Shubert et al v. Scope Products, Inc. et al
Filing
32
ORDER granting 17 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 7/27/2011. (vld)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
BARBARA SHUBERT,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOPE PRODUCTS, INC. d/b/a
RECONSERVE, INC.,
RECONSERVE, INC. and
RECONSERVE OF GEORGIA
INC.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:10-CV-00101-RWS
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [17].
After reviewing the record, the Court enters the following Order.
I.
Background
Defendants Scope Products, Inc. et al., bring this motion in response to
Plaintiff Barbara Shubert’s civil complaint. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants violated her rights under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §
206(d). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis
of her gender by not paying her the equivalent of male employees in
comparable positions, by not allowing Plaintiff to participate in a benefits
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
program in which other equally situated male employees were allowed to enroll,
and by not providing the same travel, phone, and automobile privileges that
male employees were given. (Dkt. [1] pp. 7-8). Plaintiff began her employment
with Defendant in July of 1997. (Dkt. [17-1] pp. 1-3). She signed an Employee
Acknowledgment Form (“Form”) on or about April 29, 2002 following her
receipt of Defendant Scope Product’s employee handbook. Id. The Form that
accompanied the handbook contained an arbitration clause which stated:
I agree that employment disputes and disagreements will be
submitted to final and binding arbitration to the American
Arbitration Association, in accordance with the rules promulgated
by the Association, in the event that the disputes and
disagreements are not resolved by the Company’s Complaint
Resolution Procedure. I agree that judgment upon an award
rendered by an arbitrator, or arbitrators, will be binding and may
be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
(Dkt. [19-1] p. 55). Plaintiff continued to work for Defendants for almost seven
years following her signing of the Form. (Dkt. [17-1] p. 1). Her employment
was terminated on approximately January 5, 2009. Id. Plaintiff filed her
complaint in this Court on June 2, 2010, and Defendants subsequently filed
their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on January 7, 2011. (Dkts. [1,
17]).
2
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
II.
Discussion
Defendants bring the present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
asserting that Plaintiff’s assent to the Employment Acknowledgment Form,
including a clause agreeing to arbitrate, is legally binding and bars Plaintiff
from bringing the present action without first pursuing arbitration. The Court
now examines Defendants’ Motion [17].
A.
Standard of Review
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is “a congressional declaration of
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The FAA established
the policy favoring arbitration with the goal of “moving the parties to an
arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly as possible.” Green
Tree Fin. Corp-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 85 (2000) (citing Mercury
Constr. 460 U.S. at 22). Further, the FAA establishes that “as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
3
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.” Mercury Constr. 460 U.S. at 24-25.
In order to determine whether Plaintiff must submit her claim to
arbitration, the Court assesses whether “(1) there is a valid written agreement to
arbitrate; (2) the issue [sought to be arbitrated] is arbitrable under the
agreement; and (3) the party asserting the claims has failed or refused to
arbitrate the claims.” Lomax v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y, 228 F.
Supp. 2d 1360, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2002). As Plaintiff and Defendants in this case
dispute all three prongs, the Court will address each issue in turn.
B.
Valid Written Agreement
In order to determine whether a valid and enforceable agreement was
entered into between the parties, Georgia contract law governs. Caley v.
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding
that “state law generally governs whether an enforceable contract or agreement
to arbitrate exists”). Under Georgia law, a binding contract requires “[a] definite
offer and complete acceptance, for consideration.” Moreno v. Strickland, 567
S.E.2d 90, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). Plaintiff argues that the arbitration
agreement contained in the Form is not binding because it lacks consideration.
4
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
“To satisfy the consideration requirement under Georgia law, an
accepting party to a contract can either tender bargained-for performance or
make a mutual promise.” Lambert v. Austin Ind., 544 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th
Cir. 2008) (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-3-42). Plaintiff argues that due to the onesided nature of the terms of the arbitration clause (the language of the
arbitration clause states “I agree...” rather than “The Company and I agree...”),
mutuality does not exist. (Dkt. [19] p. 10). Conversely, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s continued employment after her assent to the Form constitutes
consideration. (Dkt. [22] pp. 9-10).
The Court finds Defendant’s argument to be persuasive. Georgia courts
have held that continued employment constitutes consideration for contract
purposes. Hiers v. Choicepoint Services Inc., 606 S.E.2d 29, 31 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004). Even assuming that the arbitration clause lacks mutuality of obligation,
Defendants’ continued employment of Plaintiff (who was an at-will employee)
constitutes bargained for performance in exchange for Plaintiff’s assent. See Id.
(stating that so long as the employee in question was an at-will employee, “his
continued employment constitutes valid consideration” when employee signed
employer’s commission agreement). Therefore, the Employment
5
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Acknowledgment Form, and the arbitration clause contained therein, is a valid
written agreement.
C.
The Scope of the Agreement
The second factor used to determine the enforceability of an arbitration
clause is whether “the issue [sought to be arbitrated] is arbitrable under the
agreement.” Lomax 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1362. Plaintiff contends that because
there is not a specific “Company Complaint Resolution Procedure” as
referenced in the arbitration clause and because the clause does not specifically
cover statutory issues, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are not subject to
arbitration.
“While arbitration agreements are creatures of contract... [there is a]
presumption in favor of arbitration in case of a contractual ambiguity.” Id. at
1373. “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.” Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. at 24-25. The Court
finds that although there is not a specific “Company Complaint Resolution
Procedure[,]” there is a “Complaint Procedure” in the Employee Handbook in a
section entitled “Equal Employment Opportunity” that outlines a process to
utilize “[i]f you experience any job-related discrimination or harassment based
6
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
on your... sex... or believe you have been treated in an unlawful, discriminatory
manner.” (Dkt. [19-1] at p. 9). On its face, this language covers Plaintiff’s
claims of discrimination that occurred during her employment. See Lambert
544 U.S. at 1198 (finding that an arbitration policy and resolution procedure
with language akin to that in Defendants’ Complaint Procedure “establishes a
mandatory program for the resolution of disputes arising from or related to
employment”).
Moreover, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s assertion that her
termination does not fall within the scope of the arbitration language because it
specifically references “employment disputes.” “A plain meaning interpretation
of [the] language suggests that employment-termination disputes do indeed fall
under the scope of the [arbitration clause]... [A] termination is a[n]
‘[employment] dispute’ in the sense that termination is the final stage of a[n]
[employment] dispute.” Lambert 544 F.3d at 1199. Finally, while the arbitration
clause does not explicitly include statutory claims, the broad language1 of the
clause encompasses such claims. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that
1
The arbitration clause covers “disputes or disagreement between [Plaintiff]
and [Defendants]” and “employment disputes and disagreements.” (Dkt. [19-1] p. 55).
7
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
broadly-worded clauses do cover statutory claims. See e.g. Id.; Brown v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2000). Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claims are within the scope of the arbitration clause.
D.
Refusal to Arbitrate
The Court must determine whether “the party asserting the claims has
failed or refused to arbitrate the claims.” Lomax 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1362. The
record indicates that Plaintiff has refused to submit her claims to arbitration.
Thus, the Court concludes that all three prongs have been satisfied such that
Plaintiff is required to submit her claim to arbitration.
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [17] is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of July, 2011.
_______________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?