Mohr v. Wallace
Filing
9
ORDER affirming the Bankruptcy Court's Order sustaining the Trustee's objections. The Clerk shall terminate all deadlines, and motions and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 05/16/2016. (thb)
IN THE UNITED STATES
SOUTHERN
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT
AUGUSTA
FOR THE
OF GEORGIA
DIVISION
*
IN
*
RE:
*
CHRISTOPHER G.
*
MOHR,
*
*
Debtor.
*
CHRISTOPHER G.
l:15-cv-184
*
MOHR,
Bankruptcy Case
*
*
Appellant,
*
No.
13-11606
v.
A. STEPHENSON WALLACE, Chapter
7 Trustee,
*
*
Appellee,
ORDER
This bankruptcy appeal asks the Court to determine whether
the cash surrender value of Appellant-Debtor Chris Mohr's life-
insurance policy is part of his bankruptcy estate.
that
question
requires
the
resolution
of
Answering
another:
Was
Plaintiff's life-insurance policy a "trust" as used in 11 U.S.C.
§
5429(c)(2)?
Because
the
Court
finds
that
it
was
"trust," the cash surrender value of Debtor-Appellant's
insurance policy is part of his bankruptcy estate.
therefore, AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court's ruling.
not
a
life-
The Court,
I.
BACKGROUND
Debtor-Appellant Chris Mohr filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
on
August
30,
2013.
Approximately
Chapter
7
case.
amended his
value
one
of
(Record on
year
(Id.
Appeal,
Doc.
later,
his
case
10.)
On
October
at
2,
was
Ex.
1
at
converted
19,
2014,
1.)
to
a
Appellant
Schedule C exemptions to include the cash surrender
his
life-insurance
exempt under O.C.G.A.
policy,
§§ 33-25-11,
valued
at
as
(IcL_ at 53.)
44-13-100.
$18,000.00,
In
particular, Appellant claimed the following exempt amounts:
Law Providing Each Exemption
O.C.G.A.
Value of Claimed Exemption
§ 44-13-100(a)(8)
$5,100.00
O.C.G.A. § ,44-13-100(a)(9)
$2,000.00
O.C.G.A.
§ 44-13-100 (a) (6)
$5,099.94
O.C.G.A.
§ 33-25-11
$6,000.00
(Id.)
The Bankruptcy Trustee objected to the exemptions claimed
under O.C.G.A. §§ 33-25-11 and 44-13-100(a)(8).
At
a
hearing
contended
that
available
under
before
O.C.G.A.
state
Bankruptcy
§
35-25-11(c)
law.
Appellant
was then pending before
argued that 11 U.S.C.
the
the Eleventh
§ 541(c)(2)
(Id^ at 55-56.)1
Court,
creates
an
"exemption"
acknowledged
Circuit.
Appellant
that
issue
Appellant
also
excludes the entire value of
his life-insurance policy from the definition of property of the
estate.
(Id.
1 The
at 68.)
Trustee
also
relevant on this appeal.
objected
to
another
claimed
exemption
not
On October
sustaining
surrender
29,
the
2015,
Trustee's
value
of
the
Bankruptcy Court
objection
Appellant's
and
issued an Order
finding
life-insurance
that
the
policy
cash
over
and
above the amount of $7,099.94 is part of the bankruptcy estate.
The
Bankruptcy Court noted that the
Eleventh Circuit had since
held that life insurance policies are not exempt under O.C.G.A.
§
35-25-11(c).
McFarland,
determined
(Record
790
that
§ 541(c) (2) .
1182
the
Appeal
(11th
policy
at
Cir.
was
74,
n.2
2015))).
not
a
(citing
The
"trust"
In
Court
as
re
also
used
in
(Id^_ at 74-78.)
Appellant
Court denied.
Bankruptcy
F.3d
on
moved
for
reconsideration,
(IcL_ at 79-82, 87.)
Court's
Order
"trust" under § 541(c)(2).
II.
finding
which
the
Bankruptcy
Soon after, he appealed the
that
the
policy
was
not
a
(Id^ at 91-92.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal asks whether 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) excludes the
cash surrender value of a life-insurance policy that is subject
to a statutory restriction on transfer from the property of a
bankruptcy estate.
"The proper construction of the Bankruptcy
Code, whether by the bankruptcy court or the district court, is
a matter of law," subject to de novo review.
F.3d 1209,
1210
(11th Cir.
1997).
In re Meehan, 102
III.
"Under federal law,
property becomes
exposed to
however,
may
the
See
11
exempt
541(b)
bankruptcy
U.S.C.
certain
McFarland,
§§
when a debtor files
of
creditors.
exposure."
Similarly,
part
DISCUSSION
§
for bankruptcy his
estate
and
types
of
thereby
The
541(a)(1)
is
debtor,
property
from
790 F.3d at 1185; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
and
(c)(2)
provide
for
certain
kinds
property that are not property of the bankruptcy estate.
appeal concerns § 541(c)(2).
In full,
§ 541(c) provides:
(c) (1)
of
Except
this
as
provided
subsection,
debtor
in
estate
under
(a) (5)
of
in
an
subsection
this
section
in
an
paragraph
interest
property becomes
provision
property
(a)(1),
of
of
(a)(2),
notwithstanding
agreement,
(2)
the
the
or
any
transfer
instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law(A)
that
transfer
debtor;
(B)
restricts
or
such
interest
of
that
is
or
the debtor,
case
under
conditioned
financial
by
the
on
the
trustee
in a
custodian
condition
of
on the commencement of a
this
title,
or
on
the
appointment of or taking
a
conditions
or
insolvency
a
possession by
case under this
before
such
title or
commencement,
and that effects or gives an option to
effect
this
a
forfeiture,
termination
property.
of
the
modification,
debtor's
interest
or
in
of
This
(2)
A
restriction
beneficial
on
interest
of
the
the
transfer
debtor
that
is
enforceable
under
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable
under this
11 U.S.C.
541.27
as well.
§
2010),
applicable
in a case
a trust under
see Collier on Bankruptcy 5
but the section applies to
See Patterson v.
541(c)(2)
a
trust
The paradigmatic example of
is a spendthrift trust,
(16th ed.
of
a
title.
§ 541(c).
§ 541(c)(2)
in
satisfied
Shumate 504
by
an
U.S.
753
other trusts
(1992)
ERISA-qualified
(finding
pension
plan
containing a restriction on transfer).
Appellant argues that the cash surrender value of his lifeinsurance policy constitutes a beneficial interest in a trust.
He contends that O.C.G.A.
of
his
interest
§ 541(c)(2).
Meehan,
and
thereby
creates
a
trust
under
102
F.3d
found
1209
Meehan
in
(11th
Cir.
''determined
[O.C.G.A.
that
1997).
U.S.C.
the
In
§ 18-4-22 (a) ] was
all
The cash surrender values of life insurance
policies
issued upon the lives
residents
of
this
state,
upon
of citizens
whatever
or
form,
shall not in any case be liable to attachment,
garnishment,
or legal process
in favor of any
creditor of the person whose life is so insured
unless the insurance policy was assigned to or
was effected for the benefit of such creditor or
unless the purchase,
policy
is
creditors.
made
with
sale,
the
or transfer of the
intent
to
his
anti-alienation
2 O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c):
(c)
11
He bases his argument on a single authority, In re
characterization,
language
§ 33-25-11(c)2 restricts the transfer
defraud
that
was
needed
to
remove
(Appellant's
Appellant's
things:
5
argument
"the
only
Georgia
similarly
3
creates
of
(emphasis
Meehan must
the
conclusion
added)).
have
done
was
at
a
issue
trust
at
here,
by
For
one
of two
In Appellant's
that
referenced in Meehan was
Br.
estate."
created a trust or that
§ 18-4-22 (a)
(Appellant's
statute
property
has no trust requirement.
*trust'
the
at
logical
statute."
as
to work,
§ 541(c)(2)
creating the
that
Doc.
Br.,
IRA]
held that O.C.G.A.
11 U.S.C.
view,
[the
3.)
language
contained in the
Appellant
O.C.G.A.
restricting
the
§
reasons
33-25-11(c),
transfer.
This
interpretation of Meehan is incorrect.
Appellant
beneficial
interest
restriction
question
contained
document.
confuses
on
and
in
its
held
a
a
issues:
trust
transfer.
that
102
enforceable because
the document").3
in
statute
Meehan,
two
it
the
and
and
Meehan
does
not
1212
on
need
to
is
a
is
a
there
addressed
the
transfer
be
in
latter
can
the
("a restriction is no
located in the
statute
be
trust
less
rather than in
Meehan did not resolve the first question and
did not hold that the nonbankruptcy statute at
§ 18-4-22 (a),
there
whether
restriction
F.3d at
is
whether
created a trust.
Instead,
the
issue,
O.C.G.A.
Eleventh
Circuit
3 Other circuits recognize this as Meehan's holding.
See In re
Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1999).
In fact, the question
of
whether
restrictions
on
transfer
must
be
included
in
the
trust
document or whether statutory restrictions are alone sufficient is the
subject of a circuit split.
See id.
(recognizing the circuit split);
Meehan, 102 F.3d at 1212; In re Yuhas, 104 F.3d 612 (3d. Cir 1997).
assumed
the
stipulated
defines
IRA
the
it
was
IRA
as
a
an
395871,
same
support
a
that
(citing 26 U.S.C.
WL
was
at
*6,
trust
or
because
trust.
§ 408(a));
n.13
M.D.
102
Ga.
other
argument
the
at
4,
1211,
n.4
2010
2010)
Meehan
cash
Code
10-50827,
No.
Oct.
parties
Revenue
F.3d
words,
that
the
Internal
see In re Allen,
In
for Appellant's
because
the
Meehan,
(Bankr.
conclusion).4
either
(drawing
provides
no
surrender value
of his life-insurance policy is a "beneficial interest ... in
a trust."
11 U.S.C.
Moreover,
transfer
in
restriction
541(c)(2).
interest
read
§ 541(c) (2) .
alone
Section
in
property
"notwithstanding
instrument,
or
its
any
entirety,
§
does
create
not
541(c)(1)(A)
becomes
applicable
provides
part
provision
541(c)
of
in
the
an
nonbankruptcy
is
a
clear
that
a
restrictions
are
Section 541(c)(2)
transferring
Collier
on
In other
not
words,
in
§
debtor's
bankruptcy
agreement,
law that
as a general
enforceable
a
under
"trust"
transfer
or
11 U.S.C.
rule,
bankruptcy
estate
restricts
conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor."
§ 541(c)(1)(A).
that
transfer
proceedings.
is an exception that enforces restrictions on
a debtor's
Bankruptcy
beneficial
1
541.27
interest
(16th
ed.
in a trust.
See
2010)
one
("[t]he
4 Similarly, the Supreme Court appears to have assumed that the
ERISA-qualified pension plan at issue in Patterson was a trust because
the IRS defines such an account to be a trust.
2247 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a) (13) (A)) .
Patterson 504 U.S. at
express exception to the general rule that every [restriction on
transfer]
is invalid is stated in
[11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2)],
which
preserves restrictions on the transfer of a beneficial interest
of the debtor in a trust").
The Third Circuit,
in an IRA,
in a case involving a debtor's interest
explained that § 541(c)(2)
contained the following
elements:
(1) the IRA must constitute a 'trust' within
the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2); (2)
the
funds
in
debtor's
trust;
IRA
must
"beneficial
(3)
Section
(4)
the
the
408
the
statute]
interest"
IRA must
of
the
of
that
the
in
that
qualified
be
under
Revenue
Code;
New
Jersey
Internal
provision
stating
represent
[the
property
held
in
a
qualifying IRA is 'exempt from all claims of
creditors'
must
be
transfer' of the IRA
restriction
must
be
nonbankruptcy law.'
a
'restriction
on
funds; and (5) this
'enforceable
under
In re Yuhas, 104 F.3d 612, 614 (3d. Cir. 1997). Meehan concerns
the fourth requirement above and does not address the first.
The Court now turns to whether Appellant's life-insurance policy
constitutes
a
trust.
Trusts come in many varieties, and a precise definition of
"trust"
in
§
542(c)(2)
may
prove
elusive.
The
Court
is
satisfied, however, the life-insurance policy at issue here is
not one.
The Revised Georgia
Trust
Code of 2010 defines
a
"trust" as "an express trust or an implied trust but shall not
include
trusts
created
by
statute
8
or
the
Constitution
of
Georgia."
O.C.G.A.
§
53-12-2(13).
An
express
trust
"(1) An intention by a settlor to create such a trust,
property,
(3)
ascertainable
reasonably
(4)
A
...
at
either
by
a
time
ascertainable
trustee;
provided
the
a
and
law."
who
of
the
of
within
trust
§
or
creation
the
Trustee
O.C.G.A.
resulting
§ 53-12-2(5).
(5)
beneficiary
rule
duties
a
An
constructive
Trust
reasonably
such
a
trust
or
perpetuities;
specified
53-12-20.
(2)
is
against
requires
in
writing
implied
trust.
trust
or
is
O.C.G.A.
Georgia courts have long described a trust as
an equitable obligation either express or
implied resting upon a person by reason of a
confidence reposed in him, to apply or deal
with property for the benefit of some other
person or for the benefit of himself and
another
or
others
according
to
such
confidence.
Peach
Consol.
Ct. App.
(Ga.
2006)
1965)
1898)));
Props.,
LLC
v.
Carter,
(quoting Smith v.
(quoting McCreary v.
see also
Trust,
628
Francis,
Gewinner,
S.E.2d
144
680,
S.E.2d 439,
29 S.E.
Black's Law Dictionary
682
960,
963
(Ga.
444
(Ga.
(10th ed. 2014)
("A fiduciary relationship regarding property and
charging the
person with title to the property with equitable duties to deal
with it for another's benefit.").
By contrast, the Georgia Insurance Code defines "insurance"
as
"a
contract
distributing
which
individual
is
an
losses
integral
whereby
part
one
of
a
plan
undertakes
for
to
indemnify another or to pay a specified amount of benefits upon
determinable
added);
contingencies."
see
2014)
Insurance,
also
contract
("A
by
relationship
confidential
Crumpton,
& Cas.
Walsh
v.
In
an
fiduciary in
Campbell,
Accordingly,
contract
between
Fordham,
a
and not
a
.
.
(emphasis
nature.
657,
(emphasis
.
(10th
an
ed.
undertakes
added)).
and
to
Further,
insurer
is
not
Modern Woodmen of Am.
(Ga. Ct. App.
S.E.2d
33-1-2(2)
Dictionary
party
250 S.E.2d 843,
202
§
Law
insured
life-insurance
conclusion,
§ 541(c)(2)
one
. . . ."
487 S.E.2d 47, 49
Co.
v.
or
Black's
which
indemnify another party
the
O.C.G.A.
1997);
845
661
policy
(Ga.
(Ga.
v.
State Farm Fire
Ct.
1978);
App.
1973).
a
Ct.
App.
typical
resembles
trust.
to
be
excluded
from the
bankruptcy
estate,
requires that the property at issue be "a beneficial
interest of the debtor in a trust."
11 U.S.C.
Court
O.C.G.A.
agrees
nonbankruptcy
with
law
Appellant
that
that
restricts
the
§
transfer
surrender value of a life-insurance policy.
Georgia's insurance code does
§
541(c)(2).
33-25-11
of
is
not create a "trust."
and the cash surrender value
cash
Because a
§ 541(c)(2)
of the policy is
property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1).
10
a
But that section of
life-insurance policy is a contract and not a trust,
does not apply,
the
The
IV.
As
Court's
discussed
Order
above,
sustaining
CONCLUSION
the
the
Court
Trustee's
AFFIRMS
the
Bankruptcy
objections.
The
Clerk
shall terminate all deadlines and motions and CLOSE this case.
The
Clerk
shall
terminate
all
deadlines
and
motions
and
CLOSE this case.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this _/j£^ day of May
2016.
HONORABLE J.
UNITED
STATES
RANDAL HALL
DISTRICT
JUDGE
'HERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
11
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