Stefani v. City of Grovetown et al

Filing 103

ORDER adopting the 102 Mandate as the judgment of this Court; vacating 96 Order; granting summary judgment for Defendants Jones and Nalley in their individual capacities; and directing the Clerk to enter Judgment in their favor. 58 Motion fo r Summary Judgment respecting all of Plaintiff's remaining claims is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the City of Grovetown. This case stands closed. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 09/25/2019. (thb) Modified on 9/26/2019 (thb).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

CHAD STEFANI,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*
*

V.

*

CV 115-164

*

CITY OF GROVETOWN, a municipality *
of the State of Georgia; GARY
*
*
JONES, individually and in his
*
official capacity; and JONES
*
NALLEY, individually and in his
*
official capacity.
Defendants.

*

ORDER

In this case. Plaintiff alleged constitutional violations for
malicious prosecution and unlawful search under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendants Gary Jones and Jones Nalley in their individual
capacities and against Defendant City of Grovetown.

On August 24,

2018, this Court granted in part Plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment and denied in part Defendants' motion for summary
judgment upon the finding and conclusion that no reasonable officer
would have believed that a crime had been committed.

Court

concluded

that

the

officers

did

not

have

Thus, this

even

arguable

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and denied qualified immunity

to the individual officers.

law

claim

of

negligence

The Court dismissed Plaintiff's state

but

granted

summary

judgment

as

to

liability on Plaintiff's state law claim of malicious prosecution

against the City of Grovetown.

The Court further directed that

the case proceed to trial against the officers and Defendant City
of Grovetown on the issue of damages.
On August 16, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed

and

remanded

this

decision.

(See

Stefani

v.

City

of

Grovetown, Case No. 18-13906 (11^^ Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), Doc. 101
(''Appeal Opinion").)

officers

had

arguable

The Court of Appeals determined that the

probable

cause

to

arrest

Plaintiff

and

therefore are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff s
federal claims.

The Court of Appeals therefore directed that this

Court vacate its August 24, 2018 Order to the extent it granted
partial summary judgment to Plaintiff on the individual-capacity
claims and remanded for entry of judgment in the officers' favor.
The Court of Appeals also directed that this Court vacate its

August

24,

2018

Order

to

the

extent

that

it

granted

summary

judgment to Plaintiff as against the City of Grovetown on his §

1983 claims and the state law claim for malicious prosecution and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the mandate of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is
made the judgment of this Court.

In accordance therewith, the

Court hereby VACATES its Order of August 24, 2018 in its entirety.
Further, and as directed by the Court of Appeals, the Court GRANTS

summary

judgment

for

individual capacities.

Defendants

Jones

and

Nalley

in

their

The Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT in

their favor.

In light of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, the Court will
now consider whether the City of Grovetown is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff's constitutional claims and the remaining

state law claim.^

As noted in the Order of August 24, 2018,

[a]

municipality may be held liable for a single act or decision of a
municipal official with final policymaking authority in the area

of the act or decision."

(Order of Aug. 24, 2018, Doc. 96, at 21

(quoting McMillan v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11^^ Cir. 1996)).
In this case. Defendants concede that Defendant Jones, the Chief

of Police of the City of Grovetown's Department of Public Safety,
had final policymaking authority over the arrest, detention and

search of Plaintiff.

Thus, the City of Grovetown is only liable

to the extent that Defendant Jones is liable for any constitutional
violation.2

^
Defendant City of Grovetown previously moved for summary
judgment on these claims. The Court need not reopen the case and
will rule on the record before it.

2 It is undisputed that Defendant Jones was not involved in the
procurement and execution of the search warrant issued against
Plaintiff; accordingly, the City of Grovetown cannot be held liable
for any constitutional violation arising out of the search warrant.

To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff
must prove two things; (1) the elements of the common law tort of
malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment
right

to

be

free

from

unreasonable

seizures.

(Id.

(citing

Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004))).

^^As to the first prong, the constituent elements of the common law
tort of malicious prosecution are:

Ml) a criminal prosecution

instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice
and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff
accused's favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.'"
(Id. (quoting Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003))).

As to the second prong, it is well established that an arrest
without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure that violates

the Fourth Amendment.

(Id. (citing Brown v. City of Huntsville,

Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010))).

Consequently, the

existence of probable cause negates both prongs and defeats a §
1983 malicious prosecution claim.^ id.

For probable cause to exist, an arrest must be objectively
reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.
F.3d at 882.

Wood, 323

Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and

The City of Grovetown is therefore entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim of unlawful search.

3

Of course, the existence of probable cause will also defeat

Plaintiff's state law claim of malicious prosecution.

circumstances within the

police officer's

knowledge

^^warrant a

reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was committing
a crime."
(quoted

Case v. Eslinqer, 555 F.3d 1317, 1327 {11^^ Cir. 2009)

source

omitted).

""^Probable

cause

requires

only

a

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an

actual showing of such activity."

Atterbury v. City of Miami

Police Dep't, 322 F. App'x 724, 727 (11^^^ Cir. 2009) (quoted source
omitted).

''^Thus, an officer must have something more than mere

suspicion but he may have less than convincing proof."

Id. (cited

source omitted).

While the Eleventh Circuit couched its opinion in terms of
arguable probable cause, it clearly indicated without so holding
that actual probable cause existed to obtain the arrest warrant

against Plaintiff.

The Court of Appeals first pointed out that a

neutral magistrate issued the arrest warrants.
13-14.)

It also pointed out that the district attorney's office

had advised
criminal

(Appeal Opinion at

pre-arrest that the suspect could be charged

attempt

to

commit

child

molestation.

(Id.

at

with
16.)

Finally, when it came to an analysis of whether the facts and
circumstances

warranted

a

reasonable

belief

that

Plaintiff

had

committed the charged crime, the Court of Appeals recognized that
the key issue is the suspect's intent, ^^that is, in offering Lucas

$200 per hour to spend time alone with her three daughters, did
the man have intentions that were innocuous or lascivious?"

(Id.

at 14.)

On this point, the Court of Appeals held that ^^a reasonable

officer

could

have concluded that there

was probable cause to

believe that the suspect intended to commit an ^immoral or indecent
act' to or in the presence of Lucas's daughters ^with the intent
to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the
person.'"

findings

(Id.

as

a

at 15

whole,

(quoted

and

in

source

omitted).)

consideration

of

Taken

the

these

facts

and

circumstances upon which Defendant Jones sought the warrant, this
Court concludes that Defendant Jones had probable cause to seek

the arrest warrant for Plaintiff.

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot

establish a federal or state claim for malicious prosecution.

Importantly, Plaintiff has not provided evidence of malice,
which is also an essential element of both his federal and state

law claims of malicious prosecution.

Plaintiff has presented no

evidence of personal animus, ill will or spite towards him from
Defendant Jones.

In fact, in response to the City of Grovetown's

motion for summary judgment on this point. Plaintiff only states
that malice can be inferred from a lack of probable cause.

Having

now determined that probable cause does exist. Plaintiff loses
that one indicia of malice to which he clung.

Accordingly, without

evidence of malice, the City of Grovetown is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims.
Upon the foregoing, the Court determines and concludes that

Defendant

City

of

Grovetown's

motion

for

summary

judgment

respecting
GRANTED.

all

of

Plaintiff's

remaining

claims

(doc.

58)

is

The Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of the

City of Grovetown.

ORDER

ENTERED

The case stands CLOSED.

at

Augusta,

Georgia,

this

day

of

September, 2019.

J. RANCm/^HALL,'/trHlEF JUDGE

UNireDT^ATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHZRN

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA