Brannon v. Towns County et al

Filing 13

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 4 Motion to Dismiss. Defendants Donaldson, Shattles, Dyer, Goolark, Goolark, and Rodeys Motion to Dismiss for lack of service is MOOT. Claims for damages against Sheriff Clinton in his official capacity ar e deemed ABANDONED. Defendant Sheriff Clintons Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to all claims for injunctive relief. Defendant Towns Countys Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to all claims. Having reached a final decision on Defendants Motion to Dismiss, the Court ORDERS that the previously issued stay be lifted. See Dkt. No. 8 . Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 10/24/2011. (vld)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
JORDAN BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWNS COUNTY, GEORGIA, et
al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:11-CV-43-RWS

ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [4].
After a review of the record, the Court enters the following Order.
Factual Background1
This case arises out of a traffic stop conducted by Defendants Donaldson,
Shattles, Dyer, Goolark, Goolark, and Rodey on March 19, 2010 (collectively,
“Individual Defendants”).2 Comp., Dkt. No. [1] at ¶¶ 1, 5, 7. Defendant

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As this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court takes the
factual allegations in the Complaint [1] as true. Cooper v. Pate , 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
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In Defendants’ Answer, Officers Kenny Goolark, Doe Goolark, and Carson
Rodey are identified as Officers Chris Goulart, Brett Goulart, and Carson Rhoton.
Dkt. No. [9] at ¶ 4. The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time of
Service [10] and allowed Plaintiff sixty days from the identification of all Defendants
through initial disclosures to perfect service. Dkt. No. [12]. All Defendants will be

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Donaldson pulled Plaintiff over while traveling through Hiawassee, Georgia
where the posted speed limit was fifty-five miles per hour. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 5. At all
times prior to the stop, Plaintiff was traveling below fifty-five miles per hour,
and Defendant Donaldson acknowledged that Plaintiff “never went above forty
miles per hour.” Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff believes he was targeted for this stop based
solely on his race as a black man and that of his passenger, Joanna Lee, who is a
white woman. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 7.
As Defendant Donaldson approached Plaintiff’s car, he stated that he was
“afraid there’s dope in that car” and that it “smelled a bit.” Id. at ¶ 7. Donaldson
also stated, “[A]nd this guy, I don’t really know man, something ain’t right.” Id.
After this, another officer informed Donaldson that he knew Lee “had a black
boyfriend.” Id. Another officer asked Plaintiff how Plaintiff knew Lee and
where they were going. Id. The officers also expressed shock that Plaintiff
played tennis at Young Harris College instead of basketball. Id. at ¶ 9.
After Plaintiff provided the officers with identification to conduct a
computer search, which revealed nothing irregular, Defendant Donaldson stated
many times that he was “gonna put the dog on [Plaintiff].” Id. at ¶ 9. Defendant
addressed as they are named in the Complaint.
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Shattles arrived with the drug dog, and during the dog’s search of the car, the
officers repeatedly asked the dog to “please sit.” Id. at ¶ 10. The drug dog never
alerted to the presence of drugs during the search, but a later-filed officer report
states the drug dog alerted to the passenger side door. Id. After the drug dog’s
search, Donaldson stated that he “should have let [Plaintiff] alone,” and
Defendant Dyer apologized to Lee, calling the stop a “misunderstanding.” Id.
Individual Defendants also conducted a search of Plaintiff’s person and
car interior without Plaintiff’s consent. Id. at ¶ 12. Two officers searched
Plaintiff’s car after taking his keys during a pat down search. Id. They searched
the car’s interior, glove box and all other compartments, the trunk, fluids under
the hood, and all of Plaintiff’s packages and personal belongings. Id. During
this time, Plaintiff was told he could not observe the search and was required to
turn away from his car. Id. After a half-hour detention, Plaintiff and Lee were
released without being issued a ticket or warning. Id. at ¶ 14. Based on the
above facts, Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Id. at ¶ 19.
Additionally, Plaintiff claims the Towns County Sheriff’s Department
has a policy of racial profiling by stopping black drivers without cause,
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especially black drivers with white female passengers. Comp., Dkt. No. [1] at ¶
20. In further support of this claim, Plaintiff alleges the Towns County Sheriff’s
Department stopped Lee on multiple other occasions, without reason and under
similar circumstances, when she was riding with her husband, who is also
black. Id. at ¶ 8. Once, Lee and her husband were stopped three times on a
single trip. Id.
In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he asserts claims against all Defendants
collectively for: (1) violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by stopping and
detaining him without probable cause, (2) violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights of substantive due process and equal protection by stopping
and detaining Plaintiff because of his race or because of his race in combination
with the race of his passenger, (3) violation of his rights under article 1, section
1 of the Georgia Constitution, which entitles persons to due process, equal
protection of the law, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, by
stopping and detaining Plaintiff because of his race or because of his race in
combination with the race of his passenger, (4) false imprisonment for detaining
Plaintiff without legal authority, (5) battery for intentionally and with force
touching and seizing Plaintiff, and (6) intentional infliction of emotional
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distress for intentionally engaging in outrageous and unlawful conduct that
caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress. Comp., Dkt. No. [1] at ¶¶ 19-23.
In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he seeks, inter alia, “nominal and compensatory
damages against each defendant” and “injunctive and declaratory relief
preventing a custom or policy of race based stops applicable to all law
enforcement officers acting with Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
Defendants move to dismiss on several grounds. Dkt. No. [4]. Defendant
Sheriff Clinton moves to dismiss all federal law claims seeking injunctive relief
on grounds that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Defendant Sheriff Clinton moves to dismiss state
law claims seeking injunctive relief, arguing that he has Eleventh Amendment
immunity from such claims. Plaintiff has abandoned all claims for damages
against Sheriff Clinton. Dkt. No. [5] at 1-2.
Defendant Towns County moves to dismiss all federal and state law
claims on grounds that Sheriff Clinton and his deputies are state, not county
actors, and therefore their alleged acts or omissions cannot give rise to county

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liability. Towns County also moves to dismiss state law claims on grounds of
state sovereign immunity.
Defendants Donaldson, Shattles, Dyer, Goolark, Goolark, and Rodey
move to dismiss for lack of service, but have since waived service. Dkt. No. [7]
at ¶ 3.
Discussion
I. Preliminary Matters
Defendants Donaldson, Shattles, Dyer, Goolark, Goolark, and Rodey
move to dismiss for lack of service, but have since waived service. Dkt. No. [7]
at ¶ 3. As such, Defendants Donaldson, Shattles, Dyer, Goolark, Goolark, and
Rodey’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of service is rendered MOOT.
II. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss, a federal court is to accept as true
“all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint.” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A.,
225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Further, the court must
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (internal citations
omitted); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir.
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1999). However, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id.
The United States Supreme Court has dispensed with the rule that a
complaint may only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when “‘it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.’” Twombly, 127 U.S. at 561(quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The Supreme Court has replaced that rule
with the “plausibility standard,” which requires that factual allegations “raise
the right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 556. The plausibility
standard “does not [however,] impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence [supporting the claim].” Id.
III. Analysis of Claims
Plaintiff brings his federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statutory
vehicle for addressing the violation of civil rights. It provides as follows:
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "In order to prevail in a civil rights action under section
1983, 'a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of two elements: (1) that the
act or omission deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the act or omission
was done by a person acting under color of law.'" Marshall County. Bd. of
Educ. v. Marshall County. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added) (quoting Bannum, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 901 F.2d
989, 996-97 (11th Cir. 1990)). In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court held that "neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983" when sued for
damages. On the other hand, state officials sued in their official capacities for
prospective injunctive relief are “persons” amendable to suit under § 1983. Id.
at 71 n.10.
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A. Claims against Sheriff Clinton in his official capacity
Although Plaintiff seeks damages for “nominal and compensatory
damages against each defendant” in his Complaint, Dkt. No. [1] at 10, Plaintiff
specifically states in his Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that he
“agrees that there are no claims in this lawsuit for damages against the Sheriff
in his official capacity for violations of state or federal law.” Dkt. No. [5] at 1.
Plaintiff clarifies that the “case presents equitable relief claims against Sheriff
Clinton in his official capacity, and damage claims against other defendants in
their individual capacities.” Id. at 2. Accordingly, the Court deems abandoned
any claims for damages against Sheriff Clinton in his official capacity that may
have been alleged in the Complaint and will consider only Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief against Sheriff Clinton.
States and their agencies enjoy sovereign immunity from suit pursuant to
the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution absent a waiver by the State
or valid congressional abrogation. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit does not
extend, however, to claims for prospective injunctive relief brought against
state officials in their official capacities. Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1550
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(11th Cir. 1989) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). In Manders v.
Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003), the Eleventh Circuit held that a
Georgia sheriff is a state official for purposes of implementing law enforcement
policies at county jails. Further, in Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326,
1327-28, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2003), the Eleventh Circuit held that a Georgia
sheriff is a state official for purposes of enacting policies for conducting arrests.
Accordingly, Sheriff Clinton is a state official and is not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for prospective injunctive relief,
whether based on state or federal law.3
Here, Plaintiff seeks an injunction to “prevent[] a custom or policy of
race based stops” for all law enforcement officers “acting with Defendants.”

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Defendant Sheriff Clinton argues that claims for injunctive relief based on
state law are barred by the Eleventh Amendment under Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). However, the Court in Pennhurst held that
the Eleventh Amendment bars state law claims for injunctive relief against state
officials only when “the state is the real, substantial party in interest.” Id. at 101
(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). The
Court held, “The reasoning of our recent decisions on sovereign immunity thus leads
to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law
contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when–as here–the relief sought and ordered has
an impact directly on the State itself.” Id. at 117. In Pennhurst, the grant of injunctive
relief against the state official would have required substantial monetary expenditures
on the part of the state, thus making the state the real party in interest. No such
concern is present here, making the Pennhurst holding inapplicable.
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Comp., Dkt. No. [1] at 10. Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Clinton and his deputies
“have a custom of stopping and detaining African-American drivers,
particularly black men driving with white women.” Id. at ¶ 9. Sheriff Clinton
moves to dismiss based on failure to plead sufficient facts to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Dkt. No. [6] at 5.
In support of his claim that Sheriff Clinton maintains a racially
discriminatory custom or policy, Plaintiff points to the officers’ direct and
indirect references to race during the suspicion-free traffic stop on March 19,
2010 when Joanna Lee, a white female, was in the car with him. Dkt. No. [5] at
6. The officers expressed surprise when they discovered Plaintiff played tennis
on scholarship at Young Harris College, not basketball, and inquired as to how
Plaintiff knew Lee, after one officer stated that Lee “had a black boyfriend.”
Comp., Dkt. No. [1] at ¶¶ 7, 9. The officers detained Plaintiff for a half-hour,
conducted a search of Plaintiff’s person and car, and conducted a separate drug
dog search of Plaintiff’s car, yet did not issue Plaintiff a ticket or warning. Id. at
¶¶ 10, 12, 14. Plaintiff also points to the fact that Lee, while in the company of
her black husband, had been stopped on multiple occasions in the past,
including one trip during which Lee and her husband were stopped three times.
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Dkt. No. [5] at 6. These stops were conducted without reason and under similar
circumstances as the stop against Plaintiff. Comp., Dkt. No. [1] at ¶ 8.
Taking the above facts as true, as the Court is required to do on a motion
to dismiss, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to state a claim
for relief based on the existence of a racially discriminatory policy or practice.
In particular, the Court finds sufficient Plaintiff’s allegations that, in addition to
Plaintiff’s own traffic stop, conducted without suspicion or probable cause and
while Plaintiff was in the company of Lee, a white woman, Lee has also been
subjected to multiple suspicion-free traffic stops while in the company of her
black husband. At the motion to dismiss stage, these allegations are sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief, as they constitute more than mere legal
conclusions, but rather concrete facts making a plausible showing of a raciallydiscriminatory policy or practice. As such, Defendant Sheriff Clinton’s Motion
to Dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief.
B. Claims against Towns County
i. Federal Law Claims
It appears from Plaintiff’s Complaint that he also seeks damages and
injunctive relief against Defendant Towns County for alleged violations of
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federal law. Comp., Dkt. No. [1] at 10. Towns County moves to dismiss these
claims on grounds that they are based on the alleged acts or omissions of
Sheriff Clinton and his deputies, for which Towns County cannot be held liable,
as the doctrine of respondeat superior is not available against municipalities.
Dkt. No. [4] at 3-5.
The Supreme Court has established that “a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can
be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief
where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690. Therefore, under
Monell, to state a claim against Towns County, Plaintiff must plead that Towns
County maintained an unconstitutional “policy or custom” that Sheriff Clinton
or his deputies were executing during the traffic stop at issue. Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails in this regard.
Plaintiff alleges that when the deputies in this case stopped Plaintiff and
his companion, they may have been enforcing a county policy of stopping cars
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based on the race of the driver. Dkt. No. [5] at 3. In support of this claim, and as
stated in Part III.A, supra, Plaintiff points to the officers’ direct and indirect
references to race made during the traffic stop at issue. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also
points to the multiple prior stops conducted against Lee and her black husband.
Id. at 7. However, Plaintiff pleads no facts in support of his claim that the
racially-discriminatory policy was promulgated by Towns County or enforced
on its authority.
Even if Plaintiff had pled facts indicating the existence of a county policy
or custom, Plaintiff still could not recover against Towns County because
Sheriff Clinton and his deputies are not municipal officers. As stated in Part
III.A., supra, the Eleventh Circuit has held that Georgia sheriffs are state, not
county, employees. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2002).
Further, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “[d]eputies . . . are employees
of the sheriff and not the county.” Id. at 1311. Accordingly, Towns County
cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the alleged acts or omissions of Sheriff
Clinton and his deputies.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Towns County’s Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED as to all federal law claims.
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ii. State Law Claims
To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against Towns County based on
alleged violations of state law, again, the only plausible basis on which to hold
Towns County liable is for the acts and omissions of Sheriff Clinton and his
deputies. However, as established in Parts III.A and III.B.i, supra, neither
Sheriff Clinton nor his deputies are county actors under Georgia law. As
Plaintiff has alleged no basis on which Sheriff Clinton or his deputies were
acting under the authority of Towns County, Plaintiff’s state law claims against
Towns County must fail. Accordingly, Defendant Towns County’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED as to all state law claims.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [4] is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants Donaldson, Shattles,
Dyer, Goolark, Goolark, and Rodey’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of service is
MOOT. Claims for damages against Sheriff Clinton in his official capacity are
deemed ABANDONED. Defendant Sheriff Clinton’s Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED as to all claims for injunctive relief. Defendant Towns County’s
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to all claims. Having reached a final
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decision on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court ORDERS that the
previously issued stay be lifted. See Dkt. No. [8].

SO ORDERED, this 24th day of October, 2011.

________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge

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