International Alliance of Theater Stage Employees Local 927 v. Mashburn et al

Filing 129

ORDER: This matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of standing. Intervenors' Motion to Dismiss Doc. 66 is thus DENIED as moot. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge J. P. Boulee on 3/7/2025. (gww)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF
THEATER STAGE EMPLOYEES
LOCAL 927,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.:
1:23-CV-04929-JPB

JOHN FERVIER, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Republican National Committee and
the Georgia Republican Party, Inc.’s (“Intervenors”) Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint [Doc. 66]. This Court finds as follows:
BACKGROUND
International Alliance of Theater Stage Employees Local 927 (“Plaintiff”) is
a labor union comprised of approximately 190 members who work behind the
scenes at live theater and television productions throughout Georgia and the United
States. [Doc. 62, p. 5]. In their work, these members build sets and operate
advanced computerized sound and lighting technology. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that it is “dedicated to protecting the dignity and both the
financial and physical well-being of its members.” Id. To accomplish this
mission, Plaintiff contends that it “advocat[es] for safe working conditions, fair
wages, and [the] just treatment of all its members.” Id. Plaintiff also negotiates
contracts on behalf of its members and advocates for the “election of candidates at
all levels of government who support both the rights of workers and the cultural
traditions and institutions that have brought Atlanta international renown.” Id. at
5–6.
Plaintiff brought this case against State Defendants 1 and County Defendants 2
on October 26, 2023. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Amended Complaint”) on January 29, 2024.
[Doc. 62]. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that its members must
frequently “travel around and outside of Georgia, often on short notice” because of
their jobs. Id. at 3. Plaintiff thus contends that “[i]t is a virtual certainty that [its

State Defendants include John Fervier, Edward Lindsey, Janice W. Johnston, Sara
Tindall Ghazal and Rick Jeffares. These defendants are members of the Georgia State
Election Board and were sued in their official capacities. The Court dismissed State
Defendants from this action on June 13, 2024. [Doc. 97].

1

County Defendants are Patrise Perkins-Hooker, Aaron V. Johnson, Michael Heekin and
Teresa K. Crawford. County Defendants are members of the Fulton County Registration
and Election Board.

2

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members] will be called on to work outside of their voting jurisdiction during . . .
election[s], as evidenced by the fact that in every year dating back to at least 2016 .
. . members have been on the road touring with productions on . . . election day.”
Id. at 6.
In this action, Plaintiff seeks to protect its members’ voting rights by
challenging the provision of Senate Bill 202 (“S.B. 202”) which states that
absentee ballot applications cannot be submitted earlier than seventy-eight days
before the election and will not be accepted if submitted fewer than eleven days
before the election. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(A). According to Plaintiff, this
provision harms its members because they “will be forced to travel during the
election but will not know of their need to vote absentee until shortly before
election day.” Id. at 3–4.
Plaintiff asserts that S.B. 202 violates section 10502(d) of the Voting Rights
Act (“VRA”), which provides that:
[E]ach State shall provide by law for the casting of absentee ballots
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for
President and Vice President, by all duly qualified residents of such
State who may be absent from their election district or unit in such
State on the day such election is held and who have applied therefor
not later than seven days immediately prior to such election and
have returned such ballots to the appropriate election official of
such State not later than the time of closing of the polls in such
State on the day of such election.

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52 U.S.C. § 10502(d). In Plaintiff’s view, S.B. 202’s “premature deadline [of
eleven days] threatens to make it more difficult for [its] members to vote because it
restricts their legally protected opportunities to request and cast an absentee
ballot.” Id. at 6. Ultimately, Plaintiff contends that Georgia’s eleven-day deadline
for submitting absentee ballot applications violates the seven-day period found in
the VRA. Id. at 11.
On May 3, 2024, Intervenors filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. [Doc. 66]. The motion is now ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), courts must “accept the allegations in the complaint as true and
constru[es] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Traylor v. P’ship
Title Co., 491 F. App’x 988, 989 (11th Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although detailed factual
allegations are not necessarily required, the pleading must contain more than
“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is insufficient
if it only tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.

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Id. Importantly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (citation omitted).
At bottom, the complaint must contain more than “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and must “plead[] factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. While all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true
and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Powell v. Thomas, 643
F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011), a court need not accept as true the plaintiff’s
legal conclusions, including those couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
Accordingly, evaluation of a motion to dismiss requires two steps: first, a
court must eliminate any allegations in the pleading that are merely legal
conclusions; and second, where there are remaining well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court must “assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
DISCUSSION
Article III of the Constitution limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal
courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To satisfy this
case and controversy requirement, litigants must have standing. Lujan v. Defs. of

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Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to
show that it: (1) suffered an injury-in-fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision. Id. at 560–61. “These three elements ‘are not mere
pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case.’” Ga.
Ass’n of Latino Elected Offs., Inc. v. Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Registration &
Elections, 36 F.4th 1100, 1113 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
Plaintiff in this case is a labor organization and asserts that it has
associational standing. An organization has associational standing (1) “when its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right”; (2) “the
interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose”; and (3) “neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.” Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d
1153,1160 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).
Intervenors did not move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for lack
of standing.3 A court, however, can sua sponte dismiss a case on standing grounds
so long as the court provides both notice of its concern regarding the jurisdictional
Intervenors asserted that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal because
section 10502(d) of the VRA is unconstitutional.

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deficiency and an opportunity for the plaintiff to respond. See Bischoff v. Osceola
County, 222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the “federal courts are
under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction”). On July 31,
2024, the Court first signaled its reservations about standing when it denied
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In that order, the Court determined
that Plaintiff was not substantially likely to show the second element of
associational standing—i.e., that the interests at stake are germane to the
organization’s purpose. [Doc. 106, p. 10]. 4 Then, on October 15, 2024, the Court
entered an order requiring Plaintiff to show cause as to why standing exists in this
case. [Doc. 121, p. 2]. The Court specifically instructed Plaintiff to focus on the
germaneness prong. Id. The Court has thus provided Plaintiff with notice of its
concerns about jurisdiction as well as an opportunity to respond.
As stated above, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that “[t]he germaneness requirement is ‘undemanding’ and
requires ‘mere pertinence’ between the litigation at issue and the organization’s
purpose.” Schalamar Creek Mobile Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Alder, 855 F.
App’x 546, 553 (11th Cir. 2021). In conducting this inquiry, courts thus look to
The preliminary injunction order contains analysis regarding the germaneness prong.
As such, the preliminary injunction order is fully incorporated herein.

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“whether [an organization’s] lawsuit would, if successful, reasonably tend to
further the general interests that individual members sought to vindicate in joining
the association and whether the lawsuit bears a reasonable connection to the
association’s knowledge and experience.” Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of
Buffalo v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2006).
While the germaneness requirement is not demanding, it exists “for ‘the
modest yet important’ purpose of ‘preventing litigious organizations from forcing
the federal courts to resolve numerous issues as to which the organizations
themselves enjoy little expertise and about which few of their members
demonstrably care.’” Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 597 (D.C.
Cir. 2015). The germaneness prong therefore “serves as a backstop” against suits
where members of an organization claim a cognizable injury despite the
“wholesale mismatch between litigation topics and organizational expertise.” 5

The following are two examples of a mismatch between litigation topics and
organizational expertise: (1) a labor union challenging a school-aid program on
establishment clause grounds; or (2) a civil libertarian organization challenging a trade
policy on commerce clause grounds. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45,
57 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Another case used this illustration: “A local PTA, for example,
cannot be expected to represent its members in matters not relating to education.” Boyce
v. Rizzo, 78 F.R.D. 698, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In these hypotheticals, the interests at
stake are not germane to the organization’s purpose. A labor union asserting an
establishment clause case or bringing claims unrelated to labor matters is similar to what
has happened here.
5

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Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Simply put,
the germaneness prong prevents organizations from asserting claims based on
injuries that have “nothing whatsoever to do with the association’s area of
competence or reason for existence.” Id.
In response to this Court’s show cause order, Plaintiff asserts that the
germaneness requirement is satisfied because its primary purpose is to ensure the
“‘just treatment of all its members,’ particularly when engaged in the work that
forms the basis of their membership.” [Doc. 122, p. 2]. 6 According to Plaintiff,
“there is more than a sufficient connection between this litigation and [its] core
purpose of ensuring the ‘just treatment’ of its members who are traveling on
assignment by ensuring that those members can cast votes for candidates that
advance the physical, social, and economic wellbeing of theater stage workers.”

This is not the first time that Plaintiff has addressed the germaneness requirement. In its
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff never claimed that the germaneness
requirement was satisfied because its primary purpose was the “just treatment of all its
members.” Instead, Plaintiff argued that “[i]ts core mission is to advance the interest of
its members, including by supporting their participation in democracy and advocating for
the election of politicians who support trade unions.” [Doc. 83-1, p. 25]. Similarly, in its
Response in Opposition to State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff claimed “that its members’ voting rights are germane to its purposes, which
include ‘advocating for the election of candidates at all levels of government who support
both the rights of workers and the cultural traditions and institutions that have brought
Atlanta international renown.” [Doc. 69, p. 22]. The Court notes that the allegations in
the Amended Complaint say nothing about “participation in democracy.”

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Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted). In Plaintiff’s view, the relevant question is
whether the subject matter of this action—the absentee ballot deadline—bears
some connection to Plaintiff’s purposes. Id. Ultimately, Plaintiff contends that it
has an interest in ensuring that its members have access to the elective franchise
while traveling for work “so that they may exercise their right to vote and
collectively support candidates and policies that are critical to protecting members’
pay, benefits, and workplace safety.” Id. at 6. In other words, Plaintiff claims that
its
interest in ensuring that its members can travel for work without
sacrificing their voting rights due to a discrete provision of state
law is particularly pertinent because [Plaintiff’s] normal activities
include advocating for candidates and policies that promote
workers’ rights and educating members about the importance of
voting to achieve these goals.
Id. at 10.
As an initial matter, the Court cannot ignore the scarcity of the allegations in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff only alleges that its purpose or
mission is advocating for safe working conditions, fair wages and the just
treatment of all its members. The Amended Complaint contains no additional
allegations or details describing what the just treatment of all its members means.
For instance, the Amended Complaint never alleges that “just treatment”
encompasses protecting those who are traveling on assignment by ensuring that
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they can vote for Plaintiff’s preferred candidates. It also never specifies that just
treatment applies in some special way when members are engaged in the work that
forms the basis of their membership. It is well settled that a plaintiff cannot amend
a complaint through arguments in briefs. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 716 F.3d 535, 559 (11th Cir. 2013).
The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff has standing to challenge Georgia’s
election laws based on the broadly stated interest of ensuring the “just treatment of
all its members,” which is all that is alleged here. The Court agrees with
Intervenors that if this type of general interest is sufficient to satisfy the
germaneness prong, “then every organization whose membership includes adult . .
. citizens has standing to file the same lawsuit.” [Doc. 125, p. 2]. Indeed, the “just
treatment of all its members” interest is a catchall that would essentially render the
germaneness requirement a nullity. 7 In sum, the Court finds that a plaintiff must
do more than allege an interest at a high level of generality.8

Surely Plaintiff would not have standing to assert claims challenging an abortion or a
firearms law in another state by alleging in its complaint that its members might travel to
those other states for work and that its mission is the just treatment of all its members. In
the Court’s view, these hypothetical claims would fail because Plaintiff is a labor union
that represents the interests of its members as laborers in a particular industry.

7

Plaintiff claims that Guilford College v. McAleenan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 377 (M.D.N.C.
2019), supports its standing argument. In that case, however, the plaintiff labor union
pled that its mission included “supporting commonsense policies that promote
immigration opportunities for individuals who wish to serve as teachers” and that one of
8

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The Court recognizes that Plaintiff additionally argues that it has standing
because it encourages its members to vote for candidates who support particular
issues. In the Court’s view, however, germaneness requires more than advocating
for candidates and issues—otherwise, every organization 9 would have standing to
bring claims under the VRA. In Republican National Committee v. Burgess, the
Trump Campaign challenged a Nevada law that changed the deadlines for mail-in
ballots. No. 3:24-cv-00198, 2024 WL 3445254, at *6 (D. Nev. July 17, 2024).
Relevant here, the court found that “the purpose of the Trump Campaign—electing
Donald J. Trump to public office—[was] not ‘germane’ to vindicating individual
voting rights.” Id. The court explained that while the voters may be a means
through which the Trump Campaign achieves its purpose, the voters’ “individual
interests in their voting rights are ‘wholly distinct’ from the interests of the
Campaign.” Id. After careful consideration, this Court finds that the individual
interests in voting rights that Plaintiff seeks to protect here are wholly distinct from
Plaintiff’s purpose, which includes advocating and supporting pro-labor

its purposes was “advocating for the civil rights of its members.” Id. at 389. Plaintiff
never pled that advocating for civil rights was one of its purposes. This case is thus not
analogous.
9

Most organizations have preferred candidates or issues that they support.
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candidates. As such, the interests at stake here are not germane to Plaintiff’s
purpose.
In its response to the show cause order, Plaintiff argues that the “mere
pertinence” standard is “so forgiving that the Eleventh Circuit has only once found
that an association lacked standing because it could not establish germaneness.”
[Doc. 122, p. 3]. While this may be true, Plaintiff overlooks that in other voting
cases, the claims are brought by voting organizations whose missions include
registering voters or running vote drives. See Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 772
F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (voting rights organizations had associational
standing because the interests at stake were germane to the purposes and goals of
the organizations); Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State for State of
Ala., 992 F.3d 1299, 1316 (11th Cir. 2021) (civil rights organizations “whose
purposes focus[ed] on voting rights and equal opportunity for minority voters”
satisfied the germaneness requirement in suit challenging voting law); Fla. State
Conf. of NAACP v. Lee, 576 F. Supp. 3d 966, 970–71 (N.D. Fla. 2021) (holding
that an organization’s mission whose “core purposes involve[d] registering voters,
voter education, encouraging electoral participation, and advocating for
accessibility for Florida” was germane to the interests at stake in a voting rights
suit).

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As stated above, Plaintiff seems to assert that because the Eleventh Circuit
has only one published opinion concerning this issue, not enough legal authority
exists to dismiss this case on standing grounds. The Court disagrees. Cases have
been dismissed, in both this jurisdiction and others, for failure to satisfy the
germaneness prong. In other words, organizations do not have limitless standing
to challenge laws that fall outside the scope of their mission.
For example, in Idaho Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt, two organizations
brought suit to contest a classification that four species of mollusks in the Snake
River were endangered. 900 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (D. Idaho 1995). The
organizations’ members were farmers and ranchers, and the organizations argued
that the endangered mollusks threatened to harm their members’ “aesthetic and
recreational enjoyment” of their land. Id. at 1355. Problematically for the
organizations, however, the organizations had only alleged that their purpose was
representing “the economic, education and social interest” of their members. Id. at
1357. Indeed, the organizations failed to allege or produce any evidence that the
protection of the members’ aesthetic or recreational interests were germane to their
organizations’ purpose. Id. In granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on germaneness grounds, the court determined that the organizations
had “failed to carry their burden of establishing standing as organizations

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established to represent the aesthetic/recreational interests of their members.” Id.
Because there were no facts in the record which would establish or indicate that the
organizations represented anything more than the “economic, educational and
social interests” of their members, the court found that the organizations were “not
protecting an interest germane to their organizations’ purpose.” Id.
Medical Association of State of Alabama v. Schweiker, which was affirmed
by the Eleventh Circuit, is also instructive. 554 F. Supp. 955 (M.D. Ala. 1983)
aff'd, 714 F.2d 107 (11th Cir. 1983).10 There, a medical association comprised of
more than 2,000 physicians challenged a law which sought to increase the
availability of and access to primary health services for residents of medically
underserved areas. Id. at 957. The medical association claimed that the law was
financially hurting the medical practices of its members. Id. at 958. In deciding
that the medical association did not have standing, the court stated that standing
requirements exist, in part, “to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants
best suited to assert a particular claim.” Id. at 960. Notably, the court stated:
Members of the association joined the association because they
were physicians, not because they were taxpayers. Although it is
well established that an organization whose members are injured
may represent those members in judicial proceedings, reason
dictates that the organization may do so only when the injury to its
members has some reasonable connection with the reasons the
The Court acknowledges that this case did not use the term “germane.” The analysis is
nevertheless applicable.
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members joined the organization and with the objectives of the
organization. This is not the case with the Alabama Medical
Association to the extent that it is seeking to represent its members
simply as taxpayers.
Id. at 965 (internal citations omitted).
Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless and Service Employees International
Union, Local 1199 v. Blackwell, also provides some helpful analysis. In that case,
two organizations filed suit alleging that a voter identification law was
unconstitutional. 467 F.3d 999, 1002 (6th Cir. 2006). One of the organizations
was a labor union. Id. Notably, that labor union alleged that it “engages in voter
registration and other election activities on behalf of its members.” Id. at 1010.
Although decided on other grounds, the court stated that “[t]he scanty information
about the plaintiff organizations in the complaint also raises substantial questions
about whether the interests at stake here are germane to the organizations’
purposes, which clearly are not primarily related to election or voters’ rights
issues.”11
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council
25 v. Land also involves a labor union. 583 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Mich. 2008). In
that case, the labor union had over 64,000 members, and the members of the labor
The labor union’s allegations were even stronger than what is present here. Indeed,
there are no allegations in this case that Plaintiff has ever helped its members register to
vote or has worked with its members to overcome any perceived barriers in voting.
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union planned to wear buttons and shirts evidencing issues of concern, support for
various issues and admiration for various candidates when they went to vote in the
upcoming election. Id. at 843. The labor union sued challenging a directive that
election inspectors had the right to ask voters entering the polls to remove
campaign buttons or cover up clothing bearing a campaign slogan or a candidate’s
name. Id. Particularly relevant here, the court determined that the labor union
could not show associational standing because it failed to allege sufficient facts in
its complaint to demonstrate that the interests at stake—the voting rights of its
members—were germane to its purpose. Id. at 844 n.3.
Turning back to the case at hand, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
show that the germaneness requirement is satisfied. The Amended Complaint does
not demonstrate that Plaintiff’s mission or purpose is to protect its members’
individual voting rights. Completely missing from the Complaint is any allegation
that any part of Plaintiff’s mission is related to enforcing the voting rights of its
members or evidence that Plaintiff’s members joined the organization to
“vindicate” their voting rights. See Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 448 F.3d at
149.12 For instance, no allegations exist that Plaintiff assists its members in
This Court’s ruling should not be construed to mean that a plaintiff must show an exact
match between litigation goals and organizational purpose. Indeed, in the Eleventh
Circuit, a plaintiff need only show a mere pertinence. That standard has not been
satisfied in this case.
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requesting absentee ballots or provides information about the absentee voting
process. Notably, nothing in the record exists which would show that the
enforcement of voting rights or election law has a reasonable connection to
Plaintiff’s knowledge and experience, which appears to be limited to advocating
for better pay and working conditions. Moreover, Plaintiff’s specific goal in this
litigation—to ensure the voting rights of its members under the VRA—is not
pertinent to its stated purposes of advocating for safe working conditions, fair
wages or pro-labor candidates. In short, Plaintiff is a labor union and not a voting
organization. It represents the interests of its members as laborers in a particular
industry and not as voters in the State of Georgia. As such, the Court finds that
this case presents a “wholesale mismatch” between the litigation topic and
Plaintiff’s organizational expertise. See Humane Soc’y, 840 F.2d at 57.
As stated previously, the pleadings do not show that Plaintiff’s mission—or
even part of Plaintiff’s mission—is pertinent to the enforcement of its members’
voting rights. Cf. Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State for Ala., 992
F.3d 1299, 1316 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the germaneness requirement was
satisfied in a voting case because the organizations’ purposes focused on voter
rights and equal opportunity for minority voters). As such, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the interests it seeks to vindicate here (voting rights) bear a

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reasonable connection to its knowledge and experience (workers’ rights) or that
election law is germane to its organizational purpose. Consequently, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate standing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for lack of standing. 13 Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 66] is
thus DENIED as moot. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED this 7th day of March, 2025.

A dismissal for lack of standing is without prejudice. Stalley ex rel. United States v.
Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008).
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