Goodridge et al v. Quicken Loans Inc. et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss; dismissing as moot 19 Motion for Order for Entry to Quiet Title; dismissing as moot 19 Motion to Strike; and dismissing with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims. The Clerk shall terminate all deadlines and motions and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 10/21/2014. (thb)

IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

FRANKLYN GOODRIDGE and

*

JUNE P.

*

GOODRIDGE,

*

Plaintiffs,

*

v.

*

CV 114-150

*

QUICKEN LOANS,

INC.;

GOVERNMENT

NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AS

*
*

TRUSTEE FOR SECURITIZED TRUST

*

GINNIE MAE REMIC TRUST 2013-131;

*

GINNIE MAE; and MORTGAGE

*

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,

*

INC.,

*
*

Defendants.

*

ORDER

This matter

Inc.

("Quicken")

Inc.'s

("MERS")

is

before the Court on Defendants Quicken Loans,

and

Mortgage

(collectively,

Electronic

Registration

"Defendants")

Motion

Plaintiffs Franklyn and June P. Goodridge's Complaint.
Also before the Court is the Goodridges'
Title

and

to

Standing."

Strike

(Doc.

to

Dismiss

(Doc. 10.)

"Order for Entry to Quiet

Defendants [' ] Motion

19.)

Systems,

to

Dismiss

for

Lack of

The Goodridges charge Defendants with a

litany of claims arising from their ownership of 3301 Thames Place,
Hephzibah,

Georgia 30815,

including wrongful

intentional infliction of emotional distress,

well

as

violations

of

the

Truth

in

Lending

foreclosure,

fraud,

slander of title, as

Act

("TILA") , Home

Ownership

and

Equity

Protection
Act

Act

("HOEPA"),

("RESPA") .

and

The

Real

majority

Estate

Settlement

Procedures

of

the

Goodridges'

allegations appear to be grounded in the theory that

Defendants "unlawfully" securitized their home loan and improperly

split the promissory note from the security deed.

The Goodridges

further

facilitate

contend

NON-JUDICIAL

process

(Doc.

coup"

...

allegedly

that

and

to

occurred,

and

granted.

have

"conspired to

"engaging

court

cooperate

in

an

unrelenting

a

Rule

abuse

of

plaintiffs"

and distract

during

[a]

by

26(f)

conference.

Defendants respond simply that no foreclosure has

fail
For

Defendants'

to

on

Goodridges

are

delay this

failing

19 at 4.)

Defendants

account

to
the

of

state

any

reasons

Motion

to

severe

claim

set

Dismiss

pleading

upon

forth
(Doc.

deficiencies,

which

below,
10)

relief

the

and

the

may

Court

DENIES

be

GRANTS

AS

MOOT

Plaintiffs' "Order for Entry to Quiet Title and to Strike"1 (Doc.
19.)

I.

On July
$127,250.00
located
1

at

25,
("the

33 01

2013,
Loan")
Thames

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff
from
Place,

obtained a

Quicken,

secured by

Hephzibah,

The Court also construes the Goodridges'

preliminary injunction.

mortgage

Georgia

loan

the
3 0815

for

property
("the

second filing to move for a

(See Doc. 19 at 11, 14.)

For the same reasons the

Court ultimately dismisses all the Goodridges' claims with prejudice, the
Court finds that the Goodridges cannot establish "a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits," a prerequisite to granting such extraordinary
equitable relief.
See Cataldi v. New York Cmty. Bank, No. 1:13-CV-3972-RWSJSA, 2014 WL 359954, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2014); Alexis v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-01967-RWS, 2012 WL 716161, at *5 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 5, 2012). As this defect alone is fatal, the Court will not address

the remaining prerequisite elements for preliminary injunctions set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and Siebert v. Allen, 506 F.3d 1047, 1049
(11th Cir.

2007) .

Property"),
executed

in

and

evidenced

favor

of

by

a

Quicken

promising to repay the

Promissory

and

Loan amount.

H 29; Doc. 10, Ex. A ("Deed"), at 2.)2

its

Note

("the

successors

(Doc.

1,

and

Ex. A

Note")
assigns,

("Compl."),

The Goodridges also signed a

Security Deed ("the Deed") in favor of MERS, as nominee for Quicken
and

its

security

successors

interest

indebtedness under

and

in

assigns,

the

granting

Property

the Note.

to

(Deed at

MERS

a

secure
2-3.)

first

the
The

priority

Goodridges'

Security Deed

granted MERS — as nominee for Quicken and Quicken's successors and
assigns — and MERS' successors and assigns, power of sale.

3.)

(Id. at

MERS subsequently assigned the Deed to Government National

Mortgage Association,

as Trustee for Securitized Trust Ginnie Mae

REMIC Trust 2013-131 ("the Trust").
10-1, at 3.)

Despite these transfers, Quicken retained its role as

the Loan's service provider.

According

(Compl. H 30; Defs.' Br., Doc.

to

(Defs.' Br. at 3.)

Defendants,

in

March

2014,

defaulted on the Loan, a fact which they contest.
Defs.' Br. at 3.)

the

Goodridges

(Compl. H 100;

The Goodridges, proceeding pro se, then filed a

complaint against Defendants

in the Superior Court of Richmond

County, Georgia, on May 19, 2014, asserting various claims under
federal and state law.

Two days later, on May 21, 2014, pursuant

to the express terms of the Deed, Quicken sent the Goodridges pre-

2
"The court may consider a document attached to a motion to dismiss
without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if the attached
document is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim and (2) undisputed," meaning
the "authenticity of the document is not challenged."
Day v. Taylor, 400
F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

acceleration notices that informed them of their default and gave
them thirty days to cure.
later,

on September 30,

Shapiro,

Swertfeger

2014,

&
the

Ex.

to

total

According

indebtedness

LLP

will

conduct

Property on November 4,

a

the entire loan amount.

(Doc.

Ex.

the complaint

non-judicial
(Doc.

19,

the

Goodridges

23,

a

dated September 30,

separate notice

owed by the

After service of

Nearly four months

the Goodridges received notice that

Hasty

foreclosure sale of

A.)

(Defs.' Br. at 3.)

is

2014.

$126,324.82,

nearly

B.)

in

the Richmond County case,

Defendants timely removed the action to this Court on July 3, 2014.
(Doc.

that

1.)

Defendants now file a motion to dismiss on the grounds

the Goodridges have failed to state an actionable claim for

relief and have failed to meet the requisite pleading standards of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b).

II.

MOTION TO DISMISS

STANDARD

In considering a motion to dismiss

under Rule

12(b)(6),

the

court tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not whether the

plaintiff will
Rhodes,

all

ultimately prevail on

416 U.S.

232,

facts alleged

inferences

in

the

in the
light

Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey,

court,

however,

236

(1974).

the

The court must

complaint and
most

merits.

favorable

construe
to

312 F.3d 1222, 1225

the

Scheuer
accept as

all

v.

true

reasonable

plaintiff.

(11th Cir. 2002) .

See
The

need not accept the complaint's legal conclusions

as

true,

662,

only its

678-79

A

well-pled facts.

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

(2009) .

complaint

also

must

"contain

sufficient

factual

matter,

accepted as true,

*to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its

at

face.'"

U.S.

544, 570

content

the

Id.

that

678

(2007)).
allows

defendant

is

(citing Bell Atl.

Corp.

v.

Twombly,

550

The plaintiff is required to plead "factual

the

court

liable

plausibility standard is

to draw the

for

reasonable

the misconduct

not akin to a

inference

alleged."

that

Id.

"The

^probability requirement,'

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully."

Additionally,
"held

to

a

less

Id.

when plaintiffs
stringent

attorneys and will,
v.

United

States,

pro

act

standard

se,

than

the pleadings

pleadings

drafted

therefore, be liberally construed."
148

F.3d

1262,

1263

(11th

Cir.

are
by

Tannenbaum

1998).

"This

leniency, however, does not require or allow courts to rewrite an
otherwise

deficient

Thomas v.

Pentagon Fed.

Cir. 2010).

Indeed,

pleading

in

order

Credit Union,

to

sustain

an

393 F. App'x 635,

pro se claimants have

action."
637

(11th

"no license to harass

others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and
abuse already overloaded court dockets."

Patterson v. Aiken, 841

F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III.

The

Goodridges'

standards

to

a

DISCUSSION

Complaint

degree

the

fails

Court

Goodridges provide a 32-page,

to

cannot

satisfy

the

reconcile.

pleading

First,

the

152-paragraph laundry list of events,

many of which are irrelevant to the Goodridges' asserted claims and
appear to be copied or reworked from a "forensic audit" of their
loan documents.

In

instances

such as

does not require the district court,
through

the

material

facts

presented

and

this,

the

Eleventh Circuit

or the defendants,

decide

for

[itself]

which

to the particular cause of action asserted."

Income Fund,

L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp.,

1296 (11th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted).

to "sift
were

Strategic

305 F.3d 1293,

Although the Goodridges

narrate the facts of this case, they also interject their opinions

and

make

vague

and

conclusory

allegations

of

wrongdoing

by

Defendants related to the mortgage at issue, the securitization of

the mortgage, the assignment of the security deed, and Defendants'
acceleration of the Goodridges'

obligation upon default.

For the

most part, the Goodridges fail to specify the actions in which each
defendant engaged to support each cause of action.
justifiably may be dismissed on these grounds.
Graddick,

739

F.2d

553,

556-57

(11th Cir.

1984).

A complaint

See Fullman v.
Simply,

the

Goodridges' filings are equivalent to a "shotgun" pleading that has
been soundly condemned by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 650 n.22 (11th
Cir.

2010) .

Moreover,

at the outset, the Court observes:

Plaintiff's allegations are remarkably similar to those
in

numerous

other

cases

that

have

been

filed

by

plaintiffs (often unrepresented) in an effort to delay,
prevent or even reverse foreclosures and dispossessory
actions.

Such lawsuits — wherein the plaintiffs often

make
rambling,
incomprehensible
and/or
conclusory
allegations about mortgage industry practices such as the
securitization of mortgages, and the MERS assignment and
registration system, allege that the promissory note and
the security deed have been improperly "split" or
separated, and demand to see the promissory note - have
become commonplace.

Jorgensen v. Fed.

Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No.

2013 WL 5200598, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 13,

In this regard,
account,

2:12-CV-00236-RWS,

2013)

even taking the Goodridges'

(listing cases).

pro se status into

the allegations before the Court facially appear to be

frivolous.

The

Goodridges

merely

echo

the

unsound

theories

described above, namely that (1) Defendants have "unlawfully sold,

assigned,

and/or

transferred . . .

[the]

Promissory

Note

and

Mortgage/Deed of Trust, and, thus, do not have lawful ownership or

a security interest in Plaintiff's [sic] Home" (Compl. H 14; see
also Doc.

19 at 13-14);

(2) the securitization of their home loan

was unlawful (Compl. UH 30-37, 44); and (3) the "assignment of [the

Deed] without proper transfer of the obligation that secures it"
renders the transaction void (id^ 11 43) .

Goodridges

allege

that

More comprehensibly, the

Quicken sold them a deceptive product,

unjustly qualified them for a loan that they could not afford, and
failed to
transaction.

explain

to

(Id.

M

them

"the workings"

51-55.)

of

the

entire

loan

In the interest of thoroughness,

the

Court

nevertheless

turns

to

the

substance

of

the

Goodridges'

claims.

A.

Wrongful Foreclosure & Slander of Title

As previously noted,

proceedings

against

the

(Counts I & V)

Defendants did not initiate foreclosure

Property

at

issue

in

this

case

until

September 30, 2014, and the sale will not take place until November
4,

2014.

seeking

(Doc.

damages

property at
McCalla

for

Ex.

A.)

wrongful

Georgia

law

foreclosure

requires

to

a

LLC,

the

492

F.

Goodridges

App'x

cannot

968,

972

state

a

plaintiff

establish

issue was actually sold at foreclosure.

Raymer,

Accordingly,

19,

the

Jenkins v.

(11th

claim

that

Cir.

for

2012).

wrongful

foreclosure, and the Court DISMISSES Count I.3
The Goodridges nevertheless continue on to allege that each
Defendant

"disparaged

Plaintiff's

and through the preparing,

[sic]

posting,

exclusive valid

publishing,

title by

and recording of

3
To be sure, Georgia law also recognizes a cause of action for attempted
wrongful foreclosure when a foreclosure action was commenced but not
completed, and the plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant "knowingly

published

an untrue

and

derogatory

statement

concerning

the

plaintiffs'

financial conditions and that damages were sustained as a direct result."
Sale City Peanut & Milling Co. v. Planters & Citizens Bank, 130 S.E.2d 518,
520 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963) ; see also Morgan v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 795 F.

Supp. 2d 1370, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(citing cases).
The Goodridges'
Complaint avers that Defendants have "disparaged Plaintiff's [sic] exclusive
valid title by and through the preparing, posting, publishing, and recording
of the documents previously described herein, including, but not limited to,
the Notice of Default, Notice of Trustee's Sale, Trustee's Deed, and the
documents evidence the commencement of judicial foreclosure by a party who

does not possess that right."
(Compl. U 104.) The Court does not accept as
true this boilerplate, conclusory assertion referencing documents that are of
no relevance to this case.

The Goodridges allege no facts in support of

their argument that either the Notices of Default or the newly-issued Notice
of Sale are false, that Defendants possessed any knowledge of any falsity, or

how the Goodridges have sustained any damages as a result of the publication.
To the extent, therefore, that the Goodridges seek to state a claim for
wrongful attempted foreclosure, the Court DISMISSES it too.
8

the

documents

limited

to,

Trustee's

previously

the

Notice

Deed,

and

described
of

the

herein,

Default,

documents

Notice

cloud

H 104.)

on

As

their

continuing

a result,

title

expenses,

that

and

among other feelings.
slander of title,

the

the work was

property

damages.

the

M

Sale,

commencement

of

not possess that right."

them

"humiliation,

not

unspecified

mental

106-108.)

there

anguish,

is a

damages,

anxiety"

—

To sustain a claim for

a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant

uttered and published a

(3)

caused

but

Trustee's

the Goodridges assert

has

(Id.

of

evidence

judicial foreclosure by a party who does

(Compl.

including,

slanderous work;

malicious;

slandered;

Amador

v.

(4)

and

Thomas,

(2)

the work was

false;

plaintiff possessed an estate

(5)
578

plaintiff
S.E.2d

537,

sustained
540

in

special

(Ga.

Ct.

App.

of

the

five

2003).

The
elements

Goodridges
of

sufficiently

neither

their

slander

allege

any

allege
of

one

nor

title

of

prove

claim,

those

three
and

elements

the

is

failure

fatal.

to

In

particular, the only documents Defendants have "published" are the
Notices of Default and Notice of Sale.

As to the default notices,

the extent of that "publication" was exclusively to the Goodridges,
and slanderous "publication" does not occur under the law, until it
is

communicated

O.C.G.A.

"to

§ 51-5-3

any

person

other

(emphasis added);

227, 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) .

than

Roberts

Moreover,

the
v.

impugned party."
Lane,

435

S.E.2d

the Goodridges allege no

facts to support their argument that the information contained in

either

the

Notices

malicious.

of

Default

or

Notice

(See Compl. 1M 104, 105.)

of

Sale

based

on

the

securitization

"unlawful"

solely

and

false

and

Defendants complied with the

Deed's express terms in providing such notice.
Falsity

is

Goodridges'

(Deed at 13, K 22.)

misguided

"separation

of

the

theories

note"

—

of

both of

which the Court addresses in depth below in Part III.D — is simply
insufficient
DISMISSES

a

matter

of

law.

The

Court

therefore

also

Count V.

B.

The

as

Fraud (Counts II &

Goodridges

"concealed"

the

III)

allege

Defendants

securitization

of

the

defrauded
Loan

and

them

failed

when
to

they

disclose

"that Borrower's loan changed in character" by being "included in a

pool with other notes."

(Compl. U 76.)

They further allege that

an unspecified defendant intentionally misrepresented to them that
the successors and assigns of the Deed "were entitled to exercise

the power of sale provision."
fashion,

the

Goodridges

(Id. H 85.)

allege

that

a

Finally, in conclusory
defendant

disclose the material terms of the transaction."
"[I]n

all

averments

of

fraud

or

"fail[ed]

to

(Id. f 87.)

mistake,

the

circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
Fed.

R.

Civ.

plaintiffs

P.

in

9(b).

Georgia

To

sufficiently plead

must

establish

representation by a defendant,

five

scienter,

plaintiff to act or refrain from acting,

10

a

claim

elements:

for

"a

fraud,

false

intention to induce the

justifiable reliance by

plaintiff,
LLC,

No.

and damage

to plaintiff."

l:ll-CV-2747,

Kabir v.

2011 WL 4500050,

at

*6

Statebridge

(N.D.

Ga.

Co.,

Sept.

27,

2011) (quoting Baxter v. Fairfield Fin. Servs., 704 S.E.2d 423, 429

(Ga. Ct. App.
misconduct

against

2010)).

with

which

spurious

Sept.

30,

they

charges

Barclay's Nominees,

Fla.

This rule alerts defendants to the precise

2008)

No.

are

of

charged

and

protects

fraudulent behavior.

04-60897,

2008

(citing Brooks v.

WL

defendants

Steinberg v.

4601043,

at

The Eleventh

Circuit has further held that compliance with Rule 9 (b)

were

made

omissions

in
were

what
made,

documents
and

(2)

(S.D.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of

Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1997)).

complaint to set forth the following:

*11

requires a

(1) precisely what statements

or

oral

representations

the

time

and

place

of

or
each

what
such

statement and the person responsible for making (or, in the case of
omissions, not making) same, and (3) the content of such statements

and the manner in which they misled the plaintiff, and (4) what the
defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.
4500050,

Kabir, 2011 WL

at *6.

The Goodridges'

Complaint

is

insufficient

heightened pleading standard outlined above.

any precise

statements

that were made,

to

satisfy

the

They fail to allege

which defendant(s)

made

those statements, where they were made, how the statements caused
them to enter the loan agreement, or how Defendants benefitted as a

consequence.

Instead, they generalize that Defendants "concealed"

the securitization, which purportedly was "intended to induce" the
11

Goodridges to enter the Loan, and Defendants ultimately "profited"
from this concealment.
Even

if

Defendants'

(Compl. 1M 76, 78, 81.)

sufficiently

pled,

the

Goodridges'

theory

that

failure to inform them that the Loan may be securitized

and sold in any number of pieces entitles them to relief is without
merit.

The

Goodridges

Court

is unaware

provide

securitization

of

none —
a

debt

of any

legal

supporting

insulates

a

the proposition
debtor

relieves a debtor of the obligation to repay.
Am., N.A, No. 1:13-CV-1435-WSD,

authority —

from

and

the

that

the

foreclosure

or

See Tonea v. Bank of

2014 WL 1092348, at *3

(N.D.

Ga.

Mar. 18, 2014); Montoya v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., No. 1:11-CV-

01869-RWS, 2012 WL 826993, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2012); Searcy v.

EMC Mortg.

Corp. , No.

Sept. 30, 2010)

l:10-CV-0965-WBH,

slip op.

at 2

(N.D.

Ga.

("While it may well be that Plaintiff's mortgage

was pooled with other loans into a securitized trust that then
issued bonds to investors,

Plaintiff's

that fact would not have any effect on

rights and obligations with respect

to the mortgage

loan, and it certainly would not absolve Plaintiff from having to

make

loan payments

or somehow shield Plaintiff's property from

foreclosure.").

The

Goodridges'

claims

that

Defendants

"intentionally

misrepresented" who was entitled to exercise the power of sale

(Compl. H 84) and who was the ultimate holder of the Note and/or
Deed (id. 1 86) suffer from the same gross pleading deficiencies:
there

is no "who,

what,

when,

where,
12

and how."

Moreover,

it

appears to the Court that the Goodridges ground these claims in a
fundamental
executed

misunderstanding

the

Deed,

which

(Deed at 3.)

the

law.

The

Goodridges

expressly granted MERS,

successors, and its assigns

Property."

of

its

freely

subsequent

"the right to foreclose and sell the

To the extent Defendants made fraudulent

— or even merely confusing — oral representations about the power
of

sale above

and beyond the express

language

in the Deed,

the

Goodridges do not allege them.

The

Goodridges

do

allege

Defendants

made

fraudulent

representations when they "were attempting to collect on a debt

which they have no legal, equitable, or pecuniary interest in" on
account of secondarily assigning or selling "the mortgage loan" to

the Trust.

(Compl.

1ffl 34,

grounds in the law.
owner'

of

the

Goodridges'

Note"

86.)

This too,

substantively, has no

Even if Defendants are not the "xholder and
and

had

no

beneficial

interest

debt obligation despite representing so,

in

the

they still

have the right to exercise the power of sale pursuant to the terms
of the Deed.
433

(Ga.

You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 743 S.E.2d 428,

2013).

Plaintiff's claims for fraud (Counts II & III),
also DISMISSED as a matter of law.

13

therefore, are

C.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

("IIED")

(Count IV)

The

Complaint

emotional

distress,

anxiety,

and

alleges

including

depression"

emotional

nightmare"

with

loss

the

the

of

but

and

because

the

Goodridges
not

are

have

limited

"living

Defendants

Property."

"suffered

to

lack

under

have

(Compl.

of

[a]

93,

98,

According to the Goodridges, Defendants "intentionally,

sleep,

constant

"threatened

U1J

severe

[them]

100).

knowingly,

and recklessly" created this "outcome," which "exceeds all bounds

. . . usually tolerated in a civilized society" because Defendants

allegedly

do

not

have

Property.

any

right,

title,

or

interest

in

the

(Id^ 1M 94-96.)

To prevail on an IIED claim under Georgia law a plaintiff must
allege,

and ultimately provide evidence for,

intentional
cause of

519

or

(2)

extreme

severe emotional distress.

S.E.2d

whether

reckless;

15,

the

17

(1999) .

conduct

outrageous

is whether

member

the

of

"The

complained

of

or

conduct that was (1)

outrageous;

and

United Parcel Serv.

rule

was

of

thumb

in

sufficiently

v.

(3)

the

Moore,

determining

extreme

and

the recitation of the facts to an average

community would

arouse

her

resentment against

defendant so that she would exclaim "Outrageous!'" Id.

the

The conduct

must be deemed extreme by a reasonable person, and whether it would
be is a question of law for the court.

Id. ; Blue View Corp. v.

Bell, 679 S.E.2d 739, 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).

14

Generally,
breach

of

contract,"

United Parcel
omitted) .

"[s]harp or sloppy business practices,

Serv.,

Indeed,

foreclosures,

as

stringent.

For

are

519
in

in

generally

S.E.2d at

the

any

area

other

instance,

of

not

17

(emphasis

debt

context,

neither

extreme

or

outrageous.

added)(citations

collection

a

even if in

and

plaintiff's

"threatening

mortgage

burden

language"

is
nor

collecting on a debt that has already been paid goes "beyond all
bounds of decency" so as to state a claim.
Am., N.A. , 992 F.

Supp.

2d 1277, 1282-83

Covington Credit of Ga.,

Inc.,

Smith-Tyler v. Bank of
(N.D. Ga. 2014);

660 S.E.2d 855,

858

Cook v.

(Ga. Ct. App.

2008) .

This pleading is thus deficient on its face since it provides

the Court with no plausible grounds on which to reasonably infer
Defendants are liable for IIED.

Goodridges'

See Iqbal,

556 U.S.

at 678.

conclusory allegations are nothing more than a recital

of the IIED elements with no specific factual allegations.
the facts had been alleged with more specificity,
law

these

The

facts

do

not

indicate

Defendants

Even if

as a matter of

are

liable.

No

reasonable person would believe Defendants' actions were extreme or

outrageous.

As previously explained, Defendants have a legitimate

reason to believe they are entitled to pursue foreclosure upon the

Goodridges' default according to the terms of the Deed.
understands

that

the

Goodridges'

financial

situation

The Court
may

be

stressful, but the mere mailing of notices and frequent sales calls

15

exploring refinance options are hardly alarming.

(Pis.' Br. at 2.)

Consequently, the Court DISMISSES the Count IV.

D.

Lack of Standing and/or Invalid Assignment (Counts VI,
VII & X)

Several of the Goodridges'

claims rest on the arguments that

(1) Defendants do not hold the promissory note and therefore do not

have standing to exercise the power of sale;

(2) the Deed is void

because it was improperly "split" from the Note; or (3)

MERS did

not have authority to assign the Deed and violated the "Pooling and

Servicing Agreement" in doing so.
these claims,
law.

Tonea

Courts have repeatedly rejected

and each argument is wholly unsupported by Georgia
v.

Bank

of

Am.,

N.A. ,

No.

1:13-cv-1435,

2014

WL

1092348, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2014) (rejecting the plaintiff's

argument

that

MERS

did not have

the authority

to assign

his

mortgage because "MERS [was] the grantee under the security deed,
to which Plaintiff

Servicing,

LP,

No.

Ga. Mar. 21, 2013)

expressly agreed");

1:12-CV-0228-RWS,

Menyah v.

BAC

2013 WL 1189498,

Home Loans

at *3 (N.D.

(finding the plaintiff lacked standing to attack

the assignment between MERS and the defendant because the plaintiff
was not a party to the contract); Milburn v. Aegis Wholesale Corp.,
NO.

1:12-CV-01886-RWS,

2013

WL 1136983,

at

*3

(N.D.

Ga.

Mar.

18,

2013) (explaining that "as a stranger to the Assignment, Plaintiff
lacks standing to challenge it"); Clarke v. Branch Banking & Trust
Co., No. l:12-CV-03383-JEC-RGV, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49875, at *22

(N.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2013)

(noting that the plaintiff's "claim appears
16

to be an attempt

to repackage a

^produce

the note'

argument

that

has been repeatedly rejected by this court, and is therefore due to
be

dismissed");

RWS,

LaCosta v.

2011 WL 166902,

at

McCalla Raymer,

*5-6

(N.D.

Ga.

LLC,

Jan.

No.

18,

1:10-CV-1171-

2011)

(rejecting

plaintiff's wrongful foreclosure claim based on "splitting" of note
and

security deed

and

finding

that

holder

of

security deed

was

authorized to exercise power of sale); You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A.,

743

S.E.2d

Georgia law,

428,

433

(Ga.

2013)

(holding

" [u]nder

current

the holder of a deed to secure debt is authorized to

exercise the power of sale in accordance with the terms of the deed
even

if

it

beneficial

does

not

interest

in

also

hold

the debt

the

note

obligation

or

otherwise

have

any

underlying the deed")

(emphasis added).

The Court therefore DISMISSES the Goodridges'

claims for quiet

title (Count VI),4 declaratory judgment (Count VII), and rescission

4
The Goodridges' pleading and subsequent "Order for Entry to Quiet
Title" also fail to satisfy the statutory requirements for a quiet title
action under Georgia law.

The Georgia Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et

seg., provides specific procedural prerequisites to pleading a quiet title
action.
A plaintiff must file (1) a plat of survey of the land, (2) a copy
of

the

immediate

instrument

or

instruments,

if

any,

upon

which

the

petitioner's interest is based, and (3) a copy of the immediate instrument or
instruments

which

any

petitioner.

of

record

person

or

might

O.C.G.A.

otherwise

base

an

§ 23-3-62(c).

known

to

interest

the

in

At minimum,

petitioner,

the

land

if

any,

adverse

to

upon

the

the Goodridges failed to

attach to the Complaint and subsequent filings a plat as required by statute,
and therefore their quiet title petitions are subject to dismissal.
Montoya
v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., No. 1:11-CV-01869-RWS, 2012 WL 826993, at *3
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2012); GHG, Inc. v. Bryan, 566 S.E.2d 662, 662 (Ga. 2002)

("A petition [to quiet title] is subject to dismissal only when on the face
of the pleadings it appears that it is in noncompliance with OCGA § 23-362.") .

17

(Count X) , all of which seek either injunctive relief or damages
based on the flawed legal theories described above.

E.

TILA,

Lastly,

violation

the

of

Defendants

home

TILA,

and

(Compl.

of

in

the

H 133.)

equity,"

"were

to

approving

pros

them

unable

into

and cons

to

for

Defendants'

the

was

their

home

fully

rate

claim

material

intent

to

adjustable

the Goodridges

refinance

alleged

Goodridges

"accurate

account

which

of

IX)

The
with

[TILA]

As a result,

(Id. U 135, 136.)

of

the

inform

mortgages."

"lost substantial
or

to

obtain

any

which has resulted in Plaintiff being
fraudulent

loan made

by defendants."

Pursuant to RESPA, the Goodridges further allege

interest

disproportionate

RESPA.

" [take]

permanently burdened by the

"[t]he

relief

provide

modification of their loan,

that

seek

and

HOEPA,

failed to

Legislature
buyers

and RESPA (Counts VIII &

Goodridges

failed

disclosures"

State

HOEPA,

and

income

that

Defendants

to the situation Plaintiff

have

find

[sic]

gained

is

themselves

in due directly to Defendant's failure to disclose that they will
gain a financial benefit while Plaintiff suffer [sic]

financially."

(Id. H 144.)

The

Goodridges

again

fail

to

plead

their

claims

with

sufficient particularity to provide fair notice to any defendant in
this

case

of

what

the

statutory claims

which the claims rest.

gained

"disproportionate

are

and

the

grounds

Conclusory allegations that Defendants

income" or

18

"creat[ed]

a

windfall,"

upon

(1)

(2)

violated the whole of TILA and RESPA,

and (3)

provided inaccurate,

false or incomplete disclosures fail to assert the necessary facts

to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level."
550 U.S.

at

555.

Moreover,

they did not receive

Twombly,

to the extent the Goodridges complain

the required disclosures at all,

the Court

notes that both Mr. and Mrs. Goodridge appear to have signed such

disclosures.5

claim

that

adjustable

(Doc. 10, Ex. B.)

they

were

misled

rate

loans

in

These documents in fact bely their

or uneducated

violation

Goodridges have a fixed-rate,

of

about

the

federal

fifteen-year mortgage.

perils

law,

as

(Id.)

of

the
For

these reasons, the Court also DISMISSES Counts VIII and IX.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that where a

"more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim," the court

must allow a pro se plaintiff "at least one chance to amend the

complaint

before the district

court

dismisses

prejudice," unless amendment would be futile.
510 F.3d 1307, 1310

1112

A more carefully drafted complaint would

not state a claim in this case.

Plaintiffs'

Cockrell v. Sparks,

(11th Cir. 2007); Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108,

(11th Cir. 1991).

support

the action with

claims,

It is utterly devoid of facts to

and

the

incoherencies,

internal

5
The Goodridges wholly failed to respond to Defendants' arguments in
favor of dismissing the TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA claims, and as such, did not
challenge - or even mention - the authenticity of the TILA disclosures
attached to Defendants'

motion.

19

inconsistencies,

and irrelevant attachments fail to demonstrate the

plausibility of

those

therefore,
(Doc.

10.)

the

claims.

For

the

reasons

Court hereby GRANTS Defendants'

All of Plaintiffs'

forth above,

Motion to Dismiss.

claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Court therefore DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs'
Quiet Title and to Strike."

set

(Doc.

19.)

"Order for Entry to

The Clerk SHALL terminate

all deadlines and motions and CLOSE this case.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this & u lis <£>c/—' day of October,
2014.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Southern district of Georgia

20