Gold Cross EMS, Inc. v. The Children's Hospital of Alabama
Filing
68
ORDER denying Plaintiff Gold Cross EMS, Inc.'s 62 Motion for Reconsideration; and declining Gold Cross's requests for certification to the Georgia Supreme Court or interlocutory review. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 06/01/2015. (jah)
IN THE UNITED
FOR THE
STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
GOLD CROSS EMS,
INC.,
*
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
*
v.
CV
113-081
*
THE
CHILDREN'S
HOSPITAL OF
*
ALABAMA,
*
*
Defendant.
*
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Gold Cross EMS,
("Gold Cross") Motion for Reconsideration
(doc.
Court's Order (doc. 61) granting,
Defendant The Children's
in part,
62)
Inc.'s
following this
Hospital of Alabama's ("CHOA") Motion for Summary Judgment.
alternative,
Gold
Cross
asks
the
Court
to
either
In the
certify
the
question to the Supreme Court of Georgia or certify that the issue
warrants
immediate
Court of Appeals.
interlocutory
review
by
the
Eleventh
Circuit
The facts giving rise to this dispute were fully
set forth in the Court's Order on the summary judgment motion and
so
the
herein,
Court
the
(doc. 62).
does
Court
not
restate
DENIES
Gold
them
here.
Cross's
For
Motion
the
for
reasons
stated
Reconsideration
The Court similarly declines to certify the question to
the Georgia Supreme Court or the issue for interlocutory review.
I.
Motion
for Reconsideration
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a party may
seek to alter or amend a judgment in a civil case within twentyeight days after the entry of the judgment.
a
previous
order
is
%an
sparingly.'"
Williams
N.V. ,
Supp.
320
omitted) .
F.
extraordinary
v.
2d
"[R]econsideration of
remedy,
to
Cruise
Catering
&
1347,
Ships
1358
(S.D.
Fla.
be
employed
Serv.
2004)
Int'l,
(citation
In fact, a motion for reconsideration is not an appeal,
and thus it is improper on a motion for reconsideration to "ask the
Court to rethink what it ha[s] already thought through — rightly or
wrongly."
Above the Belt,
F.R.D.
101
99,
Co.,
No.
and
(E.D. Va.
Vidinliey
5459335,
08-23183,
at
*1
Inc.
v.
Carey
(N.D.
Inc.,
1983), quoted in Weitz Co. v. Transp.
2009 WL 1636125,
v.
Mel Bohannan Roofing,
Int'l,
Ga.
Dec.
15,
at *1
Inc.,
(S.D.
No.
2008).
A
Fla.
June 11,
l:07-cv-762,
99
Ins.
2009)
2008
WL
movant must "set forth
facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to
reverse
F.R.D.
its prior decision."
294,
294
(M.D.
Fla.
Although Rule 59(e)
district
courts
in
this
Cover v.
1993)
Wal-Mart
Stores,
does not set forth the grounds for relief,
Circuit
have
order:
identified
(1)
an
controlling law;
(2)
the availability of new evidence;
e.g. , Ctr.
an
three
of
correct
148
(citation omitted).
reconsideration
need to
Inc.,
intervening
clear error or prevent manifest
for Biological Diversity v.
Hamilton,
that
change
and
F.
in
(3)
injustice.
385
merit
the
See,
Supp.
2d
1330,
1337
P.A.,
(N.D.
153 F.R.D.
Ga.
689,
2005);
694
Sussman
(M.D. Ga.
v.
Salem,
Saxon
&
Nielsen,
1994).
"Motions for reconsideration should not be used to raise legal
arguments which could and should have been made before the judgment
was issued."
Cir.
1998);
1423,
30,
No.
Lockard v.
see
also
Collins
2:09-cv-093,
2013)
("Motions
Equifax,
2013
for
v.
WL
Inc.,
Int'l
393096,
163
F.3d 1259,
at
reconsideration
*1
(S.D.
should
(11th
Ass'n
Longshoremen's
1267
Local
Ga.
not
2013
be
relitigate issues which have already been found lacking."
quotations omitted));
Fla.,
408
F.3d 757,
Rule
59(e)
motion
Michael Linet,
763
to
(11th Cir.
relitigate
Inc. v. Vill.
2005)
old
used
to
(internal
of Wellington,
("[A party]
matters,
Jan.
cannot use a
raise
argument
or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.").
Further,
Rule 59(e)
"is not a vehicle for
rehashing
arguments already rejected by the court or for refuting the court's
prior
decision."
F.R.D.
680,
Gold
Wendy's
686
(M.D. Ga.
Cross
moves
Int'l
v.
Nu-Cape
Constr.,
Inc.,
169
1996).
for
reconsideration
based
on
a
need
to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
"A motion to
reconsider
error
is properly brought
to correct
a
clear
court's interpretation of either the facts or the law.
in the
It should
be used in order to prevent manifest injustice, however it is an
extreme measure, and substantial discretion rests with the court in
granting such a motion."
F.R.D.
697,
698
(M.D.
Medley v.
Ala.
1995)
Westpoint Stevens,
(internal
citations
Inc.,
162
omitted).
"This
ordinarily
where
the
Ryland
requires
interests
Grp.,
of
Inc.,
a
showing
justice
497
F.
(M.D.
Fla.
1996)).
legal issues are
272
F.
Supp.
Assurance Co.
(11th Cir.
^clear
demand
Supp.
2007) (quoting Prudential Sec,
417
of
Inc.
2d
v.
1356,
(N.D.
Ga.
2003)
Inc.,
Fla.
Supp. 415,
if the
(quoting
Am.
763 F.2d 1237,
Home
1239
1985)).
Gold Cross first argues
that a case relied upon by CHOA and the Court,
358
919 F.
S.E.2d
468
contrary result.
(Ga.
However,
Ct.
App.
1987),
Gay v. Piggly Wiggly
actually
supports
In Piggly Wiggly,
plaintiff was injured by the driver of a Piggly Wiggly truck.
Following that injury,
negligent
Physical
appeal,
care
from
Therapy
two
a
the Piggly Wiggly court addressed both a
factually and legally distinguishable issue.
at 469.
v.
United States v. Battle,
To support its claim of clear error,
S. ,
(M.D.
'clear and obvious'
Glenn Estess & Assocs.,
v.
1358
error
McGuire
1358
Emerson,
"An error is not
1354,
obvious
correction.'"
*at least arguable.'"
2d
and
Id.
the plaintiff purportedly received
doctors
Associates,
the
and
Inc.
an
individual
("PTA").
which addressed appropriate venue,
Id.
employed
at
470.
by
The
centered on whether the
defendants were successive rather than joint tortfeasors.
Id.
The
trial court held that Piggly Wiggly was the original tortfeasor and
PTA the
the
successive.
Id.
For
Piggly Wiggly portion of
that
the
reason,
action
to
the
another
The appellants argued that the driver and doctors,
respective
employers,
were
joint
tortfeasors
court
transferred
county.
Id.
as well as their
making
the
original
venue
appropriate.
between
the
In
addressing
tortfeasors,
the
the
Georgia
respective
Court
of
relationships
Appeals
posed
the
following two options as to their employers:
[I]f, under the circumstances of this case, the employees
of Piggly Wiggly and PTA can be considered to be classic
joint tortfeasors as between each other, then Piggly
Wiggly and PTA, as vicarious joint tortfeasors with their
respective employees, can be considered to be classic
joint tortfeasors as between themselves and venue in
Fulton County would be proper. If, on the other hand, the
employees cannot be considered to be
classic
joint
tortfeasors
as
between
each
other,
then
neither
can
Piggly Wiggly and PTA[.]
Id.
at 471.
Gold Cross focuses its attention on this quote and argues that
the
Court
committed
conclusion
on
Factually,
this
contracted
drivers.
two
the
with
clear
contribution
Court
an
was
sets
entities
square.
In
straight
line:
(two
of
relying
issue.
The
with
service
employees
a
on
Court
single
which
it
for
disagrees.
hospital
then
its
selected
that
its
bar,
hired
and
employers.
To
put
the
the relationship between the Piggly
employers
the case at
CHOA
not
the Piggly Wiggly court was presented with
distinction into visual terms,
Wiggly
by
presented
ambulance
In contrast,
distinct
error
and
their
two
employees)
the relationship
Gold
Cross
and
forms
a
is more akin to a
Gold
Cross
in
turn
selected its drivers.
As
options.
quoted
If
above,
the
amongst each other,
the
employees
Piggly
were
Wiggly
court
considered
presented
joint
two
tortfeasors
then their employers could be vicarious joint
tortfeasors.
If the employees were not joint tortfeasors amongst
each other,
then their employers would not be either.
The legal
significance of these two options, however, is materially impacted
by the language that precedes the court's presentation of them:
Accordingly,
in
some
legal
senses,
including
the
satisfaction of constitutional venue requirements, joint
tortfeasors is a somewhat broader concept, embracing more
than merely those individuals whose own, separate acts of
negligence have allegedly produced a single injury and
who have, as among themselves, an independent right of
contribution.
Joint
tortfeasors
is
not
limited to
this
concept of classic joint tortfeasors, but may extend also
to include the concept of vicarious joint tortfeasors.
Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added).
stated in Piggly Wiggly applies to appropriate venue.
court expressly recognized that when addressing venue,
may
expand
vicarious
the
traditional
joint
joint
tortfeasors.
tortfeasor
Expanding
doctrine
the
The law
Indeed, the
the
to
courts
consider
definition
as
it
applies to venue makes sense, as the plaintiff's selection of forum
will necessarily occur prior to any discovery on the merits of a
joint
tortfeasor
Wiggly court
relationship.
did
not
hold that
Importantly,
"vicarious
however,
the
Piggly
joint tortfeasors"
liable amongst each other for contribution,
as
are
that issue was not
before the court.
As
Gold Cross
relied
only
quoted
the
vicariously
on
a
recognizes — and takes
limited
following
liable
classic sense,
portion
language:
employer
are
of
" [A]
not
issue with — this
Piggly
Wiggly.
negligent
xjoint
The
employee
tortfeasors'
Court
Court
and
his
in
the
in that the employer has committed no separate and
distinct
act
of
negligence
and
the
contribution against his employer."
employee
Id.
has
no
right
The Court did not engage
in a factual comparison of Piggly Wiggly and the instant case,
no
such
quoted
cases
comparison
the
logically exists.
above-referenced
supporting the
sentence
Instead,
and
same proposition.
from
relationship"
given
is
a
natural
[CHOA]
that
based
"an
person."
Gold
on
^employee,'
(Doc.
62-1
Gold
Cross's
persuasive.
extremely
Indeed,
Gold
does
Court
number
Cross
as
simply
of
other
contends
that
as it did "not seek
employer/employee
virtually by definition,
at
5
restrictive
Cross
a
an
(citing
Dictionary and Merriam-Webster Dictionary).)
find
the
cited
this rule is inapplicable to the present facts,
contribution
of
The
Court
definition
not
cite
Black's
any
Law
does
of
not
employee
authority to
support the proposition that one company cannot hire another.
To
the
as
contrary,
people.
in
See,
many
e.g. ,
contexts
Nina
courts
Totenberg,
recognize
When
Did
companies
Companies
Become
People? Excavating The Legal Evolution, National Public Radio, July 28,
2014,
http://www.npr.org/2 014/07/28/3 352883 88/when-did-companies-
become-people-excavat ing-the-legal-evolut ion.
reasons,
the
Court
Court's
application
reconsideration
on
finds
of
that
Gold
Piggly
Cross
Wiggly
the
contribution
Cross
directs
issue
For
has
not
was
all
shown
clear
is
not
Court
to
of
these
that
error,
warranted
on
the
and
this
basis.
Next,
sections:
Gold
(1)
the
Restatement
the
(First)
of
two
Restitution
Restatement
and
(2)
the
Restatement (Second) of Agency.
As a preliminary matter, neither
of these sections have been adopted or cited by Georgia courts.
And although Gold Cross argues that because "[n]othing cited by
[CHOA] or the Court demonstrates that these principles have been
rejected by Georgia
explicit
rejection
Restatement
into
courts [,]"
does
accepted
not
(doc.
62-1
convert
Georgia
law,
at 7),
an
such lack of
otherwise
much
less
unutilized
support
an
argument that the Court committed clear error by not relying on it.
In any event,
the Court finds these sections inapplicable to
the facts presented.
As to the Restatement (First) of Restitution,
the cited section provides as follows:
Where two persons were liable in tort for the conduct of
a third person, and neither of them was at fault or, as
between the two, primarily responsible, one of them who
has discharged a liability against them created by the
tortious conduct of such third person is entitled to
contribution from the other of a proportionate share of
expenditures properly made in the discharge of such
liability.
Restatement (First) of Restitution § 99 (193 7) .
To clarify the scope of
this section, the following two examples are provided:
1.
The A and B railroads agree to employ C as station
agent at a station maintained by A and B jointly.
While in the scope of his joint employment,
C
negligently injures D. D obtains judgment against A,
which A satisfies.
A is entitled to contribution from
B.
2.
A,
B
and
attorney
C,
to
creditors
prosecute
of
D,
their
unite
several
in
employing
claims.
In
an
the
course of the proceedings, the attorney is guilty of
malicious abuse of process against D, for which the
creditors are responsible. D brings an action against
C who reasonably defends it after asking A and B to
join in the defense.
which C
A
Id.
. In
satisfies.
Mims
each
must
and
is entitled to contribution from
and from B.
of
these
situations,
with and hire another.
Cross
D obtains a judgment against C
C
allege
that
Johnson.
characterize
the
Thus,
Gold
two
or
more
to apply to the
Cross
Regardless
contract
instant case,
Gold
and
the
CHOA contracted
to
how
of
relationship,
entities
Gold
wishes
record
Cross
now
supports
a
employ
conclusion
that CHOA contracted with Gold Cross for ambulatory services.
evidence
shows
that
CHOA had any part
in
determining
Cross employees would drive the ambulance.
is
thus
services,
more
for
akin
to
a
example.
company
There,
as
to
No
which Gold
The present
situation
that
contracts
for
janitorial
here,
Company A
would contract
with Company B,
who would then assign the work to one or more of
its employees.
Thus,
Restatement
§
the present case falls outside the scope of
99.
Addressing
section states as
the
Restatement
(Second)
of
Agency,
the
cited
follows:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between them, one of two
principals who has made expenditures because of the
conduct of a common agent is entitled to (a) contribution
from the other principal if, as between the two, each was
equally responsible for the agent's conduct,
or
(b)
indemnity from the other principal if the agent's conduct
was the result of a breach of duty to the plaintiff by
the other principal.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 317A(1)
of
this
above
section
language;
to
the
present
(2)
a case
(1958) .
facts,
out of the
To support application
Gold
Court
Cross
cites
(1)
of Common Pleas
the
in
Pennsylvania
liable
for
holding
the
contribution,
holding
that
Eleventh
that
actions
(3)
of
this
one
co-employers
joint
Court's
may be
Circuit
a
Court
the
of
are
jointly and
employee
Order
and
servant
Appeals
of
and
other
two
case
thus
give
rise
to
clear
masters,
addressing
error
subject
Georgia
between a hospital and its wholly-owned subsidiary.
citations
severally
case
and
(4)
to
law
an
contribution
None of these
sufficient
to
support
reconsideration.
Turning first
to the Restatement
section quoted above,
which
again has never been cited with approval by Georgia courts,1 Gold
Cross fails to show how it applies to the facts presented.
a
section out of
particular
the Restatement,
relevance,
is
without
insufficient
any argument
to
support
a
Quoting
as
to
motion
its
for
reconsideration.
Gold
Cross
proposition that
plaintiff
Sleasman
to
v.
additionally
cites
co-employers are
the
extent
Brooks,
32
of
Pa.
the
D.
a
Pennsylvania
case
for
the
jointly and severally liable to
joint
&
employee's
C.3d
187,
195
liability.
(1984).
See
Even
assuming this case is consistent with Georgia law, Gold Cross again
presents no argument as to its application in this case.
1
The First Circuit Court of Appeals cited this Restatement section in
discussion,
Putnam v.
DeRosa,
963 F.2d 480,
485
(1st Cir.
1992);
the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals quoted i t but declined to follow, Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co. , 564 F.2d 22, 226 (7th Cir. 1977) ; a district court in Connecticut
quoted i t in dictum, Dennler v. Dodge Transfer Corp., 201 F. Supp. 431, 439
(D. Conn. 1962); a district court in Oregon cited i t in a footnote and
discussed i t in dictum, Oregon v. Tug Go-Getter, 299 F. Supp. 269, 277 (D.
Or. 1969) ; and a district court in Vermont cited and quoted the section but
did not follow it, St. Johnsbury & Lamobile CO. R.R. v. Canadian Pac. Ry.
Co., 341 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (D. Vt. 1972).
10
Next, Gold Cross cites case law from Georgia that one may be
the servant of two masters.
statement of
the law,
The Court does not disagree with this
but Gold Cross already argued this point in
its summary judgment briefing.
Seeking to relitigate the matter is
inappropriate on a motion for reconsideration.
Finally,
Gold Cross cites a case out of
Court of Appeals
negligent
Cir.
for the proposition that multiple employers of
employee
Healthcare Sys.,
2006)(per
can
Inc.
There,
be
of
the
both
court
the
hospital.
medical
Id.
as
it
case
tortfeasors.
No.
The
06-13444,
Eleventh
where
the
and a
determine
was
a
medical
and
center.
the
two
in
wholly-owned
Stated differently,
a
Reg'1
(11th
however,
is
contribution issue in a
for contribution purposes
center
case,
doctors
whether
Columbus
2006 WL 3406543
Circuit
addressed a
hospital
had to
considered one
that
a
joint
Beck,
curiam).
malpractice
employees
be
v.
clearly distinguishable
medical
the Eleventh Circuit
nurses
Id.
at
entities
light
of
subsidiary
were
*1.
should
the
fact
of
the
the issue before the court was
"whether the same party is being held liable twice for the same set
of acts."
between
Id.
the
At no point did the court address the relationship
employers
and
the
employees,
as
the
nature
of
that
relationship was undisputed.
In sum,
Gold Cross's presentation of
authority in brief does
not demonstrate clear error in the Court's ruling.2
Gold Cross
2
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that Gold Cross could not have
raised these points sooner.
"Motions for reconsideration should not be used
to raise legal arguments which could and should have been made before the
11
repeatedly states that neither the CHOA nor the Court have proven
that the legal theories relied upon are incorrect or that they have
been
rejected
misunderstands
upon
the
the
movant
supporting
2010
under
existing
standard
to
for
at
*1
the
Fla.
v.
and
Stating
proven
meet
in
the
the
herein,
reconsideration
conclusory
legal
high
fashion
theories
burden
at
have
for
a
that
been
relief.
"The
Alejo,
July 2,
Court's opinions are not intended as mere
revision
Gold
extraordinary
Prescott
(M.D.
law.3
reconsideration.
establish
reconsideration."
WL 2670860,
Georgia
the
Court
Indeed,
rejected
is
For
the
all
"[t]he
subject to
pleasure."
and
is
2:09-cv-791,
first drafts,
litigant's
burden
circumstances
No.
2010).
Cross
Id.
CHOA have
not
insufficient
reasons
to
stated
the Court DENIES Gold Cross's request for reconsideration.
judgment was issued."
Lockard, 163 F.3d at 1267.
Gold Cross asserts that
its argument could not have been made before because CHOA raised the issue
for the first time in a reply brief.
Following CHOA's reply brief, Gold
Cross did not file a notice of intent to file a sur-reply, and instead left
CHOA with the last word on this issue.
As the late Judge Edenfield explained
in Pattee v. Georgia Ports Authority:
The proper course [in this district] is to allow new arguments to
be raised in reply briefs, placing the burden on opposing counsel
to identify those new arguments and notify the Clerk pursuant to
Local
Rule
7.6
that
a
sur-reply
is
forthcoming.
This
is
preferable to refusing to reach valid arguments — many of which
will only be raised again during a trial which itself might be
avoided if the argument is reached-based on a ham-fisted, ones i z e - f i t s - a l l rule.
477 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274-75
3
(S.D. Ga. 2007).
Doc. 62-1 at 7 ("Nothing cited by [Defendant] or the Court demonstrates
that these principles have been rejected by Georgia courts."); Id. at 9
("Neither [Defendant] nor the Court has identified any controlling precedent
in this State that rejects the principles of contribution described above.");
Doc.
65
at
3
("As
[Defendant] cites no
to
the merits
of the motion
for
authority whatsoever which supports
contribution is unavailable.").
12
reconsideration,
its theory that
II.
Certification to the Georgia Supreme Court
Alternatively, Gold Cross asks the Court to certify the issue4
to
the
Georgia
Supreme
Court.
courts
to
certify questions
Court
if
"there
decisions[.]"
obligatory,
U.S.
no
however,
state
the
390-91
law
law
to
controlling
§ 15-2-9(a).
and "[i]ts use
of
386,
of
clear
O.C.G.A.
sound discretion
416
are
Georgia
federal
in
In
district
the Georgia Supreme
precedents
in
a given case
rests
Lehman Bros,
this
regard,
v.
the
the
is
Certification
court."
(1974).
authorizes
not
in
the
Schein,
Eleventh
Circuit's
practice
has
been
to
resort
to
certification
"with
restraint" upon consideration of the following factors:
"The most important [factors] are the closeness of the
question and the existence of sufficient sources of state
law . . . to allow a principled rather than conjectural
conclusion.
But also to be considered is the degree to
which considerations of comity are relevant ....
And
we must also take into account practical limitation of
the certification process."
City of Rome v. Hotels.com,
2013)
L.P.,
549 F. App'x 896,
904
(11th Cir.
(quoting Escareno v. Noltina Crucible & Refractory Corp.,
F.3d 1456,
To
merely
1461
(11th Cir.
support
its
conjectural,
1998)).
contention
Gold
139
Cross
that
relies
the
on
Court's
the
conclusion
same
arguments
was
it
presented in support of reconsideration — that the Court improperly
applied Piggly Wiggly and that the Restatement provisions dictate a
contrary
4
result.
Gold
Cross
maintains
that
because
"[n]either
Gold Cross asks the Court to certify the following question: u[W]hether
Georgia law permits contribution between two employers or principals
persons engaged in a joint venture) who may be vicariously liable for
acts or omissions of joint employees or agents."
(Doc. 62-1 at 9.)
13
(or
the
[CHOA]
nor the Court has identified any controlling precedent that
rejects
the
principles
appropriate.
of
contribution,"
(Doc. 62-1 at 9.)
certification
is
However, Gold Cross presents (1) a
distinguishable Georgia Court of Appeals case already cited by the
Court
and
(2)
Restatement
sections
and
cases
that
are
either
factually distinguishable or have not been recognized in Georgia.
To
base
the
Court's
distinguishable
decision
authority would
on
unrecognized
result
or
in precisely
factually
the
conjecture the certification doctrine seeks to avoid.
sort
Instead,
of
the
Court based its analysis on a principled application of existing
Georgia case law.
not
transformed
conclusion
Stated differently,
from
a
simply because
principled
the
Court
the Court's reasoning is
decision
chose
to
not
a
to
conjectural
rely on
legal
theories that have either not been recognized in this state or that
do not apply to the facts presented.
As such,
certification to the
Georgia Supreme Court would be inappropriate.
III.
Interlocutory Review
Gold Cross finally asks this Court to include a certification
under
28
question
U.S.C.
of
law
§ 1292
that
as
which
to
the
order
there
is
"involves
a
substantial
controlling
ground
for
difference of opinion and that immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."
enacting this section,
sparingly and
"only
in
In
Congress clearly intended for it to be used
exceptional
14
cases
where
a
decision
of
the
appeal
may
avoid
protracted
antitrust
and
would
dispositive
be
and
expensive
similar protracted cases,
of
the
litigation,
where a
litigation
is
2434,
reprinted
interlocutory
in
review
1958
is
U.S.C.C.A.N.
not
intended
where
For all of
the reasons described above,
there
5260.
there
question as to the correctness of the ruling[.]"
and
S. Rep. No.
5255,
in
question which
raised
serious doubt as to how it should be decided [.]"
as
is
85-
Indeed,
exists
a
"mere
Id.
both in reference to
the motion for reconsideration and the request for certification to
the
Georgia
Supreme
Court,
the
Court
finds
that
interlocutory
review under § 1292 is not warranted in this matter.
IV,
Based on the foregoing,
(Doc.
62)
requests
is
for
hereby
DENIED,
certification
CONCLUSION
Gold Cross's Motion for Reconsideration
and
the
to
the
Court
DECLINES
Georgia
Gold
Supreme
Cross's
Court
or
interlocutory review.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta,
Georgia,
this
/
day of June,
2015.
HONORABBE J.
RANDAL HALL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DISTRICT
15
OF
GEORGIA
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