Smith v. Augusta-Richmond County et al

Filing 50

ORDER denying 36 Motion for Reconsideration re 33 Order on Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 04/18/2012. (thb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

ROBERT SMITH, through the
next friend Melissa Smith,
Plaintiff,

AUGUSTA-RUCHMOND COUNTY,
through Mayor, Deke
Copenhaver, and the
Commissioners, in their
official capacities, et al.,
Defendants.

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CV 110-126

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. no. 36) of this Court's September 9, 2011
Order granting in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. Upon due
consideration, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against numerous
defendants asserting various claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and state law. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants, through the use
of excessive force, violated his rights under the First, Fourth,
Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution. He further alleged that Defendants deprived him of
his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments through their
unlawful entry into his home and their unlawful seizure.
On September 9, 2011, the Court ruled on two motions to
dismiss filed by various Defendants. (Doc. no. 33.) The Court
dismissed the claims against Augusta-Richmond County ("ARC")
because Plaintiff's Complaint did not contain any allegations that
would permit the Court to impose liability against ARC for
failures arising from the actions or inactions of the Richmond
County Sheriff's Office. The Court also dismissed the claims
against Defendants Strength, Young, Johnson, McKenzie, Bell,
Singletary, Langford, and Norman, in their official capacities
based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Moreover, the Court dismissed the claims against Sheriff
Ronald Strength in his individual capacity. Plaintiff alleged
that Strength's actions and omissions resulted in "one or more
policies, practices, or customs, that caused deputies . . .

to

act in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to
constitutional rights and duties." (Compl. ¶ 10.) However, the
Court found that Plaintiff failed to allege a causal connection
between Strength's actions and the acts of the other Defendants
that formed the basis of the § 1983 claims. Although Plaintiff
mentioned the words "policies, practices, or customs," he did not
identify a single one and did not set forth any facts showing how

PA

Strength's custom or policy caused the alleged constitutional
violations. The Court also dismissed the claims against Pat
Young, the supervising officer of the Internal Affairs Department
of the Richmond County Sheriff's Department, in his individual
capacity for identical reasons. The claims against Paul Johnson
in his individual capacity were dismissed because all the
allegations against him were lacking in factual support.'
Plaintiff's current motion seeks reconsideration of the
Court's September 9, 2011 Order. Specifically, Plaintiff contends
that the claims against Strength, Young, and Johnson, in their
individual capacities, should not have been dismissed because the
Complaint established a plausible claim of supervisory liability
that was worthy of discovery.

II. STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a party
may seek to alter or amend a judgment in a civil case within
twenty-eight days after the entry of the judgment.
"[R]econsideration of a previous order is 'an extraordinary
remedy, to be employed sparingly.'" Williams v. Cruise Ships
Catering & Serv. Intl, N.V., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1358 (S.D.
Fla. 2004) (citation omitted). A movant must "set forth facts or
law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse
1

Paul Johnson is identified in the Complaint as Bell and McKenzie's
supervisor.

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its prior decision." Cover v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 F.R.D.
294, 294 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citation omitted)
Although Rule 59(e) does not set forth the grounds for
relief, district courts in this Circuit have identified three
grounds for reconsideration of an order: (1) the availability of
new evidence; (2) an intervening change in-controlling law; and
(3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 385 F. Supp.
2d 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2005); Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen,
P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
"Motions for reconsideration should not be used to raise
legal arguments which could and should have been made before the
judgment was issued." Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259,
1267 (11th Cir. 1998). Further, Rule 59(e) "is not a vehicle for
rehashing arguments already rejected by the court or for refuting
the court's prior decision."

Wendy's Intl v. Nu-Cape Const.,

Inc., 169 F.R.D. 680, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is an obvious attempt
"to relitigate old matters" and refute the Court's prior decision.
Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757,
763 (11th Cir. 2005).
evidence.

Plaintiff does not present any new

Instead, Plaintiff believes the Court failed to

consider the Complaint as a whole when dismissing the claims
against the supervisors. He claims that "the complaint pled a

supervisory review of the incident that was more cover-up, than
attentive, legitimate supervision, such that a plausible claim of
supervisory liability, worthy of discovery, was pled." (Doc. no.
36 at 2.) According to Plaintiff, once "a police expert reviews
the records of other incidents . . . there will be a causal link
between some practice or custom . . . and the challenged brutality
under color of state law." (Id. at 3.) However, suggesting that
discovery is warranted is not the equivalent of producing new
evidence. More importantly, despite Plaintiff's claim to the
contrary, the Court did consider Plaintiff's Complaint in its
entirety when ruling on the motions to dismiss.
Plaintiff also failed to present evidence of an intervening
change of law that would support reconsideration. Although
Plaintiff's current motion attempts to educate the Court on the
pleading requirements of Iqbal and Twornbly, the Court utilized
these pleading standards when ruling on the motions to dismiss.
Indeed, based on these standards, the Court determined that
Plaintiff failed to present factual support for his deliberate
indifference claims. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of
an intervening change in the pleading standards, and thus the
Court will not reconsider its prior Order on this ground.

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Finally, Plaintiff has not established that reconsideration
is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. The only argument
that could be reasonably read to challenge the Order on injustice
grounds is Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Strength should remain
in this case because he is the only official who can effect
changes within the department to prevent further constitutional
violations. While Plaintiff cites the doctrines of specific
intent and joint liability as reasons why Defendant Strength
should remain in this lawsuit, his current motion fails to address
the Eleventh Amendment immunity argument that served as the
Court's basis for dismissing Defendant Strength in his official
capacity.
In conclusion, the Court notes that it has thoroughly
considered the issues that form the basis of its prior ruling and
finds neither a reason nor a legal basis for reconsidering its
September 9, 2011 Order.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

foregoing,

Reconsideration (doc. no. 36) is
ORDER ENTERED

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

DENIED.

at Augusta, Georgia, this

/P-

day of April,

2012.
LE J. RNDAL HALL
HO
UNITE)J STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOBERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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