Porter v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

Filing 5

ORDER: Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief in his Complaint (Dkt. 1 at 35) is DENIED. Pursuant to Standing Order No. 14-01, the action is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Fuller to hear and determine any pretrial matters pending before the Court and to conduct hearings and submit reports andrecommendations to the full extent allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 07/22/15. (sk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
THOMAS PORTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING,
LLC,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:15-CV-00154-RWS-JCF

ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s request for injunctive
relief found in his Complaint [1]. After considering the record, the Court
enters the following Order.
Before a court will grant preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party
must establish that: (1) “it has substantial likelihood of success on the merits,”
(2) it will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is not granted, (3) the threatened
injury outweighs the harm the relief may inflict on the non-moving party, and
(4) entry of relief “would not be adverse to the public interest.” KH Outdoor,
LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006). “Of these
four requisites, the first factor, establishing a substantial likelihood of success

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on the merits, is most important . . . .” ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F.
Supp. 2d 1272, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is appearing pro se. Thus, their
complaint is more leniently construed and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, nothing in
that lenience excuses a plaintiff from compliance with the stringent
requirements to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
Having reviewed the Complaint [1] and the allegations therein, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of success of any of his claims. Specifically, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that
Defendant is a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1692, such that judicial foreclosure is required under 15 U.S.C. §
1692i and that validation is required under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. See, e.g.,
Fenello v. Bank of Am., N.A., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2013)
(holding mortgage servicer was not a “debt collector” for the purpose of
Section 1692g), recons. denied, No. 1:11-CV-4139-WSD, 2013 WL 5965635
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(N.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 2013), aff'd sub nom. Fenello v. Bank of Am., NA, 577 F.
App’x 899 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive
relief in his Complaint (Dkt. [1] at 35) is DENIED.
Pursuant to Standing Order No. 14-01, the action is hereby REFERRED
to Magistrate Judge Fuller to hear and determine any pretrial matters pending
before the Court and to conduct hearings and submit reports and
recommendations to the full extent allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and
(B).
SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of July, 2015.

________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge

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