Great American Alliance Insurance Company v. Hensley et al

Filing 25

ORDER denying 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 18 Motion to Expedite. Defendant Anderson shall have 30 days to renew his motion after December 17, 2014, the closing date of the 90-day discovery period. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 9/18/14. (cmr)

IN THE

UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

COURT

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

*

GREAT AMERICAN ALLIANCE
*

INSURANCE COMPANY,
*
*

Plaintiff,
*

*

v

*

CV

114-112

*

BRIAN PRESTON HENSLEY and
*

ULYSSES RODNEY ANDERSON,
*
*

Defendants.
*

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ulysses Rodney

Anderson's

12.)

("Anderson")

Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. no.

Also before the Court is Plaintiff Great American Alliance

Insurance

Company's

("Great

American")

Motion

for

Expedited

Ruling/Hearing on its request that Anderson's summary judgment
motion

be

denied

or

deferred

for

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).

consideration

(Doc. no.

18.)

under

Federal

For the reasons

that follow, Defendant Anderson's motion is DENIED with leave to
renew, and Plaintiff's motion is therefore DENIED AS MOOT.
I.

This

action

arises

out

BACKGROUND

of

a

collision

in which Anderson

allegedly sustained "catastrophically permanent injuries" after
a vehicle owned by Looper Cabinet Company,
Defendant

Brian Preston Hensley

("Hensley")

Inc. and driven by
struck Anderson's

motorcycle.

(Compl., Doc. no. 1, M

28-35.)

Hensley is alleged

to have been under the influence of alcohol and to have fled the

scene.

(Id.

H

31.)

Anderson

filed

suit

against

Hensley

and

Looper Cabinet Company in the Superior Court of Columbia County,
Georgia on January 15, 2013.

(Id^ Ex. 3 (Compl., Ulysses Rodney

Anderson v. Looper Cabinet Co. , No. 2013cv0040,

Cnty.

Super.

action,

he

Ct.

Jan.

seeks

to

15,

recover

past and future medical
medical treatment,

2013)).)

In that personal injury

comprehensive

expenses,

at 10 (Columbia

damages,

the expense of travel

past and future lost earnings,

damages for pain and suffering,

for

as well as

diminished capacity,

enjoyment and recreation, and punitive damages.
6-9; Doc. no. 1, K 34.)

including

loss of

(Id. Ex. 3, pp.

The relevant parties imminently are set

to begin trial in the underlying action.

(Doc. no. 14, p. 1.)

On May 5, 2014, however, Great American filed the instant

action against Anderson seeking a declaration of the parties'

rights

and

obligations

Businesspro Policy

(No.

under

two

insurance

CAP 250-34-88-00)

policies:

the

and the Commercial

Umbrella Policy (No. UMB 2-50-34-89-00) that Great American, the
insurer,
vehicle.

issued to Looper Cabinet Company,
(Doc.

no.

1,

H 2.)

the owner of the

Approximately two weeks after

answering the complaint and prior to the beginning of discovery,
Anderson
Dkt.

filed the

instant

motion for

summary judgment.

See

Anderson

asserts,

based

on

evidence

produced

during

course of litigating the underlying personal injury action,

the
that

all issues as to coverage of Defendant Hensley are "undisputed."
(Doc. no.

must be
and

14,

pp.

3,

9.)

He further argues that Great American

estopped from denying coverage as

"exhaustively"

defended

Hensley

months in the underlying action,

American

opposed

for

over

eighteen

(18)

albeit pursuant to an allegedly

"illegal" reservation of rights.
Great

it has "exclusively"

(Id. at pp. 3-5, 19-22.)

the

motion,

requesting

in

its

response (Doc. no. 16) and subsequently in an independent motion
(Doc. no. 18) that the Court deny or defer its consideration of
Anderson's summary judgment motion at this premature stage.

As

Great American is not a named party in the underlying personal

injury action,

Great American asserts it "cannot at this time

present all the material facts essential" to its opposition of
Anderson's present motion without discovery.

4-9.)

Specifically,

cross-examine

Great American seeks

various

witnesses,

including

(Doc. no. 16, pp.

the opportunity to
Defendant

Hensley,

and to serve production requests and interrogatories designed to

yield

information about

Hensley's

actions

on the day of the

collision and the nature of his professional relationship with

Looper Cabinet Company at that time.
II.

Summary

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

judgment

genuine dispute as

(Id. at p. 6.)

is

appropriate

to any material
3

only

if

"there

is

no

fact and the movant

is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Facts

are

"material"

if

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

they could affect

suit under the governing substantive law.
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) .

facts

in

the

light

Matsushita Elec.

587 (1986),
favor."

most

Indus.

Co.

favorable
v.

the

outcome

Anderson v.

of

Liberty

The Court must view the

to

the

non-moving

Zenith Radio Corp.,

party,

475 U.S.

and must draw "all justifiable inferences in

U.S. v.

Four Parcels of Real Prop.,

(11th Cir. 1991)

(en banc)

the

574,

[its]

941 F.2d 1428,

1437

(internal punctuation and citations

omitted).

The moving party has

Court,

the

initial burden of showing the

by reference to materials on file,

motion.
Before

Celotex
the

Corp.

Court

can

opposition, however,

v.

Catrett,

evaluate

477 U.S.

the

the basis for the
317,

323

non-movant's

(1986).

response

in

it must first consider whether the movant

has met its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of

law.

Jones v.

City of

(11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

Columbus,

120

F.3d 248,

254

A mere conclusory statement that

the non-movant cannot meet the burden at trial is insufficient.

Clark v.

Coats

& Clark,

Inc.,

929 F.2d 604,

608

(11th Cir.

1991) .

If - and only if - the movant carries its initial

burden,

the non-movant "must set forth specific facts showing

that

there

judgment.

is

a genuine

issue

for trial"

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
4

to

avoid

summary

III.

DISCUSSION

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the filing of a

motion for summary judgment at any time after the filing of the

complaint.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).

Although discovery is always

permitted and permissively expansive, a summary judgment motion
may

be

properly

relevant

facts

record on the

considered at

are

within

the

any

stage

control

of

limitations"

("Parties
matter

the

subject is fully developed.

842 F.2d 1266, 1269-70 (11th Cir. 1988)

and

where

may

of

Rule

obtain

that

is

defense . . . .")

relevant

(emphasis added) .

parties

the

and the

See WSB-TV v. Lee,

Fed.

regarding

to

of

(discussing the "utility

56 procedure);

discovery

all

any

R.

any

Civ.

P.

26(b)

nonprivileged

party's

claim

or

At the same time, with the

non-movant's explicit burden in mind, this Circuit has held that

"summary judgment is premature when a party is not provided a

reasonable opportunity to discover information essential to his

opposition."

Smith v. Florida Pep't of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059,

1064

(11th Cir.

see

also

2013)

WSB-TV,

denominator"

of

842

the

judgment is "that

(citing Anderson,
F.2d

Supreme

[it]

at

477 U.S.

1269

Court's

at 250 n.5);

(finding

jurisprudence

the
on

"common
summary

may only be decided upon an adequate

record") .

Defendant

Anderson filed his motion for summary

judgment

approximately three weeks prior to the parties'

Rule 26(f)

conference.

undoubtedly

Here,

Great

American

-

though

knowledgeable about the underlying facts of this action through

its provision of a defense for Defendant Hensley on liability
grounds in superior court — has had no opportunity to develop
its own case

as

to

coverage beyond initial

Court agrees that at the very minimum,
to cross-examine Hensley,

disclosures.

The

Great American's desire

the sole remaining defendant

underlying action and about whom coverage

in the

is in dispute,

is

patently reasonable and potentially indispensable to the issues
at hand in this declaratory judgment action.

Indeed, "[m]utual

knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation."
495,

Hickman v.

Taylor,

329 U.S.

507 (1947).

The Court therefore finds Defendant Anderson's motion to be

premature.1

The Court further expresses no opinion on the merits

of Anderson's motion for summary judgment, and therefore, has no

objection to it being re-filed without prejudice after the close
of discovery.
III.

For

the

reasons

set

CONCLUSION

forth

Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc.

above,

no.

Defendant

Anderson's

12)

is DENIED and the

Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE the motion.

Defendant Anderson

shall have 30 DAYS to renew his motion after DECEMBER 17, 2014,
1
Defendant Anderson, moreover, failed to timely respond to
Plaintiff Great American's Motion to Expedite Ruling/Hearing on the

Rule 56(d) request, and in any case appears to concur with the

expedited discovery schedule proposed by Great American during the
parties' Rule 26(f) conference.

(Doc. no. 21, p. 2.)
6

the

closing

Plaintiff

date

Great

on its Rule 56(d)

of

the

American's

parties'

Motion

for

90-DAY

Expedited

period.

Ruling/Hearing

request is therefore DENIED AS MOOT.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia,
September,

discovery

this _/jQ_^ day

2014.

HONORABLE J.

RANDALIHALL

UNITED/STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
LOUTHBRN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

of