M.I.T., Inc., v. Medcare Express, N. Charleston, LLC et al

Filing 12

ORDER granting the Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Default Judgment; instructing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Medcare Express N. Charleston in the sum of $115,731.67, and against Defendant Medcare Urge nt Care Center in the sum of $147,231.67, and against Defendant Medcare Express Lexington in the sum of $165,231.67; and, directing the Clerk to terminate all deadlines and motions, and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 10/14/2014. (jah)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF COURT FOR THE GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION M.I.T., INC., a Georgia Corporation, Plaintiff, CV 114-081 v. MEDCARE EXPRESS, N. CHARLESTON, LLC, a South Carolina Limited Liability Company, and MEDCARE URGENT CARE CENTER, W. ASHLEY, LLC, a South Carolina Limited Liability Company, and MEDCARE EXPRESS LEXINGTON, a LLC, South Carolina Limited Liability Company, Defendants. ORDER Presently for Default below, pending before the Court (Doc. 9.) For Judgment. is the Plaintiff's reasons Motion set forth Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. I. This Defendants dispute arises regarding the BACKGROUND from a sale contract and between service of Plaintiff medical and imaging (Compl. % 6-10.) equipment. selling and servicing the Plaintiff imaging is in the business of equipment, and provide medical services to the general public. 2010, Radwin S. Hallaba, Defendant companies, M.D., who owns Defendants (Id. 1 6.) and manages the In three spoke with Plaintiff regarding the purchase of CT Imaging Equipment, along with service for those machines. (Id. H 7.) The present dispute regards contracts entered into by all three Defendants; were entered the contract terms are identical, into on different dates. (Id. H though they 8-10.) Each contract provided for the purchase of the CT machine and thirtysix months of service for that machine. $150,000 for Medcare Express, N. (Id.) The machine cost Charleston and Medcare Urgent Care Center, but $160,000 for Medcare Express Lexington. The monthly service fee was $4,500 for each Defendant. On October 1, 2010, Plaintiff quoted Medcare (Id.) Express, Charleston for the purchase and service of the machine. 8.) In response, equipment and months unpaid. Medcare Express, eleven (Id.) months of N. (Id.) (id. N. H Charleston paid for the service, leaving twenty-five On May 15, 2011, Plaintiff quoted Medcare Urgent Care Center for the purchase and service of the machine. (Id. H 9.) In response, Medcare Urgent Care Center paid for the equipment and four months of service, leaving thirty-two months unpaid. Plaintiff (Id.) On January 5, 2012, quoted Medcare Express Lexington for the purchase and service of (Id. H 10.) equipment leaving the machine. In response, Medcare Express Lexington paid for the but has yet thirty-six complaint, it to pay months alleges any of unpaid. that the service (Id.) Defendants, on In payments, Plaintiff's multiple occasions, acknowledged their debt under the service agreement via e-mail. (Id. H 12.) event of The contracts additionally provided that, default, Plaintiff all Service Obligations due under provided th[e] service Defendants' may request. the (Compl., equipment Exs. to or otherwise Subsequently, June 17, 2014, Procedure and Plaintiff Defendants, Plaintiff filed suit upon seeking to compel and quantum meruit. Defendants waived service on May 6, answers were due May 26, plead 2-4.) all arbitration and/or for breach of contract 1.) Agreement (Id. H 13.) On March 25, 2014, (Doc. this and accelerate all remaining payments Agreement." for "terminate in the 2014. respond (Doc. to 3.) the 2014, and their Defendants failed to Complaint. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff filed its Motion for Default Judgment on asserting that, 55(b), the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil should against Defendants on its claims. enter (Doc. 9.) a default judgment II. DISCUSSION w[D]efendant's default does not in entering basis in the defendant or to a default judgment. pleadings for a in itself warrant the court There judgment conclusions Houston Nat'l Bank, defendant, of law." 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 by his default, matters judgment: (1) Pitts ex rel. 1356 A. a entered Nishimatsu sufficient .... The [are] essential jurisdiction; Pitts v. (S.D. Ga. Constr. (5th Cir. Co. 1975).x v. A is only deemed to have admitted the "plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of 1353, be is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded admit distinct must (2) in fact." Id. considering liability; Seneca Sports, and Inc., "[T]hree any (3) default damages." 321 F. Supp. 2d amount in 2004). Jurisdiction The parties in this case controversy exceeds $75,000. are Carolina Complaint limited alleges liability and the Thus, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. The diverse § 1332. that the Defendants companies. (Compl. are 1f 2.) South To determine whether nonresident defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction analysis. 1 in Georgia, Diamond Crystal the Court Brands, must Inc. v. perform Food a two-part Movers See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 Int'l, (11th Cir. 1981) (holding Fifth Circuit decisions made on or before September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit). Inc., must 593 F.3d 1249, decide 1257-58 whether the (11th Cir. exercise of 2010) . personal proper under Georgia's long-arm statute. must determine with the forum state Fourteenth U.S. 310 whether Amendment. the of to Columbia Contractual v. of Nalley (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) . the Second, the Court "minimum contacts" Int'l Shoe Process Co. legal arrangements" in the Clause of the Washington, v. Equipment jurisdiction of County, 326 Management and as these, jurisdiction, Equip. Leasing, are the State or (Doc. Georgia. such 1, Exs. which valid Ltd., 432 provide and Federal for context, their jurisdiction." S.E.2d 673, 675 471 U.S. 462 (1985), that wa variety of exist through which a parties controversies Id. the enforceable. litigant can consent to personal jurisdiction and explicitly recognized that commercial 2-4.) In fact, the Supreme Court held in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, submit is sufficient are agreed provisions consent Lightsey jurisdiction Id. satisfy the Due Id.; parties Repair Agreements advance to the Court (1945). Here, Courts there First, at frequently stipulate for 472 resolution n.14 within (internal "in the in advance a to particular quotation marks omitted). Thus, this Court properly has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties. B. Liability Based record, on Plaintiff's and the evidence against Defendants in evidence the and that pleadings submitted by and Owner of M.I.T., Under there for the is a substantive, sufficient relief seeks.2 The as Plaintiff Plaintiff liability includes the to "(1) has broken." Norton 306 (Ga. Defendants the v. service. (Doc. 1, arbitration, litigation. established a other claims. (Doc. claim breach 1.) for A Car Here, terms of breach of the Sys. , contract (3) to the contract Inc., 705 being S.E.2d the complaint asserts that the contracts and service the contracts required Defendants to of 2-4.) each By sets forth of a resultant damages thirty-six Exs. Plaintiff's Complaint Rent price into (2) for complain about 2010) . the purchase divided 2 to Specifically, the elements Budget Ct. App. $162,000 compel the right breached agreements. pay law, breach and the party who President Inc. Georgia claim are: (1) the cause of action for breach of contract governing contracts and the affidavit of Rick Player, 305, in the Court is satisfied that the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint state a basis allegations contract, Because breach of the CT machine virtue (2) pay installments monthly for of several claims quantum Court contract, is it and their an application to meruit, and satisfied that need not default, for costs Plaintiff address of has Plaintiff's Defendants have admitted that they have not maintained monthly payments in accordance with the contract. the Court finds the complaint damages that, and resulting based on record from Accordingly, the well-pleaded allegations evidence, their the Defendants breach of the are liable purchase in for contracts and service agreements. C. Damages Notwithstanding the propriety of default Defendants, it remains incumbent on judgment against Plaintiff to prove its damages. "While well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted, plaintiffs' allegations relating to damages are not admitted by virtue of default; must determine Whitney Nat'l 4702916, at *3 both Bank there is a see " [a] Inc. amount Flying Ala. legitimate Anheuser Busch, 2003); v. (S.D. judgment context, the 4, 2011). No. of damages." 11-0249, Even basis v. for Philpot, any damage 2011 in the the award 317 F.3d 1264, default that enters." (11th Cir. (explaining that judgment only if for it WL Movement Against Racism & (11th Cir. 1985) basis 1266 of the court court has an obligation to assure awarded on default reflects amount rather, character LLC, also Adolph Coors Co. v. may be adequately Tuna, Oct. the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 damages and the the award). the record However, a judicial determination of damages is unnecessary where the claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain. 1353, 1364 n.27 F.3d 1225, 1231 Here, of See the (11th Cir. (11th Cir. Plaintiff contracts purchase Chudasama of has at (Doc. Charleston following Urgent Center well Exs. thirty-two Court 123 F.3d v. Smyth, with contract as a 2-4.) 420 thirty-six As months, but above, Medcare failed to but totaling failed the service each Express pay $112,500.00. payments, months, for month discussed totaling four documentation provided service agreement. months, made the Each eleven twenty-five Care following paid Corp., see also S.E.C. provided Defendant has breached the N. Motor 2005). as 1, Mazda 1997); issue. equipment, agreement. v. the Medcare to $144,000.00. pay the Finally, Medcare Express Lexington has not made a single payment, though service was provided, equaling $162,000.00 in damages. Plaintiff also requests attorney's fees, as provided for in the contracts. Georgia law allows for the collection of litigation expenses where "the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly unnecessary trouble September 29, regarding 2014, any litigious, and affidavit (Doc. 11.) has expense[.]" caused O.C.G.A. the § plaintiff 13-6-11. On this Court requested detailed documentation attorney's counsel for Plaintiff. an or as well In these fees (Doc. as incurred 10.) invoices records, Mr. 8 by Robert In response, and billing Lowe Mr. J. Lowe filed account asserts Lowe, that records. he spent 36.05 hours Plaintiff on paid $11,215.00. the $400 (Doc. "The matter, in 11, starting at filing Ex. $300.00 fees per and hour, other and costs, that totaling 1.) point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Wrap It Up, (quotations Inc., 548 omitted) F.3d (noting 1348, that 1350 courts (11th may Bivins v. Cir. 2008) consider twelve factors in determining the reasonableness of hours and rates3) . The product of these two figures is the calculating the lodestar, "lodestar." F.2d 1292, 151 F. Supp. 1302 (11th Cir. 2d 1364, After the Court may then consider whether it should be adjusted upwards or downwards. 836 Id. 1369 1988); (N.D. Ga. Norman v. Hous. Lambert v. 2000). Auth., Fulton Cnty., "The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates." 3 The twelve factors are: (1) the Norman, time and 83 6 F.2d at 13 03. labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; F.3d at 1350 n.2. and (12) awards in similar cases. Bivins, 548 i. Reasonable Hourly Rate "A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, at 1299. The "going rate" experience, and reputation." Id. in the community is the most critical factor in setting the fee rate. Martin v. Univ. F.2d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1990). The relevant legal community is the district in which the court sits. Supp. Air 1022, 1027 n.l 944 Force, Court is (N.D. Ala. 804, F.2d itself community, it considered may independent judgment. (11th an consult Knight v. Alabama, 1993) 808 Cir. own 911 824 F. (citing Turner v. Sec'y of expert its of S. Ala., on 1991)). hourly experience Because rates in the in the forming an Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303. Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $300.00 per hour. This Court has previously approved $250.00 per hour as a reasonable billing rate Consumer Nov. 171 6, Law in the Group 2012); Ruben Doc. Chevrolet, 6, 2009). et al. , Johnson v. (S.D. Ga. Apr. l:09-cv-021, Augusta No. (S.D. Inc., No. Ga. market. l:ll-cv-187, YKK Am., 29, 2010); 39 legal Inc., No. See Doc. 91 Guzman (S.D. 3:07-cv-048, v. Ga. Doc. Ingram v. Kellogg's Sales Co., No. Feb. 24, l:06-cv-195, 2010); Doc. Salazar v. 86 (S.D. Milton Ga. Mar. Upon consideration of the circumstances of this case, the relevant legal and recognizing market, that two counsel's years 10 have experience passed and expertise, since the above mentioned cases, hour for Mr. the billing rate will be set at $275.00 per Lowe. ii. Hours Reasonably Expended While exercising proper "billing judgment," exclude excessive, redundant, from fee applications. (11th Cir. 1999). unreasonable reputation, "[A] to otherwise unnecessary ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, "[H]ours bill or a excluded client" are without or experience of counsel. attorneys must hours 168 F.3d 423, those that reference Norman, would to the 428 be skill, 836 F.2d at 1301. lawyer may not be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he would not bill a client of means who was seriously intent on vindicating similar rights, recognizing that in the private sector the economically rational person engages in some cost benefit analysis." Plaintiff with one has Id. met exception. its Two burden with regard to entries reflect time hours Mr. billed Lowe spent addressing this Court's September 29, 2014 Order (Doc. 10). award in this case is only for time spent on the The underlying complaint and default judgment, not the September 29, 2014 Order requiring Thus, supplemental these Accordingly, time the $275.00/hour at the filing fees, information entries Court will finds 33.8 hours, be the or regarding excluded lodestar $9,295.00. in attorney's from the this case fees. award. to be Taking into account the total award of fees and costs is $9,695.00, 11 which shall be divided equally among the three co-defendants, each being responsible for $3,231.67. IV. Based judgment upon (doc. the 9) CONCLUSION foregoing, Plaintiff's is GRANTED. motion for default The Clerk is instructed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the sum of $115,731.67 from Medcare Express from Urgent Medcare Care Lexington. The deadlines and motions, ORDER ENTERED October, Express Center, Clerk N. and is Charleston, $165,231.67 DIRECTED to $147,231.67 from Medcare TERMINATE all and CLOSE this case. at Augusta, Georgia, this li*^ day of 2014. Honorable J. Randal Hall ilnifeea States District Judge Southern District of Georgia 12

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