Howard et al v. Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia Commission et al

Filing 35

ORDER that, accordingly, the Defendants' 26 Motion for Reasonable Attorneys' Fees is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs for $15,975.00 in attorneys' fees. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 11/10/2014. (jah)

IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

FOR THE

GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

HENRY D.
SMITH,

EARNEST G.

GLORIA FRAZIER,

WALKER,

IVEY,

HOWARD,

*

THOMAS

KENNETH MARTIN,

*

MELVIN

and ALBERT ROBINSON,

*

JR.,

*

Plaintiffs,

*
*

v.

*

AUGUSTA-RICHMOND COUNTY,

*

GEORGIA,

CV 114-097

*

COMMISSION;

DEKE S.

COPENHAVER, in his official
capacity as Mayor of AugustaRichmond County; and LYNN

BAILEY, in her official capacity

*
*
*
*

as Executive Director of the

*

Richmond County Board of

*

Elections,

*
*

Defendants.

*

ORDER

On May 13,

2014,

this

Court

granted Defendants'

motion to

dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs could not state a cognizable claim
for relief under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
the Court is Defendants' motion for attorneys'

Voting Rights Act,

42 U.S.C.

§ 19731(e),

Now before

fees pursuant to the

and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988,

which the Court hereby GRANTS.

I.

BACKGROUND

On April 18, 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973j to enforce rights under Section 5 of

the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

Specifically,

Plaintiffs
Georgia,

sought

to

Commission

enjoin

Defendants

Augusta-Richmond

("County Commission"),

Deke

S.

County,

Copenhaver,

in

his official capacity as Mayor of Augusta-Richmond County, and Lynn

Bailey,
Richmond

in

her

official

County

Board

capacity

of

as

Elections

Executive

Director

(collectively,

of

the

"Defendants"),

from holding elections for Mayor and the County Commission on May
20,

2014.

In

2011,

§ 21-2-139(a)

the

to

Georgia

move

all

General

federal,

Assembly

state,

amended

and county nonpartisan

elections to the date of the general primary.
However,
charter

this

amendment

provisions

Richmond County is

a

(Compl.

permitted municipalities

regarding

election

O.C.G.A.

dates.

consolidated government

to

^|

follow

(Id.)

17.)
their

Augusta-

and determined that

under its charter it was more appropriate to follow the municipal
election

rules.

(Id.)

Thus,

it

held

time of the November general election,
primary.
In

amended

the

2012

elections

at

the

and not at the time of the

(Id.)
2012,

the

O.C.G.A.

governments

General

§

Assembly

21-2-139(a)

holding

nonpartisan

counties for election purposes,

to

enacted

provide

elections

Act

that

No.

all

should

in

elections

date

of

the

2014

Commission and Mayor from November to July.
Augusta-Richmond

County

Georgia

elections

to

hold

consolidated

be

(Id. H 18.)

the

which

treated

as

so that elections would be held in

conjunction with the state primaries.
changing

719,

was the only

This resulted
for

(Id.)

consolidated

for nonpartisan

offices

the

County

At the time,
government

in

in November.

(Id.)

Georgia submitted Act No. 719 to the Department of Justice

("DOJ")

for preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

(Id. t 19.)

Citing statistics showing minorities are less likely

to vote in July than in November,
December

21,

2012.

(Id.)

the DOJ entered an objection on
Georgia

did

preclearance of Act No. 719 at that time.
On
Shelby

June

25,

County,

Georgia

Ala,

General

statewide

(Compl.

H 23.)
was

v.

and

United

Holder,

then

§ 21-2-132(c).

on

(Doc.

the

March
no.

17,

S.

adopted

Supreme
Ct.

Act

qualifying

Ex.

No.

at

five County Commission

2.)

April

qualifying

and

moving

and

the

to

May.

May

20,

2014

to

Nineteen

seats

The

July

pursuant

Absentee voting began on April 4, 2014.

On

the

decided

(2013).

343,

from

for

2014,
1

judicial

Court

2612

elections

3-7,

seek

(Id.)

States

133

nonpartisan

Subsequently,
held

qualified for

the

Assembly

primary

election

(Id.)

2013,

not

O.C.G.A.
candidates

Mayor's

race.

(Id. at 3.)

18,

2014,

forty-two

days

following

the

two

weeks

following

the

commencement

close

of

of

absentee

voting, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint to enjoin the May 20, 2014
elections.

Plaintiffs
court.

(Doc.

filed

no.

their

(Doc. no.

4.)

1.)

A

motion

few days

for

later on April

appointment

On April 22,

2014,

of

a

21,

2014,

three-judge

this Court entered an

Order setting an expedited briefing schedule.

(Doc. no. 7.)

That

same day, Plaintiffs filed their motion for preliminary injunction.
(Doc.

no.

8.)

Defendants

timely

filed

their

motion

(doc.

no. 17) , response in opposition to Plaintiffs'

to dismiss
motions

for

appointment of a three-judge court (doc. no. 18), and response in

opposition to the preliminary injunction (doc. no. 19) on April 30,
2014.

After

Defendants'

full

briefing

motion

to

on

dismiss,

the

issues,

denied

the

Court

Plaintiffs'

granted

motion

for

appointment of a three-judge court, and denied as moot Plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction.
On

June

24,

2014,

Defendants'

reasonable attorneys'

fees,

7, 2014.

26,

issues,

(Docs.
the

no.

Court

now

reasonable attorneys'

27.)

warranted,
A.

and

responded on July

its

ruling

on

the

motion

motion,

the Court engages in a two

the Court addresses whether attorneys'
then,

because

it

finds

attorneys'

fees

fees

are

it addresses the reasonableness of the fees requested.

Appropriateness of an Award of Attorneys' Fees

U.S.C.

1973j,

and 42

U.S.C.

§ 1983.

Section 19731(e)

1965,

of

Voting Rights Act allows courts to award reasonable attorneys'

to

for

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs raised claims under the Voting Rights Act of

42

for

fees.

First,

appropriate

motion

Having been fully briefed on the

issues

In addressing Defendants'

are

their

to which Plaintiffs

II.

part inquiry.

submitted

prevailing

guarantees
U.S.C.

of

parties
the

in

actions

Fourteenth

and

brought
Fifteenth

under

the

Amendments,

§ 1988 allows prevailing parties to seek attorneys'

actions under Section 1983.

The

standards

of

the

two

the same, and thus the Court addresses them together.

the
fees

voting
and

42

fees in

statutes are

See Dillard

v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000).

While

all a plaintiff must show to receive an award of attorneys'
under these statutes is that he is a "prevailing party",

"quite different equitable considerations" at stake,

fees

given the

fee awards to

prevailing defendants are judged under a different standard.
v.

Vice,

131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213

omitted).

Accordingly,

(2011)

Fox

(internal quotation marks

a district court may award attorneys' fees

to prevailing defendants only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's
action was

(quoting
Comm'n,

frivolous,

unreasonable,

Christianburg
434 U.S.

412,

Garment

421

or

Co.

(1978).

without

v.

foundation."

Equal

Therefore,

Emp't

Id.

Opportunity

to determine whether

attorneys'

fees are appropriate in the above-captioned matter,

Court must

address whether Defendants were prevailing parties and

next

whether

the

action

was

frivolous,

unreasonable,

or

the

without

foundation.

Defendants Were "Prevailing Parties."

i.

"A defendant is a prevailing party if the plaintiff achieves
none of the benefits sought in bringing its
Iowa
Here,

Beef

Processors,

Defendants'

Plaintiffs'

claims

149

F.

motion
dismissed.

to

App'x

831,

dismiss
Thus,

it

lawsuit."
832

was
is

(11th

Pickett v.
Cir.

granted,

clear

2005).

and

the

that

Defendants

Unreasonable,

or Without

are "prevailing parties."
ii.

Plaintiffs' Claim Was Frivolous,
Foundation,

"In determining whether a suit is frivolous,

must

focus on

the

question whether

the case

arguable merit as to be groundless or without

"a district court

is

so

lacking

in

foundation rather

than whether the
Sch.

Bd.

of

claim was ultimately successful.'"

Pinellas

Cnty,

773

F.2d 1182,

(quoting Jones v. Tex. Tech. Univ.,
1981)) .

Critically,

cases

1189

(11th Cir.

656 F.2d 1137,

finding

frivolity

Sullivan v.
1985)

1145 (5th Cir.

generally

involve

motions for summary judgment or motions for involuntary dismissal
where

the

plaintiffs

evidence.

Id.

support

their

stand."

did

Where,

not

support

however,

plaintiffs

factors
noting

and

Eleventh
to

These

Circuit

determine

however

such

that

decisions

factors

must

(2)

a

full-blown

Gainesville,
Sullivan,

In

Ga. ,

of

introduce

an

action

with

any

evidence

on

whether

a

typically

several
is

provide

"be made
"(1)

frivolity

identified

they do not

a

to
not

non-dispositive

frivolous,

"hard and

carefully

fast

case-by-case

the

do

rule[]"

basis."

plaintiff

Id.

established

whether the defendant offered to settle;

whether the trial

held

has

whether

include:

prima facie case;
(3)

"findings

claims

Id.

The

claims,

their

a

and

court dismissed the case prior to trial or

trial

177

on

F.3d

the

949,

merits."

952

Bruce

(11th

Cir.

v.

City

1999)

of

(citing

773 F.2d at 1189).

arguing

that

Plaintiffs'

claim

was

frivolous,

Defendants

point to this Court's Order granting the motion to dismiss, wherein
the Court found that no other court considering the same issues had
found

in

argument

point

to

favor

was

this

of

Plaintiffs'

"implausible."

Court's

three-judge court.

ruling

position

(Doc.

24.)

denying

A three-judge

and

that

Plaintiffs'

Moreover,

Defendants'

Plaintiffs'

court,

request

for

a

as Defendants correctly

assert,

is

unnecessary

where

the

plaintiff's

constitutionally insubstantial or without merit.
Fowler,

152

F.3d

974,

982

Sch.

Bd.,

601

F.2d 859,

U.S.

512,

518

(1973);

In

fact,

this

(D.C.

863

(5th Cir.

Bailey v.

Court

Cir.

held

1998);
1979);

Patterson,

that

claim

See LaRouche v.

Saint

Landry

Goosby v.

369 U.S.

Plaintiffs'

is

Osser,

31,

claim

Parish

33

was

409

(1962).
"clearly

foreclose[d]" by the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County, and
thus

Plaintiffs'

claims

were

constitutionally

insubstantial

and

without merit.

In response,

Plaintiffs assert that they did,

substantial evidence to support their claim.

For one,

in fact, present

The Court disagrees.

Plaintiffs point to a January 17, 2014 letter from Deputy

Legislative Counsel H.

Jeff Lanier to Representative Wayne Howard

in which he concluded that the 2012 DOJ objection was still valid.
Plaintiffs'

County,

other

evidence

relates purely to

the

ruling

in Shelby

in which they allege the Court did not hold or suggest that

objections made after 2 006 were unconstitutional,

but

rather that

the coverage formula could not be used as a basis for preclearance.

This

evidence

opposition
Plaintiffs'

to

is

identical

the

motion

dismiss,

to

that

presented
where

to

this

the

Court

Court

in

held that

claims were "constitutionally insubstantial and without

merit."

Finally,

stating

that

Plaintiffs

to

and

no

seemingly in

courts

have

response

accepted

to

the

Court's

Plaintiffs'

Order

position,

supplied this Court with a recent decision out of

Eastern District

of

County does

apply

not

Virginia which they assert

retroactively.

Page

v.

holds

Va.

that

State

the

Shelby

Bd.

of

Elections,

decision,

et

al.,

No.

however,

3:13-cv-678

simply

(E.D.

that

states

Va.

because

formula was in effect when plans were drawn,

Oct.

7,

2014).

the

That

preclearance

complying with the law

was a valid state interest.

Thus,

under the
and

that

without
Shelby

the Court holds that Defendants'

were prevailing parties

language of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C.
Plaintiffs'

foundation
County.

claims

in

light

were

of

Accordingly,

frivolous,

the

Supreme

attorneys'

fees

§ 1988,

unreasonable,

Court's

and

in

appropriate

are

holding

in

this matter.

B.

Calculation of Attorneys'

Having
addresses

decided

the

that

amount

of

Fees

fees
fees

are
to

be

warranted,

the

awarded.1

Court

This

now

task

is

accomplished by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
by a reasonable billing rate.

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.

(1984); Norman v. Hous.

of Montgomery,

(11th Cir. 1988) .

"lodestar."
Clean Air,

Auth.

886,

836 F.2d 1292,

897
1299

The product of that calculation is called the

Pennsylvania
478 U.S. 546,

In Johnson v. Ga.

v.

563

Del.

Valley

Citizens'

Council

for

(1986).

Highway Express,

Inc., 488 F.2d 714,

717-19

(5th Cir. 1974),2 the Fifth Circuit enumerated twelve factors that

may be considered in calculating a lodestar amount.
Blanchard
1

v.

Bergeron,

489

U.S.

87,

91-92

(1989);

See also
Hensley

v.

Defendants state in their motion that due to electronic filing and the

tight timeline of the case, Defendants did not incur any recoverable costs.
(Doc. 28 at 13.)

2

see Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala.,

661 F.2d 1206,

1207 (11th Cir.

1981) (holding Fifth Circuit decisions made on or before September 30, 1981,
are binding precedent in Eleventh Circuit).
8

Eckerhart,

461 U.S.

424,

434 n.9

the time and labor required,

legal

questions,

(3)

services properly,

the

(4)

in

contingent,

(7)

circumstances,

skill

undesirability

the

the

to

perform

the case,

(5)

(1)

the

legal

the customary fee

whether

the

limitations

imposed

by

amount

involved

and

and ability of

case,

relationship

similar cases.

required

(6)

reputation,
of

factors are:

the preclusion of other employment by the

community,

time

(8)

the experience,

professional

the

These

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the

attorney due to acceptance of

similar work

(1989).

(11)

with

Williams v.

Bd.

the

the

is

the

results

fixed

client,

and
and

or

client

or

obtained,

(9)

the attorney,

nature

of Comm'rs

fee

for

(10)

the

of

the

length
(12)

awards

of Mcintosh Cnty.,

in
938

F. Supp. 852, 857 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 71719) .

i. Hours Reasonably Expended

In determining

the

number of

hours

reasonably expended,

the

Court must consider whether the work sought to be compensated was

"useful

and

of

a

type

ordinarily

necessary

result obtained from the litigation."
(citations

omitted).

"excessive,

redundant,

U.S.

at

434.

Courts

or

must

otherwise

Del.

to

secure

Valley,

exclude

final

478 U.S. at 561

hours

unnecessary."

the

that

Hensley,

were

461

Defendants provided extensive records of the following hours
worked by Anne Lewis,

Bryan P. Tyson, and John J. Park:

Lewis:

21.6 hours

Tyson:

27.8 hours

Park:

14.5 hours

After reviewing the attached affidavits and extremely detailed

billing records provided by Defendants,
requested hours
attorneys.

should be

Defendants'

sufficiently,
counsel.

efforts

time

effort.

research

4.8

took

internal

took

conferences

5.8

hours.

hours,

and

expeditiously

took

drafting
7.4

hours,

preparation

of

that
all

three

matter

covered

by

time

the

were
their

spent

in

and other court filings.

time logs,

Specifically,

to

this

considerable

various briefs,

hours,

finds

respect

litigating

enumerate

when comparing the

duplication of

in

and

logs

preparing the pleadings,
Furthermore,

compensated with

competently,

The

the Court

there appears to be no

Defendants
pleadings

took

conferences

the

fee

show that
3 0.8

with

petition

the

legal
hours,
client

took

15.1

Based upon a thorough review of the billing entries,

the

Court finds that the hours expended were reasonable.
i i . Reasonable Hourly Rate

A

reasonable

relevant

legal

rate

is

community

"the

for

prevailing

similar

market

services

rate

by

lawyers

reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation."
836 F.2d at 1299;

see also Blum,

held

rights

that

voting

465 U.S.

attorneys

possess

attorneys practicing in complex areas,
10

at 895-96.

skills

in

the

of

Norman,

It has been

comparable

to

such as antitrust law or

highly
858.

technical

bankruptcy matters.

Moreover,

the

relevant

which the Court sits,

Cir.

community

938

is

F.

the

Supp.

at

district

in

that being the Southern District of Georgia.

See Knight v. Alabama,
(citing Turner v.

legal

Williams,

824 F. Supp.

1022,

1027 n.l (N.D. Ala.

Secretary of Air Force,

944

F.2d 804,

808

1993)
(11th

1991)) .

The party seeking an award of attorney's fees bears the burden

of establishing that the requested rate is reasonable.
U.S.

at 895-96 n.ll;

Norman,

836 F.2d at 1299.

Blum,

465

This burden may be

met by a showing of an attorney's hourly billing rate on cases with
similar complexity and skill.

Knight, 824 F. Supp. at 1028.

Defendants have requested an hourly rate of $250.00/hour per
attorney.

Each requested rate will be evaluated in turn.
a)

Voting

Anne Lewis

Rights

Act

litigation

is,

in

and

extremely complex and intimidating area of the law.
Autauga
1994)

Cnty.

Bd.

("[E]ven

of

the

Educ,
simplest

858 F.

Supp.

1118,

one-person-one-vote

of

itself,

an

See Medders v.
1125

(M.D.

case

Ala.

would

be

formidable to an attorney unfamiliar with the voting rights law.").

As a result,

attorneys practicing in this area must possess much

skill and experience, two qualities that Ms. Lewis enjoys.

Ms. Lewis requests a fee of $250.00 per hour, which the Court
notes is $100.00 per hour less than her standard rate in such
cases, a substantial reduction by all accounts.

In support of that

rate,

she supplied an affidavit that clearly details her twenty-

five

(25)

years

of

experience
11

litigating

matters

including

redistricting and voting rights,

F. Walbert,
Ms.

as well as the affidavit of David

an attorney familiar with Voting Rights Act cases and

Lewis,

who

"significantly

states

less

that

than

a

a

rate

of

^reasonable

$250

per

rate'[.]"

hour

(Walbert

is

Aff.,

Doc. 28, Ex. B H 7.)
A court "is itself an expert on the question and may consider

its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper

fees and may form an

independent judgment either with or without

the aid of witnesses as

to value."

776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994)
Court

has

previously

Loranger v.

approved

Ingram v.
Ga.

Feb.

3:07-cv-048,

l:06-cv-195,
rate

is

2 010);

$250.00

doc.

in

no.

(S.D.

with

line

86

171

No.

per

hour

(S.D.

Mar.

fee

6,

(M.D. Ga. Nov.

and

a

reasonable

April

no.

2009).
in

of

39

This

No.

2010);
(S.D.

Inc.,

other

Inc.,

16, 2006)

specialized nature

doc.

29,

Chevrolet,

awards

See Fisher v. Trutech,

complicated

Ga.

l:09-cv-021,

Ga.

as

This

See Johnson v. YKK Am. ,

Milton Ruben

other

2006 WL 3791977, at *5

the

no.

Salazar v.

complicated cases.

on

doc.

Kellogg's Sales Co.,
24,

10 F.3d

(internal quotation marks omitted).

billing rate in the Augusta legal market.
Inc. , No.

Stierheim,

No.

billing

similarly

5:04-cv-109,

(finding that based

the

ERISA action,

together with the attorney's twenty years or more of experience and

prevailing rates in the Middle District of Georgia, a billing rate
of

$2 00 was reasonable) ; see also Grable v.

No.

l:05-cv-3133,

2007 WL

879584,

at

*5

Gregory J.

(N.D.

Ga.

Barro,

Mar.

20,

PLC,

2007)

(finding the relevant range of billing rates to be $175-$380 per
hour

in

other

cases

from

the

Eleventh
12

Circuit,

including

ERISA

cases).

Upon consideration of the circumstances of this case, the

relevant

legal market, and Ms.

Lewis'

considerable experience and

expertise, her billing rate will be set at $250.00 per hour.
b)

As

John J.

Lewis,

with Ms.

Park

the Johnson

factors addressing the

limitations imposed and complexity of the case are relevant,
the

skill

Alabama

of

Mr.

Park.

Attorney

Mr.

Park has

General's

office

served as

within the

and

currently represents the State of Alabama as outside counsel

in a

Mr.

Park also has

review of Mr.
more

agreed to

twelve

as is

years

significant Voting Rights Act case.

for

counsel

time

(12)

(Walbert Aff. | 6.)
a

fee

of

$250.00

per hour.

A

Park's billing records indicates that such a fee is

than reasonable

for his

expended in this matter.

level of

Thus,

experience and the efforts

the Court determines that a rate of

$250.00 per hour is appropriate.
c)

Mr.
LLP,

Tyson

and

renewal

Bryan P. Tyson

is

an associate with Strickland Brockington Lewis

previously

of

served

the Voting

(Walbert Aff. % 5.)

as

a

Rights Act

policy

in

staffer

the

during

United States

the

2 006

Congress.

Additionally, Mr. Tyson is currently the chair

of the Appellate Practice Section of the State Bar of Georgia and
has
in

seven years'
election

previously

law

experience as
cases.

stated,

the

a litigator,

(Id.)

Court

Thus,

finds

and

that

including involvement
for

the

all

requested

$250.00 per hour is reasonable for Mr. Tyson as well.

13

the

reasons

rate

of

3.

Lodestar

Based on the above,
to be calculated as

the Court finds

the lodestar in this case

follows:

Lewis

$250.00/hour at 21.6 hours

$5,400.00

Park

$250.00/hour at 14.5 hours

$3,625.00

Tyson

$250.00/hour at 27.8 hours

$6,950.00

The total lodestar,
Court

recognizes

therefore,
that

in this case is $15,975.00.3

Defendants

also

request

an

The

additional

$1,125.00 for the 4.5 hours spent responding to Plaintiff's reply
brief.

(Doc.

request

and

31 at 5.)

does

The Court,

not

include

however,

those

4.5

denies the Defendants'

hours

in

its

lodestar

calculation.
IV.

Accordingly,

Defendants' motion for reasonable attorneys'

(doc.

26)

is GRANTED.

favor

of

Defendants

attorneys'

fees

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in

and

against

Plaintiffs

for

$15,975.00

in

fees.

ORDER
November,

CONCLUSION

ENTERED

at

Augusta,

Georgia,

this

/6 cd day of

2 014.

HONORABLE J .

\

RANDAL HALL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
~^SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

3

At this point it is usually necessary to determine whether the lodestar

should

be

enhanced

or

diminished.

Williams,

938

F.

Supp.

at

859

n.9.

Neither party has asked for such an adjustment, and the Court has found that
no adjustment is necessary.
Id.
(citing Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 565-66
(noting the strong presumption that the lodestar amount represents the
reasonable fee award and, thus, the lodestar should only be adjusted in rare
and exceptional circumstances)).
14