Thomas v. Strange Engineering, Inc.

Filing 42

ORDER granting 9 Motion to Change Venue. The Clerk is directed to transfer this action to the U.S. Court for the Middle District of Florida and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 03/22/2012. (thb) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/22/2012: # 1 Receipt of Extraction) (thb).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
AUGtjSTj OW.

.

1811 MAR 22 c

*CLERK

ENNIS E. THOMAS, JR.,

*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,
V.

CV 111-074

*
*

STRANGE ENGINEERING, INC.,

*

Defendant.

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court is Strange Engineering,
Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion to Transfer Venue. (Doc. no. 9.) After a review of the
Complaint and the affidavits provided by the parties,
Defendant's motion is GRANTED to the extent set forth below.

I • BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

This case arises from the destruction of Ennis Thomas'
("Plaintiff") drag racing vehicle. Plaintiff is a professional
drag racer, and Defendant is in the business of fabricating and
assembling aftermarket automotive parts, including rear end
assemblies.

(Compi. [1 1, 2.)

Plaintiff entered into a contract to purchase a Vehicle
Rear End ("Rear End") welded and manufactured by Defendant.
(Id. 9j 4.) Defendant advertises its rear end assemblies as
"professionally welded" and states that it "has been the leader
in driveline suspension for over 40 years by paying attention to
detail. ,, (Id. ¶ 3.) In deciding to purchase the Rear End,
Plaintiff alleges that he relied upon Defendant's advertisements
that suggested that Defendant was the foremost authority in
building Rear Ends for drag racing vehicles. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Instead of contacting Defendant directly, Plaintiff ordered the
Rear End from the Tennessee office of Power-Pro Racing Products
("Power-Pro").

(NcGivern Aff. ¶ 12.)

Power-Pro is a

distributor of afterrnarket automotive parts marketed by numerous
fabricators and assemblers. (Id. ¶ 13.) Upon receiving
Plaintiff's request, Power-Pro contacted Defendant and ordered
the Rear End. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Defendant fabricated and assembled the Rear End at its
facility in Morton Grove, Illinois and shipped the product to
Power-Pro's Tennessee office. (Id. 9191 15, 16.) While the Rear
End was en route to Tennessee, Power-Pro requested that
Defendant ship it directly to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 17.) As a
result, Defendant contacted the shipping carrier and rerouted
the Rear End to Plaintiff's place of business in Grovetown,
Georgia.

(Id.; Compl. ¶ 10.)

Fj

Upon receiving the Rear End, Plaintiff attached it to his
drag racing vehicle. (Compl. ¶ 11.) On February 6, 2010,
Plaintiff traveled from his home in Georgia to attend a drag
race in Florida. During the race, his vehicle crashed after the
weld on the Rear End fractured.

(Id. ¶ 12.)

The accident

caused Plaintiff substantial injuries and destroyed his vehicle.
(Id. ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's negligent

manufacture of the Rear End caused the accident. (Id. ¶ 13.)
B. Procedural Background
On April 1, 2011, Plaintiff brought a negligence action
against Defendant in the Superior Court of Columbia County.
(Id. ¶ 12.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
is subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia by virtue of the
Georgia long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Specifically,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction in Georgia because Defendant transacted business in
Georgia, committed acts that resulted in a tortious injury to
Plaintiff in Georgia, solicited business in Georgia, and derived
substantial revenue from goods used in Georgia. (Id. ¶ 1.)
On may 20, 2011, Defendant removed the case to this Court
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. no. 1.)
Defendant subsequently filed the present motion to dismiss
contending that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction.
no. 9.)

(Doc.

In support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant

3

submitted the affidavit of its General Manager John McGivern.
(Doc. no. 9, Ex. 3.) This affidavit supports Defendant's
argument that it does not have sufficient contacts with the
state of Georgia to warrant the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
In opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff submitted
his own affidavit and the affidavit of David Turner, Chief
Executive Officer for Turner's Automotive, Inc., a Georgia
corporation that regularly orders parts from Defendant.
According to Plaintiff, these affidavits demonstrate that
Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia.
Plaintiff also noted that no discovery had been conducted in the
case and requested that this Court defer ruling on the motion to
dismiss to allow the parties additional time to obtain
affidavits and declarations. (Doc. no. 14 at 1-2.) This
additional time would allow Plaintiff the opportunity to
ascertain the full nature of Defendant's contacts with the state
of Georgia and better respond to Defendant's argument that this
Court is without jurisdiction.
After considering Defendant's request, the Court issued an
Order permitting the parties to engage in limited jurisdictional
discovery. (Doc. no. 22.) The parties were given forty-five
(45) days from the date of the Order to file supplemental
responses to Defendant's motion to dismiss.

4

(Doc. no. 22.)

Plaintiff, however, did not take advantage of the jurisdictional
discovery and failed to supplement his response within the
forty-five (45) day window. Therefore, this Court will now
address Defendant's motion to dismiss and consider only the
parties' original briefs and affidavits.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

"In the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction in which no evidentiary hearing is held, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
jurisdiction over the movant, nonresident defendant." Morris v.
SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988) . The plaintiff
establishes a prima fade case by presenting 'substantial
evidence . . . of such quality and weight that reasonable and
fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might
reach different conclusions. . ."

Walker v. Nations Bank of

Florida, 53 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995) .

The facts

presented in the plaintiff's complaint are taken as true to the
extent they are uncontroverted.

Foxworthy v. Custom Trees,

Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1207 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1995). If,
however, the defendant submits affidavits challenging the
allegations in the complaint, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction. Diamond
Cry stal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Intern., Inc., 593 F.3d
5

1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010)

If the plaintiff's complaint and

supporting evidence conflict with the defendant's affidavits,
the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff. Id. (citing Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288
F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002)).
To determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to
personal jurisdiction in Georgia, the Court must perform a twopart analysis. Id. at 1257-58. First, the Court must decide
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper under
Georgia's long-arm statute. Id. Next, the Court must determine
whether there are sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum
state to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Id.; Int'l Shoe Co. V. Washington Office of

Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that 'the Georgia long-arm
statute does not grant courts in Georgia personal jurisdiction
that is coextensive with procedural due process," but instead
"imposes independent obligations that a plaintiff must establish
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction that are distinct from
the demands of procedural due process." Diamond Crystal Brands
Inc., 593 F.3d at 1259.
limitations and requirements

'[C]ourts must apply the specific
of O.C.G.A. 9-10-91 literally and

must engage in a statutory examination that is independent of,
and distinct from, the constitutional analysis to ensure that

6

both, separate prongs of the jurisdictional inquiry are
satisfied." Id. at 1263.

III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that this Court should dismiss this case
pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because Defendant is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Georgia. In support of this argument,
Defendant contends that it does not maintain any offices in the
state of Georgia and does not have any employees who reside in
Georgia. (McGivern Aff. ¶ 5.) Moreover, Defendant asserts that
it is not domesticated in or authorized to do business in
Georgia and does not manufacture goods in Georgia. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Finally, Defendant contends that it does not regularly do or
solicit business in Georgia and does not derive a substantial
portion of its income from Georgia.' (Id. 9[1 7, 8.)
Plaintiff, however, asserts that this Court has personal
jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to subsections (1) , (2) and
(3) of the Georgia long-arm statute. Plaintiff argues that a
number of factors support the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Defendant. These factors include: (1) Defendant contracted
with a Georgia resident, (2) Defendant advertises its products
in catalogs that are distributed in Georgia, (3) Defendant
1

According to Defendant, only about 1% of its sales are made to
Georgia residents.

7

attends drag races in Georgia and regularly promotes its
products at these races, (4) Defendant maintains a facility in
McDonough, Georgia, and (5) Plaintiff incurred medical expenses
in Georgia

.2

Moreover, Plaintiff claims that exercising personal

jurisdiction over Defendant comports with the due process
requirements of the United States Constitution.
A. Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Georgia Long-Arm
Statute

As noted above, to determine whether it can exercise
personal jurisdiction, the Court must first examine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper under Georgia's
long-arm statute.
1.

Subsections (2) and (3) of the Long-Arm Statute

Plaintiff asserts that this Court has personal jurisdiction
over Defendant pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) of the
2

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant garners substantial revenue from
the sale of its products to Georgia residents. In support of this argument,
Plaintiff employs a self-created "formula" for calculating Defendant's
revenue from sales to Georgia residents. Specifically, using this "formula,"
Plaintiff asserts that "based on the fact that Georgia is the ninth (gt) most
populated state; that Georgia's population is 9,687,663 or over 3% of the
total population of the United States; and based upon the popularity of
racing of all types in Georgia, Plaintiff] believes that [Defendant] has
more than sufficient contacts with the state of Georgia" to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. (Thomas Aff [ 8.)
The Court did not utilize Plaintiff's "formula" when considering
Defendant's contacts with the state because the "formula" is based solely on
conjecture. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence substantiating his
calculations. Moreover, Plaintiff relied on his "formula" because "without
discovery, he [could not] say with certainty . . . what percentage of
[Defendant's] sales occur with residents of Georgia." (Id.) If Plaintiff
believed that a substantial amount of Defendant's sales came from Georgia
residents, he was free to explore that assertion by conducting jurisdictional
discovery. Because he failed to take advantage of the limited discovery
period or supplement his briefs, the Court is unwilling to consider his
unsubstantiated "formula" when determining whether Defendant derived
substantial revenue from the state of Georgia.

8

Georgia long-arm statute. Under subsection (2), a nonresident
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia if it
"commits a tortious act or omission within this state."
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2). plaintiff suggests that because the Rear
End was defective when shipped to Georgia, the act occurred in
Georgia. The Court does not agree. The clear language of
subsection (2) requires that the nonresident defendant commit a
tortious act in

the state of Georgia. O.C.G.A.

9-10-91(2). A

tortious act occurs "where the allegedly negligent act or
omission was made . . - •" Atlanta Propeller Svc., Inc. v.
Hoffman GMBH & Co. KG, 191 Ga. App. 529, 530 (1989); See also
Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 130 (1987)

(reinstating the

difference between subsections (2) and (3) established by the
literal language of the long-arm statute).

Here, the alleged

negligent act occurred in Illinois where the Rear End was
manufactured. Therefore, shipping a defective product to
Georgia is not a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction
under subsection (2)
Plaintiff also contends that personal jurisdiction is
proper under subsection (3) of the long-arm statute. Pursuant
to subsection (3) , personal jurisdiction exists if the defendant
"commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or
omission outside this state if the tortfeasor regularly does or
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of

9

conduct . . . in this state." O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3). In
support of his claim that subsection (3) applies, Plaintiff sets
forth numerous factors to establish that Defendant engaged in a
persistent course of conduct in Georgia. The Court, however,
need not address these factors because Defendant did not commit
a tortious injury in Georgia, and therefore subsection (3) is
inapplicable.
Plaintiff contends that the injury occurred in Georgia
because he underwent medical treatment in the state following
his accident and therefore suffered an economic injury in
Georgia. This argument is without merit. The Georgia Court of
Appeals has held that a tort occurs where the actual injury
takes place and not where the economic consequences of the
injury arise. Gee, 259 Ga. App. at 897 (citing Atlanta
Propeller Svc., Inc, 191 Ga. App. at 530); see also Turley v.
Vaudeville Café, LLC, No. 1:10-cv-2284, 2011 WL 3844361, at *2
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 26. 2011) (holding no personal jurisdiction in
Georgia because plaintiff was served contaminated food in
Tennessee and only suffered economic consequences in Georgia).
Thus, suffering economic consequences in Georgia is insufficient
for purposes of subsection (3).
2.

Subsection (1) of the Long-Arm Statute

Plaintiff also contends that jurisdiction is proper under
subsection (1) of the long-arm statute because Defendant
10

transacted business in the state. The Georgia long-arm statute,
O.C.G.A.

9-19-91, provides in relevant part:

A court of this state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any nonresident or his or her
executor or administrator, as to a cause of action
arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership,
use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in
the same manner as if he were a resident of this
state, if in person or through an agent, he or she:
(1) Transacts any business within this state.
O.C.G.A. § 9-19-91(1). To meet the "transacts any business"
prong of the Georgia long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant
must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in
Georgia. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1260 (citing
Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 517 (2006)).
Based on the record before the Court, it is clear that,
under a literal interpretation of the long-arm statute,
Defendant transacted business in Georgia. Defendant shipped a
product to Georgia and derived revenue from the sale of that
product. Nothing in subsection (1) of the long-arm statute
"requires the physical presence of the nonresident in Georgia or
minimizes the import of a nonresident's intangible contacts with
the State."

Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC. V.

First Nat'l Bank of Ames,

279 Ga.

672,

673-75

(2005)

Therefore, while Defendant lacks a physical presence in Georgia,
its intangible contacts are sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of § 9-10-91(1).
11

B. Constitutional Requirements
Having found that Georgia's long-arm statute permits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction, the Court must now address
the due process component of the jurisdictional analysis. "The
Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in
not being subject to binding judgments imposed by foreign
sovereigns." Diamond Crystal Brands, 593 F.3d at 1267. Due
process requires that (1) a nonresident defendant has certain
minimum contacts with the forum state and (2) the exercise of
jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." Id.
To satisfy the minimum contacts analysis, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that Defendant "purposefully availed" itself to the
protection and laws of the state of Georgia, such that it
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" here. Id.
At the heart of the inquiry is the notion of "fair warning."
Id. The fair warning requirement is met when a nonresident
defendant "deliberately engage[s] in significant activities
within [the forum] state or create[s] continuing obligations
with residents of the forum." Id. at 1268 (citing Burger King
Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480 (1985)). Put differently,
Defendant must purposefully establish contacts with the forum
state, and there must be a significant nexus between those
contacts and the litigation. Id. at 1267.
12

Here, Defendant is a foreign corporation that is not
licensed to do business in Georgia and does not have offices or
employees in Georgia. Although Defendant sold a Rear End to a
Georgia

resident,

this

transaction,

without

more,

is

insufficient to satisfy the due process requirements. In
Diamond Crystal Brands, the Eleventh Circuit noted that entering
a contract with a citizen of another state, standing alone, does
not automatically satisfy the minimum contacts test. See also
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79. Instead, when inspecting the
contractual relationship for minimum contacts, courts must focus
on the substance of the transaction including prior
negotiations, contemplated future consequences, the terms of the
contract, and the actual course of dealing. Id. The focus must
be on whether the nonresident defendant engaged in significant
activities within a state or created continuing obligations with
residents of the forum. Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at
480). This focus ensures that a defendant will not be subject
to jurisdiction based solely on 'random," "fortuitous," or
"attenuated" contacts.

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (citing

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984))
The sale of the Rear End appears to be an isolated
transaction in the state of Georgia. Plaintiff failed to
present any evidence suggesting that Defendant regularly
contracts with Georgia residents.
13

In fact, based on the

evidence before the Court, it does not appear that there were
any direct negotiations or a history of other dealings between
Plaintiff and Defendant. Instead, Plaintiff ordered the Rear
End from Power-Pro's offices in Tennessee, and Power-Pro
contacted Defendant in Illinois. This is not a case where
Defendant reached out to a Georgia resident or had knowledge at
the time of contracting that the product would reach Georgia.
The only portion of the contract that involved the state of
Georgia was the shipment of the product to Plaintiff's principal
place of business in Grovetown, Georgia. Shipment, however,
cannot be the basis for personal jurisdiction. See Francosteel
Corp. v. N/V Charm, Tiki, Mortensen & Lange, 19 F.3d 624, 628
(11th Cir. 1994) (finding that the only connection Defendant had
to Georgia was delivery of cargo in Georgia which is not enough
to establish personal jurisdiction)

(overruled on other

grounds); Baynes v. Mason Funeral Home, No. 1:07-cv-2805, 2008
WL 5191808, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2008) (holding that there
was no specific jurisdiction based on the single contract which
requirement shipment to Georgia).
Construing all justifiable inferences in favor of
Plaintiff, aside from the sale of the Rear End to Plaintiff, the
only contacts Defendant had with the state of Georgia were its
advertisements and the fact that Defendant attended drag races

14

in Georgia.' However, these contacts cited by Plaintiff are
exactly the type of "fortuitous" and "attenuated" contacts that
do not satisfy due process. According to Plaintiff, "[c]atalogs
such as the Summit Catalog advertise the Defendant's parts and
those catalogs are sent to and utilized by Georgia residents."
(Doc. no. 14 at 2.) Defendant presented evidence that while it
does sell some products to Summit, it does not have any
agreement with Summit regarding where its products are sold or
how its products are advertised. (McGivern Supp. Aff. 19{ 3, 5•)
There is nothing to indicate that Defendant pays Summit to
advertise its products and therefore nothing to suggest that
Defendant purposefully directs its advertisements at Georgia
residents or actively solicits sales within Georgia.
Additionally, Defendant admits that it is part of a
National Hot Rod Association ("NHRA") contingency program
Plaintiff claims Defendant maintains a facility in McDonough, Georgia.
Defendant, however, presented evidence that this facility is actually owned
by Autosales,. Inc. d/b/a Summit Racing Equipment ("Summit"), an Ohio
corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio. (Doc. no. 16, Ex.
A.) Defendant has no ownership interest in Summit nor does Summit own any
interest in Defendant. The only relationship between the two companies is
Summit's purchase of Defendant's products. Plaintiff failed to present any
evidence to refute this claim.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that its engineering expert is located
in Columbia, South Carolina and that Defendant had its expert inspect the
vehicle in Columbia County, Georgia. The fact that an engineer is located in
South Carolina is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether personal jurisdiction
is proper in Georgia. Moreover, while Defendant's expert travelled to
Georgia to inspect the vehicle following the accident, the minimum contacts
analysis focuses on the relationship between Defendant and the forum state
prior to the event in question. A subsequent inspection of the vehicle does
not support the assertion that Defendant engaged in significant activities
with the state of Georgia prior to the incident giving rise to the current

Suit.
15

whereby it pays a racer a small contingency fee if the racer
uses Defendant's parts, displays stickers indicating that the
vehicle contains Defendant's parts, and wins a race. (Id. ¶ 9.)
However, this is a nationwide program that is not Georgia
specific, and the only knowledge Defendant has regarding whether
its parts are used at races in Georgia comes after such use when
Defendant is notified by the NHRA that fees are owed to the
drivers.
catalog,

(Id.)

Thus, like the advertisements in the Summit

there is nothing to suggest that Defendant's

participation in the contingency program was an effort to
directly target Georgia residents. Furthermore, Plaintiff
failed to present any evidence establishing a substantial nexus
between Defendant's participation in the contingency program and
the current lawsuit.

As such, the advertisements and

contingency program cannot be the basis of personal
jurisdiction.

See Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp.

2d. 1261, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (finding that defendant's
advertisements did not specifically target Alabama residents and
therefore were not a basis for personal jurisdiction); Baynes,
2008 WL 519808, at *3 (finding that business did not advertise
in Georgia for the purpose of personal jurisdiction when its
name appeared in national funeral home directories)
Moreover, Plaintiff cannot rely on Defendant's attendance
at Georgia drag races to establish personal jurisdiction.
16

Plaintiff stated that Defendant "has it trailers or personnel
present at various races in the State of Georgia . . . marketing
its products." (Thomas Aff. ¶ 6.) However, Defendant rebutted
Plaintiff's broad assertion with evidence that in the last five
years, Defendant only attended one racing event in the state of
Georgia, which occurred in April of 2009. Attending this single
race cannot amount to "significant activity" and thus does not
provide the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy the due
process requirements. 4 Additionally, Plaintiff failed to present
evidence that he purchased the Rear End from Defendant at the
2009 race, or that he learned of Defendant's products at the
race. Thus, even if this one race was enough to satisfy the
minimum contacts analysis, there is no evidence to suggest a
nexus between Defendant's attendance at the 2009 race and the
current lawsuit.
In short, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant's
contacts with Georgia are too attenuated to satisfy the minimum
contacts analysis. To exercise such jurisdiction would violate

It appears from the affidavits before the Court that an employee of
Defendant may have attended a Georgia drag race in April of 2011. To
consider this contact would ignore the concept of specific jurisdiction and
the clear mandate of Georgia's long-arm statute which require that the injury
"arise out of" Defendant's contacts with the state. Because the injury
occurred in the year prior to Defendant's attendance at the 2011 race, it
cannot be said that the injury "arose out of" this contact.
17

Defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .
C.

Transfer Venue

Defendant also requests a transfer of venue to the Middle
District of Florida, the place where the accident occurred.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), even if the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction, it may correct venue and jurisdictional
defects through the transfer of venue. Goldlawr, Inc. v.
Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) ("The language of 29 U.S.C. §
1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of
cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his
case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had
personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.") Therefore,
given the Court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant
Plaintiff asserts that Diamond crystal Brands supports his position
that the court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. It does not. In
that case, the Eleventh circuit found that Defendant established sufficient
minimum contacts "when it purposely carried on a substantial and ongoing
relationship with a Georgia manufacturer, specified delivery by "customer
pickup" in Savannah, and sent payments to Savannah of twelve or fourteen
transactions." Id. at 1268. The Eleventh Circuit further noted that "each
individual transaction involved meaningful contact with Georgia, and, by
purposefully engaging in fourteen transactions in just six months,
[Defendant] established a substantial and ongoing relationship with a Georgia
manufacturer" Id. at 1269. Under the present facts, there is simply no
similar evidence of a substantial and ongoing relationship necessary to
establish personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff also relies on the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Aero
Toy Store. However, the facts of that case are distinguishable from the
present suit. In that case, the court held that while the defendant did not
have officers, employees, offices, or business affiliates in Georgia, and
although it did not derive substantial revenue from Georgia, it regularly
solicited business in Georgia through the internet. Here, there is no
evidence that Defendant solicited business in Georgia. The only evidence of
solicitation is the placement of Defendant's products in the Summit catalogs,
which, as noted above, does not establish that Defendant actively sought out
sales from Georgia residents.

18

and the fact that a substantial part of the events giving rise
to the negligence claim occurred in another state, the case
should be transferred to the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's notion (doc. no. 9)
is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to TRANSFER this action to
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida and CLOSE this case.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this

i.24ay of

March,

2012.

HONGBLE J. RNDAL HALL
UNIT STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOtJ'HERJJ DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

19