Walden v. CSX Corporation, Inc.

Filing 6

ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions and deadlines and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 01/14/2015. (thb)

IN THE

UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

COURT

FOR THE

GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

GREGORY WALDEN,

*

Plaintiff,
*

*

v.

CSX CORPORATION,

CV 114-158

*

INC. ,

*
•

Defendant.

ORDER

Before

dismiss.

the

Court

(Doc. no.

is

Defendant's

unopposed

motion

5.) For the reasons stated herein,

to

the

motion is GRANTED.

I.

BACKGROUND

On June 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a personal injury claim
in the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia, alleging that

he sustained injuries during a train accident in Richmond

County on June

24,

2012,

due

to the negligence

of CSX

Corporation ("CSX"). (Compl., Ex. A.) Plaintiff alleges in the
state action that a CSX-owned train dragged him approximately

fifty feet and that he was hospitalized for three months after
the accident.

(Id^. 11 4-21.)

On July 23, 2014, Defendant removed the action to this
Court, then filed a motion to dismiss.

argues that
Defendant;

(1)
(2)

(Doc. no. 5.) Defendant

the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendant

prior to removal; (3) Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; and (4) Plaintiff's
claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations
because service was not accomplished prior to the expiration

of the limitations period. Defendant insinuates that Plaintiff

sued

the

wrong

entity:

CSX

Transportation

("CSXT"),

a

subsidiary of CSX, may have been a more appropriate defendant.
Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant's motion.

II.

Defendant

argues

DISCUSSION

that

Plaintiff's

claims

must

be

dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (2)
for lack of personal jurisdiction. "A federal court sitting in
diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining whether

personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction
must (1) be appropriate under the state long-arm statute and
(2)

not violate

the Due Process

Clause

of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution." Diamond Crystal

Brands v. Food Movers Int' 1, 593 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (11th Cir.

2010).

A

plaintiff

seeking

the

exercise

of

personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial
burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make

out a prima facie case of jurisdiction. Id. at 1257. Where, as
here,

the

defendant

challenges

jurisdiction by

affidavit evidence in support of its position,

submitting
"the burden

traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence
supporting jurisdiction." Id.
Georgia's

long-arm

statute

"imposes

independent

obligations that a plaintiff must establish for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction that are distinct from the demands of

procedural due process."

Id.

at

1259.

Specifically,

the

statute confers personal jurisdiction over nonresidents only
as

to

a

cause

of

action

omissions, ownership, use,

arising

from

any

of

the

acts,

or possession enumerated in the

statute if in person or through an agent, he or she:
(1) transacts any business within the state;
(2)

commits a tortious act or omission within the

state,

except

as

to

a

cause

of

action

for

defamation of character arising from the act;

(3) commits a tortious injury in this state caused

by an act or omission outside this state if the
tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or

engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in this state;

(4)

owns,

uses,

or

possesses

situated within this state
O.C.G.A.

§

.

.

any
.

real

property

."

9-10-91.

Here, Defendant argues that CSX is a Virginia corporation

with its principal place of business in Florida. CSX is a

holding company which owns various subsidiaries,

including

CSXT. As a result,

CSX does not operate a railroad and has

never

maintained,

constructed,

or

operated

a

railroad

in

Georgia or anywhere else. Additionally, Defendant asserts that
it does not maintain an office or conduct business in Georgia,

is not licensed to do business in Georgia, and has no agent in

Georgia for the purpose of accepting service of process. In
sum, Defendant has no contacts in the state and asserts that
it does not fall into any of the categories listed in the
statute.

Even if a related entity such as CSXT may be subject to

personal jurisdiction due to an alleged tortious act in the
state, Defendant contends that mere ownership of a subsidiary
is

not

sufficient

to

justify

the

exercise

of

jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate parent.

personal

See e.g.,

Drumm Corp. v. Wright, 755 S.E.2d 850, 854 (2014)("So long as

a

parent

and

subsidiary

maintain

separate

and

distinct

corporate entities, the presence of one in a forum state may
not be attributed to the other.") (quoting Vogt v. Greenmarine
Holding,

LLC,

2002 WL 534542,

*4

(N.D.

Ga.

Feb.

20,

Plaintiff has not rebutted Defendant's argument.

the Court

finds

that Defendant

is

not

subject

2002)).

Therefore,

to personal

jurisdiction under Georgia's long-arm statute. The Court need

not address Defendant's other arguments in favor of dismissing
Plaintiff's

claims

because

resolution

of

the

personal

jurisdiction issue is dispositive.
III.

For

the

Defendant's

reasons

motion

to

CONCLUSION

stated
dismiss

herein,
(doc.

IT
no.

IS
5)

ORDERED
is

GRANTED

that
and

Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk
is directed to terminate all pending motions and deadlines and
CLOSE this

case.

)RDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this

fyE& day of

, 2015.

Hall

United/States District Judge
District of Georgia