Taylor v. United States Department of Labor et al

Filing 21

ORDER granting Respondent's 12 Motion to Dismiss; and, accordingly, dismissing Taylor's petition and directing the Clerk to terminate all motions and deadlines and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 8/2/2016. (jah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

CALETHA D.

TAYLOR,

*

Petitioner,

*
*

v.

*

CV 115-049

*

UNITED

STATES

DEPARTMENT OF

*

LABOR;

EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS

*

ADMINISTRATION;

OFFICE OF

*

WORKERS COMPENSATION PROGRAMS;

*

DIVISION OF ENERGY EMPLOYEES

*

OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS

*

COMPENSATION; and FINAL
ADJUDICATION BRANCH,

*

*
*
*

Respondents.

ORDER

Presently
dismiss.

before

(Doc. 12.)

the

Court

is

Respondents'

motion

to

For the reasons below, Respondents' motion

is GRANTED.

I,

BACKGROUND

From 1990 to 1993, Petitioner Caletha D. Taylor *worked as

a laborer in F-Area Laundry Room,
driver at

the

Savannah River Site

and was assigned as a shuttle
in Aiken,

South Carolina,

[Department of Energy] facility." (Pet., Doc. 1, at 2.)
capacity,

a

In this

Taylor was exposed to toxic compounds and radiation

and claims to have contracted chronic beryllium disease ("CBD")

therefrom.
claim

with

(IdJ
the

Consequently, on May 28, 2010, Taylor filed a
Department

of

Labor's

Office

of

Workers'

Compensation Programs
of

the

Energy

("OWCP")

Employees

Program Act of 2000

OWCP

("FAB")

benefits

13,

her

Part

E

medical

was causing.

a

CBD.

Taylor applied for,

the Final

final

for

(Id.)

recommended decision,

awarding

Subsequently,

Taylor

on

May

the chronic dermatitis

the

medical

17,

2 011,

additional

that her CBD

(Doc. 1-2 at 1.)

two

years

later,

on

based on her CBD and chronic dermatitis,

loss benefits

result,

§ 7384 et seg.

Adjudication Branch of

decision

(Id.)

Compensation

and the OWCP later awarded her,

benefits

Approximately

February 3,

Illness

the OWCP issued a

2011,

issued

for

Occupational

("EEOICPA") , 42 U.S.C.

After due consideration,

and on January

for medical benefits under Part E

under Part E.

(Pet.

June

3,

mailed

this Court,

at 3.)

in

Taylor,

filed a claim for wage-

Yet,

2015, the FAB denied her claim.

Taylor

2013,

an

this

time,

(Id. at 5.)

envelope

April 4, 2015, a petition for judicial review.

on

As a

postmarked

(Id. at 19; Doc.

1-3.)

In response to Taylor's petition,

which was received and

filed by the Clerk of Court on the morning of April 7,

2015,

Respondents filed the instant motion to dismiss - pursuant to
Federal

Court

Rule

has

of

no

Civil

Procedure

subject

matter

12(b)(1)

-

jurisdiction

alleging

to

that

conduct

the

the

requested review.1

(Pet. at 1; Doc. 12.)

6(a).

Taylor,

in

Since then,

opposition

(Doc.

13);

16)

and a notice of

has

filed a

response

See 42 U.S.C. § 7385s-

proceeding pro se,
Respondents

additional

authority

to Respondents'

received these submissions,

have

has filed a brief

filed
(Doc.

notice

a

reply

19);

(Doc.

(Doc.

and Taylor

20) .

Having

the Court now considers Respondents'

motion.

II,

DISCUSSION

The statute under which Taylor proceeds reads as follows:

A person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final
decision of the Secretary [of Labor] under this part
may review that order in the United States district
court

in

the

district

in

which

the

injury

was

sustained, the employee lives, [or] the survivor lives
. . . by filing in such court within 60 days after the
date on which

that final

decision was

issued a

written

petition praying that such decision be modified or set
aside.

42 U.S.C.

language,
not

§ 7385s-6(a)

(emphasis added).

Given this

statutory

Respondents contend that because Taylor's petition was

received and

filed until

April

7,

2015

-

more

than

sixty

days after the FAB denied Taylor's claim for wage-loss benefits

- this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction.2 In response,
Taylor maintains that because 42 U.S.C.

§ 7385s-6(a)

is silent

1 u[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S.

500,

514

(2006).

2 Taylor's sixty-day window closed on April 6, 2015 - the day before her
petition was filed.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 (explaining how a time period "in
any statute that does not specify a method of computing time" is calculated) .
3

as to what constitutes a "filing," the Court should construe the
word in accordance with
Rules

of

Appeals
hold

Practice

for

that

and

Veterans

her

filed as

Vet.

that
of

App.

is

was

the

and/or

Claims,

(3)

filed

as

to

R. 4(a); 20 C.F.R.

20

13,

Rule 4 of

States

C.F.R.

its

§

Court

501.3

postmark

court

U.S.C.

§ 501.3(f).

of

and

date

that Taylor cites,

See 38

the

of

at 3-5.)

the relevant

its postmark date.

(2)

United

of

Doc.

the provisions

mailed

§ 7266,

for

(Pet.'s Resp. Br.,

Within each of

appeal

38 U.S.C.

Procedure

petition

April 4, 2015.

of

(1)

a notice

can be

deemed

§ 7266(c);

However,

U.S.

none of these

provisions are applicable to the filing of Taylor's petition - a
petition to set aside a Department of Labor decision in a United
States

district

court.

See

38

U.S.C.

§

72 66(c)

(governing

''review by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims of a final
decision

of

501.2(a)

(indicating that 20 C.F.R.

operation[s]
U.S.

Vet.

the

of

App.

Board

the
R.

of

Veterans'

Employees'

1(a)

Appeals");

§ 501.3(f)

Compensation

(indicating that U.S.

20

C.F.R.

applies

Appeals
Vet.

App.

to

§

xxthe

Board");
R.

4(a)

applies to "practice and procedure in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for Veteran Claims").
Rule

among

of

Civil

other

Instead,

Procedure

things,

5,

that

the applicable rule is

which has

Mw]hen

Federal

been interpreted to mean,

papers

are

mailed

to

the

clerk's office, filing is complete only upon the clerk's receipt
of

them."

See Fed.

R.

Civ.

P. 5(d)(2);

Mcintosh v.

Antonio,

71

F.3d 29,
Inc. ,

36

76

(5th Cir.

F.

Supp.

established,

office,

those papers,
a

deadline

2d

however,

filing

is

1995);

see also Nearhood v.

304,

305

(W.D.N.Y.

1999)

Tops Mkts. ,

("It

is

well

that when papers are mailed to the clerk's

complete

only

upon

the

clerk's

receipt

of

and that filings reaching the clerk's office after

are

deadline.").

untimely,

even

Consequently,

if

they

are

mailed

before

the

Taylor's petition was not *filed" on

the postmark date of April 4, but rather on the day on which the

Clerk received it,

more

Court

than sixty days

has

forward.

1140,

April 7.

no

after

subject

(D.

Colo.

final

jurisdiction

U.S.

Dep't

2011)

deadline is jurisdictional.

Taylor's petition was filed

the FAB's

matter

See Barrie v.

1144

Hence,

of

("The

decision,

with

Labor,

EEOICPA's

and this

which

805

F.

to

move

Supp.

60-day

2d

filing

Because Mr. Barrie filed his claim

after the expiration of the 60-day filing deadline, his claim is
time-barred

and

[the

court]

lacks

jurisdiction

over

his

complaint.").3

3 Despite Taylor's suggestion, the Court cannot equitably toll the sixty-day
deadline within 42 U.S.C.

§ 7385s-6(a).

Smith v. U.S.

Dep't of Labor,

928 F.

Supp. 2d 123 6, 1243 (D. Nev. 2012) (*Though denying Petitioner . . . the
opportunity for judicial review may seem harsh, Petitioner['s] . . . failure
to timely file her petition defeats jurisdiction in this matter and the court
may not apply equitable doctrines in circumvention of this express

Congressional limitation on the court's jurisdiction."
marks and citation omitted)).

Additionally,

(internal quotation

although the Court is under an

obligation to construe Taylor's pro se pleadings liberally, this obligation
does not permit the Court to provide Taylor with leniency as to deadlines.
See Hughes v. Lott 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Pro se pleadings
are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and
will, therefore, be liberally construed." (internal quotation marks and
5

III.

For the reasons above,

to dismiss
petition

(Doc.

and

12).

directs

August,

ENTERED

at

the Court GRANTS Respondents'

Accordingly,
the

deadlines and CLOSE this

ORDER

CONCLUSION

Clerk

motion

the Court DISMISSES Taylor's

to

TERMINATE

all

motions

and

case.

Augusta,

Georgia,

this

(=><

day

of

2016.

fONORA^rE J. RANDAL HALL
STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

FHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

citation omitted)); Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir. 1999)
("Liberal construction does not mean liberal deadlines."), overruled on other
grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) .
6