Farr v. Hall County, Georgia et al
Filing
30
ORDER that Defendants' 10 and 12 Motions to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's (Counts I and III) are GRANTED. Defendants HCSO, Hall County, Gilbert, and GBIs Motions to Dismiss 10 , 12 as to all counts are GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendants HC SO, Hall County, Gilbert, and GBI are dismissed from this action, and because no substantive claims remain against these Defendants, the attorneys fees and punitive damages asserted against them are DISMISSED. As to Plaintiffs malicious prosecution c laim under state law asserted against Defendant Blackwell, Defendants Motion to Dismiss 10 is GRANTED. As to Plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 asserted against Defendant Blackwell, Defendants Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Bec ause substantive claims against Defendant Blackwell remain in this litigation, his Motion to Dismiss 10 as to attorneys fees and punitive damages is DENIED. Defendants Hall County, HCSO, and Gilberts Motion for Summary Judgment 27 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 11/28/11. (sk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
BLAKE EUGENE FARR,
Plaintiff,
v.
HALL COUNTY, GEORGIA,
et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:11-CV-00074-RWS
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendants Georgia Bureau of
Investigation (“GBI”) and Steve Blackwell (“Blackwell”)’s Motion to Dismiss
[10] and Defendants Hall County, Georgia (“Hall County”), the Hall County
Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”), and Ramone Gilbert (“Gilbert”)’s Motion to
Dismiss [12] and Motion for Summary Judgment [27]. After a review of the
record, the Court enters the following Order.
Background1
On May 15, 2008, Defendant Blackwell of the GBI executed a search
warrant pursuant to allegations that Plaintiff had downloaded child
1
The factual background is derived from the Complaint [1] and subsequent
pleadings. The Court makes no findings with respect to the facts contained herein.
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pornography. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 27-29). The pornography was believed to have
been downloaded on March 19, 2008 at approximately 9:45 a.m. to a computer
in Plaintiff’s home. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 31). On that date, Plaintiff asserts that he was
not at home, but rather from 7:00 a.m. to approximately 5:00 p.m. he was at an
HCSO Honor Guard commendation ceremony along with Defendant Gilbert.
(Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23, 30). Defendant Blackwell’s search of Plaintiff’s home
revealed a video containing child pornography which had been downloaded
onto Plaintiff’s computer. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 34). Plaintiff was then taken to the
HCSO and questioned. (Id. at ¶ 35). In addition to denying knowledge of the
downloaded video, when questioned, Plaintiff announced that both the internet
account and Bear Share account were registered to Plaintiff’s wife, Mrs. Farr;
that the Bear Share account had not been renewed in 2008; and that several
people had access to the computer during the time when the child pornography
was downloaded. (Id. at ¶ 36).
The next day, May 16, 2008, Defendant Gilbert told Plaintiff to come to
the Hall County Law Enforcement Center to take care of some administrative
tasks related to the search warrant and assured Plaintiff that he was not going to
be arrested. (Id. at ¶¶ 41, 42). When Plaintiff arrived, Defendant Gilbert
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grabbed Plaintiff’s neck and asked, “Did you sleep well last night?” (Id. at ¶
43). Defendant Gilbert then proclaimed that “this is where the Farr’s [sic] and
Hall County part ways,” and later that same day, Defendant Gilbert fired
Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 45, 46). Plaintiff asserts that prior to this incident there had
been hostility between Defendant Gilbert and himself.2 (Id. at ¶ 18).
Plaintiff was subsequently arrested for sexual exploitation of children
pursuant to an arrest warrant sworn out by Defendant Blackwell. (Id. at ¶¶ 50,
83). According to Plaintiff, Blackwell omitted critical facts when obtaining the
arrest warrant from the magistrate.3 Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant
Gilbert knew that Plaintiff could not have downloaded the child pornography on
March 19, 2008 at approximately 9:45 a.m. because at that time Plaintiff was at
the HCSO Honor Guard commendation ceremony along with Defendant
Gilbert. (Id. at ¶¶ 23, 30, 32). Nonetheless, Defendant HCSO belly-chained,
2
For example, in July 2007, Plaintiff was contacted by Defendant Gilbert for a
position in the Hall County Courthouse in which Plaintiff expressed he would rather
remain at his current position. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 16). In response, Defendant Gilbert
expressed his disgust with Plaintiff for refusing the position. (Id. at ¶ 17).
3
For instance, Plaintiff alleges the following facts were omitted: Plaintiff was at
the Honor Guard commendation ceremony during the time when the alleged file was
downloaded; the Bear Share account was not renewed in 2008; and several people
had access to the computer when the child pornography was downloaded. (Dkt. 1 at ¶
51).
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handcuffed, and shackled Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 53). Plaintiff was escorted to a
patrol car and was left standing outside the patrol car for an extended period of
time—an action Plaintiff alleges was intended to humiliate and embarrass him.
(Id. at ¶ 54). Plaintiff was then transported to Hall County Jail for the
remainder of the day. (Id. at ¶ 55). On May 27, 2010, the Hall County District
Attorney dismissed the charge against Plaintiff for lack of probable cause. (Id.
at ¶ 67-68).
On March 21, 2011—over two years after the arrest occurred—Plaintiff
filed his Complaint [1] asserting false arrest and malicious prosecution claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Blackwell and Gilbert, as well
as state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution against all
Defendants. The Defendants have now moved to dismiss all claims against
them.
I.
Motions to Dismiss
When considering a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, a federal court is to accept as true “all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s
complaint.” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). Further, the court must draw all reasonable inferences
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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187
F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (internal citations omitted). However, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Id.
The United States Supreme Court has dispensed with the rule that a
complaint may only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when “‘it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.’” Twombly, 127 U.S. at 561(quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The Supreme Court has replaced that rule
with the “plausibility standard,” which requires that factual allegations “raise
the right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 556. The plausibility
standard “does not[, however,] impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence [supporting the claim].” Id.
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A. False-Arrest Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1
(Counts I and III)
Plaintiff asserts a false-arrest claim under Section 1983 (Count I) against
Defendants Blackwell and Gilbert and a false-arrest claim under O.C.G.A. § 517-1 (Count III) against all Defendants. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s falsearrest claims are barred under the two-year statute-of-limitations.
For both Section 1983 and state-law false-arrest claims, Georgia’s twoyear statute-of-limitations governing personal injuries applies. See O.C.G.A. §
9-3-33 (“Actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years
after the right of action accrues. . . .”); Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711,
716 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The proper limitations period for all Section 1983
actions in Georgia is the two-year limitations period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 93-33.”). For false-arrest claims, the two-year period begins to run from the date
the plaintiff was detained pursuant to legal process. Betts v. Yount, 2011 WL
294509, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2011) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384
(2007)).
Plaintiff was arrested on May 15, 2008, and the statute of limitations
began to run on Plaintiff's false arrest claims that same day. Therefore, the
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statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s false-arrest claims expired on May 15, 2010.
As Plaintiff did not file his Complaint until March 21, 2011, more than two
years after the limitations period had expired, Plaintiff’s false arrest claims
under Section 1983 and state law are time-barred. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
false-arrest claims (Counts I and III) against all Defendants are DISMISSED
with prejudice.
B. Claims Against Defendants HCSO and GBI
As stated supra, Plaintiff’s false arrest claims—both federal and state—
have been dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the Court will address the
remaining malicious prosecution claims under Section 1983 and O.C.G.A. § 517-40 (Counts II and IV) against Defendants HCSO and the GBI. “After
performing thorough research and verifying Defendants’ arguments,” Plaintiff
concedes that the state law malicious prosecution claim (Count IV) against
Defendants HCSO and GBI is barred and requests the Court to dismiss the
claim against these Defendants without prejudice. (Dkt. 21 at 7-8; Dkt. 15 at
22). As to the Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Count II), the
Complaint makes it clear that the claim is directed against “individual
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defendants only.”4 (Dkt. 1 at 19). Accordingly, the Court interprets the Section
1983 malicious prosecution claim (Count II) to be asserted against Defendants
Gilbert and Blackwell only. Therefore, the Court concludes that all
claims—both federal and state—against Defendants HCSO and GBI must be
DISMISSED with prejudice.5
C. Claims Against Defendant Hall County
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff asserts a state-law false-arrest claim
against Defendant Hall County. However, as stated supra, Plaintiff’s false
arrest claims have all been dismissed. Therefore, the Court will address the
only remaining claim against Defendant Hall County— Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40.6
4
Plaintiff asserts that the Section 1983 claims (Counts I and II) “clearly provide
that they are directed at only the individual defendants.” (Dkt. 21 at 8).
5
The Court believes there is no just reason to limit the dismissal, because even
if the claims were dismissed without prejudice, the Court sees no viable claim.
Moreover, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the claims only after Defendants
spent the time and effort drafting a Motion to Dismiss.
6
Although Defendant Hall County cites various cases as to why Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a federal claim against it, Plaintiff’s federal causes of action
“are directed at only the individual defendants,” and as such, the Court will not
address those arguments as they are moot. (Dkt. 12-1 at 5; Dkt. 21 at 8).
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Defendant Hall County argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
a complete bar to the malicious prosecution claim. (Dkt. 12-1 at 6-7).
Defendant’s argument is premised on the ground that Plaintiff has not and
cannot show that Hall County has waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to an
act of the General Assembly. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff argues that should he be
allowed to proceed with discovery, Plaintiff would be able to determine whether
Hall County has insurance coverage, and in turn, such insurance coverage
would waive sovereign immunity. (Dkt. 21 at 8).
Under both the 1991 Amendment to the State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. II,
Par. IX, and the Georgia Tort Claims Act, sovereign immunity provided to
counties will be retained unless waived by an act of the General Assembly.
Swan v. Johnson, 219 Ga. App. 450, 452, 465 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1995). Thus,
“[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity protects governments from legal action
unless they have waived their immunity from suit.” Williams v. Whitfield
Cnty., 289 Ga. App. 301, 302, 656 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). “The immunity, at
least for counties, may only be waived by a legislative act which specifically
provides that sovereign immunity is waived and the extent of such waiver.”
Williams, 289 Ga. App. at 302, 656 S.E.2d at 586.
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In Georgia, only the purchase of motor-vehicle liability-insurance
coverage waives sovereign immunity. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-5 provides that a
county waives its sovereign immunity to the extent it purchases liability
insurance to cover personal injuries arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.
See Williams, 289 Ga. App. at 302 (applying O.C.G.A. § 33-24-5). Moreover,
under O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2(a), sovereign immunity is waived “for a loss arising
out of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. . . .” See City of
Atlanta v. Lockett, 2011 WL 4840632, at *1 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2011)
(holding that the City waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. §
36-92-2(a) where police officers initiated and continued a high speed pursuit in
violation of police department protocol).
Because the facts of this case do not support a claim of liability arising
out of use of a county motor vehicle—or any motor vehicle—sovereign
immunity has not been waived. Sovereign immunity thus acts as a complete bar
to any state law claims against Defendant Hall County, and the Court finds no
just reason to allow discovery on this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law
claim for malicious prosecution against Defendant Hall County must be
DISMISSED with prejudice.
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D. Claims Against Defendant Blackwell
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff concedes that the state law claims for
false arrest and malicious prosecution (Counts III and IV) asserted against
Defendant Blackwell are barred and requests this Court to dismiss them without
prejudice.7 (Dkt. 15 at 22). As stated supra, Plaintiff’s false arrest claims have
already been dismissed, and because the Court finds no compelling reason to
limit the dismissal of the state malicious prosecution claim (Count IV), it is
DISMISSED with prejudice. Accordingly, the Court will address the only
viable claim remaining against Defendant Blackwell—a claim for malicious
prosecution under Section 1983.
To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious
7
In addition, Defendant Blackwell asserts that he is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity and sovereign immunity with regard to any state law claims
that Plaintiff has alleged against him. (Dkt. 10-1 at 22). Moreover, Defendant
Blackwell asserts that even if the state-law claims had been brought in a proper state
court, they would be subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”). More specifically, Defendant
Blackwell argues (1) he is immune under the GTCA; (2) Plaintiff failed to satisfy the
ante-litem notice requirement of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26; (3) Plaintiff failed to effect
proper service of the Complaint; and (4) the state-tort-law claims are barred by the
exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24. (Dkt.
10-1 at 22-29).
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prosecution, and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003)).
As to the constituent elements of the common law tort
of malicious prosecution, [the Eleventh Circuit] has
looked to both federal and state law and determined
how those elements have historically developed. For
example, in Uboh, [the Eleventh Circuit] examined
both federal law and Georgia law and indicated that,
for purposes of a Section 1983 malicious prosecution
claim, the constituent elements of the common law
tort of malicious prosecution included: (1) a criminal
prosecution instituted or continued by the present
defendant; (2) with malice and without probable
cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused's
favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.
Wood, 323 F.3d at 881-82 (citation omitted).
Defendant Blackwell, however, asserts that he is entitled to qualified
immunity for the individual capacity claim. Qualified immunity protects
government officials performing discretionary functions from being sued in
their individual capacities. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). In
addressing a qualified immunity defense, a two-part analysis is used. First, a
Defendant must prove that he was “acting within the scope of his discretionary
authority” when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Second, if Defendant
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provides such proof, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that Defendant’s
actions violated “clearly established constitutional law” of which a reasonable
person would have known. Hudgins v. City of Ashburn, 890 F.2d 396, 404
(11th Cir. 1989); Garrett v. Athens-Clarke Cnty., 378 F.3d 1274, 1278-9 (11th
Cir. 2004). If the law has not staked out a bright line “right” in factual
circumstances highly similar to those presented, qualified immunity almost
always protects the defendant. The Court determines the legal issue of whether
the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity using the version of facts most
favorable to the plaintiff. Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir.
2003).
Here, the first prong is satisfied as Plaintiff concedes that Defendant
Blackwell was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority as a
special agent of the GBI. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 70; Dkt. 15 at 19). Accordingly, the
critical question is whether Plaintiff has provided competent evidence that
Defendant Blackwell’s actions violated clearly established constitutional
standards of which a reasonable person would have known — in this case
Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 89).
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First, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim is recognized
as a Fourth Amendment violation. The Eleventh Circuit “unequivocally has
identified malicious prosecution to be a constitutional tort cognizable under
Section 1983,” Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (11th Cir. 1998), and the
Fourth Amendment is the source of the right to be free from malicious process.
Wood, 323 F.3d at 881 (“Our Court has identified malicious prosecution as a
violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . ”). Second, “an arrest without probable
cause violates the right to be free from unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.” Durruthy, 351 F.3d at 1088. “Probable cause to arrest exists
when law enforcement officials have facts and circumstances within their
knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had
committed or was committing a crime.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d
1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to render it plausible that
Defendant Blackwell violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free
from malicious process by making an arrest without probable cause. Plaintiff
has plead that the arrest warrant affidavit omitted several material facts which,
if alleged, would have prevented a judge from issuing the warrant. (Id. at 13).
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Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Blackwell failed to mention that
while the child pornography was being downloaded, Plaintiff was in attendance
at a commendation ceremony and thus not present at his residence; that the
internet and Bear Share accounts were registered under Mrs. Farr’s name; that
twenty five individuals had access to the computer; that Mrs. Farr admitted to
purchasing the computer and downloading adult pornography; and that Plaintiff
denied any knowledge of the downloaded files. (Id. at 13-14).
The Court, in accepting as true “all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s
complaint,” and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, believes Plaintiff has asserted enough facts to allege a
constitutional violation and a violation of a clearly established law. Grossman
v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted);
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, Defendant Blackwell is not entitled to qualified immunity, and his
Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim under Section
1983 is DENIED.
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E. Claims Against Defendant Gilbert
As stated supra, Plaintiff’s false arrest claims have been dismissed.8
Therefore, the Court will address only Plaintiff’s federal and state malicious
prosecution claims against Defendant Gilbert.
Plaintiff asserts that he has alleged a plethora of facts which reveal a
plausible claim for relief.9 However, while Plaintiff does allege a number of
8
In addition, Plaintiff’s failure to address the statute of limitations argument
asserted in Defendants’ Motion [12] renders Plaintiff’s false arrest claims as
abandoned, and the Court would also be authorized to dismiss the claims on such
grounds. See L.R. 7.1(B), NDGa; see also Hudson v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 209
F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
9
Plaintiff asserts that his Complaint contained the following facts in support of
his claim: “Defendant Gilbert offered the Plaintiff a position with the Sheriff’s Office;
that Plaintiff respectfully refused said offer; that Defendant Gilbert thereafter visited
Plaintiff at his workplace to express disgust with the Plaintiff and often became hostile
towards the Plaintiff; that the Plaintiff had to contact two of his supervisors to restrain
Gilbert and protect himself; that Plaintiff spoke with his supervisors regarding
Defendant Gilbert’s hostility; that Plaintiff was with Defendant Gilbert at the time in
which he allegedly downloaded the pornography he was arrested for knowingly
possessing and therefore, Defendant Gilbert knew that Plaintiff could not have
downloaded the file; that Defendant Gilbert lied to the Plaintiff to get him to come to
the Law Enforcement Center; that Defendant Gilbert choked the Plaintiff and
threatened him; that Defendant Gilbert fired the Plaintiff before he had been charged
with any unlawful act; that Defendant Gilbert effectuated the arrest of Plaintiff; that
Defendant Gilbert sent an e-mail message to the employees of the Hall County
Sheriff’s Office instructing them not to speak with or assist the Plaintiff in any way;
that Defendant Gilbert had no probable cause to support the criminal prosecution; that
Defendant Gilbert participated in instituting and maintaining a criminal prosecution
against Plaintiff with malice and without probable cause; that as a direct result of
Gilbert’s actions, the Plaintiff was seized and detained against his will and subjected
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improper actions by Gilbert, none of the allegations go to malicious
prosecution. As seen above, in order to mount such a claim under either federal
or state law, Plaintiff must allege that Gilbert instituted or continued Plaintiff’s
prosecution. See Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 851 F. Supp. 469, 472 (M.D. Ga.
1994). “The central question is whether the officials involved made an
‘independent decision to arrest or prosecute’” apart from the defendant’s
conduct, or whether they relied upon the defendant. Id. (quoting Baggett v.
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 330 S.E.2d 108, 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)). And simply
making an arrest after another party initiates the prosecution does not lead to
liability. Payne v. DeKalb Cnty, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1177 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(finding that making an arrest in response to a 911 call and in reliance on
another party’s representation that a warrant was forthcoming did not institute
or continue plaintiff’s prosecution).
Here, the only fact which Plaintiff plead that arguably relates to his
prosecution is that it was Gilbert who called him and asked him to come down
to the station where he was subsequently arrested. Plaintiff did not plead that
to criminal prosecution; and that the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed.” (Dkt.
21 at 11-12 (citing Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 32, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 52, 58, 67, 71, 73, 75, 77, 84, 86, 89)).
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Gilbert gave false information to Blackwell, or that it was Gilbert who
conducted the pornography investigation. In fact, Plaintiff plead that Blackwell
knew the Plaintiff was at the commendation ceremony and thus could not have
relied on Gilbert for this information. Cmpl., Dkt. No. [1] at ¶ 37. And Plaintiff
also plead that a warrant was issued against him to substantiate the arrest by
Gilbert and Hall County. Id. at ¶ 49. As Gilbert did not continue or institute
Plaintiff’s prosecution and only participate in the arrest of him, that claim is
DISMISSED against Defendant Gilbert.
a. Official Capacity
Defendant Gilbert also asserts that any federal law claims alleged against
him in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. 12-1
at 18). "It is [ ] well-settled that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits
brought in federal court when the State itself is sued and when an 'arm of the
State' is sued." Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003).
“Georgia law recognizes its sheriffs as ‘arms of the state.’” Rylee v. Chapman,
316 Fed. App’x 901, 905 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d
1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007) (rev’d en banc on other grounds)).
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Although Plaintiff argues that Defendant Gilbert is not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment Immunity because he is not being sued as an arm of the
state, to the contrary, sheriffs and sheriffs’ employees are “arms of the state”
when performing law-enforcement functions. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1313.
Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant Gilbert—a deputy sheriff with
the Hall County Sheriff’s Office— is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Accordingly, insofar as Defendant Gilbert seeks dismissal on the
official capacity claims, his Motion to Dismiss [12] is hereby GRANTED.
F. Punitive Damages and Attorneys Fees
Because substantive claims against Defendant Blackwell remain in this
litigation, his Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to attorneys’ fees and punitive
damages. See Connell v. Houser, 375 S.E.2d 136, 139 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding that an attorneys’ fee award under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 is predicated on
finding a violation of the other elements of damages). Moreover, because no
substantive claims remain against Defendants HCSO, Hall County, GBI, and
Gilbert the attorneys’ fees and punitive damages asserted against them are
DISMISSED.
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II.
Motion for Summary Judgment10
Defendants Hall County, HCSO, and Gilbert filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment [27] on October 6, 2011. The motion asserts that on September 14,
2011, Plaintiff Farr filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in
the Untied States Bankruptcy Court. (Dkt. 27-2 at ¶ 4). Plaintiff Farr was
required to list all suits in which he is or was a party within one year prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy in the “Statement of Financial Affairs;” however,
Plaintiff failed to do so. (Id. at ¶ 5). Plaintiff Farr contends that while meeting
with his bankruptcy attorney he informed him that there was pending litigation.
(Dkt. 28-1 at ¶ 2). Thus, according to Plaintiff, the litigation was inadvertently
omitted from the bankruptcy filings. (Id. at ¶ 3).
Defendants Hall County, HCSO, and Gilbert (“Defendants”) filed their
Motion for Summary Judgment [27] on October 6, 2011. After receiving the
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff was put on notice that the pending
litigation was omitted from the bankruptcy filing and took action to amend the
bankruptcy petition to include the lawsuit. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5).
10
The Court incorporates the facts contained in both Defendants’ Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts [27-2] and Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts [28-1].
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A. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . .
court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259
(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a showing,
the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and
present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does
exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at
248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence
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is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Id. at 249-50.
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th
Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which are
reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations
omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (once the moving party has met
its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party “must do more than simply
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
B. Judicial Estoppel
Defendants seek judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claims for
malicious prosecution and false arrest under state law and Section 1983.
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Defendants contend that Plaintiff should be estopped from pursuing his claims
because he failed to disclose his involvement in this pending lawsuit in a sworn
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition filed in the Bankruptcy Court. According to the
“Statement of Financial Affairs” filed before the Bankruptcy Court, Plaintiff
was required to “[l]ist all suits and administrative proceedings to which [he] is
or was a party within one year immediately preceding the filing of this
bankruptcy case.” (Dkt. 27-1 at 3-4). Although this case was pending at the
time of the bankruptcy filing, Plaintiff did not disclose the pendency of this
lawsuit. (Id. at 6).
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a plaintiff from asserting a
position in a judicial proceeding that contradicts the position taken under oath
in a bankruptcy proceeding. Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1271
(11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a two-prong test for
determining the application of judicial estoppel. First, the prior inconsistent
position must be asserted under oath. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, 291 F.3d
1282, 1285-88 (11th Cir. 2002). Next, the court considers whether the
inconsistent statements amount to a manipulation of the judicial system. See id.
at 1287-88. As Burnes demonstrates, where a party fails to list a potential
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employment claim on her bankruptcy disclosure forms and later brings that
claim in court, the first factor is met and the issue becomes one of intent. See
id. (finding first factor met under circumstances). Intent may be inferred from
the record, particularly where a party knew about her undisclosed claims and
had a motive to conceal them from the bankruptcy court. Id. at 1287.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff made inconsistent statements to the
Bankruptcy Court under oath by falsely swearing that he was not a party to any
pending lawsuits. (Dkt. 27-1 at 6). As to the second prong, Defendants argue
that the motive to deceive the Bankruptcy Court can be inferred from Plaintiff’s
filing of the bankruptcy, because if Plaintiff realized any proceeds from the suit
prior to the discharge of his bankruptcy, he would have been able to keep the
proceeds for himself. See Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1275
(11th Cir. 2010). Defendants contend, therefore, that judicial estoppel should
be applied to bar Plaintiff from pursuing his claims. De Leon v. Comcar
Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (“judicial estoppel bars a
plaintiff from asserting claims previously undisclosed to the bankruptcy court
where the plaintiff both knew about the undisclosed claims and had a motive to
conceal them”).
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In response, Plaintiff argues that he had disclosed the pending lawsuit to
his bankruptcy attorney. (Dkt. 28 at 4). Moreover, Plaintiff contends that his
failure to disclose this action in the bankruptcy filings was inadvertent. (Id.).
Once Plaintiff Farr realized this mistake, Plaintiff amended his Bankruptcy
Petition and rectified the error. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff argues that as he lacked
any intent to deceive the Court or his creditors, the doctrine of judicial estoppel
should not be applied to bar his claims as a matter of law. See Strauss v. RentA-Ctr., Inc., 192 F. App'x 821, 822 (11th Cir. 2006)
Here, the inconsistent statements under oath prong has been met.
However, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence that Plaintiff had the
requisite intent or motive to meet the second prong. Construing all facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that Plaintiff
lacked the intent to manipulate the judicial system by omitting his involvement
in the pending case. Further, the prompt rectification of the error by amending
the schedule satisfies Plaintiff’s statutory duty to amend. See Robinson, 595
F.3d at 1274 (“[A] Chapter 13 debtor has a statutory duty to amend her
financial schedule to reflect her current assets.”). The Court finds that
Defendants have failed to offer evidence sufficient to support application of
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judicial estoppel.11 Accordingly, Plaintiff should not be estopped from
asserting his claims. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[27] is DENIED.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [10, 12] as to
Plaintiff’s false arrest claims (Counts I and III) are GRANTED. Defendants
HCSO, Hall County, Gilbert, and GBI’s Motions to Dismiss [10, 12] as to all
counts are GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendants HCSO, Hall County, Gilbert,
and GBI are dismissed from this action, and because no substantive claims
remain against these Defendants, the attorneys’ fees and punitive damages
11
Although Defendants have offered Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1282, Robinson, 595
F.3d at 1274, and Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) as
authority for their arguments that Plaintiff has attempted to make a mockery of the
Court, in considering the specific circumstances of this case, the Court finds those
cases to be distinguishable. For instance, in Burnes, the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy
before filing suit and thereafter did not amend his schedule of assets or statement of
financial affairs to reflect the pending suit. Moreover, when the plaintiff converted
the Chapter 13 petition to a Chapter 7, the bankruptcy court ordered the plaintiff to file
an amendment, in which the plaintiff, again, failed to report the pending lawsuit.
Moreover, Barger involved a plaintiff who did not attempt to amend her bankruptcy
petition until after being discharged of her debts. And in Robinson, the plaintiff was
in the process of repayment at the time she chose not to disclose the pending suit.
Further, there was a nine-month period between when the plaintiff brought her claim
and when she was dismissed from the bankruptcy. Here, Plaintiff mistakenly left off
this suit in his Statement of Financial Affairs, and the Court does not find that Plaintiff
acted in bad faith.
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asserted against them are DISMISSED. As to Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim under state law asserted against Defendant Blackwell,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [10] is GRANTED. As to Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim under Section 1983 asserted against Defendant Blackwell,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Because substantive claims
against Defendant Blackwell remain in this litigation, his Motion to Dismiss
[10] as to attorneys’ fees and punitive damages is DENIED. Defendants Hall
County, HCSO, and Gilbert’s Motion for Summary Judgment [27] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of November, 2011.
_______________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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