Blackwell v. Astrue

Filing 17

ORDER adopting 14 Report and Recommendations, reversing the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and remanding the case to Commissioner for further consideration in accordance with the Court's opinion. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 06/14/2012. (thb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

LAJIJANA BLACKWELL,
Plaintiff,
CV 111-022
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

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After a careful, de novo review of the file, the Court concurs with the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), to which objections have been filed (doc.
no. 16). In the administrative proceedings underlying the above-captioned social security
appeal, the Administrative Law Judge ("AU") found that Plaintiff suffered from
impairments associated with paraneoplastic limbic encephalitis and was disabled from
November 22, 2006, through November 22, 2007. However, he found that she experienced
medical improvement such that she was not disabled from November 23, 2007, through the
date of his decision. Tr., pp. 23-31. The Magistrate Judge found that the AL's partially
favorable decision was erroneous because he improperly discounted the opinion of Plaintiff's
treating physician, Nicholas G. Avgeropoulos, M.D. As a result, the Magistrate Judge

recommended the reversal of the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. no. 14.)
In his objections, the Commissioner asserts that "the relevant inquiry is whether the
record showed a decrease in the severity of Plaintiff's cognitive disorder or deficits related
to her ability to work after November 22, 2007." (Doc. no. 16, P. 2.) The Commissioner
also contends that ALJ established the requisite good cause for discounting Dr.
Avgeropoulos's opinion when he stated that Dr. Avgeropoulos's treatment notes do not list
any vocational limitations after November 22,2007, that would prevent all competitive work.
(j4 at 3-4.) In addition, the Commissioner argues that the record discloses evidence showing
a decrease in the severity of Plaintiff's impairments following November 22, 2007, which
supports the AL's determination that medical improvement as of that date and his decision
to accord reduced weight to Dr. Avgeropoulos's opinion regarding the nature and severity
of Plaintiff's impairments. (Ld. at 1-3.)
The Court finds that these objections lack merit. As noted in the R&R (doc. no. 14,
pp. 6-7), a treating physician's opinion is entitled to substantial weight absent a showing of
good cause, which requires specification of an adequate reason for discounting the opinion.
See Crawford v. Comm'rofSoc. Sec., 363F.3d 1155, 1159(1lthCir. 2004) (per curiam);
Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). In light of this well-established
principle, the Commissioner misses the mark in attempting to cast the determinative inquiry
as whether the record discloses evidence suggesting a decrease in severity of Plaintiff's
impairments after November 22, 2007. (See doc. no. 16, p. 2.) The problem is that, in
determining that Plaintiff experienced medical improvement such that she was not disabled
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after November 22nd, the ALJ discounted the opinion of Dr. Avgeropoulos without showing
good cause, which constitutes reversible error under Eleventh Circuit law. MacGregor v.
Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986).
Contrary to the argument advanced by the Commissioner in his objections, the AU
did not establish good cause for discounting Dr. Avgeropoulos's treating source opinion by
stating that his treatment notes do not list any vocational limitations after November 22,
2007, that would prevent all competitive work. In a series of medical records from June to
October of 2007, the period immediately preceding Plaintiff's purported date of medical
improvement, Dr. Avgeropoulos specified a number ofimpairments resulting from Plaintiff's
paraneoplastic limbic encephalitis, including impaired memory and language processing due
to a residual cognitive deficit, as well as fine motor inabilities on the left side. Tr., pp. 36266. The Commissioner emphasizes in his objections that a later treatment note from Dr.
Avgeropoulos, dated December27, 2007, does not list specific impairments, but rather offers
a general opinion as to the severity of Plaintiff's physical, cognitive, and emotional
impairments. (Doc. no. 16, p. 3-4.) However, the fact that Dr. Avgeropoulos's December
27th treatment note does not redundantly catalogue the impairments specified in his records
from June to October of 2007 does not show any inconsistency that justifies according
reduced weight to the entirety of Dr. Avgeropoulos's "assessments and treatment notes,"
which is precisely what the ALJ did. Tr., p. 30.
The Commissioner further takes issue with the Magistrate Judge's reliance on Dr.
Avgeropoulos's treatment records from June to October of 2007, asserting that such records
are immaterial because they "do not concern the period at issue after November 23, 2007."

(Doc. no. 16, P. 2 n.3.) This contention is also unavailing, as medical records that relate to
the nature and severity of Plaintiff's impairments do not become wholly irrelevant simply
because they precede the date of medical improvement fixed by the ALJ. See Barclay v.
Comin'r of SSA, 274 F. App'x 738, 744 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that evidence
from outside the relevant time period may nevertheless relate to that period); Kem p v.
Astrue, Civil Action No. 8:09-3318, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107497, at *50 n.15 (D.S.C.
Sept. 22, 2011) ("[E]vidence should not be disregarded merely because an evaluation
occurred outside the relevant time period so long as it may be relevant to prove a disability
during the relevant time period."). Moreover, it cannot be said that Dr. Avgeropoulos's
records from June to October of 2007 lack relevancy due to their timing, as they were created
during the period immediately leading up to the date of Plaintiff's purported medical
improvement. Cf. Barclay, 274 F. App'x at 743 (finding that medical records dated two to
four years after the relevant time period lacked relevance).
Furthermore, the Court is unpersuaded by the Commissioner's attempt to point to
record evidence suggesting medical improvement that was not specified by the ALJ as a
reason for discounting Dr. Avgeropoulos's opinion. (See doc. no. 16, pp. 2-3.) Because the
Court must refrain from deciding the facts anew or re-weighing the evidence, see Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), the Court cannot rescue the
AL's inadequate analysis based on the Commissioner's post-hoc identification of record
evidence not specifically relied upon by the ALJ with respect to his decision to discount the
opinion of Plaintiffs treating physician.

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In sum, these objections provide no basis for departing from the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation. The Commissioner's objections not specifically discussed herein are
likewise without merit. As a result, the Commissioner's objections are OVERRULED.
Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the
opinion of the Court. Therefore, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the
Commissioner's final decision is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to the
Commissioner for further consideration in accordance with the Court's opinion.
, 2012, at Augusta, Georgia.

SO ORDERED this /4ay of

TBLE J.ANDAL HALL
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
RN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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