Callaway v. Colvin

Filing 50

ORDER that Defendant agrees that Plaintiff will be awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $11,802.31 for 61.4 hours of work under the Equal Access to Justice ("EAJA"). Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 07/29/2020. (thb)

Case 1:15-cv-00166-JRH-BKE Document 50 Filed 07/29/20 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
LEE A. CALLAWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 1:15-CV-166

ORDER
The parties, acting through counsel, having filed with the Clerk a Joint
Stipulation for Resolution of Petition for EAJA fees in the above-referenced matter.
(Doc. no. 48.)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendant agrees that Plaintiff will be awarded
attorney’s fees in the amount of $11,802.31 for 61.4 hours of work under the Equal
Access to Justice (“EAJA”).
In Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010), the Supreme Court held, based
on the “plain text” of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), that an EAJA award “is payable to the
litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt
that the litigant owes the United States.” Based on Ratliff, the proper course is to
“award the EAJA fees directly to Plaintiff as the prevailing party and remain silent
regarding the direction of payment of those fees.” Bostic v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 858
F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2011). Indeed, this approach has been followed in
this District. See Shank v. Berryhill, CV 116-030, doc. no. 20 (S.D. Ga. May 24, 2017)
(awarding EAJA fees to plaintiff without directing payment to counsel despite
plaintiff’s assignment of award to counsel); Brown v. Astrue, CV411-152, doc. no. 24

Case 1:15-cv-00166-JRH-BKE Document 50 Filed 07/29/20 Page 2 of 2
(S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2013) (same); Scott v. Colvin, CV 313-004, doc. no. 26 (S.D. Ga. Nov.
11, 2013) (same).
In accord with this practice, the Court awards the EAJA fees to Plaintiff, in
the amount of $11,802.31, subject to offset by any debt owed by Plaintiff to the United
States. The Court leaves it “to the discretion of the government to accept Plaintiff’s
assignment of EAJA Fees and pay fees directly to Plaintiff[’s] counsel after a
determination that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt.” Bostic, 858 F. Supp. 2d at
1306; see also Robinson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:13-CV-2073-T-23TGW, 2015 WL
176027, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2015) (allowing EAJA fees “to be paid by virtue of a
fee assignment, to plaintiff’s counsel by the defendant if the plaintiff does not owe a
debt to the United States Department of the Treasury”); Griffin v. Astrue, 1:10cv115,
2010 WL 5211548, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2010) (“There is nothing in Ratliff to
indicate that it is intended to divest the government of its discretion to enter into
direct payment arrangements where there is no debt to the government or where
funds remain after satisfaction of such debt.”).
SO ORDERED this 29th day of July, 2020, at Augusta, Georgia.

2