Haynes v. Richmond County Sheriff Office et al

Filing 89

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 85 Motion to Serve Additional Interrogatories to Defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 09/29/2016. (jah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
RODERICK D. HAYNES,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
RICHMOND COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE, )
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_________

CV 114-237

ORDER
_________

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. no. 26.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve additional
interrogatories to Defendant. (Doc. no. 85.)
I.

BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant used excessive force by hitting Plaintiff

with his police car during a chase in Richmond County. (Doc. no. 26.) After initial
screening, the Court dismissed claims against the Richmond County Sheriff Office but
allowed claims against Defendant Garner to proceed. (Doc. nos. 10, 12, 14.) The parties
then commenced discovery, which has been repeatedly extended from its original deadline of
January 1, 2016 to its current deadline of October 3, 2016. (See doc. nos. 20, 35, 42, 60, 68,
74, 84.)

Most recently, the Court granted Plaintiff a one-month extension to take

Defendant’s deposition by written examination. (Doc. no. 84.)

On September 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to serve a third set of
interrogatories to Defendant and attached eighteen proposed interrogatories. (Doc. no. 85.)
Plaintiff does not give a reason for his request. Plaintiff has already served forty-five
interrogatories on Defendant—twenty-five as a matter of course and twenty additional as
permitted by the Court on May 24, 2016. (See doc. nos. 52, 68.) Defendant opposes
Plaintiff’s motion on the grounds these requests are cumulative and harassing. (Doc. no. 88.)
II.

DISCUSSION
A court may allow a party to serve additional interrogatories beyond the twenty-five

allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 as long as they are consistent with the scope
and limits of Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C), a
Court may limit discovery where:
(i)

the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative . . . ;

(ii)

the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the action; or

(iii)

the proposed discovery is outside the scope . . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
Although pro se IFP litigants are given some leeway, they are still subject to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for three reasons. First, Plaintiff’s proposed
interrogatories are both cumulative and duplicative. See Breach v. Prison Health Servs., No.
2:06-CV-1133-MEF, 2008 WL 2959778, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 31, 2008) (excluding
interrogatories because they were unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other

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discovery). Plaintiff already questioned Defendant at length about his blue lights, internal
intercom speaker, and camera. (Compare doc. no. 85, p. 10, interrog. nos. 11-13, with doc.
no. 46, pp. 8-9, interrog. nos. 6-8, 15-16, and doc. no. 52, attach. 1, p. 3, interrog. nos. 1112.) Plaintiff has also already asked for witness statements from the incident and the speed
at which Defendant was traveling. (Compare doc. no. 85, pp. 9-10, interrog. nos. 9, 14, with
doc. no. 46, p. 8-9, interrog. nos. 12, 18-19, and doc. no. 52, attach. 1, p. 2, interrog. no. 1.)
Furthermore, Plaintiff has had “ample opportunity to obtain the information” through
previous discovery requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii). On May 24, 2016, the Court
gave Plaintiff leave to serve twenty interrogatories beyond his initial twenty-five. (Doc. no.
68; doc. no. 52.) Plaintiff can also still obtain this information through the written deposition
he intends to take for which the Court has extended the discovery deadline. (Doc. no. 84.)
Given Plaintiff’s many chances to obtain the information he seeks, he should not be allowed
to seek it through another set of interrogatories. See Abruscato v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No.
3:13-CV-962-J-39JBT, 2014 WL 11394858, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2014).
Finally, Plaintiff seeks information irrelevant to his case and therefore outside the
scope of discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “[W]hile
the standard of relevancy [in discovery] is a liberal one, it is not so liberal as to allow a party
to ‘roam in the shadow zones of relevancy and to explore a matter which does not presently
appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so.’” Banta Properties, Inc.
v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., No. 10-61485-CIV, 2011 WL 13096151, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 15,
2011) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff seeks to explore such “shadow zones” as
“why [Defendant] chose to be a police,” if Defendant “like[s] being a police,” and if
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Defendant “believe[s] Black American lives Matter.” (Doc. no. 85, p. 8.) Plaintiff further
proposes Defendant engage in pure speculation and draw legal conclusions. (See doc. no.
85, p. 8, 11.) (“What would you do different if you could go back to the Date of which the
collision occurred? . . . Is it against the Law for a free citizen to refuse to answer question by
an Police?”) These inquiries can in no way lead to evidence supporting Plaintiff’s claims of
excessive force, and thus are not appropriate topics for discovery.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve

additional interrogatories to defendant. (Doc. no. 85.)
SO ORDERED this 29th day of September, 2016, at Augusta, Georgia.

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