Interface, Inc. et al v. Tandus Flooring, Inc. et al

Filing 60

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING Plaintiffs' 56 Motion for Reconsideration re: 55 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr., on 1/22/14. (jta)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ROME DIVISION
INTERFACE, INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

4:13-cv-46-WSD

TANDUS FLOORING, INC. and
TANDUS FLOORING US, LLC,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of
the Court’s Order denying their Motion for Preliminary Injunction [56].
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Facts

Plaintiffs Interface, Inc., Interface Americas, Inc., InterfaceFlor LLC, and
Flor, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) manufacture and sell carpet, and carpet
installation services. Defendants Tandus Flooring Inc. and Tandus Flooring US,
LLC (“Defendants”) compete with Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs invented a method for the glueless installation of carpet tiles,
which they market as TacTiles. On February 26, 2013, the Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) issued, to Plaintiffs, Patent No. 8,381,473 (the “Interface Patent”)

in connection with their glueless installation invention. The Interface Patent
contains numerous independent and dependent claims, including independent
claim 20:
An installation of modular carpet tiles connected together with
connectors, each connector comprising:
a. a sheet having two sides; and
b. a layer of adhesive located on one side of the sheet, wherein
the layer of adhesive is capable of forming a bond between
the sheet and the undersides of the tiles and comprises a
sufficient shear strength so that, when a connector spans
adjacent edges of adjacent tiles so that the layer of adhesive
contacts the undersides of the adjacent tiles, the connector
prevents adjacent tiles from moving relative to the connector
or each other and thereby creating gaps between the adjacent
tiles after installation; and
wherein the sheet comprises material sufficiently stiff for a connector
positioned partly in contact with an underside of a tile to project
beyond the edge of the tile in roughly the same plane as the
underside of the tile.
(Interface Patent, Compl. Ex. A [1-1] at 21.)
Defendants manufacture and sell a glueless carpet tile installation product
marketed as “TandusTape.” Plaintiffs’ TacTiles and Defendants’ TandusTape
compete for the same customers.
B.

Procedural History

On February 26, 2013, Plaintiffs filed this patent infringement action against
Defendants. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, by manufacturing and
selling its TandusTape product, Defendants directly infringe the Interface Patent
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and are liable for inducement of infringement and contributory infringement of the
Interface Patent. On March 19, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Preliminary
Injunction seeking an order enjoining Defendants from manufacturing and selling
TandusTape. On November 4, 2013, the Court denied the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction because Plaintiffs did not offer any evidence to show that
TandusTape infringed the Interface Patent. Plaintiffs argued, in their Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, only that “[t]he plain language of the Patent claims” shows
that Defendants’ TandusTape products “include each and every element of at least
one claim” of the Interface Patent. To support this argument, the Plaintiffs referred
to a single document, titled “Exemplary Claim Chart – ‘Tandus Tape’ Connectors”
(the “Claim Chart”). The Court found that the Claim Chart was not evidence
because the Claim Chart was not accompanied by, or incorporated into, any
affidavits or other evidence to establish the Claim Chart’s accuracy or truthfulness.
As a result, the Court denied the Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
On November 22, 2013, the Plaintiffs moved the Court to reconsider its
decision to deny their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. The Plaintiffs argue
that the Court made a “clear error of fact” by “misconstrue[ing]” the purpose of the
Claim Chart because the Claim Chart was “submitted as an “ai[d] to the Court, to
outline the elements of an exemplary claim and to describe where in the record the

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supporting evidence of infringement was located for each element of that claim.”
Plfs.’ Mot. for Recons. at 2. The Plaintiffs claim that “the evidence on which
[they] relied—including sworn declarations, sworn deposition testimony, and
Tandus documentary evidence—[were] submitted as exhibits to both [their] PI
Brief and Reply, and also cited in the charts.” Id.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard

A district court has discretion to revise or reconsider interlocutory orders at
any time before final judgment has been entered. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see
also Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000);
McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1222 (M.D. Ga. 1997). The
Court does not reconsider its orders as a matter of routine practice. See LR 7.2 E,
ND. Ga. A motion for reconsideration is appropriate only where there is:
(1) newly discovered evidence; (2) an intervening development or change in
controlling law; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or fact. See Jersawitz
v. People TV, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Pres. Endangered Areas
of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 916 F. Supp. 1557, 1560
(N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996). A motion for
reconsideration should not be used to present the Court with arguments already

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heard and dismissed, or to offer new legal theories or evidence that could have
been presented in the previously-filed motion. Bryan v. Murphy, 246 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1259 (N.D. Ga. 2003); see also Pres. Endangered Areas, 916 F. Supp. at
1560 (“A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for the moving party and
their counsel to instruct the court on how the court ‘could have done it better’ the
first time.”).
B.

Analysis

To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs had the burden to show that
they are “likely to succeed on the merits” of their infringement claims. See Titan
Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008)). This required the Plaintiffs to submit evidence enabling the Court to
engage in a two-step analysis: “First, the court determines the scope and meaning
of the patent claims asserted . . . . [Secondly,] the properly construed claims are
compared to the allegedly infringing device” to determine “that every claim
limitation or its equivalent be found in the accused device.” Oakley, Inc. v.
Sunglass Hut Int’l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (omission and alteration
in original) (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,

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520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)). In the Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court found that
Plaintiffs did not meet this burden because Plaintiffs, citing only the attorneyauthored Claim Chart, failed to present any evidence that Defendants’ products
infringe the Interface Patent.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs assert that the Court failed to
consider certain evidence. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the following
declarations and depositions establish that Defendants infringed the Interface
Patent:
Evidence Supporting Likelihood of
Success on the Merits of Proving
Infringement:
Tandus Marketing Document
and User Guide
Declaration of Stuart Jones
Declaration of Timothy B. Jensen,
Ph.D., PE
Deposition Testimony of
Timothy B. Jensen
Deposition Testimony of
Paul Daniel Evans, Jr.
Deposition Testimony of
Russell Martin Joyce
Deposition Testimony of
James Brian Sandy
Vimeo Video: “Introducing
TandusTape and TandusTape+
by Tandus Flooring”

Prior Submission to Court:
PI Brief, Ex. C
(Dkt. No. 8–16, at 8-9)
PI Brief, Ex. A, Tab 2
(Dkt. No. 8–5)
Tandus Opposition, Ex. B
(Dkt. No. 26–2)
Reply, Lee Decl., Ex. 1
(Dkt. No. 34-5)
Reply, Lee Decl., Ex. 2
(Dkt. No. 34-6)
Reply, Lee Decl., Ex. 3
(Dkt. No. 34-7)
Reply, Lee Decl., Ex. 7
(Dkt. No. 34-11)
Cited in Claim Charts
(See, e.g., Dkt. No. 8-15)

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In their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, however, Plaintiffs did not cite any of
these declarations or depositions. As discussed in the Preliminary Injunction
Order, Plaintiffs cited only the Claim Chart, which Plaintiffs do not now claim
constitutes evidence of infringement.1 The Plaintiffs further concede in their
Motion for Reconsideration that the Claim Chart was provided “to assist the Court
in sifting through th[e] evidence . . . showing where the evidence in the record
matched each elements [sic] of one of the asserted claims.” (emphasis added).
Plfs.’ Mot. for Recons. at 2.
The Court is not required to scour through the record for the evidence upon
which the Plaintiffs relied in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See
Magnum Towing & Recovery v. City of Toledo, 287 F. App'x 442, 449 (6th Cir.
2008) (holding that “it is not the district court's ... duty to search through the record
to develop a party's claims; the litigant must direct the court to evidence in support
1

In their preliminary injunction brief, Plaintiffs’ entire argument as to how
Defendants’ product infringes consisted of a single sentence, with one citation to
the Claim Chart:
The plain language of the Patent claims makes clear that installations
created with Tandus’ TandusTape connectors include each and every
element of at least one claim of Interface’s Patent, as illustrated by the
attached claim chart. See Ex. B, Infringement Claim Chart.
(Pls.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. [8-2] at 13.)

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of its arguments before the court.”). The Plaintiffs’ failure to properly analyze
their infringement claim and cite evidence with specificity left this Court groping
“‘unaided for factual needles in a documentary haystack.’” Grant v. El
Conquistador Partnership L.P., No. 06–1849(SEC), 2009 WL 1140261, at *2 (D.
Puerto Rico Apr. 27, 2009) (quoting Sanchez–Figueroa v. Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico, 527 F.3d 209, 213 (1st Cir.2008)).
The Plaintiffs seek to “‘unfairly shift the burdens of litigation to the court.’”
Id. The mere submission of exhibits without specifically tying those exhibits to the
infringement claims raised in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction does not
entitle the Plaintiffs to relief. The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
failed to cite evidence with specificity, and the Court was not required to wade
through Plaintiffs’ exhibits, including the Claim Chart, and craft Plaintiffs’
arguments for them. See Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Util., Inc., 463 F.3d 1201,
1208 n. 11 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Neither the district court nor this court has an
obligation to parse a summary judgment record to search out facts or evidence not
brought to the court's attention.”); see also Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc.,
388 F.3d 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004) (requiring parallel citations to the record in
appellate briefs and noting that “Corley has failed miserably and we will not root
through the hundreds of documents and thousands of pages that make up the record

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here to make his case for him.”); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237
F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “requiring the district court to search
the entire record, even though the adverse party's response does not set out the
specific facts or disclose where in the record the evidence for them can be found, is
unfair” to the movant, to the court, and to other litigants whose cases the court
could be addressing); Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that “where the burden to present such specific facts by reference to
exhibits and the existing record was not adequately met below, we will not reverse
a district court for failing to uncover them itself.... If the rule were otherwise, the
workload of the district courts would be insurmountable and summary judgment
would rarely be granted.”); Herman v. Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir.1989)
(“A district court need not scour the record to make the case of a party who does
nothing.”).
The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is based on Plaintiffs’ revisionist
history to support their current contention that the Court made a “clear error of
fact.” Plaintiffs failed to properly provide evidence to support their request for
injunctive relief. The error committed here is the Plaintiffs’ decision to not
properly analyze their infringement claim and properly cite evidence with

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specificity to support their Motion for Preliminary Injunction.2 It is inappropriate
for Plaintiffs to now use a Motion for Reconsideration to “advance [the same]
arguments or [present] evidence that could have previously been offered but was
not.” Panduit Corp. v. Band-It-Idex, Inc., 00 C 1461, 2000 WL 96881, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. July 11, 2000) (quoting Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.
1996)). “Thus, under well-settled law, [the Plaintiffs’] “newly presented (but not
newly discovered) evidence and authority may be disregarded.” Id.
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration

[56] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 2014.

2

For example, even if the Court were to consider the Claims Chart, the Court will
need to make the Plaintiffs’ case for them because the Claims chart consists of
nothing more than conclusory statements alleging infringement that are attached to
images and a link to a video uploaded on https://vimeo.com. In other words, the
Plaintiffs expect the Court to advocate their legal positions on their behalf, which
the Court refuses to do.

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