Johnson et al v. Pickens County, Georgia
Filing
16
ORDER granting Defendant Pickens County Georgia's Second 9 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' state-law claims are DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 09/12/14. (sk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
JAMES JOHNSON and
VIKKI FORD,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
PICKENS COUNTY, GEORGIA,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:13-CV-00283-RWS
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendant Pickens County,
Georgia’s Second 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss [9]. After reviewing the record,
the Court enters the following Order.
Background
This case arises out of Plaintiffs’ termination following their comments
made to the Pickens Progress newspaper regarding county funding for legal
defense for indigent persons. From January 2009 until their termination in
August 2013, Plaintiffs James Johnson and Vikki Ford worked for Pickens
County (the “County”) as attorneys providing legal defense for indigent persons
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in proceedings before the Pickens County Juvenile Court. (Am. Compl., Dkt.
[7] at 2-4.)
On or about January 7, 2009, Plaintiffs entered into written contracts with
the County to provide legal representation to indigent parents and children in
proceedings before the Pickens County Juvenile Court. (Id. at 4.) The
contracts provided that Johnson would be paid $45,000 per year; Ford would be
paid $40,000. (Id.) Both contracts provided that waiver or modification of the
contracts’ terms must be made in writing and signed. (Id. at 4-5.) In 2009 and
2010, the County paid the Plaintiffs the amounts set forth in the contracts. (Id.
at 5.) In 2011, the County paid Plaintiffs $30,000 each; in 2012, the County
paid Plaintiffs $20,000 each; and in 2013, the County paid Plaintiffs a pro-rated
monthly amount that would have been equal to $20,000 annually until
Plaintiffs’ contracts were terminated on or about August 23, 2013. (Id. at 5.)
The events preceding Plaintiffs’ termination took place between October
2012 and August 2013. (Id. at 2-4.) In mid-October 2012, Plaintiffs and
another attorney, Karen Voyles, (collectively, the “Attorneys”) were
interviewed for an article in the Pickens Progress local newspaper regarding the
effects of budget cuts on county services. (Id. at 5; see also Ex. A to Defs.’
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First Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. [6-1].) In the article, the Attorneys are reported as
saying that “cuts to their funding have been so severe they are no longer able to
adequately defend clients that are facing having their children taken from
them.” ([6-1] at 1.) The article reports the drop in the Attorneys’ pay from
$40,000 to $20,000. (Id. at 2.) The article also discusses the Attorneys’
objections to being required to ask a judge for extra funding for special
expenses, such as mental health evaluations or translation services. (Id.)
Additionally, the article reports that the Attorneys “considered a mass
resignation to protest the cuts, but didn’t out of concern for what would happen
to the clients.” (Id.) The article further states that the Attorneys “expressed
concern that they may not be given another contract because they have spoken
out here publicly, but all three expressed sentiments that something has to
change.” (Id.) The Pickens Progress interviewed Judge John Worcester,
Pickens County Juvenile Court judge, by email for the same article. (See id.)
On or about October 25, 2012, Plaintiffs received a letter from Judge
Worcester notifying Plaintiffs that their contracts would be terminated as of
December 31, 2012. (Am. Compl., Dkt. [7] at 7; Ex. 1 to Am. Compl., Dkt. [71].) The letter was also sent to Ms. Voyles and Jennifer Galligan. (Id.) On or
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about October 29, 2012, Plaintiff Johnson wrote to the Pickens County
Commissioner, Robert Jones, on behalf of himself, Plaintiff Ford, and Ms.
Voyles, informing Commissioner Jones of Judge Worcester’s letter and seeking
clarification of whether the Commissioner, as a party to the contract, in fact
intended to terminate the contracts. (Am. Compl., Dkt. [7] at 7; Ex. 2 to Am.
Compl., Dkt. [7-2].) Also on October 29, 2012, Judge Worcester sent a letter
inviting a group of Pickens County indigent defense attorneys to notify him
whether they wanted to be considered for contracts for 2013. (Am. Compl.,
Dkt. [7] at 8; Ex. 3 to Am. Compl., Dkt. [7-3].) That letter was not sent to
Plaintiffs, but was sent to Ms. Voyles and Ms. Galligan. (Id.)
On October 31, 2012, Commissioner Jones responded to Plaintiffs’ letter,
confirming that Judge Worcester’s letter had terminated the contracts. (Am.
Compl., Dkt. [7] at 8; Ex. 4 to Am. Compl., Dkt. [7-4].) Despite the purported
termination of Plaintiffs’ contracts, the County later deemed the termination
“ineffective” (Am. Compl., Dkt. [7] ¶ 29), and Plaintiffs continued to perform
services under the contracts until “the County provided contractually proper
notice to Plaintiffs” on June 21, 2013. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs stopped performing
and the County stopped paying under the contracts in August 2013. (Id.) After
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the contracts were terminated, Plaintiff Johnson “inquired into” a newly-created
position with the Pickens County public defender. (Id. at 2, ¶ 34.) Plaintiff
Johnson alleges that he was never considered or interviewed for the position.
(Id. at ¶ 42.) The County hired another lawyer who is not a party to this case.
(Id.)
Plaintiffs filed suit against the County on December 24, 2013. (Compl.,
Dkt. [1].) Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim on January 21, 2014. (Dkt. [6].) Plaintiffs amended their complaint on
February 6, 2014. (Am. Compl., Dkt. [7].) Plaintiffs raise claims related to
First Amendment retaliation (Count I) as well as breach of contract claims
(Count II). (Id. at 10-13.) Defendants filed the instant Second 12(b)(6) Motion
to Dismiss and Brief in Support [9] (“Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss”) on February 24,
2014.
Discussion
I.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” While this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual
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allegations,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In order to
withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is plausible on its face
when the plaintiff pleads factual content necessary for the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Id.
At the motion to dismiss stage, “all-well pleaded facts are accepted as
true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273
n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). However, the same does not apply to legal conclusions set
forth in the complaint. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260
(11th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, the court does not “accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
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“The district court generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment if it considers materials outside the complaint.”
D.L. Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d). However, documents attached to a complaint are considered part
of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Documents “need not be physically
attached to a pleading to be incorporated by reference into it; if the document’s
contents are alleged in a complaint and no party questions those contents, [the
court] may consider such a document,” provided it is central to the plaintiff’s
claim. D.L. Day, 400 F.3d at 1276. At the motion to dismiss phase, the Court
may also consider “a document attached to a motion to dismiss . . . if the
attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed.” Id.
(citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002)). “‘Undisputed’
means that the authenticity of the document is not challenged.” Id.
In this case, as stated in the Background section, supra, Plaintiffs bring
claims against Defendant Pickens County under federal law arising out of
Plaintiffs’ termination and under state law for breach of contract. Using the
framework articulated above, the Court considers Defendant’s Motion to
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Dismiss, first as to Plaintiffs’ federal law claims and then as to their
supplemental claims arising under Georgia state law.
II.
Analysis
A.
First Amendment Retaliation Claims
In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs raise claims against the
County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for terminating Plaintiffs’ employment
contracts in violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs claim
that the constitutional violation occurred when “the County terminated
Plaintiffs’ contracts in retaliation for their speaking to the local newspaper
regarding the dilatory effects of the County’s budget cuts on public defender
services, a matter of public concern.” (Am. Compl., Dkt. [7] ¶ 11.) The Court
reads Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint to allege three possible retaliatory acts:
(1) Judge Worcester’s October 25, 2012 letter purporting to terminate Plaintiffs’
contracts and Commissioner Jones’s October 31, 2012 letter confirming
termination; (2) the notice received by Plaintiffs on June 25, 2013 of the
contracts’ termination and the subsequent termination on August 21, 2013; (3)
the failure to consider or interview Plaintiff Johnson for the newly-created
position with the Pickens County public defender.
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Defendant moves to dismiss these claims on grounds that it cannot be
held municipally liable for the allegedly retaliatory acts. (Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, Dkt. [9] at 24-25). To state a claim for retaliation in violation of the
First Amendment, Plaintiffs, as government contractors, must show that their
speech was constitutionally protected and that the speech was a substantial or
motivating factor in Defendant’s decision to terminate their contracts. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996). Whether Plaintiffs can
make a showing of a First Amendment retaliation claim is governed by the
four-part Pickering1 analysis. Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Shahar v. Bowers,
114 F.3d 1097, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiffs have named Pickens
County as the sole Defendant in this case. The Court thus first considers the
standard for county liability under Section 1983 and whether Defendant may be
1
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Under the Pickering analysis,
the Court must find that (1) Plaintiffs’ speech involved a matter of public concern; (2)
Plaintiffs’ interest in speaking outweighed the government’s legitimate interest in
efficient public service; and (3) the speech played a substantial part in the
government’s challenged employment decision. Cook v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
414 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Bryson v. Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562,
1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989)). If the employee can make the above showing, the burden
shifts to the government to show that (4) it would have made the same employment
decision even in the absence of the protected speech. Id. The first two prongs of this
test are questions of law while the latter two are questions of fact. Id.
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held liable for the alleged retaliatory acts challenged in this case, analyzing each
act in turn.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
“In order to prevail in a civil rights action under Section 1983, ‘a plaintiff must
make a prima facie showing of two elements: (1) that the act or omission
deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, and (2) that the act or omission was done by a
person acting under color of law.’” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall
Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bannum, Inc.
v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 901 F.2d 989, 996-97 (11th Cir. 1990)). Local
government units such as counties constitute “persons” subject to suit under
Section 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). At
the same time, however, the Supreme Court “has placed strict limitations on
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municipal liability under [Section] 1983.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335
F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003).
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that “a municipality cannot be held
liable under [Section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 436 U.S. at 691.
On the contrary, the Court held that local governing bodies, such as counties,
can be sued under Section 1983 only where “the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s
officers.” Id. at 690. In other words, to hold a county liable under Section
1983, a plaintiff must show that a county employee or policymaker committed
the constitutional violation, and did so pursuant to an official county policy or
custom. Id. at 694; Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329. This requirement of a policy or
custom “is intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is
limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Grech,
335 F.3d at 1329 n.5 (emphasis in original) (citing cases).
In accordance with the foregoing, Pickens County can be held liable
under Section 1983 for the alleged retaliatory acts only if the actors, first, acted
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on behalf of the county, and second, acted pursuant to an official policy or
custom of the county. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege
the existence of an official government policy or custom that would render
Pickens County liable under Section 1983. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue
that they “have clearly pled that they were terminated by official act of the
County as retaliation for their protected speech.” (Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’
Second Mot. to Dismiss (“Pls.’ Opp’n Br.”), Dkt. [12] at 22 (citing Am.
Compl., Dkt. [7] ¶¶ 24-29, 32-37, 40-44).) Put differently, it is Plaintiffs’
position that the decisions to terminate Plaintiffs’ contracts and to not consider
Johnson for the public defender position were made in retaliation for Plaintiffs’
comments to the newspaper, and that these decisions were made by County
officials with final policy-making authority. The Court thus considers each
alleged retaliatory act in turn.
1.
Judge Worcester’s Letter of October 25, 2012 and
Commissioner Jones’s Letter of October 31, 2012
If, as Defendant contends, Judge Worcester had no policymaking
authority on behalf of Pickens County, there would be no basis under Section
1983 on which to hold the County liable for his conduct. In this event,
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Plaintiffs’ federal law claims arising from the October 2012 “ineffective”
termination letters would have to be dismissed. Plaintiffs have not identified an
official written policy of the County that would provide the basis for this cause
of action. Cf. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Rather, Plaintiffs point to Judge
Worcester’s letter purporting to terminate Plaintiffs’ contracts and, in addition
and in the alternative, Commissioner Jones’s letter confirming termination as
evidence of municipal policy.
Under appropriate circumstances, a single decision by an official
policymaker can establish the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986); accord Scala v. City
of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997); Martinez v. City of
Opa-Locka, Fla., 971 F.2d 708, 713 (11th Cir. 1992). As the Supreme Court
has explained: “where action is directed by those who establish governmental
policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken
only once or to be taken repeatedly.” Scala, 116 F.3d at 1399 (quoting Pembaur
475 U.S. at 481).
But “only those municipal officers who have final policymaking
authority may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability.”
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Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting City
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation omitted)). “Municipal liability may arise with regards to an
employment decision, . . . provided that the decisionmaker ‘possesses final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.’ ”
Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481).
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a municipality may be
held liable under § 1983 under a ratification theory. “County liability on the
basis of ratification exists when a subordinate public official makes an
unconstitutional decision and when that decision is then adopted by someone
who does have final policymaking authority.” Matthews v. Columbia Cty., 294
F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002). As the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly made
clear, however,
[t]he final policymaker . . . must ratify not only the
decision itself, but also the unconstitutional basis for it.
Gattis v. Brice, 136 F.3d 724, 727 (11th Cir.1998) (“A
policymaker’s approval of an unconstitutional action
can constitute unconstitutional county policy only when
the policymaker ‘approve[s] a subordinate’s decision
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and the basis for it.’ ”) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 926).
Id. at 1297-98; see also Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2006) (“[I]n order for a municipality to be liable under a ratification theory,
the final policymaker must ratify not only the decision of its member with an
unconstitutional motive, but also the unconstitutional basis itself.”).
To show an official municipal policy, Plaintiffs allege that the County
delegated to Judge Worcester “final policy-making authority with regard to
terminating these contracts.” (Pls.’ Opp’n Br., Dkt. [12] at 23.) Plaintiffs point
to Judge Worcester’s October 25, 2012 letter terminating their contracts as well
as Commissioner Jones’s October 31, 2012 letter confirming that termination as
evidence that “Judge Worcester exercised a degree of control over the Juvenile
Court’s indigent defense program, and that Commissioner Jones clearly
deferred to, endorsed, and/or agreed with Judge Worcester’s decision with
regard to the contract termination.” (Am. Compl., Dkt. [7] ¶¶ 25-29.)
In response to Plaintiffs’ argument, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs ask
the Court to make a “leap to the legal conclusion as to who it is that had final
policy-making authority,” contrary to the pleading standards set forth in
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Twombly and Iqbal. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. [9] at 24). But the standard
under which the Court must consider a motion to dismiss requires the Court to
construe all reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1273 n.1) (emphasis added).
Here, Defendant suggests that Judge Worcester’s October 25, 2012 letter
and Commissioner Jones’s October 29, 2012 letter are insufficient to show that
“Commissioner Jones somehow formally deferred all matters pertaining to
hiring, firing, contracting, and funding on to the Juvenile Court Judge.” (Def.’s
Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. [9] at 24.) Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, and
construing all inferences in their favor, at this stage the Court finds the
foregoing allegations sufficient to establish a decision of a County policymaker
that is actionable under § 1983. Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to establish
that, in October 2012, Pickens County either invested Judge Worcester with
final policy-making authority as to contract termination, or that Commissioner
Jones subsequently ratified Judge Worcester’s decision. Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss cannot be granted on the grounds that Judge
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Worcester’s October 25, 2012 letter purporting to terminate Plaintiffs’ contracts
was not an act of the municipality.
The Court must next consider whether the alleged retaliatory act in
October 2012 resulted in a constitutional deprivation such that the County
should be liable under Section 1983. The Court finds that it did not.
Although the parties have not directly raised the issue, there is a substantial
question as to Plaintiffs’ standing to bring claims based on the “ineffective”
termination letter in October 2012. Article III of the Constitution confines the
reach of federal jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2. This limitation “defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of
separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded.” Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 559-60 (1990) (describing how standing interfaces with separation of
powers and breadth of judicial power). These values are reflected in the three
required elements for constitutional standing: (1) “an ‘injury in fact’–a harm
suffered by the plaintiff that is ‘concrete’ and ‘actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical;’ ” (b) “causation–a fairly traceable connection
between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant;”
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and (3) “redressability–a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the
alleged injury.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04,
(1998); see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 771 (2000); 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2003).
“[W]hen a question about standing is raised at the motion to dismiss
stage, ‘it may be sufficient to provide general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant's conduct.’ ” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet,
405 F.3d 964, 975 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fl. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v.
EPA, 386 F.3d 1070, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations omitted). The
Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead any allegations of injury resulting
from Defendant’s conduct in October 2012. Plaintiffs continued working and
continued being paid under the contract for over nine months following their
receipt of the October 2012 letters. The contracts were terminated only after
Plaintiffs received “contractually proper” notice in June 2013; as such,
Plaintiffs have alleged no injury suffered as a result of the October 2012
“ineffective” termination. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims
arise from the letters from Judge Worcester on October 25, 2012 and
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Commissioner Jones on October 31, 2012, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
2.
The Termination Notice of June 21, 2013
Next, the Court turns to the termination notice given to Plaintiffs in June
2013. Plaintiffs state that Defendant “provided contractually proper notice to
Plaintiffs of its intention to terminate the contract” on June 21, 2013. (Am.
Compl., Dkt. [7] ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs further argue that “[i]t is also plausible that
one particular county commissioner had the policy-making authority to make
the terminations, or that a majority of the commissioners voted to terminate
Plaintiffs’ contracts, in reliance on the retaliatory motive of the final
policymaker.” (Pls.’ Opp’n Br., Dkt. [12] at 23.) Plaintiffs claim that the
“timing of events” surrounding the Plaintiffs’ termination and the continued
employment of “the only Public Defender who did not speak out in the paper”
provide evidence of the County Commission’s retaliatory animus. (Am.
Compl., Dkt. [7] ¶¶ 40-44.) Defendants move to dismiss on grounds that “the
governing body of Pickens County had changed between the time of the speech,
and the purported 2013 retaliation.” (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. [9] at 11.)
Defendant argues that a body “that did not even exist” at the time of the speech
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cannot be held liable for retaliation “some [nine and a half] months after the
fact.” (Id.)
The Court finds Defendant’s argument that the change in county
governance from a single County Commissioner to a three-member County
Commission forecloses municipal liability unavailing.2 However, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a municipal policy or act of a municipal
policymaker that would impose liability on Defendant. As explained above,
local governing bodies, such as counties, can be sued under Section 1983 only
where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Plaintiffs do
not identify a County policy statement, ordinance, or regulation that violates
their constitutional rights. Cf. Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th
2
Section 1-11 of the Pickens County Code of Ordinances states that
“[t]he board of commissioners shall have the power and authority to fix and
establish, by appropriate resolution entered on its minutes, policies, rules, and
regulations governing all matters reserved to its exclusive jurisdiction.”
PICKENS CNTY., GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1-11 (2013). Further, the County
Code provides that the board of commissioners has the power to “exercise all of
the power and authority formerly vested by law in the commissioner of Pickens
County.” (Id.)
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Cir. 2005) (challenging a Florida statutory provision on First Amendment
grounds). Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the constitutional violation occurred as a
result of a decision by County policymakers. In the Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege that “the County provided contractually proper notice to
Plaintiffs of its intention to terminate the contract.” (Dkt. [7] ¶ 31.)
But Plaintiffs do not plead sufficient facts surrounding the alleged
retaliatory decision. In particular, Plaintiffs do not specify what entity provided
notice to Plaintiffs, or what form that notice took. (See id.) Plaintiffs do not
allege which, if any, policymakers with final authority with respect to hiring
were responsible for terminating them. Plaintiffs simply assert that “the acts of
a majority of its decision-making officials–the members of the County
Commission–were motivated by retaliatory animus,” (id. at ¶ 44), and that it is
“plausible that one particular county commissioner had the policy-making
authority to make the terminations, or that a majority of the commissioners
voted to terminate Plaintiffs’ contracts, in reliance on the retaliatory motive of
the final policy-maker.” (Pls.’ Opp’n Br., Dkt. [12] at 23.) Factual allegations
in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted). “The pleading
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must contain something more than a statement of facts that merely creates a
suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (internal citation and
modifications omitted). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations
relating to County liability do not contain sufficient facts to rise above a
speculative level.
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient factual
allegations to satisfy the pleading standards articulated in Twombly and Iqbal,
to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the June 21, 2013 notice of
termination of the contracts, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
3.
Failure to Consider Johnson for the Public Defender
Position
Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff Johnson’s individual allegation.
Plaintiffs identify Defendant’s failure to consider or interview Plaintiff Johnson
for the “newly-created Juvenile Court public defender position for Pickens
County” as a third retaliatory act. (Am. Compl., Dkt. [7] ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs
claim that the “startling disparity in qualifications” between Plaintiff Johnson
and the attorney hired for the public defender position provides evidence of the
County’s retaliatory animus. (Id.) Defendant moves to dismiss on grounds that
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“Plaintiff [Johnson] does not allege who it is that was responsible for hiring, or
whether that person had final policymaking authority so as to make the County
ultimately responsible for anything infirm in the hiring process.” (Def.’s Mot.
to Dismiss, Dkt. [9] at 12.) The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs
have failed to plead sufficient factual content for the Court to draw a reasonable
inference that the County is liable for the retaliatory conduct alleged. While
Plaintiffs offer the timing of events, the perceived disparity in Johnson’s and the
hired lawyer’s qualifications, and the continued employment of Ms. Galligan as
evidence of retaliatory motive (id. at ¶¶ 40-44), Plaintiffs fail to identify whose
retaliatory motive that evidences, or how that motive should be imputed to the
County. Nor do Plaintiffs identify when Plaintiff Johnson applied for the
position, or when he received notice that he would not be considered.
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the failure to
consider or interview Plaintiff Johnson for the public defender position,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
In accordance with the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims brought
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I). The Court now considers Plaintiffs’
breach of contract claims.
B.
State Law Breach of Contract Claims (Count II)
Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ sole federal claim, and because Plaintiffs do
not allege diversity jurisdiction, the Court no longer has original jurisdiction
over this action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims related to any claims over which
the court has original jurisdiction. But § 1367 is clear in providing that the
district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that “when the
federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only
state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of
jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). And
the Eleventh Circuit has held that federal courts are “strongly encourage[d] or
even require[d]” to dismiss state-law claims “if the federal claims are dismissed
prior to trial.” Ingram v. Sch. Bd. Of Miami-Dade Cnty., 167 F. App’x 107,
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108-09 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119
(11th Cir. 1999)).
This case is still in its early stages. Indeed, no discovery has yet taken
place. Therefore, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims in this case. As such, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are
DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Pickens County Georgia’s Second
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss [9] is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are
DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of September, 2014.
_______________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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