Pearson v. Augusta, Georgia et al

Filing 214

ORDER denying 201 Motion for Certificate of Appealability; denying 202 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b); denying 203 Motion for Reconsideration; denying 204 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 08/21/2017. (pts)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

MELINDA BEASLEY PEARSON,

*
•

Plaintiff,

*

v.

*

*

AUGUSTA, GEORGIA through its
Mayor Hardie Davis, Jr., in his
official capacity, and its
commission, in its official
capacity et al.,
Defendants.

CV

114-110

*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER

In

March,

Defendants

the

Court

granted

to

Plaintiff's

proceed.

In

Title

response

(Doc.

VII

to

retaliation

the

(Doc.

Court

denied

200.)

appealability

judgment

Plaintiff

under

under

Court's

202,

203,

28

motions

now

and

set

requests

U.S.C.

Rule

of

Civil

and

leave

to

amend

204.)

(4)

in

favor

and it

The Court,

ruling,
(Docs.
the

(1)

case

a

(2)

Augusta

196,
for

an

trial.

entry

54(b);

complaint.

and

197.)

certificate

Procedure
her

denied

Plaintiff

194,

of

however,

claim against

§ 1292(b);

Federal

reconsideration;
201,

these

claims,

193.)

Augusta both moved for reconsideration.
The

judgment

on the majority of Plaintiff's

summary judgment to Plaintiff.
allowed

summary

of

of

(3)

(Docs.

A. Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b)

and

Entry of Judgment Under Rule 54 (b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court may certify in

writing that an interlocutory order "involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the

order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation . . . ."

The requesting party may then apply to the

court of appeals for leave to appeal, and the court of appeals

may, "in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order . . . ."

Id.

A "controlling question of law" is one that is purely legal

and requires little review of the record.

McFarlin v. Conseco

Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004).

There is a

"substantial ground for difference of opinion" when the district
court and the court of appeals are not in "complete and

unequivocal agreement" about the issue.
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See id^ (citation
And an immediate

appeal "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation" when "resolution of a controlling legal question
would serve to avoid a trial or otherwise substantially shorten
the litigation."

Id^ at 1259.

In short, "§ 1292(b) appeals were intended, and should be

reserved, for situations in which the court of appeals can rule

on a pure, controlling question of law without having to delve

beyond the surface of the record in order to determine the
facts."

Id.

Thus,

"[t]he legal question must be stated at a

high enough level of abstraction to lift the question out of the
details of the evidence or facts of a particular case and give

it general relevance to other cases in the same area of law."
Id.

And resolving that question must "substantially reduce the

amount of litigation left in the case."

Id.

Under Rule 54(b), a district court "may direct entry of a

final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or

parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no

just reason for delay."

In deciding whether there is no "just

reason for delay," district courts "must take

into account

judicial administrative interests as well as the equities
involved."

Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1,

8 (1980) .

And district courts should strive to ensure "that

application of [Rule 54(b)] effectively preserves the historic
federal policy against piecemeal appeals."

Io\

(citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The

Court's

order

in

this

case

does

not

involve

a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion under § 1292(b).

And the Court

declines to find that there is no just reason for delay under
Rule 54(b).

The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff's motion for a

certificate
judgment.

of appealability and her motion for an entry of
(Docs. 201, 202.)

B. Reconsideration

District courts have discretion under Rule 54(b) to revisit

interlocutory decisions.

See Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

54(b);

SEC v.

Mannion, No. 1:10-cv-3374-WSD, 2013 WL 5999657, at *2 (N.D. Ga.

Nov. 12, 2013).

But a court should exercise that discretion and

grant a motion for reconsideration only when (1) the controlling
law has changed,

(2) new evidence has been discovered, or (3)

there is a need to correct clear error.

Raiford v. National

Hills Exchange, LLC, No. l:ll-cv-152, 2016 WL 2908412, at *2

(S.D. Ga. May 17, 2016).

And "the moving party must set forth

facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court
to reverse its prior decision . . . ."

Voter Verified, Inc. v.

Election Sys. & Software, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1969-Orl-19KRS, 2011
WL 3862450, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2011) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
an

extraordinary

remedy to be

Indeed, reconsideration "is
employed

sparingly."

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Id^

A motion

to reconsider therefore "should not be used to present the Court

with arguments already heard and dismissed, or to offer new

legal theories or evidence that could have been presented inprior motions.

Mannion, 2013 WL 5999657, at *2.

For the third time,

Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider

its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on

her procedural due process claim.

But because Plaintiff has not

pointed to any change in the law or new evidence or shown that
the Court committed clear error, Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration.

(Doc. 203.)

C. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend her complaint.

204.)

(Doc.

Because Plaintiff has not shown good cause to amend the

scheduling order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), and because

Plaintiff's

proposed

amendments

would be

futile,

see

Fla_;_

Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 470 F.3d

1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 2006), the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion
(doc.

204) .

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this <2^_ daY,of August,
2017.

HALL,

CfilEF JUDGE

UNITEDS^ATES DISTRICT COURT
IERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA