Mohr v. Wallace

Filing 9

ORDER affirming the Bankruptcy Court's Order sustaining the Trustee's objections. The Clerk shall terminate all deadlines, and motions and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 05/16/2016. (thb)

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IN THE UNITED STATES SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT AUGUSTA FOR THE OF GEORGIA DIVISION * IN * RE: * CHRISTOPHER G. * MOHR, * * Debtor. * CHRISTOPHER G. l:15-cv-184 * MOHR, Bankruptcy Case * * Appellant, * No. 13-11606 v. A. STEPHENSON WALLACE, Chapter 7 Trustee, * * Appellee, ORDER This bankruptcy appeal asks the Court to determine whether the cash surrender value of Appellant-Debtor Chris Mohr's life- insurance policy is part of his bankruptcy estate. that question requires the resolution of Answering another: Was Plaintiff's life-insurance policy a "trust" as used in 11 U.S.C. § 5429(c)(2)? Because the Court finds that it was "trust," the cash surrender value of Debtor-Appellant's insurance policy is part of his bankruptcy estate. therefore, AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court's ruling. not a life- The Court, I. BACKGROUND Debtor-Appellant Chris Mohr filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on August 30, 2013. Approximately Chapter 7 case. amended his value one of (Record on year (Id. Appeal, Doc. later, his case 10.) On October at 2, was Ex. 1 at converted 19, 2014, 1.) to a Appellant Schedule C exemptions to include the cash surrender his life-insurance exempt under O.C.G.A. policy, §§ 33-25-11, valued at as (IcL_ at 53.) 44-13-100. $18,000.00, In particular, Appellant claimed the following exempt amounts: Law Providing Each Exemption O.C.G.A. Value of Claimed Exemption § 44-13-100(a)(8) $5,100.00 O.C.G.A. § ,44-13-100(a)(9) $2,000.00 O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 (a) (6) $5,099.94 O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11 $6,000.00 (Id.) The Bankruptcy Trustee objected to the exemptions claimed under O.C.G.A. §§ 33-25-11 and 44-13-100(a)(8). At a hearing contended that available under before O.C.G.A. state Bankruptcy § 35-25-11(c) law. Appellant was then pending before argued that 11 U.S.C. the the Eleventh § 541(c)(2) (Id^ at 55-56.)1 Court, creates an "exemption" acknowledged Circuit. Appellant that issue Appellant also excludes the entire value of his life-insurance policy from the definition of property of the estate. (Id. 1 The at 68.) Trustee also relevant on this appeal. objected to another claimed exemption not On October sustaining surrender 29, the 2015, Trustee's value of the Bankruptcy Court objection Appellant's and issued an Order finding life-insurance that the policy cash over and above the amount of $7,099.94 is part of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court noted that the Eleventh Circuit had since held that life insurance policies are not exempt under O.C.G.A. § 35-25-11(c). McFarland, determined (Record 790 that § 541(c) (2) . 1182 the Appeal (11th policy at Cir. was 74, n.2 2015))). not a (citing The "trust" In Court as re also used in (Id^_ at 74-78.) Appellant Court denied. Bankruptcy F.3d on moved for reconsideration, (IcL_ at 79-82, 87.) Court's Order "trust" under § 541(c)(2). II. finding which the Bankruptcy Soon after, he appealed the that the policy was not a (Id^ at 91-92.) STANDARD OF REVIEW This appeal asks whether 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) excludes the cash surrender value of a life-insurance policy that is subject to a statutory restriction on transfer from the property of a bankruptcy estate. "The proper construction of the Bankruptcy Code, whether by the bankruptcy court or the district court, is a matter of law," subject to de novo review. F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1997). In re Meehan, 102 III. "Under federal law, property becomes exposed to however, may the See 11 exempt 541(b) bankruptcy U.S.C. certain McFarland, §§ when a debtor files of creditors. exposure." Similarly, part DISCUSSION § for bankruptcy his estate and types of thereby The 541(a)(1) is debtor, property from 790 F.3d at 1185; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). and (c)(2) provide for certain kinds property that are not property of the bankruptcy estate. appeal concerns § 541(c)(2). In full, § 541(c) provides: (c) (1) of Except this as provided subsection, debtor in estate under (a) (5) of in an subsection this section in an paragraph interest property becomes provision property (a)(1), of of (a)(2), notwithstanding agreement, (2) the the or any transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law(A) that transfer debtor; (B) restricts or such interest of that is or the debtor, case under conditioned financial by the on the trustee in a custodian condition of on the commencement of a this title, or on the appointment of or taking a conditions or insolvency a possession by case under this before such title or commencement, and that effects or gives an option to effect this a forfeiture, termination property. of the modification, debtor's interest or in of This (2) A restriction beneficial on interest of the the transfer debtor that is enforceable under nonbankruptcy law is enforceable under this 11 U.S.C. 541.27 as well. § 2010), applicable in a case a trust under see Collier on Bankruptcy 5 but the section applies to See Patterson v. 541(c)(2) a trust The paradigmatic example of is a spendthrift trust, (16th ed. of a title. § 541(c). § 541(c)(2) in satisfied Shumate 504 by an U.S. 753 other trusts (1992) ERISA-qualified (finding pension plan containing a restriction on transfer). Appellant argues that the cash surrender value of his lifeinsurance policy constitutes a beneficial interest in a trust. He contends that O.C.G.A. of his interest § 541(c)(2). Meehan, and thereby creates a trust under 102 F.3d found 1209 Meehan in (11th Cir. ''determined [O.C.G.A. that 1997). U.S.C. the In § 18-4-22 (a) ] was all The cash surrender values of life insurance policies issued upon the lives residents of this state, upon of citizens whatever or form, shall not in any case be liable to attachment, garnishment, or legal process in favor of any creditor of the person whose life is so insured unless the insurance policy was assigned to or was effected for the benefit of such creditor or unless the purchase, policy is creditors. made with sale, the or transfer of the intent to his anti-alienation 2 O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c): (c) 11 He bases his argument on a single authority, In re characterization, language § 33-25-11(c)2 restricts the transfer defraud that was needed to remove (Appellant's Appellant's things: 5 argument "the only Georgia similarly 3 creates of (emphasis Meehan must the conclusion added)). have done was at a issue trust at here, by For one of two In Appellant's that referenced in Meehan was Br. estate." created a trust or that § 18-4-22 (a) (Appellant's statute property has no trust requirement. *trust' the at logical statute." as to work, § 541(c)(2) creating the that Doc. Br., IRA] held that O.C.G.A. 11 U.S.C. view, [the 3.) language contained in the Appellant O.C.G.A. restricting the § reasons 33-25-11(c), transfer. This interpretation of Meehan is incorrect. Appellant beneficial interest restriction question contained document. confuses on and in its held a a issues: trust transfer. that 102 enforceable because the document").3 in statute Meehan, two it the and and Meehan does not 1212 on need to is a is a there addressed the transfer be in latter can the ("a restriction is no located in the statute be trust less rather than in Meehan did not resolve the first question and did not hold that the nonbankruptcy statute at § 18-4-22 (a), there whether restriction F.3d at is whether created a trust. Instead, the issue, O.C.G.A. Eleventh Circuit 3 Other circuits recognize this as Meehan's holding. See In re Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1999). In fact, the question of whether restrictions on transfer must be included in the trust document or whether statutory restrictions are alone sufficient is the subject of a circuit split. See id. (recognizing the circuit split); Meehan, 102 F.3d at 1212; In re Yuhas, 104 F.3d 612 (3d. Cir 1997). assumed the stipulated defines IRA the it was IRA as a an 395871, same support a that (citing 26 U.S.C. WL was at *6, trust or because trust. § 408(a)); n.13 M.D. 102 Ga. other argument the at 4, 1211, n.4 2010 2010) Meehan cash Code 10-50827, No. Oct. parties Revenue F.3d words, that the Internal see In re Allen, In for Appellant's because the Meehan, (Bankr. conclusion).4 either (drawing provides no surrender value of his life-insurance policy is a "beneficial interest ... in a trust." 11 U.S.C. Moreover, transfer in restriction 541(c)(2). interest read § 541(c) (2) . alone Section in property "notwithstanding instrument, or its any entirety, § does create not 541(c)(1)(A) becomes applicable provides part provision 541(c) of in the an nonbankruptcy is a clear that a restrictions are Section 541(c)(2) transferring Collier on In other not words, in § debtor's bankruptcy agreement, law that as a general enforceable a under "trust" transfer or 11 U.S.C. rule, bankruptcy estate restricts conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor." § 541(c)(1)(A). that transfer proceedings. is an exception that enforces restrictions on a debtor's Bankruptcy beneficial 1 541.27 interest (16th ed. in a trust. See 2010) one ("[t]he 4 Similarly, the Supreme Court appears to have assumed that the ERISA-qualified pension plan at issue in Patterson was a trust because the IRS defines such an account to be a trust. 2247 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a) (13) (A)) . Patterson 504 U.S. at express exception to the general rule that every [restriction on transfer] is invalid is stated in [11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)], which preserves restrictions on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust"). The Third Circuit, in an IRA, in a case involving a debtor's interest explained that § 541(c)(2) contained the following elements: (1) the IRA must constitute a 'trust' within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2); (2) the funds in debtor's trust; IRA must "beneficial (3) Section (4) the the 408 the statute] interest" IRA must of the of that the in that qualified be under Revenue Code; New Jersey Internal provision stating represent [the property held in a qualifying IRA is 'exempt from all claims of creditors' must be transfer' of the IRA restriction must be nonbankruptcy law.' a 'restriction on funds; and (5) this 'enforceable under In re Yuhas, 104 F.3d 612, 614 (3d. Cir. 1997). Meehan concerns the fourth requirement above and does not address the first. The Court now turns to whether Appellant's life-insurance policy constitutes a trust. Trusts come in many varieties, and a precise definition of "trust" in § 542(c)(2) may prove elusive. The Court is satisfied, however, the life-insurance policy at issue here is not one. The Revised Georgia Trust Code of 2010 defines a "trust" as "an express trust or an implied trust but shall not include trusts created by statute 8 or the Constitution of Georgia." O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(13). An express trust "(1) An intention by a settlor to create such a trust, property, (3) ascertainable reasonably (4) A ... at either by a time ascertainable trustee; provided the a and law." who of the of within trust § or creation the Trustee O.C.G.A. resulting § 53-12-2(5). (5) beneficiary rule duties a An constructive Trust reasonably such a trust or perpetuities; specified 53-12-20. (2) is against requires in writing implied trust. trust or is O.C.G.A. Georgia courts have long described a trust as an equitable obligation either express or implied resting upon a person by reason of a confidence reposed in him, to apply or deal with property for the benefit of some other person or for the benefit of himself and another or others according to such confidence. Peach Consol. Ct. App. (Ga. 2006) 1965) 1898))); Props., LLC v. Carter, (quoting Smith v. (quoting McCreary v. see also Trust, 628 Francis, Gewinner, S.E.2d 144 680, S.E.2d 439, 29 S.E. Black's Law Dictionary 682 960, 963 (Ga. 444 (Ga. (10th ed. 2014) ("A fiduciary relationship regarding property and charging the person with title to the property with equitable duties to deal with it for another's benefit."). By contrast, the Georgia Insurance Code defines "insurance" as "a contract distributing which individual is an losses integral whereby part one of a plan undertakes for to indemnify another or to pay a specified amount of benefits upon determinable added); contingencies." see 2014) Insurance, also contract ("A by relationship confidential Crumpton, & Cas. Walsh v. In an fiduciary in Campbell, Accordingly, contract between Fordham, a and not a . . (emphasis nature. 657, (emphasis . (10th an ed. undertakes added)). and to Further, insurer is not Modern Woodmen of Am. (Ga. Ct. App. S.E.2d 33-1-2(2) Dictionary party 250 S.E.2d 843, 202 § Law insured life-insurance conclusion, § 541(c)(2) one . . . ." 487 S.E.2d 47, 49 Co. v. or Black's which indemnify another party the O.C.G.A. 1997); 845 661 policy (Ga. (Ga. v. State Farm Fire Ct. 1978); App. 1973). a Ct. App. typical resembles trust. to be excluded from the bankruptcy estate, requires that the property at issue be "a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust." 11 U.S.C. Court O.C.G.A. agrees nonbankruptcy with law Appellant that that restricts the § transfer surrender value of a life-insurance policy. Georgia's insurance code does § 541(c)(2). 33-25-11 of is not create a "trust." and the cash surrender value cash Because a § 541(c)(2) of the policy is property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1). 10 a But that section of life-insurance policy is a contract and not a trust, does not apply, the The IV. As Court's discussed Order above, sustaining CONCLUSION the the Court Trustee's AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy objections. The Clerk shall terminate all deadlines and motions and CLOSE this case. The Clerk shall terminate all deadlines and motions and CLOSE this case. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this _/j£^ day of May 2016. HONORABLE J. UNITED STATES RANDAL HALL DISTRICT JUDGE 'HERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 11

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