Muckle v. Robinson et al
Filing
13
ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants' 5 Motion to Dismiss. It is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs claims against the Barrow County Sheriff Department and Barrow County, which Defendants are DISMISSED from the suit. It is GR ANTED with respect to Plaintiffs claims against Sheriff Jud Smith in his official capacity and former Sheriff Joel H. Robinson in his individual capacity, which Defendants are DISMISSED from the suit. It is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs section 1983 excessive force and state law claims against the deputy Defendants in their official capacities. It is also GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs section 1983 excessive force claim against the deputy Defendants in their individual capacities, to th e extent the claim arises under the Fourth Amendment. It is DENIED, however, with respect to Plaintiffs section 1983 excessive force claim, arising under the Eighth or or Fourteenth Amendment, and state law claims against the deputy Defendants in the ir individual capacities. Accordingly, the only claims that remain in the suit are Plaintiffs Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment section 1983 excessive force claims and state law claims against Defendants Bray, Aguilar, Giles, and Zellars in their individual capacities. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 01/22/13. (sk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
CHARLES CALVIN MUCKLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOEL H. ROBINSON,
Individually and as Sheriff of
Barrow County, Barrow County
Sheriff Dept.; JOHN W. BRAY,
Individually and as an employee of
the Barrow County Sheriff Dept.;
GLENN AGUILAR, Individually
and as an employee of the Barrow
County Sheriff Dept.; C. GILES,
Individually and as an employee of
the Barrow County Sheriff Dept.;
T. ZELLARS, Individually and as
an employee of the Barrow County
Sheriff Dept.; BARROW
COUNTY; and BARROW
COUNTY SHERIFF
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:12-CV-0061-RWS
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5].
After reviewing the record, the Court enters the following Order.
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Background
This case arises out of an alleged beating that Plaintiff Charles Calvin
Muckle (“Plaintiff” or “Muckle”) sustained at the hands of Defendants while
incarcerated at the Barrow County Detention Center in Winder, Georgia. The
facts alleged in the Complaint are as follows.1 On March 21, 2012 at
approximately 5:40 a.m., Defendant former Deputy C. Giles (“former Deputy
Giles” or “Giles”) observed Plaintiff under the covers of his bed while
conducting a cell check. (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶ 10.) Former Deputy Giles ordered
Plaintiff to uncover and make his bed. (Id. ¶ 11.) Giles subsequently walked to
his work station and called Defendant Corporal John Bray (“Corporal Bray” or
“Bray”) and advised him of the situation. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Moments later, Corporal Bray, Defendant Deputy T. Zellars (“Deputy
Zellars” or “Zellars”), and Defendant former Deputy Glenn Aguilar (“former
Deputy Aguilar” or “Aguilar”) arrived at housing unit five and proceeded to
Muckle’s cell. (Id. ¶ 13.) At this time Deputy Zellar and Corporal Bray
withdrew their O.C. Spray and sprayed Muckle, also spraying former Deputy
1
Because the case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged
in the Complaint are accepted as true. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).
2
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Aguilar on his face and in his eyes. (Id. ¶ 14.) Aguilar took hold of Muckle
and slammed him to the floor. (Id. ¶ 15.) Bray, Aguilar, Zellar, and Giles
grabbed Muckle while he was on the floor and proceeded to beat him. (Id. ¶
16.) During the beating, Muckle screamed for help and offered no physical
resistance. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 22.) At the time of the beating, Muckle was securely
handcuffed by the wrists behind his back. (Id. ¶ 21.) As a result of the beating,
Muckle sustained multiple contusions, a black eye, and a bruised and busted lip.
(Id. ¶ 19.)
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on
March 19, 2012 against former Sheriff Joel H. Robinson (“former Sheriff
Robinson” or “Robinson”), in his official and individual capacities; Bray,
Aguilar, Zellar, and Giles (collectively the “deputy Defendants”) in their
official and individual capacities; Barrow County; and, finally, the Barrow
County Sheriff Department. Plaintiff purports to raise the following claims: a
section 1983 excessive force claim against former Sheriff Robinson and the
deputy Defendants, in their official and individual capacities, and against
Barrow County and the Barrow County Sheriff Department (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶¶
23-35; 45-49; 50-55); and state law claims for assault, battery, and intentional
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infliction of emotional distress against the deputy Defendants, in their
individual and official capacities, and against Barrow County and the Barrow
County Sheriff Department (id. ¶¶ 36-44; 46-49). Defendants move to dismiss
the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See generally Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. [5].)
The Court sets out the governing legal standard before considering Defendants’
motion on the merits.
Discussion
I.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” While this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In order to
withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is plausible on its face
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when the plaintiff pleads factual content necessary for the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Id.
At the motion to dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as
true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273
n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). However, the same does not apply to legal conclusions set
forth in the complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. Furthermore, the court does not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
II.
Preliminary Matters
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has withdrawn all claims against the
Barrow County Sheriff Department. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n Br.”), Dkt. [9-1] at 6 of 21.) Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [5] therefore is GRANTED as to all claims against this Defendant,
which is DISMISSED from this suit.
Plaintiff additionally concedes that Barrow County is entitled to
sovereign immunity, pursuant to the Georgia Constitution, against Plaintiff’s
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state law claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5] is
GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant
Barrow County.
III.
Analysis
As set out in the Background section, supra, and in accordance with the
foregoing, Plaintiff asserts the following claims against the following
Defendants: (1) a claim for excessive force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against former Sheriff Robinson in his official and individual capacities; (2) a
claim for excessive force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims
for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
deputy Defendants; and (3) a claim for excessive force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, against Defendant Barrow County. The Court considers Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss as to the claims raised against former Sheriff Robinson, the
deputy Defendants, and Barrow County, in turn.
A.
Sheriff Jud Smith & Former Sheriff Joel H. Robinson
Plaintiff asserts a section 1983 excessive force claim against former
Sheriff Robinson in both his official and individual capacities. As Defendants
argue, Robinson was succeeded by Jud Smith as Sheriff of Barrow County,
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Georgia, effective January 1, 2009—more than one year prior to the events
alleged in the Complaint. (Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Br.”), Dkt.
[5-1] at 1 n.1.) Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d),
Sheriff Jud Smith (“Sheriff Smith” or “Smith”) automatically is substituted for
former Sheriff Robinson as Defendant for Plaintiff’s official capacity claim.
The Court considers Defendants’ motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim
against Sheriff Smith in his official capacity before considering the motion as to
the section 1983 claim against former Sheriff Robinson in his individual
capacity.
1.
Official Capacity Claim
Plaintiff seeks to hold Sheriff Smith liable in his official capacity,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged excessive force in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶¶ 50-55.) Defendants
argue that this claim is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
(Defs.’ Br., Dkt. [5-1] at 5.) The Court agrees.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
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citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege: “(1) that the act or omission deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that
the act or omission was done by a person acting under color of law.” Marshall
Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.
1993) (emphasis added) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its
officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v.
Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). On the contrary, states
and their officials, acting in official capacities, are immune from suit under
section 1983 pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, which, absent congressional
abrogation,2 “protects a State from being sued in federal court without the
State’s consent.” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308. Eleventh Amendment immunity
2
Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims brought
pursuant to section 1983. Quern v. Jordan , 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979).
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from suit in federal court applies not only when the state itself is sued, but also
when an “arm of the state” is sued. Id.
Defendants argue that Sheriff Smith in his official capacity is an “arm of
the state” for purposes of this case, thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity from Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim. (Defs.’ Br., Dkt. [5-1] at 5.) The
Court agrees. Indeed, this case is controlled by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003), which holds that a Georgia
sheriff in his official capacity “is an arm of the state . . . in establishing use-offorce policy at the jail and in training and disciplining his deputies in that regard
. . . .” Id. at 1328. Thus, the Manders court held, a Georgia sheriff is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity for those particular functions. Id. Because this
case concerns the alleged use of excessive force by sheriff’s deputies at the
Barrow County Detention Facility, Sheriff Smith in his official capacity is an
“arm of the state” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5] therefore is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s
section 1983 claim against Sheriff Smith in his official capacity, and Sheriff
Smith is DISMISSED from the suit.
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2.
Individual Capacity Claim
Plaintiff also asserts a section 1983 excessive force claim against former
Sheriff Robinson in his individual capacity on a theory of failure to train and/or
supervise the deputy Defendants. (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶¶ 50-55.) Defendants
move to dismiss this claim, arguing, among other things, that former Sheriff
Robinson left the Sheriff’s Office more than a year prior to the events alleged in
the Complaint and, therefore, cannot be held liable for those events. (Defs.’
Br., Dkt. [5-1] at 10.) The Court agrees. Former Sheriff Robinson cannot be
held individually liable for the incident alleged in the Complaint given that he
was not Sheriff of Barrow County at the time of that incident. See Douglas v.
Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A Complaint will be held
defective if it fails to connect the defendant with the alleged wrong.”) (internal
quotes and citation omitted). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5] therefore is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against former Sheriff
Robinson in his individual capacity, and former Sheriff Robinson is
DISMISSED from the suit.3
3
The Court further notes that even if Plaintiff had alleged some connection
between the conduct alleged in the Complaint and former Sheriff Robinson (i.e., even
if former Sheriff Robinson had been sheriff at the time of the events alleged),
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Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against him would be subject to dismissal. “It is well
established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or
vicarious liability. . . . Instead, supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when
the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when
there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.
2003) (internal quotes and citations omitted). This causal connection may be
established “when a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights . . . .” Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s theory of liability against former Sheriff Robinson appears to be
based on an alleged failure to train/or supervise the deputy Defendants with respect to
use of force. (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶¶ 53-55; see also Pl.’s Opp’n Br., Dkt. [9-1] at 9-10
of 21 (“In this case the Plaintiff was beaten to the point where he had to be taken for
medical care. The Sheriff Deputies were not trained in handling the situation and it
would be a question for a jury to decide.”). As Plaintiff correctly states (id. at 9 of
21), to hold a supervisory official liable under section 1983 for failing to train or
supervise subordinates, a plaintiff must show that the “failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the subordinates come into
contact and the failure has actually caused the injury of which the Plaintiff
complains.” Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1397 (11th Cir. 1994). “Failure
to train can amount to deliberate indifference when the need for more training is
obvious . . . such as when there exists a history of abuse by subordinates that has put
the supervisor on notice of the need for corrective measures . . . .” Id. at 1397-98
(internal citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to show that a need for
further training and/or supervision was apparent to the sheriff, such that a failure to
further train and/or supervise could amount to deliberate indifference. On the
contrary, Plaintiff does not allege that his experience was anything more than a single,
isolated incident. Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against former Sheriff Robinson
therefore fails for this additional reason.
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B.
Deputy Defendants Bray, Aguilar, Giles, and Zellars
1.
Official Capacity Claims
i.
Section 1983: Excessive Force
Plaintiff also seeks to hold the deputy Defendants liable in their official
capacities for excessive use of force, pursuant to section 1983. For the reasons
stated in connection with the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim
against Sheriff Smith in his official capacity (see subsection A.1., supra), the
deputy Defendants in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. As stated above, Sheriff Smith and, therefore, his
deputies, are “arms of the state” for purposes of the conduct alleged in the
Complaint and therefore are immune from Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim in their
official capacities. See Scruggs, 256 F. App’x at 232 (holding that sheriff’s
deputies sued in their official capacities, “as employees of the sheriff,” share in
the sheriff’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); Scott v. Brown, No. 1:11-cv1811-TWT-JFK, 2012 WL 529983, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2012) (“[P]ersons
employed by the sheriff to perform his functions, if sued in their official
capacities, are entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity accorded the
sheriff for those functions.”). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5] therefore is
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GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the deputy Defendants
in their official capacities.
ii.
State Law Claims
The deputy Defendants in their official capacities also are entitled to
immunity from Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to state sovereign
immunity. Under the Georgia Constitution, “sovereign immunity extends to the
state and all of its departments and agencies” and “can only be waived by an
Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign
immunity is thereby waived and the extent of the waiver.” GA. CONST. art. I, §
2, ¶ 9(e). The Georgia Supreme Court has held that “departments and agencies”
of the state include counties, which, thus, are entitled to sovereign immunity
from suit in accordance with the constitutional provision. Gilbert v.
Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 479 (Ga. 1994). Moreover, because suits against
county officials in their official capacities are in reality suits against the county,
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985), a county official sued in his or
her official capacity “is entitled to the county’s defense of sovereign immunity
. . . .” Nichols, 650 S.E.2d at 385.
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For purposes of Plaintiff’s state law tort claims, the deputy Defendants in
their official capacities are county officials entitled to assert the county’s
defense of sovereign immunity. See id. at 384-85 (holding that sheriffs are
county officials under the Georgia Constitution, thus entitling sheriffs and their
deputies to assert the county’s defense of sovereign immunity when sued in
their official capacities under state law). This is true notwithstanding the
Court’s determination that Sheriff Smith and the deputy Defendants, in their
official capacities, are “arms of the state” for purposes of Plaintiff’s section
1983 claims. Indeed, the Georgia Court of Appeals has explained that while
sheriffs, under certain circumstances, may be characterized as state actors for
purposes of liability under section 1983, for purposes of liability under state
law, sheriffs are officials of the county. See id. (“[D]epending on the
circumstances, sheriffs may be deemed state agents for the purpose of
determining liability for constitutional violations under § 1983. . . . [However,],
under the plain language of the Georgia Constitution4 . . . sheriffs are county
officials, not state officers or employees.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion
4
The Georgia Constitution expressly provides that sheriffs are “county
officers.” GA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, ¶ 3(a)-(b).
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to Dismiss [5] is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s state law claims against the
deputy Defendants in their official capacities.
2.
Individual Capacity Claims
i.
Section 1983: Excessive Force
Plaintiff alleges that the deputy Defendants violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by using excessive
force against him. (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶¶ 23-35.) Defendants move to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim on grounds that the Fourth Amendment
governs the use of force during an arrest and “has no bearing on the rights of an
individual after his arrest.” (Defs.’ Br., Dkt. [5-1] at 6.) Defendants move to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to allege sufficient
facts to make a plausible showing of liability under Twombly and Iqbal. (Id. at
12-13.) Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim on
grounds of qualified immunity.
As a threshold matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that the Fourth
Amendment is not the appropriate vehicle for Plaintiff’s excessive force claim
given that Plaintiff was a detainee at the Barrow County Detention Facility at
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the time of the alleged use of force.5 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394
(1989) (“In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis
begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the
challenged application of force.”) (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment
prohibition “against unreasonable . . . seizures” of the person governs claims of
excessive force “in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’
of a free citizen . . . .” Id. at 395 (emphasis added). By contrast, “claims
involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,” and “the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause . . . applies to such
claims by convicted prisoners.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th
Cir. 1996). Although Plaintiff does not allege whether he was a pretrial
detainee or convicted prisoner on March 21, 2010, it is clear that he was an
“inmate” of the Barrow County Detention Facility and therefore was no longer
being “seized.” (See, e.g., Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶ 10 (alleging Plaintiff was asleep
5
Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this assertion, as he argues in response to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that the deputy Defendants’ alleged conduct violated
Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Pl.’s Opp’n Br.,
Dkt. [9-1] at 6 of 21.) Plaintiff does not argue in his brief that his excessive force
claim sounds in the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 6-7.)
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in his cell); ¶ 14 (referring to Plaintiff as “inmate Muckle”). Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim.
Perhaps in recognition of the foregoing, Plaintiff makes no reference to
the Fourth Amendment in his brief but argues, instead, that he has stated a claim
for excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See
footnote 5, supra.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot state a claim under
the Eighth Amendment because the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was
a convicted prisoner at the time of the incident at issue. (Defs.’ Reply Br. in
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”), Dkt. [10] at 6-7.) Indeed, the Court
notes that the Complaint itself does not purport to assert a claim under the
Eighth Amendment. (See generally Compl., Dkt. [1].) The governing legal
standard is the same, however, for both Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment excessive force claims. Skelly v. Okaloosa Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
456 F. App’x 845, 848 n4 (11th Cir. 2012). Because the legal standard is the
same, the Court considers Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, whether properly
arising under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.
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Defendants advance two arguments in support of dismissal of Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim: first, that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to
show excessive force under the pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal; and
second, that even if Plaintiff had alleged a facially valid claim, the deputy
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the qualified immunity
analysis requires the Court to determine whether Plaintiff has alleged a
violation of a clearly established constitutional right (see discussion, infra), the
Court collapses Defendants’ arguments and proceeds directly to the issue of
qualified immunity.
a.
Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
performing discretionary functions from being sued in their individual
capacities. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Officials are shielded
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “To receive qualified immunity, a
government official first must prove that he was acting within his discretionary
authority.” Cottone v. Jenne, II, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). Once
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the defendant has satisfied this initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1358. To
discharge this burden, the plaintiff must “establish[ ] both that the defendant
committed a constitutional violation and that the law governing the
circumstances was already clearly established at the time of the violation.”
Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 562 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
The Court may consider these elements in either sequence and decide the case
based on either element that is lacking. Id.
Assuming, without deciding, that the deputy Defendants were acting
within their discretionary authority during the events alleged in the Complaint,
the Court finds they are nonetheless not entitled to qualified immunity at this
stage in the litigation. The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts,
accepted as true, to show that the deputy Defendants violated Plaintiff’s clearly
established constitutional right to be free from excessive force—whether arising
under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.
A government official’s use of force is excessive under the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments only if it “shocks the conscience.” Fennell v. Gilstrap,
559 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009). Use of force does not “shock the
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conscience” “if it is applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.” Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted). If, however, the use of
force is applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, then it does ‘shock
the conscience,’ and is excessive under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.”
Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted).
As stated above, the qualified immunity analysis usually involves two
inquiries: whether the plaintiff has shown that a constitutional or statutory right
has been violated, and whether that right was clearly established at the time of
the violation. “For claims of excessive force in violation of the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments, however, a plaintiff can overcome a defense of
qualified immunity by showing only the first prong, that his Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated.” Id. at 1216-17 (citation
omitted). The Eleventh Circuit created this rule “because, for an excessiveforce violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, the subjective element
required to establish it”—i.e., malicious and sadistic use of force—“is so
extreme that every conceivable set of circumstances in which this constitutional
violation occurs is clearly established to be in violation of the Constitution.” Id.
at 1217 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
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In determining whether force was applied maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm, courts in this Circuit consider the following factors:
(a) the need for the application of force; (b) the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used; (c) the
extent of the injury inflicted upon the prisoner; (d) the extent of the
threat to the safety of staff and inmates; and (e) any efforts made to
temper the severity of a forceful response.
Id. Consideration of these factors compels the Court to conclude that, based on
the facts alleged in the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for purposes
of a motion to dismiss, the force used against Plaintiff was maliciously and
sadistically applied to cause harm. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was
observed under his bed covers at 5:40 a.m., while Defendant Giles conducted a
cell check. After being ordered to uncover and make his bed, the deputy
Defendants returned to Plaintiff’s cell and sprayed Plaintiff with O.C. spray.
Defendant Aguilar then took hold of Plaintiff and slammed him to the floor, at
which point the deputy Defendants began to beat Plaintiff. Plaintiff further
alleges that during this beating, he was securely handcuffed by his wrists behind
his back, screaming for help, and offering no physical resistance. Finally,
Plaintiff alleges he suffered multiple contusions, a black eye, and a busted lip.
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Accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff received a beating at the
hands of four deputies that was entirely unprovoked. Moreover, he sustained
this beating while he was securely restrained in handcuffs and offering no
physical resistance. Based on these facts, the force used against Plaintiff was
not needed to achieve any legitimate end other than to inflict harm on Plaintiff.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that the deputy
Defendants acted maliciously and sadistically and that their use of force shocks
the conscience and violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because
Plaintiff has shown a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the
deputy Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss [5] therefore is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s section 1983 excessive
force claim against the deputy Defendants in their individual capacities.
ii.
State Law Claims
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims on grounds of
official immunity. The state constitutional provision governing official
immunity provides as follows:
[A]ll officers or employees of the state or its departments and
agencies may be subject to suit and may be liable for injuries and
damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent
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failure to perform, their ministerial functions and may be liable for
injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual
intent to cause injury in the performance of their official
functions. . . .
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, ¶ 9(d). The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that the
term “official functions” refers to “any act performed within the officer’s or
employee’s scope of authority, including both ministerial and discretionary
acts.” Gilbert, 452 S.E.2d at 483. Accordingly, under Georgia law, “a public
officer or employee may be personally liable only for ministerial acts
negligently performed or acts [ministerial or discretionary] performed with
malice or an intent to injure.” Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344 (Ga.
2001).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims on grounds that
the conduct alleged in the Complaint was discretionary and, thus, that the
deputy Defendants may be held liable only if they acted with actual malice or
intent to injure. (Defs.’ Br., Dkt. [5-1] at 17-18.) Defendants further argue that
“Plaintiff’s Complaint offers only implausible facts and conclusory allegations”
and “provides nothing to support any inference that Defendants’ actions were
undertaken with actual malice or actual intent to cause harm.” (Id. at 18.)
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The Court disagrees. Assuming, without deciding, that the deputy
Defendants were performing discretionary acts during the incident alleged in
the Complaint such that the standard of liability is malice or intent injure,
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to meet this standard. For the reasons stated
above in connection with the Court’s analysis of qualified immunity (see
discussion at subsection 2.i.a., supra), Plaintiff sufficiently has alleged malice or
intent to injure on the part of the deputy Defendants. The deputy Defendants
therefore are not entitled to official immunity at this stage in the litigation.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5] is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s state law claims
against the deputy Defendants in their individual capacities.
C.
Barrow County
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to hold Barrow County liable for the deputy
Defendants’ alleged use of excessive force, pursuant to section 1983. Plaintiff
alleges as follows, “That given the master/servant relationship between the
Defendants Barrow County Sheriff Department and Barrow County, the acts of
the Defendants may be imputed to the Barrow County Sheriff Department and
Barrow County.” (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶ 49.) Defendants move to dismiss this
claim, arguing that the County may not be held liable under section 1983 on a
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respondeat superior theory; on the contrary, Defendants argue, the County may
be liable only if Plaintiff’s injuries were the result of a County policy or custom.
(Defs.’ Br., Dkt. [5-1] at 7-8 (citing cases).)
As Defendants argue, and as Plaintiff concedes (Pl.’s Opp’n Br., Dkt. [91] at 7 of 21), “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under §
1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Socials Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original). On the contrary, a municipality
can be held liable for the constitutional tort of its employee only if “action
pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional
tort.” Id. See also id. at 690 (“Local governing bodies . . . can be sued directly
under § 1983 . . . where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”). “To establish a
policy or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread
practice. . . . Normally random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to
establish a custom or policy.” Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496,
1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
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The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts to make a plausible showing of liability on the part of Barrow
County under section 1983. In particular, Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show
that Plaintiff’s injuries were the result of any policy, practice, or custom
maintained by Barrow County. Absent such allegations, Barrow County may
not be held liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5]
therefore is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against Barrow
County. As no other claims remain against Barrow County,6 this Defendant is
DISMISSED from the suit.
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5] is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED with respect to
Plaintiff’s claims against the Barrow County Sheriff Department and Barrow
County, which Defendants are DISMISSED from the suit. It is GRANTED
with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Jud Smith in his official
6
As stated in the Preliminary Matters section, Part II, supra, Plaintiff withdrew
his state law claims against Barrow County, leaving only his section 1983 claim.
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capacity and former Sheriff Joel H. Robinson in his individual capacity, which
Defendants are DISMISSED from the suit.
It is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s section 1983 excessive force
and state law claims against the deputy Defendants in their official capacities.
It is also GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s section 1983 excessive force
claim against the deputy Defendants in their individual capacities, to the extent
the claim arises under the Fourth Amendment. It is DENIED, however, with
respect to Plaintiff’s section 1983 excessive force claim, arising under the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, and state law claims against the deputy
Defendants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, the only claims that
remain in the suit are Plaintiff’s Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment section 1983
excessive force claims and state law claims against Defendants Bray, Aguilar,
Giles, and Zellars in their individual capacities.
SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of January, 2012.
________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
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