McNorrill v. Asset Acceptance, LLC

Filing 39

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 12 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 07/21/2016. (thb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

JOSEPH MICHAEL MCNORRILL,

on

*

behalf of Himself and all

*

others

*

similarly situated,
v.

*
*

ASSET ACCEPTANCE, LLC,

*

l:14-cv-210

Defendant.

ORDER

In

this

McNorrill,

action,

Plaintiff

Joseph

Michael

alleges that Defendant Asset

LLC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

("FDCPA")

by

payments

on

proceedings.
he

class

as class representative,

Acceptance,

because

putative

attempting

to

time-barred

collect

debt

in

and,

in

fact,

Chapter

accepting

13

bankruptcy

Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's

filed

suit

after

the

FDCPA's

statute

of

Complaint

limitations

ran.

As explained below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion IN

PART

and

DENIES

the

motion

with

respect

to

Defendant's

acceptance of payments on time-barred debt in connection with a
bankruptcy proceeding.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History
On

the

September

Superior

Defendant
2014,

Court

Soon after,

2014,

of

violated

Defendant

(Doc.

17,

Columbia

the

FDCPA.

removed

Defendant

Plaintiff

the

filed

County,
(Doc.

case

at

this

filed a motion

class

Georgia

1

to

a

to

8.)

On

dismiss

that

November

Court.

(Id.

at

7,
1.)

the

Complaint.

response

to

Defendant's

motio.n

dismiss,

to

Plaintiff

simultaneously filed a brief opposing dismissal
Complaint.

(Docs.

terminated

23,

(Doc.

While
until

7,

8.)

Defendant's

December

dismiss.

to

dismiss

Defendant

as

filed

motion

Eleventh

moot.

a

was

pending,

Circuit's

decision

Court
in

Johnson,

the Court lifted the stay on June 1,

29.)

stayed the

10.)

to

, 2016 WL 2996372

Midland

(11th Cir.

May 24,

Noting the Eleventh Circuit's

30.)

Defendant's

With

second

that

motion

decision in

2016,

additional

to

case

v.

and allowed

additional time to brief the decision's
(Doc.

adjudication.

motion

Johnson

(Doc.

complete,

F.3d

the

2015).

case.

(Doc.

second

LLC,

the parties

the Court

12.)

that

the

motion

2014,

and amended his

In light of the amendment,

Funding,

this

alleging

in

6.)

In

On

action

dismiss

impact on

briefing

now

is

for

ripe

B. Plaintiff's Allegations

This

FDCPA

class

by

putative

action

filing
class

alleges

proofs

that

claims

when

members

of

claims

"Defendant

and
and

violated

against

lawsuits
lawsuits

the

the

on

the

debts

Defendant was seeking to collect were barred by the statutes of
limitations . . . ."
At

the

(Am. Compl.,

relevant

times,

Plaintiff

members

were

SI 16.)

Defendant Asset Acceptance,

principal
debt

residents

Doc. 7 11.)

address

collection.

files

lawsuits

proofs

in

of Georgia,

Michigan,

(Id.
to

SI

4.)

recover

is

and

the

Florida,

LLC,

in

proposed

class

and Alabama.

(Id.

a Delaware LLC with its

the

business

Plaintiff alleges
time-bared

of claim in bankruptcy courts

debts

of

that

and

consumer
Defendant

time-barred

against debtors.

(Id.

SI

18.J1
In

barred

Plaintiff's

proof

[Plaintiff]

According

of

case,

claim

Defendant

on

April

allegedly

3,

2012,

to

the

Amended

Complaint,

the

the

bankruptcy,

1 "Time-barred"

refers

neither

to

Plaintiff

claims

that

debt
2006.

nor

creditors

a

shortly

petitioned for Chapter 13 protection."

Defendant became time-barred on September 1,

During

"filed

the

are

(Id.

time-

after
SI 19.)

claimed
(Id.

by

SI 20.)

bankruptcy

barred

from

collecting from debtors because of applicable statutes of limitations.

According to Plaintiff,

the relevant statutes of limitation in this

case are six years in Georgia, five years in Florida, and three years
in Alabama.
(Am. Compl. SI 28.)
Whether the debt alleged in the

Amended Complaint is in fact time-barred is irrelevant to this motion.
Accordingly, these statutes of limitation are not presently at issue;
only the FDCPA statute of limitation is at issue here.

trustee

objected

direct

result

to

of

Defendant's

filing

claim.

[the]

(Id.

SI

time-barred

21.)

proof

" [A] s

of

a

claim

against" Plaintiff, Defendant was paid the following amounts:
•
•

SI

October 1,

•

(Id.

November 3,

September 2, 2014

24.)

2014

$66.14

2014

$91.55

$51.98

Plaintiff alleges

that

absent

Court

intervention,

Defendant will continue to receive monthly payments based on the
time-barred claim.

(Id.

SI 25.)

In Count I of the Amended Complaint,
Defendant's

SIS!

conduct violates

15 U.S.C.

47-48.)

Specifically,

allegations

concerning which

violations.

First,

Plaintiff alleges that

§§ 1692e and 1692f.

Plaintiff

of

makes

Defendant's

two

actions

Plaintiff alleges that the

(Id.

separate

constitute

filing of time-

barred proofs of claim was in violation of §§ 1692e and 1692f.
(Id.

SI

53.)

Second,

Plaintiff

alleges

that

"Defendant's

collection [of] money as a result of filing of time-bared proofs
of

claim

...

is

a

false,

deceptive,

or

misleading

representation or an unfair means of collection of a debt
violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f."
II.

Under Federal

in

(Id^ SI 54.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule of Civil

Procedure

8(a)(2),

a complaint

must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief" to give the defendant

fair notice of both the claim and the supporting grounds.
Atl.

Corp.

v.

defendant's
complaint
right
must

to

Rule

must

U.S.

allegations,

Rule

the

at

"factual

relief

570.

that

To survive a

dismiss,

a

plaintiff's

allegations

speculative

level,"

and

to

raise

those

a

facts

is

plausible

on

a

complaint

attacked by

Although

and

of

a

conclusions,

cause

of

and

action

662,

a

formulaic

will

not

its

face."

678

a

the same time,

at

the
The

than an unadorned,

the-

accusation."

Id.

of

555.

(quoting Twombly,

(2009)

recitation

do."

standard "demands more

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

At

to

(2007).

motion need not be buttressed by detailed factual

8 pleading

556 U.S.

555

the plaintiff's pleading obligation "requires more

labels

elements

above

544,

motion

enough

claim to

Rule 12(b)(6)

than

include

a

550

550 U.S.

12(b)(6)

relief

"state

Twombly,

Twombly,

Bell

Ashcroft

556 U.S.

a complaint should not

be

v.

Iqbal,

at 555).

dismissed for

failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond a doubt that

the

plaintiff

can

entitle

him to

(1957);

see

2011

WL

Marshall

1171,

must

accept

construe

1174

all

as

at

Bd.

Cir.

all

reasonable

of

circumstances
Gibson,

Statebridge

(N.D.

Educ.

(11th

true

v.

*2

of

set

Conley v.

Kabir

4500050,

F.2d

no

relief."

also

Cnty.

prove

v.

Ga.

Co.,

Sept.

Marshall

1993)).

At

in

No.

27,

Cnty.
this

facts alleged

inferences

355

the

in

that

would

41,

45-46

U.S.

1:ll-cv-2747,

2011)
Gas

Dist.,

stage,

the

(citing

the

Court

complaint

light most

992

and

favorable

to the plaintiff.
(11th Cir.

Hoffman-Pugh v.

Ramsey,

312

F.3d 1222,

1225

2002) .

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

"A

grounds

Rule

is

2014)

dismissal

appropriate

complaint

Ground

12(b)(6)

that

the

Package

statute

of

limitations

*if it is apparent from the face of

claim

Sys.,

is

Inc.,

(quoting La Grasta,

Defendant's

on

motion

time-barred.'"

587

F.

App'x

Perez

603,

the

Fedex

(11th

605

v.

Cir.

358 F.3d at 845).

argues

that

Plaintiff's

FDCPA

claim

is

time-barred by the FDCPA's one-year statute of limitations.

See

15

608

U.S.C.

(11th

§

Cir.

statute

1692k(d);
1995),

of

In

the

limitations

Maloy

Eleventh

begins

v.

Philips,

Circuit

to

run

opportunity to comply with the FDCPA."
disfavors

the

doctrines

notion

that

of

a

would permit

Loan Servicing,

Cir. May 25,

2016) .

F.

held

upon

later-in-time

App'x.

See,

a

F.3d

that

607,

the

FDCPA's

defendant's

Further,

continuing

otherwise time-barred violations.

64

"last

FDCPA case law

violation

or

conduct

resurrect

e.g.,

to

Gajewski v.

, 2016 WL 3006896,

other

Ocwen

at *2

(7th

But courts do allow cases to move forward

where independent violations occur entirely within the statutory

period.
conduct

F.

In such situations,
from consideration.

Supp.

2d

1355,

1360

courts dismiss other time-barred
See

(N.D.

Kaplan v.

Ala.

Assetcare,

2000);

Pittman

Inc.,

v.

58

J.J.

Maclntyre
1997).

Co.
In

Complaint

of

this

to

Nevada,
case,

allege

time-barred

claims

payments

the

Compl.,

in
Doc.

Inc.,

the

two

969

Court

another

course

of

a

Supp.

construes

distinct

and

F.

609,

one

collecting

bankruptcy

(D.

Plaintiff's

violations,

for

611

Amended

for

and

Nev.

filing

accepting

proceeding.

(See

Am.

7, If 53-54.)

1. Defendant's Filing of a Stale Claim

The face of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint

FDCPA's

for

statute of limitations bars his

filing

Defendant

its

proof

claim.

the

filed

of
proof

of

Plaintiff

filed this

the

GRANTS

Court

case on

Defendant's

claim against

Defendant

15

See
claim

1692k(d).

on

U.S.C.
April

September 17,
motion

to

reveals that the

§
3,

2014.

dismiss

2012,

and

Accordingly,

with

respect

to

Defendant's filing of a stale claim.

2. Defendant' s Acceptance of Payments

Defendant

argues

that

acceptance of payments.

Plaintiff

cannot

recover

for

its

At least in part, Defendant frames this

as a question of whether the FDCPA's statute of limitations bars
this

the

claim.

More

Bankruptcy

particularly,

Code

permits

Defendant

the

filing

of

argued

that

stale

because

claims,

the

acceptance of payment for such a claim is "permitted by law," 15
U.S.C.

§

1692f(l),

starts

the

so

limitations

that

a

clock

"separate
running

actionable
anew"

never

event

that

occurred.

Hunnicutt v. Cach,

LLC,

(M.D.

2011).

Fla.

June 30,

Defendant's

No.

argument

10-cv-2111,

confuses

2011 WL

two

2600651,

questions:

at *1

whether

an

"actionable event" occurred for statute of limitations purposes
and

whether

FDCPA.2

Plaintiff

Properly

alleges

that

independent

alleged

alleged

construed,

Defendant's

violation

conduct

a

of

plausible

Plaintiff's

acceptance
§§ 1692e

violates

violation

of

and

those

Amended

the

Complaint

payments

is

an

Assuming

1692f.

sections,

of

the

then

Plaintiff

collected payments on time-barred debt well before the one-year

statute of limitations period passed.3
real

question

accepted

is

whether

payments

claim

in Chapter

claim

for

relief

in

Plaintiff's

conjunction

That being the case, the
allegation that

with

a

time-barred

13 Bankruptcy proceedings
under

15

U.S.C.

§§

1692e

states

or

Defendant

proof

of

a plausible

1692f.

The

Court

that

Ma]

debt

addresses this question below.

B. Failure to State a

"Section

collector

may

1692e

not

2 In fairness to

of

use

Claim

the

any

Defendant,

FDCPA

false,

provides

deceptive,

or

misleading

Hunnicutt itself appears to confuse

this question or at least does not give full consideration to
Plaintiff's argument that the second alleged violation is a plausible
claim for relief.

3 According to the Amended Complaint, Defendant accepted payments

on September 2, October 1, and November 3, 2014. Plaintiff filed this
suit on September 17, 2014 and amended his Complaint on November 25,
2014.

representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt.'"

(11th

Crawford

Cir.

v.

LVNV

2014)

similarly,

Funding,

(quoting

"Section

1692f

15

LLC,

758

U.S.C.

states

that

F.3d,

§

A[a]

1254,

1692e).

debt

1258

Somewhat

collector may

not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to

collect

any

includes

by

the

Johnson

2996372,

at

*1

omitted) .

collect

agreement

v.

Midland

(11th Cir.

of

proceedings."

it,

"evaluate

a

is

May 24,

by

that

the

debt

LLC,

2016)

1692f) .

a

unconscionable

758 F.3d at 1258.

expressly

,

2016

by
WL

(quotation and citation

personal

or

"This

permitted

F.3d

claim is

to obtain payment or

solicitation

514 U.S.

debt-collector's

not

or

291,

294

least-sophisticated-consumer

whether

misleading,

§

creating

Funding,

either

15 U.S.C.
debt

a

Heintz v. Jenkins,

applies

Crawford,

to

(quoting

"To collect a debt or

liquidation

Court

Id^

attempting

authorized
law."

debt.'"

legal

(1995).

standard

conduct

is

under

the

unfair

or

The

to

deceptive,

statute."

(internal quotations omitted).

Courts have applied these general rules to debt collectors

filing

lawsuits

Eleventh

to

Circuit

collect

explained,

on

time-barred

"[f]ederal

debts.

circuit

As

and

the

district

courts have uniformly held that a debt collector's threatening
to sue on a time-barred debt and/or filing a time-barred suit in
state

court

Id. at 1259.

to

recover

that

debt

(collecting cases).

violates

§§

1692e

and

1692f."

This is so because statutes of

limitations "represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it

is

unjust

to

fail

to

put

the

adversary

on

notice

to

defend

within a specified period of time," and "because the right to be
free from stale claims
to prosecute them."

in time comes to

Id.

prevail

over the right

at 1260.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the same goes for filing
time-barred claims

1261.

As

in bankruptcy court.

Crawford

explains,

Crawford,

"[t]he

^least

758

F.3d at

sophisticated'

Chapter 13 debtor may be unaware that a claim is time barred and
unenforceable and thus fail to object to such a claim.

Given the

Bankruptcy

otherwise

Code's

unenforceable

automatic

time-barred

allowance

debt

will

provision,

be

paid

the

from

the

debtor's

future wages as part of his Chapter 13 repayment plan." Id.

this reason,

a

among others,

time-barred

proof

^unconscionable, '

the Eleventh Circuit held that filing

of

claim

^deceptive,'

far

as

whether

the

collection

proceeding

is

the

an

Court

claim.

surrounding

the

whether

collection

Here,

the

In

a

"^unfair,'

within the broad

Court's

court

in

from

the

view,

of

violation

has

debts

violation

collection
is

no

time-barred

the

alleged

was

^misleading'

aware,

independent

time-barred

bankruptcy

Id.

is

of

in

and

scope of § 1692e and § 1692f."
As

For

the

§§

bankruptcy

filing

of

a

circumstances

payments
of

a

considered

must

1692e

or

inform
1692f.

Plaintiff's payment and Defendant's acceptance took place

because Defendant allegedly filed a time-barred proof of claim

in

a

Chapter

13

proceeding.

In
10

alleging

that

Defendant

collected and accepted Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan payments for a

time-barred

claim,

the

Court

finds

that

stated a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C.

Defendant's

arguments

Plaintiff

plausibly

§§ 1692e and 1692f.

otherwise

are

unpersuasive.

Defendant makes three arguments for why Defendant fails to state

a claim for relief.

not

independently

"permitted
third,

by

that

First,

the pendency of a claim or case does

violate

law"
no

and

the

FDCPA.

therefore

violation

Second,

no

its

violation

occurred

because

conduct

is

occurred.

And

1692f(l)

only

§

prohibits collecting excessive amounts.
In Defendant's view,

the only plausible violation occurred

when it filed the proof of claim and other litigation events are
irrelevant.

Defendant

relies

on

Slorp

v.

Lerner,

Sampson

&

Rothfuss, 587 F. App'x 249, 259 (6th Cir. 2014), where the Sixth
Circuit
to

found that

Plaintiff's

independent

a

defendant's

motion

violation

for

of

affidavit

relief

the

from

FDCPA

filed

in

judgment

because

it

opposition

was

not

"merely

an

gave

^present effect'

to deceptive conduct that had occurred outside

the

window."

limitations

Circuit

reasoned

violation

of

that

the

587

"the

FDCPA

F.

App'x

defendants

each

time

did

they

at

259.

not

The

commit

filed

Sixth

a

fresh

pleadings

or

memoranda reaffirming the legitimacy of their state-court suit;

rather,

those

violation,"

were

which

consequences."

Id.

continuing

"in

effects

themselves

have

of

their

no

present

(internal quotations omitted).
11

initial
legal

Slorp is distinguishable.

legal

filings

consequences."
and

at
Id.

Defendant's

Chapter

13

issue

As the

in

Slorp

Sixth Circuit

"[had]

no

said,

present

the

legal

The same is not true of Plaintiff's payment

acceptance

of

proceedings.

funds

on

Consider

a

time-barred

the

intended

claim

in

bankruptcy

process:

Where
a
proof
of
claim
is
filed
in
a
bankruptcy case,
that claim is
generally
deemed allowed, so it will be viewed as a
valid claim and paid out of the bankruptcy
estate. However, the bankruptcy trustee is
charged with examining proofs of claim and
objecting to the allowance of any claim that
is improper. Once the trustee objects, the
bankruptcy court is in turn charged with
determining
whether
the
claim
is
unenforceable against the debtor under any
agreement or applicable law for a reason
other than because such claim is contingent
or
unmatured.
Thus,
where
the
bankruptcy

process is working as intended,
a timebarred proof of claim may be filed but will
not be paid by the bankruptcy estate.
Johnson,
and

2016 WL 2996372,

alterations

at *3 (internal quotations,

omitted).

Conversely,

citations,

when

a

trustee

erroneously pays time-barred claims, the "distribution of funds
to

debt

collectors

.

.

.

necessarily

reduces

the

payments

to

other legitimate creditors with enforceable claims."

Crawford,

758

where

F.3d

at

1261.

In

other

words,

affidavit had no legal impact,

unlike

in

accepting funds

Slorp

the

for time-barred

claims places a debtor in a legally changed position vis-a-vis
his creditors with enforceable claims.

12

Moreover,

the

permissive

than

litigation

conduct

Miljkovic v.

Cir.

2015)

the

Sixth

may

Circuit

Circuit

give

of

collection").

Defendant's

lawyers

and

were

Id.4 Likewise,

reply

to

to

be

what

FDCPA

more

kind

liability.

791 F.3d 1291,

1304

of

See
(11th

[FDCPA] applies to the litigating
firms

engaged

in

consumer

debt

the Eleventh Circuit determined that

and

conduct

appears

regarding

P.A.,

law

In Miljkovic,

sworn

garnishment

rise

Shafritz & Dinkin,

(finding "that the

activities

the

Eleventh

failure

subject

to

to

the

release
FDCPA's

a

writ

of

requirements.

Defendant's litigation activities are subject to

FDCPA.

Defendant's

second argument

is

that because the Bankruptcy

Code permits the filing of stale claims,

collecting payments on

those

15

claims

is

"permitted by law,"

and not a violation of the

cite

any

authority for

Defendant

stand

Bankruptcy

Code

Eleventh Circuit
See Johnson,

allows

for

FDCPA.

this
the

permits

see

Defendant,

proposition.
unremarkable

creditors

acknowledges

U.S.C.

to

as much

§

however,

Most

cases

proposition

file

stale

1692f(l),
does

not

cited by
that

claims.

the

The

in Crawford and Johnson.

2016 WL 2996372, at *3 ("We recognize that the Code

creditors

to

file

proofs of claim that

face to be barred by the statute of limitations.

appear on their
However,

when

4 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit determined that this conduct,
although subject to the FDCPA, was not in violation of §§ 1692d,
1692e,

or 1292f.

13

a

particular

type

of

creditor—designated

a

Mebt

collector'

under the FDCPA—files a knowingly time-barred proof of claim in
a

debtor's

Chapter

13

bankruptcy,

that

debt

vulnerable to a claim under the FDCPA.").

collector

In short,

will

whether the

Bankruptcy Code permits filing stale claims is

immaterial as

whether

practice.

In

and Johnson confirms,

that

the

FDCPA

Crawford makes
make

"debt

permits

clear,

collectors"

that

liable

for

conduct

the

be

other
the

to

words,

FDCPA may

Bankruptcy

Code

permits.

More

language,

generally,

relevance

of

the

"permitted

by

law"

which Defendant frequently quotes but never cites,

unclear.
Its

the

It

reliance

appears
on

that

this

subsection

consider the structure of §

A

debt

Defendant

collector

unconscionable

is

is

referring

1692f(l).

To

misplaced.

to

see

1692f:

may

means

to

not

use

collect

unfair
or

or

attempt

to collect any debt. Without limiting the
general application of the foregoing,
the
following conduct is a violation of this
section:

(1)

The

collection

of

any

amount

(including any interest, fee, charge,
or expense incidental to the principal
obligation)
unless
such
amount
is
expressly authorized by the agreement
creating the debt or permitted by law.

14

is

why,

(2) The acceptance by a debt collector
from any person of a check or other
payment instrument postdated by more
than five days unless such person is
notified
in
writing
of
the
debt
collector's
intent
to
deposit
such
check

or

instrument

not

more

than

ten

nor less than three business days prior
to such deposit.

15 U.S.C.
is

but

§

1692f

one

collect

example

or

permitted

associated

Legal

by

with

Group,

(finding

of many

attempt

"permitted by law"
are

(emphasis added).

§

communication

"unfair
a

1692f (1)

in §

is

statute

533

such

F.

1292(f)(1)

claimed

or

collect

collecting

P.C.,

a

to

As

an

is

In

attorneys'
See,

2d

this

fees

304

where

the

recoverable

2d

California
checks).

763

(N.D.

law did not
As

in

Cal.

2006)

authorize

Crawford

(finding

service

and

charge

Johnson,

v.

JBC

2008)

attorney

under

New

Inc.,

that

that
costs

(E.D.N.Y.

General Obligations Law); Abels v. JBC Legal Group,

Supp.

and

Larsen

290,

to

context,

e.g.,

violation
not

means

referring to payments

debts.

amount

§ 1692f(l)

unconscionable

debt."

as

Supp.

evident,

York

434 F.

applicable

for dishonored

whether

the

FDCPA

prohibits Defendant's acceptance of payments is a matter of the

FDCPA and

not

Bankruptcy

or

state

law,

and

the

"permitted by

law" language found in § 1292f (1) is not relevant.
Defendant's

the

impact

of

third argument

§

1692f(l).

is

similarly confused regarding

Defendant

argues

that

Plaintiff

"fails to state an independent claim for relief under § 1692f(1)
because he does not challenge the amount of
15

[Defendant's]

proof

of claim, nor the payments it has received pursuant to its proof
of

claims."

focus

of

(Doc.

[§

22

1692f(l)]

at

8.)

...

rather

any debt,

whatever its amount."

774

F.

the

Supp.

Defendant

is on the

collected

Inc.,

than

As

collector's

1404,

amount

explains,
of the

debt

authorization

Gaetano v.

1415-16

"[t]he

to

to be

collect

Payco of Wisconsin,

(D.

Conn.

1990).

If

Plaintiff's claims were based on § 1692f(l), these would be good
arguments.

general

But

§

1692f(l)

prohibition

1692f (l)-(8),

and

on

is

merely

an

"unfair" practices

Plaintiff

never

example

can

suggested

be
that

of

how

the

violated,

see

§

1692(f)(1)

was the only exemplary prohibition Defendant violated.
Compl.,

Doc.

n

7,

53-54)

(alleging violations

of

§§

(See Am.
1692e and

1692f generally).

IV.

As

explained

statute

of

above,

limitations

Defendant's

filing

Accordingly,

the

DISMISSES

that

portion

the

Court

bars

of

Court

CONCLUSION

a
GRANTS
of

finds

Plaintiff's

proof

Defendant's

motion

Plaintiff's

a

timely

claim

for

relief

the

claim

time-barred

filing of time-barred proofs of claims.
states

that

claim

FDCPA's

concerning

of
IN

claim.
PART

addressed

to

and
the

But because Plaintiff
regarding

Defendant's

acceptance of payments on time-barred debts in connection with a
Chapter

13 Bankruptcy proceeding,

motion IN PART.

16

the Court DENIES

Defendant's

ORDER ENTERED at

Augusta,

Georgia,

this

^2/^c
day

of July,

2016.

HONeRftBlE J. RAN0AL HALL

UNITED^STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
iOUJtHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

17