Walden v. CSX Corporation, Inc.
Filing
6
ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions and deadlines and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 01/14/2015. (thb)
IN THE
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
COURT
FOR THE
GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
GREGORY WALDEN,
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
v.
CSX CORPORATION,
CV 114-158
*
INC. ,
*
•
Defendant.
ORDER
Before
dismiss.
the
Court
(Doc. no.
is
Defendant's
unopposed
motion
5.) For the reasons stated herein,
to
the
motion is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
On June 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a personal injury claim
in the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia, alleging that
he sustained injuries during a train accident in Richmond
County on June
24,
2012,
due
to the negligence
of CSX
Corporation ("CSX"). (Compl., Ex. A.) Plaintiff alleges in the
state action that a CSX-owned train dragged him approximately
fifty feet and that he was hospitalized for three months after
the accident.
(Id^. 11 4-21.)
On July 23, 2014, Defendant removed the action to this
Court, then filed a motion to dismiss.
argues that
Defendant;
(1)
(2)
(Doc. no. 5.) Defendant
the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendant
prior to removal; (3) Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; and (4) Plaintiff's
claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations
because service was not accomplished prior to the expiration
of the limitations period. Defendant insinuates that Plaintiff
sued
the
wrong
entity:
CSX
Transportation
("CSXT"),
a
subsidiary of CSX, may have been a more appropriate defendant.
Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant's motion.
II.
Defendant
argues
DISCUSSION
that
Plaintiff's
claims
must
be
dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (2)
for lack of personal jurisdiction. "A federal court sitting in
diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining whether
personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction
must (1) be appropriate under the state long-arm statute and
(2)
not violate
the Due Process
Clause
of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Diamond Crystal
Brands v. Food Movers Int' 1, 593 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (11th Cir.
2010).
A
plaintiff
seeking
the
exercise
of
personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial
burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make
out a prima facie case of jurisdiction. Id. at 1257. Where, as
here,
the
defendant
challenges
jurisdiction by
affidavit evidence in support of its position,
submitting
"the burden
traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence
supporting jurisdiction." Id.
Georgia's
long-arm
statute
"imposes
independent
obligations that a plaintiff must establish for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction that are distinct from the demands of
procedural due process."
Id.
at
1259.
Specifically,
the
statute confers personal jurisdiction over nonresidents only
as
to
a
cause
of
action
omissions, ownership, use,
arising
from
any
of
the
acts,
or possession enumerated in the
statute if in person or through an agent, he or she:
(1) transacts any business within the state;
(2)
commits a tortious act or omission within the
state,
except
as
to
a
cause
of
action
for
defamation of character arising from the act;
(3) commits a tortious injury in this state caused
by an act or omission outside this state if the
tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in this state;
(4)
owns,
uses,
or
possesses
situated within this state
O.C.G.A.
§
.
.
any
.
real
property
."
9-10-91.
Here, Defendant argues that CSX is a Virginia corporation
with its principal place of business in Florida. CSX is a
holding company which owns various subsidiaries,
including
CSXT. As a result,
CSX does not operate a railroad and has
never
maintained,
constructed,
or
operated
a
railroad
in
Georgia or anywhere else. Additionally, Defendant asserts that
it does not maintain an office or conduct business in Georgia,
is not licensed to do business in Georgia, and has no agent in
Georgia for the purpose of accepting service of process. In
sum, Defendant has no contacts in the state and asserts that
it does not fall into any of the categories listed in the
statute.
Even if a related entity such as CSXT may be subject to
personal jurisdiction due to an alleged tortious act in the
state, Defendant contends that mere ownership of a subsidiary
is
not
sufficient
to
justify
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate parent.
personal
See e.g.,
Drumm Corp. v. Wright, 755 S.E.2d 850, 854 (2014)("So long as
a
parent
and
subsidiary
maintain
separate
and
distinct
corporate entities, the presence of one in a forum state may
not be attributed to the other.") (quoting Vogt v. Greenmarine
Holding,
LLC,
2002 WL 534542,
*4
(N.D.
Ga.
Feb.
20,
Plaintiff has not rebutted Defendant's argument.
the Court
finds
that Defendant
is
not
subject
2002)).
Therefore,
to personal
jurisdiction under Georgia's long-arm statute. The Court need
not address Defendant's other arguments in favor of dismissing
Plaintiff's
claims
because
resolution
of
the
personal
jurisdiction issue is dispositive.
III.
For
the
Defendant's
reasons
motion
to
CONCLUSION
stated
dismiss
herein,
(doc.
IT
no.
IS
5)
ORDERED
is
GRANTED
that
and
Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk
is directed to terminate all pending motions and deadlines and
CLOSE this
case.
)RDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this
fyE& day of
, 2015.
Hall
United/States District Judge
District of Georgia
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?