Bynes v. Singh et al
Filing
44
ORDER granting 36 Motion for Summary Judgment, directing the Clerk to enter Judgment in favor of Defendant and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 06/14/2012. (thb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
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CHASTADY M. BYNES,
Plaintiff,
V.
SHAB MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendant.
CV 111-002
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant Shab
Management, LLC's ("Defendant") motion for summary judgment.
(Doc. no. 36.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's
motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff's termination from her
position as the general manager of the Holiday Inn owned by Guru
Hotels, Inc. ("Guru Hotels"). Plaintiff is an African-American
female who contends that she was discriminated against during
the course of her employment. The relevant facts are set forth
below.
A. Factual Background
In 2005, Guru Hotels began construction on a new Holiday
Inn facility in Augusta, Georgia.
(Singh Deci. ¶ 4.) Under an
agreement with Guru Hotels, Defendant was responsible for
staffing and managing the new Holiday Inn. (Id.) Accordingly,
Defendant began a search for qualified individuals to work at
the hotel, including an individual to fill the position of
general manager. (Id.)
Defendant, however, found it difficult to locate a general
manager that satisfied Holiday Inn's requirements for management
positions. (Id. ¶ 5.) Under the terms of the Holiday Inn
Standards Manual in place during Plaintiff's employment, the
general manager was required to hold two certifications.
(Id.)
First, the general manager needed to be certified through the
Holiday Inn General Manager Program. (Doc. no. 36, Ex. A.) In
order to attain this certification, the employee was required to
achieve a score of eighty percent or better on the General
Manager test given on the last day of the program.
(Id.)
Second, the general manager was required to be a Certified Hotel
Administrator ("CHA"). (Id.) Holiday Inn, however, provided
franchisees with the option of hiring a general manager without
a CHA certification, as long as the general manager obtained the
CHA certification within twelve months of being hired. (Id.)
Defendant eventually hired Plaintiff to work as the general
manager at the new Holiday Inn.' (Id. ¶E 7-8.) Plaintiff did
not hold a CHA certification, but Defendant believed that she
could be trained and eventually pass the CHA certification test
Defendant claims that Plaintiff was hired as a "trainee general
manager" until she acquired her CHA certification.
2
within twelve months of her hiring. (Id. 1 6.) Plaintiff was
initially responsible for overseeing the staffing and set-up of
the hotel, which was scheduled to open in November of 2005.
(Id. ¶ 4.) As the general manager, Plaintiff received a salary
of $25,000.00 per year, but she was promised an increase in
salary upon the opening of the hotel. (Bynes Dep. at 36.)
During the course of her employment, Plaintiff worked under
the supervision of Joe Tate, an African-American male employee.
(Singh fled. ¶ 8.) Only two management employees earned more
than Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 10.) Mr. Tate, her supervisor, earned
$28,600.00 per year.
(Id.)
In addition, Desai Dushyant, an
employee who managed the Augusta Inn and Conference Center
("Augusta Inn"), earned $30,000.00 per year. (Id.) According
to Defendant, Mr. Dushyant earned more than Plaintiff because
managing the Augusta Inn was a much more burdensome position
than managing the Holiday Inn. (Id.) The Augusta Inn had 252
rooms, whereas the Holiday Inn had only 150 rooms. (Id.)
Additionally, the Augusta Inn had a large bar activity and a
small staff, whereas the Holiday Inn had a small bar activity
and a large staff.
(Id.)
Plaintiff disputes this fact and
asserts that she had a heavier workload than Mr. Dushyant.
(Def. Stmt. of Material Facts g[ 22.) The only other employee
who earned more than Plaintiff was a Caucasian male named Joseph
Newman. Mr. Newman was the chief engineer/maintenance worker at
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the Holiday Inn for a short period of time. (Singh Deci. ¶ 11.)
He received a salary of $31,200.00 per year .2 (Id.)
Plaintiff was terminated from her position in November of
2006. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was terminated because
she failed to properly perform her job. (Id. ¶ 13.) According
to Surinderjit Singh, Defendant's manager, Plaintiff often
missed work and mandatory meetings with the Holiday Inn
personnel who supervise franchisees. (Id.) Mr. Singh claims
that Holiday Inn officials told him that Plaintiff was not
qualified for her position and must be terminated as a result.
(Id.) He states that he was told that if he did not terminate
Plaintiff, the Holiday Inn franchise would be removed from
Defendant's hotel. (Id.)
Mr. Singh also asserts that he terminated Plaintiff because
she failed to obtain her mandatory CHA certification. (Id. ¶
14.) Plaintiff admits that she took the CHA test a month prior
to her termination.
(Bynes Dep. at 82.) Plaintiff claims that
she never received the test results, but admits that she is not
certified as a CHA. (Id. at 82-83.) Defendant contends that
Plaintiff failed her exam and thus did not meet the
qualifications for the general manager position. (Singh fled. 1
14.)
At the time of her termination, Plaintiff made no
accusation of discrimination.
2
Defendant also managed two other properties in Augusta, Georgia.
(Singh Decl. ¶ 9.) The general managers at these other facilities were, like
Ms. Cathy Gibson worked at the
Plaintiff, African-American women.
(Id.)
(Id.) Ms. Gail
Wingate Inn and received a salary of $23,000.00 per year.
Mims worked at the Hampton Inn and received a salary of $22,000.00 per year.
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Following Plaintiff's termination, Defendant hired Joseph
Sloan, a Caucasian male, to replace Plaintiff and serve as the
general manager of the Holiday Inn. Unlike Plaintiff, who only
managed the Holiday Inn, Mr. Sloan was hired to manage the
Holiday Inn, the Belair Conference Center, the Hampton Inn &
Suites, and the Wingate Inn. (Doc. no. 36, Ex. D.) Mr. Sloan
was paid $65,000.00 per year. (Singh Deci. ¶E 17-18.)
After learning of Mr. Sloan's hiring, Plaintiff began to
suspect that she was terminated on account of her race and
gender, a fact which Defendant disputes. (Bynes Dep. at 12-16.)
According to Mr. Singh, Mr. Sloan was hired because he had a CHA
certification, years of experience working in Holiday Inn
hotels, and the expertise needed to manage additional
facilities.
(Singh Deci. ¶ 16.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff initiated the present action on January 4, 2011,
against Harinderjit Singh, Surinderjit Singh, Balvinder Singh,
Guru Hotels, Newport Group, Inc., and Shab Management.
(Doc.
no. 1.) Approximately one month later, Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint alleging violations of various federal
statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title
VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. §
216, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 & 1985(3).
(Doc. no. 15.)
On August 30, 2011, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's EPA and
§ 1981 claims as time barred. The Court also dismissed the §
1985(3) claims predicated upon alleged violations of the EPA.
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(Doc. no. 34.)
Finally, the Court held that Plaintiff could
only maintain her Title VII claim against her former employer,
Shab Management, and therefore dismissed the Title VII claims
against the other defendants. Thus, the only remaining claim
pending before this Court is Plaintiff's Title VII claim against
Defendant Shab Management.
On September 9, 2011, Defendant moved for summary judgment
on Plaintiff's Title VII claim. (Doc. no. 36.) Defendant
contends that Plaintiff failed to present any direct or
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory treatment. Plaintiff,
however, alleges that Defendant's reasons for her termination
were pretextual, and thus there is a question of material fact.
These arguments are discussed in detail below.
II. SUTY]MARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "all justifiable inferences
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in [its] favor."
U.S. v. Four parcels, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437
(1991) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the
Court, by reference to materials on file, the basis for the
motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
How to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of
proof at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,
1115 (11th Cir. 1993). When the non-movant has the burden of
proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one
of two ways—by negating an essential element of the non-movant's
case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact
necessary to the non-movant's case. See Clark v. Coats & Clark
Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining Adickes
V. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) and Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Before the Court can evaluate
the non-movant's response in opposition, it must first consider
whether the movant has met its initial burden of showing that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Jones v. City of
Columbus, 120 F.3d 248, 254 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) . A
mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot meet the
burden at trial is insufficient. Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.
If—and only if—the movant carries its initial burden, the
non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by "demonstrate[ing]
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that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes
summary judgment.' Id. When the non-movant bears the burden of
proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to the
method by which the movant carried its initial burden. If the
movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact,
the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to
withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material
fact sought to be negated." Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. If
the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact, the
non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence
that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward
with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed
verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary
deficiency." Id. at 1116-17. The non-movant cannot carry its
burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory
allegations contained in the complaint. See Morris v. Ross, 663
F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981) . Rather, the non-movant
must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
In this action, the Clerk gave Plaintiff appropriate
notice of the motion for summary judgment and informed her of
the summary judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or
other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default.
(Doc. no. 37.) Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith
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v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam),
are satisfied. The time for filing materials in opposition has
expired, and the motion is now ripe for consideration.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that she was discriminated against in
violation of Title VII. She claims that she was (1) terminated
because of her race and gender and (2) paid less than other
comparative employees because of her race and gender. Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff's Title VII claims must fail as a matter
of law as Plaintiff has not established a prima fade case of
discrimination.
A. Title VII Claim Based on Termination
The relevant portion of Title VII provides that an employer
may not "discharge any individual . . . with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, [or] sex." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). claims of race and gender discrimination based
on circumstantial evidence, as is the case here, 3 are evaluated
under the burden shifting framework developed in McDonnell
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of direct discrimination and
she does not rely on direct discrimination in response to Defendant's motion
for summary judgment. See Lazzara v. Howard A. Esser, Inc., 802 F.2d 260,
269 (7th Cir. 1986) (a ground not pressed in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment is to be treated by the district court as abandoned); see
also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.
1995) (grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary
judgment are deemed abandoned).
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) . First, a plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case, or "facts adequate to permit an
inference of discrimination." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,
1562 (11th Cir. 1997) . If the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff who
must show that the employer's proffered reasons for its actions
were not the real reasons that motivated its conduct, but that
the employer's proffered reasons were merely pretext for
discrimination. Id. at 253.
1.
Prima Facie Evidence
To establish a prima facie case of Title VII race and
gender discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her
position; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action;
and (4) she was replaced by an individual outside of her
protected class. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of
Fla. Dept. of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
Here, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff satisfies all
elements of her prima fade case with the exception of the
second element. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to
produce any evidence that she was qualified for the position of
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general manager. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that she
was qualified for the general manager position because she
passed the General Manager Test, and there is no evidence that
she failed her CHA certification test.
Both parties agree that the Holiday Inn Standards Manual
required a general manager to (1) pass the General Manager Test
and (2) obtain a CHA certification within twelve months of being
hired. (Doc. no. 36, Ex. A.) Moreover, both parties agree that
Plaintiff satisfied the first requirement as she obtained a
score of ninety-eight percent on her General Manager Test.
Therefore, the only question this Court must resolve is whether
Plaintiff can show that she obtained her CHA certification. On
this point, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not CHA
certified when she was hired. Moreover, she never received the
results of her CHA test. Indeed, Plaintiff testified that she
is not CHA certified. (Bynes Dep. at 83.) Having presented no
evidence that she is CHA certified, there is no genuine issue of
fact that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for the
general manager position. Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate
that she was qualified, she cannot establish a prima facie claim
of discrimination.
2.
Pretext
Even if Plaintiff established a prima facie case of race
and gender discrimination, Defendant articulated legitimate
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nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination, and Plaintiff has
failed to produce evidence that those reasons were pretext for
discrimination. In order to show pretext, Plaintiff must
"demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. A
plaintiff may establish pretext by demonstrating that the
employer has offered inconsistent reasons for the challenged
employment action.
Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d 1422,
1428 (11th Cir. 1998). The fact that the employer offers an
additional reason for the employment decision does not suggest
pretext if both of the employer's reasons are consistent. Id.;
see also Zaben V. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453,
1458-59 (11th Cir. 1997)
Plaintiff claims that Defendant provided inconsistent
reasons for her termination, Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
that Defendant, in its letter to the EEOC regarding her
termination, stated that Plaintiff was fired "for not being a
team leader." Plaintiff, however, claims that she was told in
person that "she did not meet the Holiday Inn requirements."
Despite Plaintiff's claim to the contrary, Defendant's reasons
were not inconsistent.
According to Mr. Singh, Plaintiff was
terminated because she
requirements."
"did not meet Holiday Inn's
(Singh Deci. 1 13.)
He stated that Plaintiff
"missed work and, more importantly, missed mandatory meetings
with the Holiday Inn personnel who supervise the franchisees."
(Id.) Mr. Singh noted that Plaintiff's failure to pass the CHA
test combined with her failure to perform her job adequately and
meet the demands of Holiday Inn led to her termination. (Id. ¶
15.) This testimony is consistent with Plaintiff's separation
notice. The notice states that Plaintiff was terminated because
she "did not meet Holiday Inn requirements. " 4 (Doc. no. 36, Ex.
B.)
The testimony of Mr. Singh and the separation notice are
also consistent with Defendant's letter to the EEOC. In that
letter, Mr. Sloan stated that Plaintiff's dismissal was the
result of "a failure on her part to understand her role in a
full service hotel."
(Doc. no. 36, Ex. E.)
Mr. Sloan went-on
to explain that "being a team leader required [Plaintiff] to
lead by example. One example of not performing was her
inability to tend to the needs of the hotel by working a full
schedule, meeting deadlines, [and] showing up for appointments
,,
(Id.)
Although Defendant, for the first time in the
" Plaintiff claims Mr. Singh told her that she was terminated because
she did not meet the Holiday Inn requirements as she did not have "ten years
of management experience." (Bynes Dep. at 105.) Plaintiff claims that
Defendant's reasons were pretextual because ten years of management
experience was not an actual Holiday Inn requirement. However, whether
Holiday Inn required its general managers to have ten years of experience
does not change the fact that Plaintiff was not certified as a CHA, and
therefore she did not meet Holiday Inn's requirements.
Although Plaintiff asserts that she never missed a meeting or a
deadline and always worked her entire schedule, her assertions and
perceptions do not cast sufficient doubt on Defendant's explanations to
survive summary judgment. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, "[t]he
inquiry into pretext centers upon the employers beliefs, and not the
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letter to the EEOC, cites Plaintiff's failure to be an effective
team leader as a basis for her termination, this does not
support Plaintiff's claim that Defendant's reasons were
pretextual. In that same letter, Mr. Sloan explained that one
of the reasons Plaintiff was not an effective team leader was
her failure to work a full schedule and meet deadlines, which is
consistent with Mr. Singh's testimony that she missed work and
meetings. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to
support her claim that Defendant's prof erred reasons are
unworthy of credence, and therefore Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff's Title VII termination claim.
B. Title VII Claim Based on Unequal Pay
Plaintiff also asserts that during the course of her
employment she was discriminated against in terms of pay. In
order to establish a prima fade case of disparate pay,
Plaintiff must show that "she occupies a position similar to
that of a higher paid employee who is not a member of her
protected class." Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974-75
(11th Cir. 2008) (citing Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15
F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994)). The employee whom the
plaintiff identifies as a comparator "must be similarly situated
in all relevant respects." Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376
F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation
employee's own perceptions of [her] performance." Holifield, 115 F.3d at
1565; see also Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1332-33
(11th Cir. 1998)
omitted) (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has held this
to mean that "[t]he comparator must be nearly identical to the
plaintiff." Id.; see also Drake-Sims
V.
Burlington Coat Factory
Warehouse of Ala. Inc., 330 Fed. Appx. 795, 803 (11th Cir.
2009)
Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima fade case of
disparate pay because none of the four possible comparators whom
she identifies are similarly situated to her. Plaintiff
identifies Mr. Dushyant, Mr. Tate, Mr. Newman, and Mr. Sloan as
comparators. However, these employees held different positions
with different responsibilities than Plaintiff and thus cannot
be considered similarly situated.
Mr. Dushyant was the general manager of a separate facility
that had more rooms, a larger staff, and more business than the
Holiday Inn where Plaintiff was the general manager
. 6
Plaintiff
admitted that she understood that not all managers were paid the
same and that many factors contribute to the salary of a general
manager. (Bynes Dep. at 38-39.) Likewise, Mr. Tate was
Plaintiff's supervisor. He was responsible for overseeing the
general managers at several local hotels.
Indeed, Plaintiff
6 laintiff contends that Mr. Dushyant is a comparator because the two
p
In fact, Plaintiff believes
(Bynes Dep. at 69.)
held similar positions.
that her workload was heavier than Mr. Dushyant's workload. (Id.) In
support of this assertion, Plaintiff claims that every time she observed Mr.
Dushyant at work "he was never doing anything." (Id.) Moreover, she claims
that the Augusta Inn was an older, rundown hotel that was not as busy as the
new Holiday Inn. (Id. at 69.) However, despite Plaintiff's personal
observations, she has not put forth any evidence to suggest that she and Mr.
Dushyant were "similarly situated in all respects."
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admitted that Mr. Tate is not a proper comparator as he occupied
a different position than she did. (Bynes Dep. at 26, 140.)
Next, Plaintiff contends that the hiring of Mr. Newman, the
hotel's chief engineer, supports her disparate pay claim.7
However, merely asserting that someone outside of her protected
class earned more than she did is not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of disparate pay. Plaintiff takes the position
that a hotel's maintenance worker should not earn more than its
general manager. She contends that "the maintenance engineer, a
white male, would be below her in any organizational chart of
the management company." (Doc. no. 38, at 12.) However,
Plaintiff failed to present any evidence supporting her
assertion- that the general manager would appear above the chief,
engineer on an organizational chart of Holiday Inn management.
Even if Plaintiff did present such evidence, Mr. Newman cannot
be a comparator because he and Plaintiff are not similarly
situated individuals. Plaintiff's only evidence supporting her
claim is that "a white male who was working a lesser job" made
more money than she did. (Doc. no. 38, at 12.) However, as
noted above, this evidence, without a showing that the white
male was a proper comparator, is not sufficient to survive
summary judgment.
Plaintiff argues in brief that Mr. Newman was not the "chief engineer"
but was merely a maintenance worker who worked at the Holiday Inn.
Regardless of Mr. Newman's title, the Court's analysis does not change. Mr.
Newman and Plaintiff held different positions at the Holiday Inn, and
therefore Mr. Newman cannot be considered a proper comparator.
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Finally, Plaintiff cannot support a disparate pay claim as
it relates to Mr. Sloan. Mr. Sloan, like Mr. Dushyant, Mr.
Tate, and Mr. Newman, is not a proper comparator. Although he
replaced Plaintiff as the general manager of the Holiday Inn, he
was assigned additional responsibilities which justified his
increased salary. Mr. Sloan, unlike Plaintiff, was tasked with
managing and supervising three additional hotels. Moreover, Mr.
Sloan held a CHA certification.
(Bynes Dep. 82.) Mr. Sloan is
simply not similarly situated to Plaintiff.
Because Plaintiff has failed to identify a proper
comparator, her disparate pay claim fails as a matter of law.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. no. 36) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to
ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant and CLOSE this case.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this
I4
day of June,
2012.
HON
LE J. RANDAL HALL
UNITE STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTRN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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