Ledford v. Sellers
Filing
40
OPINION AND ORDER denying 36 Petitioner's Motion to Hold This Matter In Abeyance. This Court will reconsider the issue if the Supreme Court grants certiorari. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 1/3/18. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ROME DIVISION
MICHAEL WILLIAM LEDFORD,
Petitioner,
v.
4:17-cv-211-WSD
ERIC SELLERS, Warden, Georgia
Diagnostic Prison,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Petitioner’s motion to
hold this matter in abeyance while he petitions the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari to review the Georgia Supreme Court’s denial of his certificate of
probable cause to appeal the denial of his state habeas corpus petition before the
Butts County Superior Court. [Doc. 36].
The petition for certiorari concerns the issue of whether Petitioner’s trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by presenting the testimony of two
psychological experts during the penalty phase of Petitioner’s trial. [See
attachment to Doc. 36]. Those experts testified that Petitioner suffered from
antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, and Petitioner contends that such
evidence is aggravating and not mitigating and that trial counsel’s choice to
introduce the evidence was unreasonable and prejudicial.
Respondent opposes the motion, and the parties’ argument centers on
whether a stay of these proceedings will promote judicial efficiency and preserve
judicial resources by preventing the issues in this case from being addressed by
two courts at the same time. Petitioner has cited to a few cases in which stays have
been granted in similar circumstances, while Respondent points out that, in some
of those cases, the Supreme Court had already granted certiorari when the stay was
granted. Petitioner also analogizes to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005),
where the Supreme Court held that district courts have discretion to stay a habeas
corpus action in order to allow petitioners to return to state court to exhaust
remedies. The Court noted, however, that “stay and abeyance should be available
only in limited circumstances. Because granting a stay effectively excuses a
petitioner’s failure to present his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance
is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the
petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims.” Id. at 270.
This Court is, of course, concerned with the cause of judicial efficiency, but
that concern cuts both ways. Avoiding the possibility that two courts might
2
consider the same issues must compete with this Court’s review of a petition in a
timely manner. When the chances of success of the petition for certiorari are slim,
denying the stay is probably the more efficient choice.
It appears statistically unlikely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari.
Statistical evidence shows that in any given year, the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari from one percent to five percent of the petitions filed.1 This Court also
notes, in considering if a stay is appropriate, the following discussion in Morton v.
Sec., Florida Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2012), in which the
Eleventh Circuit considered a claim identical to the one raised by Petitioner in his
petition for certiorari:
Morton argues that [trial counsel] rendered deficient performance
when they called Dr. DelBeato to testify at the retrial of the penalty
phase because antisocial personality disorder “is no more mitigating
than being ‘evil’ is mitigating,” but we disagree. Habeas petitioners
routinely ask us to rule that they received ineffective assistance when
1
See, e.g., Kedar S. Bhatia, “Likelihood of a Petition Being Granted,”
DAILY WRIT, available at http://dailywrit.com/2013/01/likelihood-of-a-petitionbeing-granted/ (noting that in 2011-12 session, 0.9% of cert. petitions granted);
SUPREME COURT PRESS, “Supreme Court Success Rate on a Writ of Certiorari,”
available at http://www.supremecourtpress.com/chance_of_success.html (2.8% in
2010-11 session); VALUE WALK, “An Empirical Analysis Of The Factors Involved
In Supreme Court Certiorari Decisions From 2001-2015,” available at
http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/06/supreme-court-certiorari-decisions/ (noting a
5% rate overall).
3
their trial lawyers failed to present evidence of an antisocial
personality disorder, so [trial counsel] chose a mitigation strategy that
many post conviction lawyers contend can be effective. Although we
have stated that evidence of antisocial personality disorder is not good
mitigation, we have never ruled that a capital defense lawyer renders
ineffective assistance as a matter of law when he introduces evidence
of antisocial personality disorder for mitigation purposes. And for
good reason. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court of the
United States explained that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.” 455 U.S. 104, (1982) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Supreme
Court ruled that a sentencing court violated the constitutional rights of
the defendant by failing to consider expert testimony that the
defendant had an “antisocial personality.” Id. at 107-08.
In the light of Eddings, there cannot be a per se rule that a lawyer
renders ineffective assistance by presenting evidence of an antisocial
personality disorder for purposes of mitigation. . . . That a diagnosis of
antisocial personality disorder has negative characteristics or presents
a double-edged sword renders it uniquely a matter of trial strategy that
a defense lawyer may, or may not, decide to present as mitigating
evidence.
Morton, 684 F.3d at 1167-68 (citations other than Eddings omitted).
Because of the likelihood that this Court will be asked to rule on this issue,
the Court will not comment on the merits of the claim presented in Morton because
the claims and arguments presented by the Petitioner may be different and
distinguished from those presented to the Eleventh Circuit in Morton. Morton
4
does, however, support that there may not be judicial inefficiency in granting the
stay requested. As a result, Petitioner’s motion, [Doc. 36], is DENIED. This
Court will reconsider the issue if the Supreme Court grants certiorari.
SO ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 2018.
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?