Electrolux Home Prod v. Whitesell Corp

Filing 1010

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 897 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding the Identity of the Remaining Course of Performance Parts In Suit and Computation of Their Contract Duration Terms. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 05/25/2018. (jlh) Modified on 5/25/2018 (jlh).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

WHITESELL CORPORATION,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*
5

V.

*

CV 103-050

*

ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS,

*

INC., HUSQVARNA, A.B., and

*

HUSQVARNA OUTDOOR PRODUCTS,

*

INC.,

*
*

Defendants.

*

ORDER

Defendant Husqvarna Outdoor Products, Inc. ("Husqfvarna")
has filed a "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding the

Identity of the Remaining Course of Performance Parts in Suit
and Computation of Their Contract Duration Terms."
897.)

(Doc. No.

The matter came before the Court for oral argument on

April 17, 2018.^

Based upon the arguments of counsel at the

hearing and in brief, and upon a thorough review of the
record, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Husqvarna's motion for partial summary judgment as explained
below.

^
The Court also heard argument on two motions for
partial summary judgment filed by Electrolux Home Products,
Inc. (Doc. Nos. 893 & 894.)

I.

On

December

14,

BACKGROUND^

2000,

Husqvarna's

predecessor

in

interest, Electrolux Home Products, Inc. C'EHP") entered into

a Strategic Partnership Agreement ("SPA")

with Plaintiff

Whitesell Corporation ("Whitesell"), whereby EHP agreed to buy
all of its current and future requirements for certain goods
from Whitesell during the pendency of the SPA, and Whitesell

agreed to supply all of Husqvarna's requirements for such
goods.^

(See Doc. No. 568, Ex. 1, Supply Agreement § 2.0.)

The initial term of the SPA was January 1, 2001 through April
1, 2008.

purchase

(Id. § 3.0.)

and

Whitesell

Thus, Husqvarna was obligated to

was

obligated

to

sell

100%

of

Husqvarna's requirements for covered parts from January 1,

2001 to April 1, 2008.

Recognizing that Husqvarna had to wind

down its existing relationships with other suppliers, the SPA

gave Husqvarna approximately 2.5

^

years to transition the

While the parties and the Court are well-versed in the

procedural and factual background of the case, Husqvarna's
motion, which asks the Court to decide the duration term of

the parties' contract with respect to certain Course of
Performance parts, compels the Court to start from the
beginning.
^ On June 12, 2006, EHP transferred its outdoor products
division to Husqvarna A.B., which in turn transferred the
business to Husqvarna Outdoor Products, Inc. ("Husqvarna").
For the sake of convenience, the Court may call the name
Husqvarna when reciting facts prior to the spinoff even though
the entity involved at the time was EHP.

covered parts to Whitesell, providing that "[f]ailure to

complete the transition [of parts by June 30, 2003] shall
proportionally extend the initial term of [the SPA]
3.1.)

(Id. §

The scope of goods subject to the SPA was to be

identified on an attached Exhibit B.

The parties did not create an Exhibit B.

Nevertheless,

the parties began to transition certain parts under the terms
of the SPA.

However, a dispute arose between them regarding

whether

SPA

the

covered

certain

parts

for

lawn

tractors

manufactured by Husqvarna at its Orangeburg, South Carolina

facility.

This dispute led to the filing of this lawsuit in

2003.

On

May 23,

2003,

the

parties

executed

a

Settlement

Memorandum through which they agreed to define the scope of

goods subject to the SPA through a "clarified Exhibit B."
(See

Doc.

Further,

No.
the

568,

Ex. 2, Settlement Memorandum

parties

agreed

to

include

H

"Brunner

1.)
and/or

wireform parts" in their supply relationship, which were to be

listed on a newly created Exhibit B-1.

(Id. K 3.)

The

initial term of the parts subject to the Settlement Memorandum
was December 31, 2003 to November 1, 2008,'* or 58 months.

^

While the Settlement Memorandum identifies the start

of the initial term as December 31, 2003, the parties and the
Court

more

often

than

not

refer

to

the

initial

contract

duration term as January 1, 2004 to November 1, 2008.
Court will maintain this convention.

The

(Id.)

Thus, the termination date for all parts listed on the

clarified Exhibit B and newly created Exhibit B-1 was to be
November

1,

contemplated

2008.

that

Similar

transition

to

of

the

the

SPA,

parts

the

parties

would

not

be

immediate but instead set the transition date as December 31,

2003.

Important

Memorandum

to

provided

the

instant

that,

for

motion,

the

parts

the

Settlement

that

were

not

transitioned by December 31, 2003, the initial term for those

parts would be ''proportionally extended by the time it takes
to fully transition"

those

parts.

(Id.)

This

will be

referred to herein as the "proportional extension provision."

Just as the parties never created the initial Exhibit B,
they never created the clarified Exhibit B or the Exhibit B-1
referenced in the Settlement Memorandum.

In 2005, the parties entered into a Consent Order "to

preserve and govern the rights of the parties prior to this
Court's final judgment on the parties' disputes regarding the
interpretation, enforcement, validity, and meaning of the

parties['] Settlement Memorandum and Supply Agreement." (Doc.

No. 30, Order of May 17, 2005, H 7.)

The Consent Order

extended the transition deadline to December 31, 2005, for

"all wireform products used or to be used by EHP's Orangeburg,
South Carolina, McRae, Georgia, or any future or alternative
locations or production facilities within North America" and

4

for

"all

parts

that

were

Settlement Memorandum."

to

be

transitioned

(Id. H 4.)

under

the

Notably, the Consent

Order did not identify the specific parts that were to be
transitioned under the Settlement Memorandum.

It also did not

change the initial term for covered parts that was provided
for in the Settlement Memorandum, i.e. January 1, 2004 to
November 1, 2008.^
On

October

14,

2008,

this

Court

concluded

that

the

subject matter of the Supply Agreement between the parties
(i.e.,

the

enforced.

scope

of

"goods")

was

too

indefinite

to

(Order of Oct. 14, 2008, Doc. No. 212, at 22.)

be
The

Court, however, determined that the Settlement Memorandum gave

rise to four enforceable part categories, one of which is the
Course of Performance category.

Because the initial duration

term of the Settlement Memorandum was seemingly about to end,

the Court invited the parties to present argument regarding
"the

date

of

obligations."

termination

of

the

parties'

contractual

(See Orders of October 14, 2008 and October 31,

2008, Doc. Nos. 212 & 216, respectively.)
Thereafter, Defendants EHP and Husqvarna filed separate

motions for partial summary judgment concerning the duration
term of the parties' contractual obligations.
& 260.)

^

(Doc. Nos. 225

On March 25, 2010, the Court resolved the motions,

See n.4, supra.

reaching

three

legal

conclusions

respecting

the

contract

duration terms of covered parts:

1.

The Settlement Memorandum's duration term provision
(January 1, 2004 to November 1, 2008) is applicable
to the four enforceable
part categories as
determined by the Order of October 14, 2008. Thus,
for certain covered parts, the termination date of
the parties' contractual obligation was November 1,
2008.

(See Order of March 25, 2010, Doc. No. 306, at 13, adopted in
the Order of March 25, 2010, Doc. No. 307, at 7.)

2.

The termination date for covered, active parts
transitioned to Whitesell prior to December 31,
2003, as well as those parts which first came into
use by Husqvarna after that date and were then
immediately transitioned to Whitesell, is November
1, 2008.

(See Order of March 25, 2010, Doc. No. 307, 8-9.)

3.

Husqvarna's obligation to purchase parts in use
prior to December 31, 2003, but which were not
transitioned to Whitesell until after that date,

was properly terminable 58 months after the part
was fully transitioned to Whitesell. Thus, each of
these non-transitioned parts would have its own
contract duration term of 58 months beginning on
the date of its full transition to Whitesell.

(Id. at 17.)

To apply these legal rulings in determining the contract
duration term of a part, the Court must first determine when
the part came into existence and when the part was then fully
transitioned to Whitesell.

No. 499, at 3.)

(See Order of June 24, 2013, Doc.

If these matters are undisputed, then the

Court may determine the contract duration term of a part as a

matter of law.

Through the course of discovery, which commenced in
earnest in February 2013 with the exchange of usage and
purchase history data (see also Order of November 12, 2013,
Doc. No. 541, at 16-23 (explaining the importance of such data
in determining the fully transitioned dates of parts)), the

parties have been able to agree on contract duration terms for
a vast majority of Parts in Suit.

Duration terms for many

more parts have been determined through the arguments and
concessions of counsel in the most recent round of motions for

partial summary judgment, as evidenced by the Orders that will
come out of the April IV^^ hearing.
Nevertheless, there remains a handful (proportionally

speaking) of parts for which the contract duration terms
remain in dispute.

Through the instant motion for partial

summary judgment, Husqvarna contends that this Court may
determine the contract duration terms as a matter of law as to

the

parts

in

dispute

between

Husqvarna

and

Whitesell.

Husqvarna's motion also seeks a determination from the Court
that the list of parts provided by Whitesell in response to
certain interrogatories is the complete universe of Course of
Performance Parts in Suit subject to Whitesell's breach of
contract claim as against Husqvarna.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to dispose
of unsupported claims or defenses which, as a matter of law,

raise no genuine issues of material fact suitable for trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts
and reasonable inferences are to be construed in favor of the

nonmoving party.

Hoaan v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 361 F.3d 621,

625 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless the factual
dispute is material to an issue affecting the
outcome

of

the

substantive

law

disputed fact.

case.

dictate

The

the

relevant

rules

materiality

of

of

a

A genuine issue of material fact

does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence

favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury
to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transp.. 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11*^^ Cir. 2000) (en

banc) (quoted source omitted) (emphasis supplied).

The party

opposing the summary judgment motion, however, "may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings.
Rather, its responses . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue to be tried."
Darby. 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (ll'^^ Cir. 1990).

Walker v.

The Clerk has given the nonmoving party, Whitesell,

notice of the summary judgment motion and the summary judgment

rules, of the right to file affidavits or other materials in
opposition, and of the consequences of default.
898.)

(Doc. No.

Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v.

Wainwricrht. 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam),

are satisfied.

The time for filing materials in opposition

has expired, and the motion is ripe for consideration.

III.

During

LEGAL ANALYSIS

discovery,

Husqvarna

propounded

three

interrogatories asking Whitesell to identify all Course of
Performance Parts in Suit for which it is claiming damages

from Husqvarna's alleged breach of contract and to state

whether the parts are subject to the proportional extension
provision.
Excel

Combining its responses, Whitesell produced an

Spreadsheet

(the ''Spreadsheet")

on

July

11,

2016,

containing over 750 listed parts with a proposed duration term

for each part.^

From

this list,

Husqvarna disputes the

contract duration terms offered by Whitesell for 39 parts,
which are discussed in Section III.A-D of Husqvarna's opening
brief.

The remaining parts from Whitesell's Spreadsheet not

®
Of note, the Course of Performance Parts in Suit
listed on Whitesell's Spreadsheet, and subject of the instant
motion, do not include the Brunner/Matrix parts.

specifically addressed in Section III.A-D have been listed on
Exhibit 36 to Husqvarna's motion.

Exhibit 36 is discussed in

Section III.E of Husqvarna's brief.

Of the 39 disputed parts, the parties have now agreed on
the contract duration terms for 11 parts.

Thus, summary

judgment is granted with respect to the following parts in
that

the

parties

have

agreed

on

the

following

contract

duration terms:

Part No.

Contract Duration Term

178345

Jan. 1, 2004 - Nov. 1, 2008

178819

Jul. 1, 2006 - Apr. 31, 2011

179065

Jul. 1, 2006 - Apr. 31, 2011

180218

Mar. 31, 2007 - Jan. 31, 2012

187556

Nov. 1, 2006 - Aug. 31, 2011

190736

Feb. 1, 2007 - Nov. 30, 2012

134300

Jan. 1, 2004 - Nov. 1, 2008

139155

Jan. 1, 2004 - Nov. 1, 2008

144648

Jan. 1, 2004 - Nov. 1, 2008

146848

Jan. 1, 2004 - Nov. 1, 2008

148456

Jan. 1, 2004 - Nov. 1, 2008

This leaves 28 parts for which the contract duration
terms are in dispute.
A.

The TEX Parts

The majority of the remaining parts, 24 of the 28 parts.

10

are known in this litigation as TEX parts.'

As explained

herein, TEX parts are parts of a sort not specifically
addressed by this Court in any prior order.

The TEX parts did not exist at the time of the transition
deadline of January 1, 2004.®

In fact, many of the TEX parts

did not come into existence for anywhere between 12 and 24

months after January 1, 2004.

When Husqvarna first needed a

TEX part, it did not purchase the part from Whitesell; in
other words, TEX parts were not immediately transitioned to
Whitesell upon first use.

Rather, Husqvarna purchased the

parts from a third-party supplier.
Whitesell

contends

that

the

proportional

extension

provision in the Settlement Memorandum applies to TEX parts in
that the contract duration term for these parts runs 58 months
from the date of full transition to Whitesell.

Whitesell's

contention would extend the duration term of the TEX parts not

only for periods of purchases from other suppliers, but also
for the periods immediately following the January 1, 2004
transition

deadline

in

which

Husqvarna

had

no

purchase

' Husqvarna represents that "TEX" stands for Tractor
Excellence and that TEX parts were redesigned for use in a new
tractor model that was coming out in the 2006 production
season.

®
Whitesell has presented no evidence to rebut this
factual assertion. That is, Whitesell has produced no usage
or purchase history data to show that the TEX parts were
active parts prior to January 1, 2004.
11

requirements for the parts from any supplier. While Husqvarna

agrees that the contract duration term begins on the date of
full transition, it contends that the duration term should

only be extended for the time that it purchased a TEX part
from

another

supplier,

i.e.,

the

time

it took

to

fully

transition the part to Whitesell, and not for the period of

inactivity

prior

to

purchase

from

any

supplier.

Thus,

Husqvarna would subtract the period of inactivity from the 58month contract duration term for each part.

By way of example, Part No. 194323 is a TEX part.

The

initial purchase of Part No. 194323 from any supplier was from
third-party supplier Northern Wire on July 26, 2005.
194323

was

not

in

existence

on

January

1,

Part No.

2004;

thus,

Husqvarna did not have a need for the part from January 1,

2004 until July 26, 2005 (18+ months). The parties agree that
the fully transitioned date for this part, the date Husqvarna
was purchasing 100% of its needs from Whitesell, is November
1, 2006.^

Thus, both parties agree that the initial contract

term of 58 months should start from November 1, 2006.

The

dispute arises as to when the contract duration term should

^

Initially, Husqvarna claimed the fully transitioned

date was earlier, May 26, 2006. However, because the usage
data indicates that Husqvarna had not exhausted its inventory
from Northern Wire by that date, Whitesell claimed November 1,
2006.
Here, as with all other TEX parts, Husqvarna accepts
the fully transitioned date offered by Whitesell.
12

end.

Whitesell simply adds 58 months to November 1, 2006 to

calculate a termination date of August 31, 2011.

Husqvarna,

however, subtracts the initial 18-month period of inactivity
from that date, resulting in a termination date of February 1,
2010.

Whitesell's

position

is

based

upon

this

Court's

application of the proportional extension provision to parts
transitioned after January 1, 2004 in the March 25, 2010
Order.

A closer look at this Order is warranted.

The Court

determined that each part would have an initial term of 58
months.

From

there,

the

Court

determined

that

the

proportional extension provision proportionately extends the
contract

duration

transition" a part.
306,

at 21-25

term

''by

the

time

it

takes

to

fully

(See Order of March 25, 2010, Doc. No.

(interpreting and relying upon Settlement

Memorandum H 3).)

Thus, for "parts that were in use . . .

prior

1,

to December

2003

but

were

not

transitioned

to

Whitesell until after that date, [Husqvarna's] obligation to
purchase these parts from Whitesell lasts [58 months] from the
date each individual part was transitioned to Whitesell."
(Id. at 21-22.)

In other words, in applying the proportional

extension provision to these non-transitioned parts, the time
it took for Husqvarna to fully transition these parts to
Whitesell would be proportionally extended in that the time

13

would not be counted against the initial contract term of 58
months.

In so holding, the Court ensured that each part that

was

active

in

use

prior

to

January

1,

2004,

but

not

transitioned until after that date received a duration term of

the full 58 months.

Concomitantly, the Court did not apply

the proportional extension provision to parts that were fully
transitioned by January 1, 2004, or to parts that first came
into

use

by

Husqvarna

after

that

date

immediately transitioned to Whitesell.

and

were

then

For those parts, the

contract duration term was determined to be January 1, 2004 to

November 1, 2008.

This is because Husqvarna was not taking

time to fully transition these parts.

They were either

transitioned prior to the transition deadline or immediately
transitioned upon first use.

The TEX parts do not squarely fall within the categories
of parts discussed in the March 25, 2010 Orders.

Because the

TEX parts did not exist prior to January 1, 2004, they were
neither active parts that transitioned by January 1, 2004, nor
active parts that failed to transition by January 1, 2004.

The TEX parts were also not parts that came into use after
January 1, 2004 and were then immediately transitioned to
Whitesell.

Nevertheless, the legal interpretation of the

proportional extension provision discussed in the March 25,
2010 Orders is pertinent.
The

intent

of

the

parties
14

as

expressed

through

the

proportional extension provision is to capture "the time
[Husqvarna] takes to fully transition" a part where it fails
to do so by the transition deadline. Thus, Whitesell does not
lose the time off of the 58-month contract duration term for

any delays caused by Husqvarna in not timely transitioning a
part.
that

For this reason, Husqvarna readily agrees, as it must,
Whitesell

should

not

lose

the

time

Husqvarna

spent

purchasing the TEX parts from third-party suppliers instead of
Whitesell

when

the

TEX

parts

first

came

into

use.^°

Consequently, Husqvarna does not seek to subtract the period
of third-party purchases from the 58-month duration term for

TEX parts.

Rather, Husqvarna concedes that the duration term

for each TEX part must be proportionately extended by the time
it purchased the part from a third-party supplier rather than
immediately transitioning the part to Whitesell.
In short, the proportional extension provision, by its
express terms, captures only "the time it takes to fully

As Husqvarna puts it, the parties intended to
proportionately extend the period of time for the transition
period - "the period of time Whitesell did not have the
opportunity to be the sole supplier of the part after it came
into existence."

(Husq.'s Br. Addressing Matter Taken Under

Advisement, Doc. No. 991, at 2.)

Had Husqvarna immediately transitioned the TEX parts
to Whitesell upon their first use, the legal rulings in this
case would dictate that the proportional extension provision
would not apply and the contract duration term would be
January 1, 2004 to November 1, 2008.
15

transition"

a

part

because

Husqvarna

should

have

been

purchasing 100% of its requirements from Whitesell during that
time.

The proportional extension provision does not capture

the time that Husqvarna was not "transitioning."
therefore

is

not

entitled

to

proportionately

Whitesell
extend

its

contract duration term by the period of time Husqvarna had no
requirements.

Upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the 24

disputed TEX parts do not receive a proportional extension of
for the months of inactivity from January 1, 2004 until the

parts' first purchase from any supplier. Accordingly, summary
judgment is granted with respect to the 24 TEX parts with the
contract duration term as follows:

Part No.

Contract Duration Term

194319

Apr. 27, 2006 - Aug. 27, 2009

194320

Feb. 1, 2007 - Jun. 1, 2010

194322

Dec. 1, 2006 - Mar. 1, 2010

194323

Nov. 1, 2006 - Feb. 1, 2010

194352

Apr. 26, 2006 - May 26, 2009

195218

Apr. 29, 2006 - Sept. 29, 2009

195804

Mar. 1, 2007 - May 1, 2010

196203

Feb. 1, 2007 - Jun. 1, 2010

196205

May 11, 2006 - Sept. 11, 2009

196826

Nov. 1, 2006 - Dec. 1, 2009

197258

Apr. 27, 2006 - Aug. 27, 2009

197259

May 19, 2006 - Sept. 19, 2009

16

197267

Mar. 1, 2007

Jun.

1, 2010

197269

Jul. 1, 2006

Oct.

1, 2009

197329

Jan. 1, 2007

- May 1/

197451

Oct. 1, 2006

-

Dec.

197659

Jul. 1, 2006

-

Nov. 1, 2009

197660

May 8,

198468

Nov.

1/ 2006

-

199189

Jun.

1, 2006

- Aug. 1,

199652

Oct. 16,

199769

Dec. 1, 2006

-

Mar. 1, 2010

199790

Jan.

1, 2007

-

Mar.

199918

Nov. 25,

B.

2010

1, 2009

Sept. 8,

2006 -

Mar.

2009

1, 2010
2009

2006 - Mar. 16, 2010

1, 2010

2009 - Oct. 25, 2012

Remaining Disputed Parts

Four disputed parts remain.

The first two parts, Part

Nos. 192502 and 192706, have a similar issue as the TEX parts.

These parts were not transitioned to Whitesell until several
months after January 1, 2004.

However, Husqvarna was not

purchasing the part from any supplier during these initial
months.

Because Husqvarna was not "transitioning" the part

and had no requirements, the proportional extension provision
does not apply to these two parts.

Accordingly, the parts,

which were immediately transitioned to Whitesell upon their
first use after January 1, 2004, have a contract duration term
of January 1, 2004 to November 1, 2008.

Summary judgment is

granted as to Part Nos. 192502 and 192706.
17

The parties dispute the fully transitioned dates for Part
Nos. 110702X and 181847.

Whitesell has presented evidence

that the parts were purchased from another supplier prior to
2004 and contends that Husqvarna is ignoring critical usage
data in its estimation of

the

fully transitioned date.

Because of this dispute of fact, the Court is unable to
determine

the

Accordingly,

contract

duration

terms

summary judgment is denied

of

these

as

parts.

to Part

Nos.

110702X and 181847.

C.

Exhibit 36

Aside

from

determining

contract

duration

terms,

the

second component of Husqvarna's motion for partial summary

judgment asks this Court to declare that the parts listed on
Exhibit 36

{plus the parts specifically discussed in the

previous section herein) are the total universe of Course of
Performance Parts in Suit subject to Whitesell's breach of
contract claims against Husqvarna.

As discussed at the April 17^^^ hearing, Whitesell agrees
not only that Exhibit 36 and the previously discussed parts
are the complete universe of Course of Performance Parts in
Suit

subject

to

its

breach

of

contract

claims

against

Husqvarna, but that the contract duration teinns listed on
Exhibit 36 are accurate for purposes of Whitesell's damages
claim.

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to Husqvarna

18

in these respects without prejudice to Whitesell to modify or
supplement

the

scope

of

Exhibit

36

should

supplemental

information become available.

IV.

Upon

the

foregoing,

CONCLUSION

Husqvarna's "Motion

Summary Judgment Regarding

the

Identity of

for

the

Partial

Remaining

Course of Performance Parts in Suit and Computation of Their
Contract Duration Terms" (doc. no. 897) is GRANTED IN PART as

specifically set forth hereinabove and DENIED IN PART (with
respect to Part Nos. 110702X and 181847).
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this

of May,

2018.

HALL/ CHIEF JUDGE
/STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

As discussed at the hearing, there must be an end
point to Whitesell's ability to introduce parts back into the
litigation or change duration terms, particularly because such
changes could alter the damages calculations of the parties'
experts.
Moreover, the parties have certified that their
production of usage and purchase history data is complete.
Accordingly, Whitesell has until 30 days after the close of
fact discovery to move to change the list of parts and their
attendant duration terms on Exhibit 36.
19