Gaylor v. Georgia Department of Natural Resources et al

Filing 100

ORDER DENYING Defendants' 81 Motion for Hearing, GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs 68 Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, and DENIES Non-Party Carol Gaylors 70 Motion to Quash Subpoena and for Protective Order. In accordance with the Courts Order of March 20, 2014, discovery is extended for sixty (60) days from the date of entry of this order to allow Defendants time to schedule and take Mrs. Gaylors deposition and to provide Plaintiff the supplemental discovery required by this order. Dispositive motions are due thirty (30) days after the close of the extended discovery period. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 8/25/2014. (vld)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
GARY GAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, et al.,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:11-CV-288-RWS

ORDER
This action is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
Responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents [68]
and Non-Party Carol Gaylor’s Motion to Quash Subpoena and for Protective
Order [70]. The Court’s rulings are set out below.1
Background
Plaintiff Gary Gaylor filed this action against the Georgia Department
of Natural Resources (“GDNR”) and Becky Kelley, in her official capacity as
the Director of GDNR’s Parks, Recreation, and Historic Sites Division
1

The Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Hearing [81]. The Court will
address Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Michael
Palacio [92] and Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Testimony of
Mike Galifianakis [93] in a separate Order.

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

(“PRHSD”),2 asserting claims for alleged disability discrimination in violation
of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131
et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants own, operate, and/or administer
Unicoi State Park and Lodge near Helen, Georgia, and Vogel State Park near
Blairsville, Georgia (the “Parks”). First Am. Compl. [24] ¶¶ 5-16. Plaintiff
further alleges that he suffers from multiple sclerosis, which impairs his
ability to walk and requires him to use a cane or a wheelchair; that he has
visited the Parks and plans on visiting them in the future, but that during his
visits he has faced difficulties accessing the goods, services, programs, and
activities within the Parks due to architectural barriers; and that he fears he
will continue to face these barriers in the future. Id. ¶¶ 4, 17-21.
Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaration that the goods, services, programs and
activities owned, operated and/or administered by Defendants are in violation
of the ADA and RA; (2) an injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing
their discriminatory practices and directing them to alter and modify the
subject premises, goods, services, activities, programs and accommodations

2

The PRHSD was also initially named as a defendant but was later
dismissed by agreement of the parties. Order of Dec. 26, 2013 [63].
2

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

as appropriate to comply with the ADA and RA; (3) an award of reasonable
attorneys’ fees, costs and litigation expenses; and (4) an award of
compensatory damages. Id., Prayer for Relief.
Discussion
I.

Motion to Compel
Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to compel Defendants to provide full

responses to Interrogatory Nos. 4-8 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories
to Defendant GDNR and Request Nos. 13-16, 18-23, and 26 of Plaintiff’s First
Set of Requests for the Production of Documents to Defendant GDNR and
Defendant Kelley.3 Defendants contend that the motion should be denied in
its entirety because Plaintiff violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) and Local Rule
37.1(A) by failing to (1) engage in a good faith effort to resolve the discovery
disputes before filing the motion, (2) properly certify that such an effort was
made, and (3) state in the motion all of the objections made by Defendants
and their grounds. After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff
made a good faith effort to resolve the discovery disputes, that certification
of such effort by local counsel was sufficient, and that Plaintiff’s summaries

3

Plaintiff has withdrawn his motion with respect to Request for Production
No. 18. See Pl.’s Reply Br. [85] at 15.
3

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

of Defendants’ lengthy and repetitive objections were reasonable and
appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of the motion,
first considering the interrogatories at issue and then the requests for
production of documents.
A.

Interrogatories
1.

Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 5

In Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 5, Plaintiff asked GDNR (1) to identify the
total amount of funding per year that it received from the federal government
for the years 1992-present; and (2) for each year, to provide a description of
each award of federal government funds, including the classification and
identifying number of the funding, the source of the funding, and a
description of how the funds were expended or are to be expended. GDNR
objected that both interrogatories were overly broad because they were not
limited to the two Parks at issue and to the areas of the Parks that Plaintiff
actually visited or attempted to visit. Without waiving these objections,
GDNR provided the requested information with regard to five funding grants
received from the federal government for projects at Unicoi and Vogel.
In his motion to compel, Plaintiff argues that information regarding
federal funding at non-Unicoi and non-Vogel parks bears directly upon
4

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

whether GDNR is subject to the RA as a recipient of federal financial
assistance.4 In response, GDNR argues that the RA requires a showing that
the specific program or activity with which plaintiff was involved received or
directly benefitted from federal financial assistance at the time of the alleged
discrimination.

Since plaintiff’s allegations relate solely to difficulty

accessing the programs and activities at Unicoi and Vogel, GDNR argues that
information regarding federal financial assistance benefitting other parks
and other divisions of GDNR is irrelevant.
The Court concludes that information regarding federal financial
assistance benefitting all of GDNR’s operations, not just Unicoi and Vogel, is
relevant to Plaintiff’s claims under the RA. In support of its argument that
only federal funding of Unicoi and Vogel is relevant, GDNR relies on the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Doyle v. Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham, 680 F.2d
1323 (11th Cir. 1982), and the former Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brown v.

Sibley, 650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981). In Brown, the court held
that “it is not sufficient, for purposes of bringing a discrimination claim under
4

The RA provides in pertinent part that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual
with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added).
5

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

Section 504, simply to show that some aspect of the relevant overall entity or
enterprise receives or has received some form of input from the federal fisc.”
650 F.2d at 769. Instead, “[a] private plaintiff in a Section 504 case must
show that the program or activity with which he or she was involved, or from
which he or she was excluded, itself received or was directly benefited by
federal financial assistance.” Id. (footnotes omitted). Relying on Brown, the
court in Doyle reached the same conclusion. Doyle, 680 F.2d at 1326-27.
Both of these decisions, however, pre-date the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), which amended the
definition of “program or activity” under the RA to include “all of the

operations of . . . a department, agency, special purpose district or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A)
(emphasis added).

The Act was passed by Congress to “overturn” the

Supreme Court’s decisions in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984),
and Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), which, like Doyle and

Brown, narrowly interpreted “program or activity” to mean only the specific
parts of a recipient’s operation that directly benefitted from federal financial
assistance. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Probation and Parole,
551 F.3d 193, 199-200 (3rd Cir. 2008). Other courts have recognized that the
6

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

Act also effectively overturned Brown. See Innovative Health Sys. v. City of

White Plains, 931 F. Supp. 222, 234 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); Corrales v. Moreno
Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. 08-00040-AC, 2010 WL 2384599, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. June 10, 2010). By logical extension, Doyle, which relied on Brown, was
overturned as well.
GDNR also relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished opinion in

Muckle v. UNCF, 420 Fed. App’x 916 (11th Cir. 2011).5 In Muckle, the court
held that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s RA claim
because he had failed to allege that the defendants received federal financial
assistance. Id. at 918. Citing Doyle, the court stated that a more carefully
drafted complaint might state a claim if the plaintiff could show that the
scholarship program from which he had allegedly been excluded because of
a disability received federal financial assistance. Id. The court did not cite
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 or discuss its effect on the continued
viability of Doyle, nor did it cite any of the cases holding that the Act had
effectively overturned Brown, on which Doyle relied.6 Accordingly, Muckle
5

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent but may be cited as
persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
6

Similarly, this Court’s decision in Rylee v. Chapman, No. 2:06-CV-0158(continued...)
7

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

does not persuade this Court that Brown and Doyle remain good law in this
circuit.7 The Court concludes that information regarding GDNR’s receipt of
federal financial assistance benefitting all of its operations, not just Unicoi
and Vogel, is relevant to the issue of whether it is subject to the RA in this
case.
Apart from relevance, GDNR objected that these interrogatories were
overly broad and unduly burdensome because they cover a 21-year period and
would require manual file reviews at each division level for this entire time
period.

According to GDNR, the manual file review for the requested

information relating only to the 63 non-Unicoi and non-Vogel parks and
historic sites operated by the PRHSD would require, at a minimum, the
review of approximately 71 grant files that include approximately 109
separate projects, some of which contain more than 200 pages of

6

(...continued)
RWS, 2008 WL 3538559, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2008), also cited by GDNR, did
not discuss the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 or subsequent caselaw calling
into question the continued viability of Brown and Doyle.
Two recent decisions from the Northern District of Alabama cite Muckle as
indicating that the Eleventh Circuit intends to abide by the principles set forth in
Brown and Doyle. See McBay v. City of Decatur, Ala., No. CV-11-8-3272-NE, 2014
WL 1513344, at *7 n.25 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 11, 2014); Mason v. City of Huntsville, Ala.,
No. CV-10-S-02794-NE, 2012 WL 4815518, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 2012). For the
reasons explained above, this Court respectfully disagrees.
7

8

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

documentation. Additionally, GDNR states that providing the requested
information on a department-wide basis would require a manual file review
of documents housed at the Georgia Archives. GDNR objects to searching
these documents for the requested information because it contends they are
equally as available to Plaintiff as they are to GDNR.
These objections have been rendered largely moot by Plaintiff’s
agreement to limit his request for additional information to non-Unicoi and
non-Vogel parks and historic sites.

See Pl.’s Reply Br. [85] at 6.

Consequently, a department-wide file review will not be necessary. As noted
above, according to GDNR, responding to the interrogatories just with regard
to other parks and historic sites will require a manual file review of
approximately 71 grant files, some of which contain more than 200 pages of
documentation. GDNR has made no showing that such a limited review
would be unduly burdensome. Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion
to compel as to Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 5 and orders GDNR to supplement
its responses to these interrogatories to provide information regarding federal
funding received by non-Unicoi and non-Vogel parks and historic sites
operated by the PRHSD.

9

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

2.

Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7

In Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7, Plaintiff asked GDNR (1) to identify the
total amount of funding per year that it received from the State government
for the years 1992-present; and (2) for each year, to provide a description of
each award of State government funds, including the classification and
identifying number of the funding, the source of the funding, and a
description of how the funds were expended or are to be expended. GDNR
asserted essentially the same objections to these interrogatories as it did to
Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 5.

Without waiving these objections, GDNR

provided information regarding State funding received by Unicoi and Vogel.
In his motion to compel, Plaintiff argues that the requested information
regarding State funding is relevant for two reasons. First, Plaintiff argues
that discovery relating to GDNR’s financial resources and how those
resources are allocated is relevant to GDNR’s affirmative defense that the
Parks comply with all accessibility requirements unless compliance would
result in an undue financial or administrative burden. Second, Plaintiff
contends that State funding is also relevant to Plaintiff’s RA claims because
State agencies that receive federal funding indirectly through State
government are subject to the RA.
10

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

In response, GDNR does not dispute that general financial information
is relevant to its undue burden defense. Accordingly, in response to Plaintiff’s
motion to compel, GDNR provided Plaintiff with the operating budgets for
GDNR and the PRHSD for the years 2010 through 2014. In his reply brief,
Plaintiff makes no argument that this information requires any further
supplementation.
With regard to indirect federal funding, GDNR again argues that, as
with direct federal funding, such funding is only relevant if it benefits a
specific program or activity to which Plaintiff alleges he was denied access.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that indirect federal
funding of all of GDNR’s operations, not just Unicoi and Vogel, is relevant.
GDNR also argues that responding to these interrogatories on a departmentwide basis for a 21-year period would be unduly burdensome. Plaintiff has
not addressed this objection. The Court concludes that, as with Interrogatory
Nos. 4 and 5, GDNR’s response to these interrogatories should be limited to
funding of parks and historic sites within the PRHSD. Therefore, the Court
grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel as to Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7 and
orders GDNR to supplement its responses to these interrogatories to provide

11

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

information regarding any indirect federal funding of other parks and historic
sites within the PRHSD.
3.

Interrogatory No. 8

Interrogatory No. 8 asked GDNR to identify all sources of federal or
State government funding relating to the design, construction, and/or
renovation of Unicoi and Vogel, or any service, program, and/or activity
provided at Unicoi and Vogel, for the last five years; and to provide certain
specified information regarding any such funding. GDNR objected because
Plaintiff failed to limit his inquiry to areas of the Parks that he actually
visited or attempted to visit. Without waiving this objection, GDNR stated
that there had been no direct federal funding of Unicoi or Vogel during the
last five years and referred to its response to Interrogatory No. 6 with regard
to State government funding of the Parks.
In his motion to compel, Plaintiff argues that federal funding at nonUnicoi and non-Vogel sites is relevant to whether the RA applies in this case,
and State funding is relevant as to Defendant’s status as a potential indirect
recipient of federal funds. This argument, however, ignores the fact that
Interrogatory No. 8 does not seek information regarding non-Unicoi and nonVogel sites. Plaintiff also ignores the fact that, despite its objection, GDNR
12

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

provided a full response to this interrogatory. Therefore, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s motion as to Interrogatory No. 8.
B.

Requests for Production of Documents
1.

Request for Production (“RPD”) Nos. 14 and 15

RPD Nos. 14 and 15 sought production of documents reflecting federal
and State government funding, respectively, relating to parks and/or
recreational services since 2008. Defendants objected to both requests on the
ground that they were not limited to Unicoi and Vogel. As discussed above,
both direct and indirect federal funding of all of GDNR’s operations is
relevant to Plaintiff’s RA claims. Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
motion to compel as to RPD Nos. 14 and 15 and orders Defendants to produce
responsive documents relating to non-Unicoi and non-Vogel parks and
historic sites.
2.

RPD No. 16

RPD No. 16 sought production of “[a]ll Documents reflecting contracts
and/or agreements with the Federal Government” wherein Defendants agreed
to comply with civil rights legislation, federal law, and/or the ADA.
Defendants objected to the request, in part, on the ground that it was not
limited to contracts relating specifically to Unicoi and Vogel. Defendants also
13

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

objected that the request was overly broad and unduly burdensome because
it was unlimited in time or subject. In his motion to compel, Plaintiff cites
evidence that contracts signed by GDNR when accepting federal funding
often mandate its compliance with federal laws against discrimination in all
of its operations regardless of whether the funding relates to those
operations.
The Court concludes that contracts between GDNR and the federal
government that require GDNR to comply with federal anti-discrimination
laws in all of its operations are relevant and discoverable. The parties should
confer in an effort to reach agreement as to a reasonable time period for
which such documents should be produced. Subject to such agreement, the
Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel as to RPD No. 16 and orders
Defendants to produce any contracts between GDNR and the federal
government that contain provisions requiring GDNR to comply with federal
anti-discrimination laws in all of its operations.
3.

RPD Nos. 19, 21, and 22

RPD No. 19 sought production of “[a]ll email communications since
1990 relating to disability access, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and/or the Rehabilitation Act.” RPD Nos. 21 and 22 sought documents
14

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

relating to Defendants’ efforts to comply with, and understanding of, the ADA
and the RA, respectively. Defendants objected to these requests on various
grounds, including that they were not limited to documents relating to Unicoi
and Vogel. Nevertheless, Defendants conducted a search and produced a
large number of documents responsive to these requests, including documents
that were not specifically related to Unicoi and Vogel. In his motion to
compel, Plaintiff fails to specify how Defendants’ responses to these requests
were insufficient.

The Court agrees that non-Unicoi and non-Vogel

documents are relevant and discoverable. However, absent any showing by
Plaintiff that Defendants failed to produce any non-Unicoi and non-Vogel
documents responsive to these requests, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion
to compel as to RPD Nos. 19, 21, and 22. In light of this ruling, the Court
need not address Defendants’ other objections to these requests.
4.

RPD No. 26

RPD No. 26 sought production of “[a]ll documents relating to funds
allocated for accessibility issues since 2008.” Defendants objected that this
request was overly broad and unduly burdensome in that it was unlimited in
time and subject matter and was not limited to the areas of Unicoi and Vogel
that Plaintiff actually visited or tried to visit. Defendants also objected that
15

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

this request was duplicative of a number of Plaintiff’s other document
requests. In his motion to compel, Plaintiff argues that documents related to
funding for accessibility at non-Unicoi and non-Vogel sites is relevant and
discoverable. For the reasons discussed above, the Court agrees. In addition,
the Court finds that the request is reasonably limited as to both time and
subject matter and is not duplicative of any of Plaintiff’s other document
requests. Therefore, the Court overrules Defendants’ other objections, grants
Plaintiff’s motion to compel as to RPD No. 26, and orders Defendants to
produce documents responsive to this request that relate to non-Unicoi and
non-Vogel parks and historic sites operated by the PRHSD.
5.

Documents Housed at the Georgia Archives

Defendants objected to producing documents responsive to a number
of Plaintiff’s document requests on the ground that the documents were
housed at the Georgia Archives and were therefore “equally available to
Plaintiff as they are to Defendants.” Defs.’ Resp. to RPD Nos. 13, 15, 18, 20,
21, 22, and 23. In his motion to compel, Plaintiff argues that Defendants
should be required to produce responsive documents housed at the Georgia
Archives because they have a legal right to obtain the documents and the
burden of locating responsive documents will be significantly less for
16

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

Defendants than for Plaintiff because Defendants are in a superior position
to know what responsive documents are housed there and how to locate them.
In response, Defendants do not dispute that they have the legal right to
obtain documents housed at the Georgia Archives. Instead, they contend that
they should not be required to do so because Plaintiff can just as easily obtain
the documents directly from the Georgia Archives himself.
The Court concludes that Defendants must produce any responsive
documents that are housed at the Georgia Archives. Parties responding to
a request for production of documents must produce all documents within
their “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). “Control is
defined not only as possession, but as the legal right to obtain the documents
requested upon demand.” Searock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653 (11th Cir.
1984). Defendants do not dispute that they have the legal right to obtain
documents housed at the Georgia Archives upon demand.
Parties must produce documents within their possession, custody, or
control unless the documents “can be obtained from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C)(i). Defendants have made no showing that it would be more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive for Plaintiff to obtain
17

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

responsive documents from the Georgia Archives than for Defendants to do
so. On the contrary, since the documents were originally in the possession of
Defendants before being deposited in the Georgia Archives, Defendants are
presumably in a better position to know which documents may be responsive
to Plaintiff’s requests and where they may be located. Therefore, the Court
grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel with respect to documents responsive to
his requests for production that are housed at the Georgia Archives and
orders Defendants to produce any such documents.
II.

Motion to Quash Subpoena and for Protective Order
Defendants served a deposition subpoena on Plaintiff’s wife, Carol

Gaylor. Mrs. Gaylor has filed a motion to quash the subpoena and for a
protective order. In support of her motion, Mrs. Gaylor argues that (1) any
potentially relevant information she could provide is available from a more
convenient and less burdensome source, namely, Plaintiff himself; (2) due to
medical conditions from which she suffers, including herniated disks in her
neck and back and fibromyalgia, a deposition would subject her to heightened
physical strain and constitute an undue burden; and (3) her deposition would
be unlikely to produce relevant non-cumulative information because the
federal common law marital confidential communications privilege would
18

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

prevent her from testifying about any confidential conversations she had with
Plaintiff.

In the alternative, Mrs. Gaylor asks the Court to require

that Defendants take her deposition by written questions rather than oral
examination, compensate her at the rate of $50/hour for time spent in
connection with the deposition, and pay all her expenses related to the
deposition, including reasonable attorneys’ fees; and that all communications
between her and Plaintiff been deemed privileged.
In response, Defendants argue that Mrs. Gaylor’s testimony is relevant
because she accompanied Plaintiff on his visits to the Parks and can relate
her own observations of the conditions there, Plaintiff’s activities, and the
effect of any barriers Plaintiff encountered. Mrs. Gaylor’s testimony would
not be cumulative, Defendants argue, because she may be able to recall
certain details of the visits that Plaintiff has stated he cannot remember.
Defendants contend that Mrs. Gaylor has failed to show that sitting for a
deposition would impose any undue burden on her. Defendants question the
applicability of the marital confidential communications privilege in a civil
case; even assuming it applies, Defendants argue it would not preclude them
from questioning Mrs. Gaylor regarding her own observations of the Parks,
Plaintiff’s activities, and the effects of any alleged barriers encountered by
19

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

Plaintiff. Finally, Defendants contend there is no justification for limiting
them to taking Mrs. Gaylor’s deposition on written questions rather than oral
examination, requiring them to compensate Mrs. Gaylor beyond the
statutorily required witness fee and mileage, or determining in advance that
all communications between Mrs. Gaylor and Plaintiff are privileged.
The Court agrees with Defendants. Mrs. Gaylor has failed to show that
her deposition testimony would be unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or
that sitting for a deposition would impose an undue burden. Even assuming
the marital communications privilege applies in this case, Mrs. Gaylor may
have knowledge of relevant information that is not subject to the privilege.
Finally, there is no reason for the Court to require Defendants to take Mrs.
Gaylor’s deposition on written questions rather than on oral examination or
to compensate Mrs. Gaylor beyond the statutorily required witness fee and
mileage or to rule in advance on any question of privilege. Therefore, the
Court denies Mrs. Gaylor’s motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective
order as well as her alternative request for modification of the subpoena.
Summary
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for
Hearing [81], GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion
20

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)

to Compel Responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents [68], and DENIES Non-Party Carol Gaylor’s Motion to Quash
Subpoena and for Protective Order [70]. In accordance with the Court’s
Order of March 20, 2014, discovery is extended for sixty (60) days from the
date of entry of this order to allow Defendants time to schedule and take Mrs.
Gaylor’s deposition and to provide Plaintiff the supplemental discovery
required by this order. Dispositive motions are due thirty (30) days after the
close of the extended discovery period.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this

25th day of August, 2014.

_______________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

21

AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)