M.I.T., Inc., v. Medcare Express, N. Charleston, LLC et al
Filing
12
ORDER granting the Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Default Judgment; instructing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Medcare Express N. Charleston in the sum of $115,731.67, and against Defendant Medcare Urge nt Care Center in the sum of $147,231.67, and against Defendant Medcare Express Lexington in the sum of $165,231.67; and, directing the Clerk to terminate all deadlines and motions, and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 10/14/2014. (jah)
IN THE
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF
COURT
FOR THE
GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
M.I.T.,
INC.,
a Georgia Corporation,
Plaintiff,
CV 114-081
v.
MEDCARE EXPRESS, N. CHARLESTON,
LLC, a South Carolina Limited
Liability Company,
and
MEDCARE URGENT CARE CENTER,
W. ASHLEY, LLC, a South
Carolina Limited Liability
Company,
and
MEDCARE EXPRESS LEXINGTON,
a
LLC,
South Carolina Limited
Liability Company,
Defendants.
ORDER
Presently
for
Default
below,
pending
before
the
Court
(Doc.
9.)
For
Judgment.
is
the
Plaintiff's
reasons
Motion
set
forth
Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.
I.
This
Defendants
dispute
arises
regarding
the
BACKGROUND
from a
sale
contract
and
between
service
of
Plaintiff
medical
and
imaging
(Compl. % 6-10.)
equipment.
selling
and
servicing
the
Plaintiff
imaging
is in the business of
equipment,
and
provide medical services to the general public.
2010,
Radwin S.
Hallaba,
Defendant companies,
M.D.,
who owns
Defendants
(Id. 1 6.)
and manages
the
In
three
spoke with Plaintiff regarding the purchase
of CT Imaging Equipment,
along with service for those machines.
(Id. H 7.)
The present dispute regards contracts entered into by all
three Defendants;
were
entered
the contract terms are identical,
into
on
different
dates.
(Id.
H
though they
8-10.)
Each
contract provided for the purchase of the CT machine and thirtysix months of service for that machine.
$150,000 for Medcare Express,
N.
(Id.)
The machine cost
Charleston and Medcare Urgent
Care Center, but $160,000 for Medcare Express Lexington.
The monthly service fee was $4,500 for each Defendant.
On October
1,
2010,
Plaintiff
quoted Medcare
(Id.)
Express,
Charleston for the purchase and service of the machine.
8.)
In response,
equipment
and
months unpaid.
Medcare Express,
eleven
(Id.)
months
of
N.
(Id.)
(id.
N.
H
Charleston paid for the
service,
leaving
twenty-five
On May 15, 2011, Plaintiff quoted Medcare
Urgent Care Center for the purchase and service of the machine.
(Id. H 9.)
In response, Medcare Urgent Care Center paid for the
equipment and four months of service,
leaving thirty-two months
unpaid.
Plaintiff
(Id.)
On
January 5,
2012,
quoted Medcare
Express Lexington for the purchase and service of
(Id. H 10.)
equipment
leaving
the
machine.
In response, Medcare Express Lexington paid for the
but
has
yet
thirty-six
complaint,
it
to
pay
months
alleges
any
of
unpaid.
that
the
service
(Id.)
Defendants,
on
In
payments,
Plaintiff's
multiple
occasions,
acknowledged their debt under the service agreement via e-mail.
(Id.
H 12.)
event
of
The contracts additionally provided that,
default,
Plaintiff
all Service Obligations
due
under
provided
th[e]
service
Defendants'
may
request.
the
(Compl.,
equipment
Exs.
to
or
otherwise
Subsequently,
June 17, 2014,
Procedure
and
Plaintiff
Defendants,
Plaintiff filed suit
upon
seeking to compel
and quantum meruit.
Defendants waived service on May 6,
answers were due May 26,
plead
2-4.)
all
arbitration and/or for breach of contract
1.)
Agreement
(Id. H 13.)
On March 25, 2014,
(Doc.
this
and accelerate all remaining payments
Agreement."
for
"terminate
in the
2014.
respond
(Doc.
to
3.)
the
2014, and their
Defendants failed to
Complaint.
(Doc.
8.)
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Default Judgment on
asserting that,
55(b),
the
Court
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
should
against Defendants on its claims.
enter
(Doc.
9.)
a
default
judgment
II.
DISCUSSION
w[D]efendant's default does not
in
entering
basis
in
the
defendant
or
to
a
default
judgment.
pleadings
for
a
in itself warrant the court
There
judgment
conclusions
Houston Nat'l Bank,
defendant,
of
law."
515 F.2d 1200, 1206
by his default,
matters
judgment:
(1)
Pitts ex rel.
1356
A.
a
entered
Nishimatsu
sufficient
....
The
[are]
essential
jurisdiction;
Pitts v.
(S.D. Ga.
Constr.
(5th Cir.
Co.
1975).x
v.
A
is only deemed to have admitted the
"plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of
1353,
be
is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded
admit
distinct
must
(2)
in
fact."
Id.
considering
liability;
Seneca Sports,
and
Inc.,
"[T]hree
any
(3)
default
damages."
321 F.
Supp.
2d
amount
in
2004).
Jurisdiction
The
parties
in
this
case
controversy exceeds $75,000.
are
Carolina
Complaint
limited
alleges
liability
and
the
Thus, the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
The
diverse
§ 1332.
that
the
Defendants
companies.
(Compl.
are
1f
2.)
South
To
determine whether nonresident defendants are subject to personal
jurisdiction
analysis.
1
in
Georgia,
Diamond
Crystal
the
Court
Brands,
must
Inc.
v.
perform
Food
a
two-part
Movers
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207
Int'l,
(11th Cir.
1981) (holding Fifth Circuit decisions made on or before September 30, 1981,
are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
Inc.,
must
593 F.3d 1249,
decide
1257-58
whether
the
(11th Cir.
exercise
of
2010) .
personal
proper under Georgia's long-arm statute.
must
determine
with the
forum state
Fourteenth
U.S.
310
whether
Amendment.
the
of
to
Columbia
Contractual
v.
of
Nalley
(Ga. Ct. App. 1993) .
the
Second,
the Court
"minimum
contacts"
Int'l
Shoe
Process
Co.
legal arrangements"
in
the
Clause of
the
Washington,
v.
Equipment
jurisdiction of
County,
326
Management
and
as
these,
jurisdiction,
Equip.
Leasing,
are
the
State
or
(Doc.
Georgia.
such
1,
Exs.
which
valid
Ltd.,
432
provide
and
Federal
for
context,
their
jurisdiction."
S.E.2d
673,
675
471 U.S. 462 (1985), that wa variety of
exist through which a
parties
controversies
Id.
the
enforceable.
litigant can consent
to personal jurisdiction and explicitly recognized that
commercial
2-4.)
In fact, the Supreme Court held in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
submit
is
sufficient
are
agreed
provisions
consent
Lightsey
jurisdiction
Id.
satisfy the Due
Id.;
parties
Repair Agreements
advance
to
the Court
(1945).
Here,
Courts
there
First,
at
frequently stipulate
for
472
resolution
n.14
within
(internal
"in the
in advance
a
to
particular
quotation
marks
omitted).
Thus,
this
Court
properly
has
both
personal
and
subject matter jurisdiction over the parties.
B. Liability
Based
record,
on
Plaintiff's
and
the
evidence
against Defendants
in
evidence
the
and
that
pleadings
submitted
by
and Owner of M.I.T.,
Under
there
for
the
is
a
substantive,
sufficient
relief
seeks.2
The
as
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
liability
includes
the
to
"(1)
has
broken."
Norton
306
(Ga.
Defendants
the
v.
service.
(Doc.
1,
arbitration,
litigation.
established a
other claims.
(Doc.
claim
breach
1.)
for
A Car
Here,
terms
of
breach
of
the
Sys. ,
contract
(3)
to the
contract
Inc.,
705
being
S.E.2d
the complaint asserts that
the
contracts
and
service
the contracts required Defendants to
of
2-4.)
each
By
sets forth
of
a
resultant damages
thirty-six
Exs.
Plaintiff's Complaint
Rent
price
into
(2)
for
complain about
2010) .
the
purchase
divided
2
to
Specifically,
the
elements
Budget
Ct. App.
$162,000
compel
the
right
breached
agreements.
pay
law,
breach and the
party who
President
Inc.
Georgia
claim are:
(1)
the
cause of action for breach of contract
governing contracts and the affidavit of Rick Player,
305,
in
the Court is satisfied that the well-pleaded allegations
of the Complaint state a
basis
allegations
contract,
Because
breach of
the
CT
machine
virtue
(2)
pay
installments
monthly
for
of
several claims quantum
Court
contract,
is
it
and
their
an application to
meruit,
and
satisfied
that
need
not
default,
for
costs
Plaintiff
address
of
has
Plaintiff's
Defendants
have
admitted
that
they
have
not
maintained
monthly payments in accordance with the contract.
the
Court finds
the
complaint
damages
that,
and
resulting
based on
record
from
Accordingly,
the well-pleaded allegations
evidence,
their
the
Defendants
breach of
the
are
liable
purchase
in
for
contracts
and service agreements.
C.
Damages
Notwithstanding the propriety of default
Defendants,
it
remains
incumbent
on
judgment against
Plaintiff
to
prove
its
damages.
"While well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed
admitted,
plaintiffs'
allegations
relating
to
damages are not admitted by virtue of default;
must
determine
Whitney Nat'l
4702916,
at
*3
both
Bank
there
is
a
see
" [a]
Inc.
amount
Flying
Ala.
legitimate
Anheuser Busch,
2003);
v.
(S.D.
judgment context,
the
4,
2011).
No.
of
damages."
11-0249,
Even
basis
v.
for
Philpot,
any damage
2011
in the
the
award
317 F.3d 1264,
default
that
enters."
(11th Cir.
(explaining that
judgment only if
for
it
WL
Movement Against Racism &
(11th Cir. 1985)
basis
1266
of
the court
court has an obligation to assure
awarded on default
reflects
amount
rather,
character
LLC,
also Adolph Coors Co. v.
may be
adequately
Tuna,
Oct.
the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544
damages
and
the
the
award).
the
record
However,
a
judicial determination of damages is unnecessary where the claim
is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be
made
certain.
1353,
1364 n.27
F.3d 1225,
1231
Here,
of
See
the
(11th Cir.
(11th Cir.
Plaintiff
contracts
purchase
Chudasama
of
has
at
(Doc.
Charleston
following
Urgent
Center
well
Exs.
thirty-two
Court
123
F.3d
v. Smyth,
with
contract
as
a
2-4.)
420
thirty-six
As
months,
but
above,
Medcare
failed
to
but
totaling
failed
the
service
each
Express
pay
$112,500.00.
payments,
months,
for
month
discussed
totaling
four
documentation
provided
service agreement.
months,
made
the
Each
eleven
twenty-five
Care
following
paid
Corp.,
see also S.E.C.
provided
Defendant has breached the
N.
Motor
2005).
as
1,
Mazda
1997);
issue.
equipment,
agreement.
v.
the
Medcare
to
$144,000.00.
pay
the
Finally,
Medcare Express Lexington has not made a single payment,
though
service was provided, equaling $162,000.00 in damages.
Plaintiff also requests attorney's fees, as provided for in
the
contracts.
Georgia
law
allows
for
the
collection
of
litigation expenses where "the defendant has acted in bad faith,
has
been
stubbornly
unnecessary
trouble
September 29,
regarding
2014,
any
litigious,
and
affidavit
(Doc.
11.)
has
expense[.]"
caused
O.C.G.A.
the
§
plaintiff
13-6-11.
On
this Court requested detailed documentation
attorney's
counsel for Plaintiff.
an
or
as
well
In
these
fees
(Doc.
as
incurred
10.)
invoices
records,
Mr.
8
by
Robert
In response,
and
billing
Lowe
Mr.
J.
Lowe filed
account
asserts
Lowe,
that
records.
he
spent
36.05
hours
Plaintiff
on
paid
$11,215.00.
the
$400
(Doc.
"The
matter,
in
11,
starting
at
filing
Ex.
$300.00
fees
per
and
hour,
other
and
costs,
that
totaling
1.)
point
for
determining
the
amount
of
a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate."
Wrap
It
Up,
(quotations
Inc.,
548
omitted)
F.3d
(noting
1348,
that
1350
courts
(11th
may
Bivins v.
Cir.
2008)
consider
twelve
factors in determining the reasonableness of hours and rates3) .
The product of these two figures is the
calculating the lodestar,
"lodestar."
F.2d 1292,
151 F. Supp.
1302
(11th Cir.
2d 1364,
After
the Court may then consider whether it
should be adjusted upwards or downwards.
836
Id.
1369
1988);
(N.D. Ga.
Norman v. Hous.
Lambert v.
2000).
Auth.,
Fulton Cnty.,
"The fee applicant
bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the
appropriate hours and hourly rates."
3
The
twelve
factors
are:
(1)
the
Norman,
time
and
83 6 F.2d at 13 03.
labor
required;
(2)
the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform
the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances;
(8)
the
amount
involved
and
the
results
obtained;
(9)
the
experience,
reputation,
and
ability
of
the
attorneys;
(10)
the
"undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
F.3d at
1350
n.2.
and (12)
awards in similar cases.
Bivins,
548
i.
Reasonable Hourly Rate
"A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in
the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skills,
at 1299.
The "going rate"
experience,
and reputation."
Id.
in the community is the most critical
factor in setting the fee rate.
Martin v. Univ.
F.2d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1990).
The relevant legal community is
the district in which the court sits.
Supp.
Air
1022,
1027 n.l
944
Force,
Court
is
(N.D. Ala.
804,
F.2d
itself
community,
it
considered
may
independent judgment.
(11th
an
consult
Knight v. Alabama,
1993)
808
Cir.
own
911
824 F.
(citing Turner v. Sec'y of
expert
its
of S. Ala.,
on
1991)).
hourly
experience
Because
rates
in
the
in
the
forming
an
Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303.
Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $300.00 per hour.
This
Court has previously approved $250.00 per hour as a reasonable
billing
rate
Consumer
Nov.
171
6,
Law
in
the
Group
2012);
Ruben
Doc.
Chevrolet,
6, 2009).
et
al. ,
Johnson v.
(S.D. Ga. Apr.
l:09-cv-021,
Augusta
No.
(S.D.
Inc.,
No.
Ga.
market.
l:ll-cv-187,
YKK Am.,
29, 2010);
39
legal
Inc.,
No.
See
Doc.
91
Guzman
(S.D.
3:07-cv-048,
v.
Ga.
Doc.
Ingram v. Kellogg's Sales Co., No.
Feb.
24,
l:06-cv-195,
2010);
Doc.
Salazar v.
86
(S.D.
Milton
Ga.
Mar.
Upon consideration of the circumstances of this case,
the
relevant
legal
and
recognizing
market,
that
two
counsel's
years
10
have
experience
passed
and expertise,
since
the
above
mentioned cases,
hour for Mr.
the billing rate will be set at $275.00 per
Lowe.
ii.
Hours Reasonably Expended
While exercising proper "billing judgment,"
exclude
excessive,
redundant,
from fee applications.
(11th
Cir.
1999).
unreasonable
reputation,
"[A]
to
otherwise
unnecessary
ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes,
"[H]ours
bill
or
a
excluded
client"
are
without
or experience of counsel.
attorneys must
hours
168 F.3d 423,
those
that
reference
Norman,
would
to the
428
be
skill,
836 F.2d at 1301.
lawyer may not be compensated for hours spent on activities
for which he would not bill a client of means who was seriously
intent on vindicating similar rights,
recognizing
that
in the
private sector the economically rational person engages in some
cost benefit analysis."
Plaintiff
with one
has
Id.
met
exception.
its
Two
burden with regard to
entries
reflect
time
hours
Mr.
billed
Lowe
spent
addressing this Court's September 29, 2014 Order (Doc. 10).
award
in
this
case
is
only
for
time
spent
on
the
The
underlying
complaint and default judgment, not the September 29, 2014 Order
requiring
Thus,
supplemental
these
Accordingly,
time
the
$275.00/hour at
the filing fees,
information
entries
Court
will
finds
33.8 hours,
be
the
or
regarding
excluded
lodestar
$9,295.00.
in
attorney's
from
the
this
case
fees.
award.
to
be
Taking into account
the total award of fees and costs is $9,695.00,
11
which
shall
be
divided
equally
among
the
three
co-defendants,
each being responsible for $3,231.67.
IV.
Based
judgment
upon
(doc.
the
9)
CONCLUSION
foregoing,
Plaintiff's
is GRANTED.
motion
for
default
The Clerk is instructed to enter
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the sum
of
$115,731.67
from
Medcare
Express
from
Urgent
Medcare
Care
Lexington.
The
deadlines and motions,
ORDER ENTERED
October,
Express
Center,
Clerk
N.
and
is
Charleston,
$165,231.67
DIRECTED
to
$147,231.67
from
Medcare
TERMINATE
all
and CLOSE this case.
at Augusta,
Georgia,
this
li*^ day of
2014.
Honorable J.
Randal
Hall
ilnifeea States District Judge
Southern District of Georgia
12
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