Pearson v. Augusta, Georgia et al

Filing 23

ORDER denying as moot 15 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying as moot in part 16 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying as moot in part 17 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying as moot in part 18 Motion to D ismiss. All causes of action against Fred Russell, Bill Shanahan, Sam Smith, and unnamed City Employees in their official capacities are dismissed as duplicative of the causes of action against the city. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 02/24/2015. (thb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

MELINDA BEASLEY PEARSON,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*

v.

*

CV 114-110

*

AUGUSTA, GEORGIA through its
Mayor Deke Copenhaver, in his
official capacity, and its

*
*
*

commission,

*

in its official

capacity, et al.,

*
*

Defendants.

*

ORDER

Yet again the Court finds itself sorting out the mess created

by shotgun pleadings.1
Pearson

three

asserts

of

claims

its

Employees"),

In this matter,
against

employees,

Augusta,

among

Plaintiff Melinda Beasley
Georgia

others

("the

City")

unnamed

("the

the Fair Labor Standards Act

Family Medical Leave Act

(MFMLA").

("FLSA")

1) .

18)

As

Ms.

Pearson's

between

them,

28-page,

they

as

and the

Presently before the Court are

Defendants separately-filed motions to partially dismiss
17,

City

for deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights,

well as violations of

16,

and

(Docs. 15,

242-paragraph Complaint

specifically

seek

to

dismiss

(Doc.

Ms.

1
This
Court
has
warned Ms.
Pearson's
counsel
repeatedly against
continuing this practice, which is a disservice to his clients, greatly
complicates the parties' tasks, and as evidenced by this Order, wastes the
Court's time.
See, e.g., Gibbons v. McBride, No. 1:114-cv-00056, Doc. 38;
Smith v. Augusta-Richmond County, No. 1:10-cv-00126, Docs. 33, 51; see also
Allen v. City of Grovetown, No. 1:10-CV-00022, Doc. 21.
The Court hereby
NOTIFIES Mr.

Procedure

Batson that his continued indifference to Federal Rule of Civil

8(a)(2)

and

the

Eleventh

Circuit

Court

of

Appeals'

repeated and

consistent condemnation of shotgun pleadings may lead to sanctions against
him personally, as well as striking his noncompliant filings.

Pearson's

claims

(1)

arising under 42

under the Civil Rights Act of 1991;

in

their official

capacities;

under the FLSA and FMLA,
as

a

matter of

Ms.

cause

(3)

and

§

1981;

(2)

arising

against the City Employees

(4)

against

as they are not Ms.

the

City Employees

Pearson's

"employer"

law.

Pearson responds that she does not allege an independent

of

1991.

U.S.C.

action under either
(PL's

Resp.,

Doc.

§

1981

20,

at

or

the

5-6.)

She

official capacity claims are duplicitous.
further agrees

that

the

City Employees

Civil

Rights

agrees

Act

that

the

(See id. at 3-4.)

cannot be

of

She

"employers"

for

purposes of FLSA or FMLA liability and insists her "complaint makes
clear" that she only seeks to hold the City Employees liable under
42

U.S.C.

§

1983

for Fourteenth Amendment violations.

(Id.

at

2-

3.)

The utter lack of

which

Defendants

issues

reasonably

to be

filed —

Complaint is not clear at all.
precision that

Rule

8 demands

resolved by these motions —

is

In fact,

perfect

proof

that

it lacks the clarity and

in abundance.

It

is

replete with

incoherent sentences, many of which either are missing words

e.g. , m
(see,

10) .

It references over twenty individuals who

are not defendants:

some by first name,

were Ms.

subordinates,

whose

(see,

41, 155) or span up to nine lines without a single period

e.g. , HI 8,

capacity,

the

Pearson's

some

relevance

who
to

worked
Ms.

for

some by last name,

some who

other

Pearson's

served in a

City

claims

supervisory

departments,

are

some who

tangential

and
at

some
best.

For example,
that

although Ms. Pearson clarifies in her response brief

"Defendants Russell,

Shanahan,

the Fourteenth Amendment"

and Smith are being sued under

for violating her due process and equal

protection rights, Defendant Smith's name does not appear at all in
Claims

V,

VI,

or

VIII,

which purport

to

lay

out

Amendment

claims.

Notwithstanding this error,

loss

to

Mr.

as

how

Smith

—

an

her

Fourteenth

the Court

admittedly

is at

subordinate

a

and

probationary employee whose "pay grade and tenure were well below"

Ms.

Pearson's

authority in

(see Compl.

^

72,

77,

79)

—

the hearing that resulted in Ms.

denial of her appeal,

had

any

role

or

Pearson's demotion,

or substantial cut in pay that serve as the

bases of those Fourteenth Amendment claims.

In

light

"[s]urely

of

there

the

was

foregoing,

not

Mr.

sufficient

Batson's

commentary

confusion

—

that

[by Defendants]

to

file a motion to dismiss prior to a phone call or a motion for a
more

specific

concerned

the

woefully

statement"

Court

will

misplaced.

(Id.

and

be

"Defendants

confused

at

Defendants should be required,

3,

cause[s]
Spear,

of

action

Leeds

&

asserted."

Kellogg

2 002)

(citations

Order

that

case.

It

omitted).

accomplishes
is

Corp.,

true

that

As

very

4.)

as here,

presented and decide . . . which

by

[are]

to

F.3d

a

result,

in
if

seriously

redundancy"
the

be

—

Court

is
nor

"sift through the facts

material

305

Defendants,

the

Neither

Strategic

little

cannot

to the particular

Income

1293,
the

terms

Fund,

1296
Court

of

n.9
now

L.L.C.

(11th Cir.
issues

advancing

confused by Ms.

v.

an

this

Pearson's

pleadings,

could

have

Procedure

12(e)

Paylor v.

Hartford Fire

Cir. 2014)
move

the

pursuant

clarification
Ins.

to

or

Co.,

748

Federal

for

Rule

outright

F.3d

1117,

of

Civil

dismissal.

1126-27

(11th

("A defendant served with a shotgun complaint should
district

Rule 12(b) (6)

12 (e)

for

moved

on

court

to

dismiss

the

complaint

pursuant

or for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule

the

ground

that

the

complaint

provides

insufficient notice to enable it to file an answer."
omitted)).

to

But

efficient either.

these

courses

of

action

are

not

it

with

(footnotes

economic

or

The plaintiff is the master of the complaint.

It should not be incumbent upon Mr. Batson's opponents — or this

Court — to do his work for him by sending him back to the drawing
board time and again to set forth plainly and simply his client's
claims.

The single substantive issue on which the Court will comment

is Ms. Pearson's claim that "[t]here is no harm in allowing the
official

dismiss

capacity claims

the

official

to

sit"

capacity

accommodate and make clear,

and,

claims

if

the

Court

anyway,

the

their

law'."

capacity as
(PL's

accommodate

Ms.

Resp.

employees
at

Pearson

Court

to

"must

that the dismissals carry no factual

or legal finding . . . that [the City employees]
in

chooses

3,
in

of

4).
this

Augusta
The

or

Court

respect,

understand to whom it needs to "make clear"

were not acting
'under color of
has

and

no
it

duty
does

to
not

the implications of

this

Order.

The

reality

is

the

Eleventh

Circuit

has

made

exceptionally clear that
because suits against a municipal officer sued in his
official
capacity
and
direct
suits
against
municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no
longer
exists
a
need
to
bring
official-capacity
actions against local government officials,
because
local government units can be sued directly[,]
just

F.2d

as

Ms.

764,

Pearson did here.

776

(11th

Cir.

Busby v.

1991)

City of

(emphasis

Orlando,

added)

931

(citations

omitted).

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Court

GRANTS

IN

PART

and

DENIES AS MOOT IN PART2 the City Employees' Motions to Dismiss.
(Doc.

16,

17,

18.)

Bill Shanahan,

All causes of action against Fred Russell,

Sam Smith,

and unnamed City Employees

official capacities are DISMISSED as duplicative of

of action against the City.

the causes

The Court further DENIES AS MOOT3

Defendant Augusta, Georgia's Motion to Dismiss.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta,
February,

in their

Georgia,

(Doc. 15.)

this

Q^r- ~^iay of

2015.

J. RANDAL ^ALL
UNITEjy STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

2

Ms.

Pearson's

claims

under

these

claims

Likewise,

Ms.

42

representation to

U.S.C.

and

§

moots

Pearson's

1981

or

the

Defendants'

concession

the

Court

Civil

motions

that

that

Rights
the

to

she

Act

of

dismiss

City

does
1991

not

these

Employees

assert

eliminates
claims.

cannot

be

"employers" for purposes of FLSA and FMLA liability eliminates these claims
against them and moots the City Employees' motions to dismiss those claims.
3
See supra note 2.