 1 's residual clause. Lyft seeks to compel Hinson to arbitrate his claim on
an individual basis, arguing that the § 1 exemption for transportation workers does
not apply to Hinson or the class ofLyft drivers to which he belongs. See Mot. to
Compel. Specifically, Lyft contends that Lyft drivers are not "engaged" in
interstate commerce within the meaning of § 1.3
2 Because this Court finds that the putative class ofLyft drivers are not engaged in
interstate commerce, it need not address Lyft's contention that § 1 does not apply
to transportation workers who transport passengers instead of goods. The Court
assumes for purposes of this opinion that it does. See Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F.
Supp. 3d 904 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ("The ships and trains that transport passengers are
staffed by seamen and railroad workers, just like the ones who transport goods.").
3 Lyft categorizes the class as "all rideshare drivers within the United States—or, at
a minimum, all of the drivers using the Lyft Platform within the United States."
Mot. to Compel at 11. Hinson does not explicitly challenge this characterization of
the class in his response to the Motion to Compel, but he refers to himself and his
class as the more specific, "Lyft drivers." Pl.'s Opp'n at 2-3. Since it does not
The Supreme Court in Circuit City conducted a thorough textual and
historical analysis of the phrase "engaged in commerce" for the purpose of
interpreting § 1 's exclusion to mean that only transportation workers were covered
by the language of the statute. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115-18. In Circuit City,
the Supreme Court concluded that the plain meaning of the phrase "engaged in
commerce," as used in the residual clause, is narrower than other, more
comprehensive jurisdictional phrases as "affecting commerce" and "involving
commerce," especially because it is preceded by two very specific categories of
workers: seamen and railroad workers. Id. at 117-18. The Supreme Court has not,
however, opined on whether "transportation workers" includes rideshare drivers.4
In a § 1 exemption case not involving rideshare drivers, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit limited the application of § 1 to
transportation workers that "actually engage in the transportation of goods in
interstate commerce" and are also "employed in the transportation industry." Hill
appear that Lyft takes issue with this characterization, the Court will consider the
class as "Lyft drivers."
4 In New Prime, the Supreme Court also settled another aspect of § 1 's exemption
for transportation workers by expanding the phrase "contracts of employment," to
include "agreements that require independent contractors to perform work." 139 S.
Ct. at 539. The parties do not dispute this application of the exemption to Hinson's
suit based on the independent contractor-employee distinction.
v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2005) (declining to
apply the § 1 exemption based on the finding that the plaintiffs "interstate
transportation activity" was only "incidental to [his] employment" as an account
manager for a furniture and appliance rental business); compare Martins v. Flower
Foods, Inc, 463 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (finding that the § 1
exemption applied where the plaintiffs worked for distributors of a bakery
company, delivered the company's products to retailers in Florida, and at least a
portion of the goods delivered were produced out-of-state). Like the Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Circuit has not yet opined on the more specific question of
whether rideshare drivers as a class are "employed in the transportation industry"
and who "actually engage in the transportation of goods in interstate commerce.
In determining whether the § 1 exemption applies, courts have considered
"not whether the individual worker actually engaged in interstate commerce, but
whether the class of workers to which the complaining worker belonged engaged
in interstate commerce." Wallace v. Gmbhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798,800
(7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 405 (6th
Cir. 1988)). Hinson contends that he and other Lyft drivers transport passengers
"within the flow of interstate commerce" because "they pick up or drop off a
passenger at an airport as the first or last leg of a larger 'interstate' journey" and
there is no requirement that transportation of persons be entirely interstate to come
within the § 1 exemption. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2-4.
Lyft contends that its services are offered and regulated on a localized level
such that it is a part of intrasiaie commerce rather than interstSitQ commerce. Mot.
to Compel at 13-14. According to Lyft, drivers are only approved to drive in one
"coverage area," which may extend to multiple cities within the same state but
does not extend to multiple states. Id (citing Lyft Help Center, Coverage Areas,
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/l 15012927607-Coverage-Areas (last visited
Jan. 28, 2021)). Lyft argues that any trips that are out-of-state are incidental, and
that only 1.97% of rides on the Lyft platform in the United States during the time
period from May 22, 2017, to August 31, 2020, and 2.03% of such rides during the
time period from June 1, 2019, to August 31, 2020, involved crossing state lines.
Id at 12 & n.4 (citing Decl. of lan Muir in Supp. ofLyft's Mot. to Compel (Sept.
24, 2020) [Doc. 16-4] ^ 5-6). In response, Hinson does not dispute any of these
statistics or that out-of-state trips are incidental to the services provided by Lyffc
drivers, and relies on cases that did not concern rideshare semces where courts
have found occasional interstate trips sufficient to qualify for the § 1 exemption.
This Court has reviewed the recent decisions that have considered whether
rideshare drivers for companies like Lyft and Uber fall with the § 1 residual clause
exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce and finds the
reasoning of those courts that have decided to the contrary to be persuasive. For
example, in In re Grice, 974 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2020), the plaintiff was an Uber
driver based in Alabama who provided rideshare services to and from international
airports and never crossed state lines even though his passengers traveled
interstate. The Ninth Circuit distinguished those cases in which delivery drivers
are engaged in interstate commerce by virtue of their employers' business (even
though they themselves do not physically cross state lines) with rideshare drivers
who affiliate with companies who are not in the general business of offering
interstate transportation to passengers but whose drivers frequently pick up and
drop off passengers at airports. Id. at 956-57. The Ninth Circuit declined to vacate
the district court's decision which held that the § 1 exemption did not apply
because Grice was not part of a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce
despite the fact that he made trips to and from airports to pick up and drop off
passengers; "Grice's employment is more like the local taxicab service that the
Supreme Court held to be 'not an integral part of interstate transportation' in
[United States v.1 Yellow Cab[, 332 U.S. 218 (1947)]." Id, at 958.
In Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc, 460 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Cal. 2020), the
plaintiffs were Uber drivers who, like Hinson, alleged they "sometimes cross state
lines while transporting passengers and . .. frequently pick up and drop off
passengers at airports, thereby placing themselves within the flow of interstate
commerce." Id. at 929. Uber provided evidence that only 2.5% of all trips within
a four-year period started and ended in different states, and only 10% of all trips in
2019 began or ended at an airport. Id at 930. The district court held that the § 1
exemption did not apply:
The statistics cited by Uber demonstrate that interstate rides given by
Uber drivers in Massachusetts is not only incidental - they are rare.
Uber drivers do not perform an integral role in a chain of interstate
transportation. Uber drivers do not fall within the Section 1 exemption
to the FAA because they are not "engaged in interstate commerce"
within the meaning of that Section. Accordingly, the FAA applies to
the arbitration agreements at issue here.
In Rogers, the district court granted Lyft's motion to compel arbitration,
again finding that the § 1 exemption did not apply (and citing to the Eleventh
Circuit's Hill decision):
Lyft drivers, as a class, are not engaged in interstate commerce. Their
work predominantly entails intrastate trips, an activity that undoubtedly
affects interstate commerce but is not interstate commerce itself.
Although we can safely assume that some drivers (especially those who
live near state borders) regularly transport passengers across state lines,
the company is in the general business of giving people rides, not the
particular business of offering interstate transportation to passengers.
Interstate trips that occur by happenstance of geography do not alter the
intrastate transportation function performed by the class of workers.
See Hill, 398 F.3d at 1290.
Rogers, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 916.
Hinson cites to a list of cases in support of his argument that even occasional
trips are enough to establish that a transportation worker is engaged in interstate
commerce, but these cases do not involve rideshare services like Lyft's. See Pl.'s
Opp'n at 3-4. These cases include:
• Int'l Brotherhood Of Teamsters Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra
Precast, LLC, 702 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2012), where the employer was a
trucking company which employed truckers who engaged in interstate
transportation work. "The heart of his case is the Illini CBA, which,
as shown above, is a contract of employment of interstate
transportation because the workers made interstate deliveries for Illini
Concrete." Id, at 958.
• Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Cartage Co., 84
F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 1996), where the employer was a trucking company
with a nationwide collective bargaining agreement that occasionally
transported cartage across state lines nevertheless was engaged in
interstate commerce. "We hold that the workers of Central Cartage
(covered in the collective bargaining agreement at issue between
Central Cartage and the Pension Fund) therefore qualify as
' transportation workers.'" Id. at 993.
Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 335, 343 (D. Mass.
2019), where delivery drivers for Amazon who may not cross state
lines "are indispensable parts of Amazon's distribution system" which
"of course, transports goods in interstate commerce."
Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 593-94 (3rd Cir.
2004), where the plaintiff was an employee of Airborne Express, "a
package transportation and delivery company that engages in
intrastate, interstate, and international shipping." Id. at 590.
Harden v. Roadway Package Svs., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.
2001), where the plaintiff was employed as a driver for Roadway
Package Systems, and contracted to provide "a small package
information, transportation, and delivery service throughout the
United States." Id, at 1139.
Christie v. Loomis Armored US, Inc., No. lO-cv-02011-WJM-KMT,
2011 WL 6152979 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2011), where the employer was
"registered with the Department of Transportation and identifies itself
as engaged in the business of interstate transport of currency." Id.
As the above list demonstrates, the cases cited by Hinson involve trucking and
delivery drivers where the transportation workers belonged to a class of workers
that was indisputably engaged in interstate commerce, even if the individual
plaintiff traveled out-of-state only occasionally. As discussed above, Lyft is not a
trucking or delivery service but a rideshare service that predominantly affects
The crux of this issue is not whether a certain proportion of a person's work
is out-of-state, but rather, whether the entire class of workers to which the person
belongs is a part of the stream of commerce such that it is engaged in interstate
commerce. See Rogers, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 915-16 ("[T]he fact that some workers
cross state lines in the course of their duties does not mean that the class of
workers as a whole is engaged in interstate commerce."). The Court finds
persuasive that Lyft drivers are only authorized to drive within a certain coverage
area and that these coverage areas do not extend between states. It is clear that a
Lyft driver's "work predominantly entails intrastate trips," and while this may
affect or involve interstate commerce, Lyft drivers as a whole are not in "the
particular business of offering interstate transportation to passengers." Rogers, 452
F. Supp. 3d at 916-17 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (finding that Lyft
drivers' "relationship to interstate transit is only casual and incidental," and "lack
the requisite practical, economic continuity with interstate air or rail
The only case cited by Hinson where a motion to compel arbitration for a
rideshare service was denied is Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.
Mass. 2020). The Cunningham court relied on a list of factors suggested by the
Eighth Circuit in Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351-52 (8th Cir.
2005), in considering whether a contract involves a worker engaged in interstate
commerce. ]A at 46. The Massachusetts district court found that passengers
traveling to and from Logan International Airport were in the '"continuity of
movement5 of a longer trip . . . similar to Amazon's last mile delivery driver
engaged in interstate commerce" in Waithaka. Id This Court finds this
comparison unpersuasive. Lyft drivers are more like taxi drivers than last-mile
delivery drivers of Amazon products, and taxi drivers have been found to have an
"only casual and incidental" relationship to interstate transit. See Capriole, 460 F.
Supp. 3d at 932 (comparing Uber drivers to the taxi drivers in United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld
Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), and holding that Uber drivers do
not perform an integral role in a chain of interstate transportation because their
relationship to interstate transportation was "only casual and incidental"); see also
Exec. Town & Country Ser^s., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1523, 1525-26
(11th Cir. 1986) (citing and quoting Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. at 230-33) (holding
that, outside of the context of the FAA, "taxicab semce between airports and
businesses and homes is not within the stream of commerce" and that the "typical
taxicab service to and from an airport is only 'casual and incidental' to the
taxicab's normal course of business"). But see Abel v. So. Shuttle Ser^s., Inc., 631
F.3d 1210, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing shuttle drivers from taxi
drivers because the airport shuttle bus company had a "practical continuity of
movement" with the overall interstate journey based on its cooperation with
internet travel companies and the fact that its customers were largely made up of
people buying travel packages through these internet travel companies). "A
taxicab does not transform into an integral part of interstate commerce if, within
the scope of its normal course of independent local semce, the passenger happens
to be beginning or completing an interstate trip." Exec. Town & Country, 789
Thus, the Court finds that Lyft drivers are, as a class, not engaged in
interstate commerce. Accordingly, they are not covered by the exemption in § 1 of
the FAA for transportation workers and are subject to the Terms of Service
Agreement agreed to in the course of using the Lyft platform, including the
agreement to arbitrate any and all claims on an individual basis, including the
FLSA claims in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Lyft,
Inc/s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Litigation [Doc. 16] is
GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that this action is STAYED and shall be
ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending completion of arbitration pursuant to
the terms of the Arbitration Agreement in this case. The parties shall notify the
Court upon completion of arbitration, and either party shall have the right to move
to reopen this case to resolve any remaining issues of contention.
IT IS SO ORDERED this ^ day of February, 2021.
United States District Judge
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