Solo Cup Operating Corporation v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 528
Filing
33
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 23 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter is hereby Remanded to Arbitrator William A. Dealy Jr. The Clerk shall terminate all motions and deadlines and Close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 1/4/17. (cmr)
IN THE UNITED
FOR THE
STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
SOLO CUP
OPERATING
*
CORPORATION,
*
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
v.
*
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD
LOCAL 528,
115-185
*
OF TEAMSTERS,
CV
*
Defendant.
*
ORDER
"Everyone
arbitration
supposedly
goes
badly."
Covad Commc'ns Co.,
In this
case,
loves
560 F.
Saturn
seeks
arbitrator's
At
least
Servs.,
until
Inc.
v.
(S.D. Fla. 2008).
the parties arbitrated whether Plaintiff Solo Cup
bargaining agreement.
now
Telecomms.
Supp. 2d 1278, 1279
Operating Corporation ("Solo")
it
arbitration.
to
collective-
The arbitration went badly for Solo,
modify
decision
violated the parties'
the
arbitrator's
represents
an
award.
arguable
Because
interpretation
and
the
of
the parties' collective-bargaining agreement, the Court will not
disturb
his
award.
I.
This
Solo,
matter
the
Factual Background
arises
termination
out
of
of Tamela
her
Wells's
employment,
and
employment
the
with
arbitration
that ensued following the end of her employment.
1. The Parties'
While
Collective-Bargaining Agreement
employed
bargaining
unit
at
Solo,
Ms.
represented
Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Wells
by
Local 528
was
a
member
Defendant
of
International
("the Union").
Solo and the
Union were parties
to a collective-bargaining agreement.
Article
agreement,
5
of
that
the management
of
the
rights:
following
methods
of
the business,
operations,
24-3 at 10.)
Solo was
change
equipment
or
(Id.
(Id.
at 17.)
under
the
at 18.)
existing
Article
11
was
(Id.
final
terms"
of
the
And,
at 18.)
under
and
Although
binding
on
the
subtract from
collective-bargaining
agreement.
Article 27 of the collective-bargaining agreement
specifically prohibited "discrimination by either [Solo]
Union against any employee because of race,
sex,
(Doc.
unable to resolve
the arbitrator had "no power to add to,
modify
limited to,
eliminate
grievances that the parties were
arbitration
or
or
not
Article 10 of the agreement established procedures
amicably would proceed to arbitration.
parties,
but
facilities . . . ."
for filing and resolving grievances.
Article 11,
Under
"vested exclusively with
including,
... to
a
disability,
or national origin,
creed,
or the
color,
age,
in the administration and
application" of the collective-bargaining agreement.
at
37.)
claims
the
The
for
parties
disability
Americans
unlawful
agree
with
to
that,
discrimination,
Disabilities
fail
with
to
Act
Article
("ADA") .
accommodate
individual with a disability.
respect
an
(Doc. 24-3
to
arbitrating
27
incorporated
The
ADA makes
otherwise
See 42 U.S.C.
it
qualified
§ 12112.
2 . Ms . Wells's Employment
Ms.
working
Wells worked for Solo from 1982 until 2014.
as
a
forklift
operator
in
position until her employment was
overwhelming
Wells
majority
operated
a
of
her
sit-down
1990,
and
she
terminated in
time
as
forklift.
a
in
held
2014.
forklift
But
She began
that
For
the
driver,
Ms.
after
Dart
2013,
Container Corporation acquired Solo, Solo transitioned to using
stand-up
forklifts.
Ms.
forklift in March 2014.
health issues:
Wells
began
Soon thereafter,
operating
a
stand-up
she began experiencing
she suffered from swollen ankles,
back pain,
and
tingling and numbing in her feet.
Ms.
Wells
chiropractor
condition."
sought medical
diagnosed
(Doc.
24-4
her
at
treatment for these
with
a
5.)
She
issues.
"degenerative
eventually
Her
arthritic
visited
an
orthopedist who recommended that she be permitted to return to
using
a sit-down
forklift.
Ms.
Wells
provided Solo with a
written statement from this doctor requesting that she either be
allowed
to
use
a
sit-down
forklift
or
take
a
fifteen-minute
break for every hour she spent on the stand-up forklift.
agreed
to
minutes
accommodate
performing
her
other
by
allowing
duties
after
her
spend
hour
every
to
she
Solo
fifteen
spent
on
the stand-up forklift.
Subsequently,
recommended that
forklift.
the
Wells's
take
a
forklift.
Wells
to
seek
Wells
reported
primary-care
physician
also
she be permitted to return to using a sit-down
Alternatively,
allowed to
on
Ms.
he
recommended
thirty-minute break
Solo denied both
additional
that
no
options
other
for
from
Ms.
every hour
requests
her
possible
Solo terminated her employment.
that
and
Wells
she
spent
instructed Ms.
doctor.
When
accommodations
In response,
be
Ms.
existed,
the Union filed a
formal grievance on Ms. Wells's behalf, which Solo denied.
The
parties thus proceeded to arbitration.
3. The Arbitration
The
parties
jointly
selected
preside over the arbitration.
aside
from
the
restrictions
arbitrator
would
placed
International
Dealy
Jr.
to
the
on
the
arbitrator
by
the
"they were not restricting the
(Id. at 4.)
determine
A.
The parties also stipulated that,
collective-bargaining agreement,
Arbitrator in any way."
William
And they agreed that the
issues
to
be
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
LLC, 803 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2015)
decided.
v.
Verizon
See
Fl.,
("[W]here - as here -
the parties refuse to stipulate to the issues at arbitration,
the arbitrator is
^empowered'
to frame and decide all the issues
in the grievance as he sees them.").
At
the
arbitration
and
in
its
post-hearing
briefs,
Solo
argued that the decision to implement the stand-up forklifts was
within
its
agreement,
a
powers
that providing Ms.
reasonable
providing
accommodation
her
accommodation,
direct
threat
things,
that
forklift was
After
under Article
a
it
under
the
reasonable
hearing
under
the
to
ADA.
allowing Ms.
a
Wells
sit-down
amounted
5 of
Wells
the
collective-bargaining
a sit-down forklift was not
the
ADA,
forklift
an
undue
and
that,
were
a
hardship
The
Union
to
return
if
reasonable
and
argued,
to
even
posed
among
using
a
a
other
sit-down
accommodation under the ADA.
evidence
and
reviewing
the
briefs,
the
arbitrator determined that he was tasked with deciding:
Did the Company violate provisions of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement and/or any provisions
of Federal law when it separated the Grievant, Ms.
Tamela R. Wells, from employment on October 10, 2014.
If so,
what is the remedy?
(Doc. 24-4 at 24.)
the
The arbitrator determined that Solo violated
collective-bargaining
agreement
(and
the
ADA)
providing Ms. Wells with a reasonable accommodation.
by
not
He awarded
Ms. Wells back pay, ordered her reinstated, and ordered Solo to
provide her with a sit-down forklift.
II.
Following
action
in
modify
the
and
the
arbitrator's
November
filed
Procedural Background
2015
by
arbitrator's
a
ruling,
filing
award.
counterclaim
a
to
initiated
complaint
(Doc.
seeking
Solo
1.)
The
enforce
the
to
vacate
Union
or
answered
award.
Both parties now move for summary judgment.
15.)
this
(Doc.
Solo asks the
Court to modify the portion of the award ordering it to provide
Ms.
Wells
enforce
with
the
arbitrator
a
sit-down
award
to
in
forklift.
its
calculate
The
entirety,
back pay,
Union
to
remand
and to
asks
the
award
the
Court
case
to
attorneys'
to
the
fees
and costs.
Ill.
Summary
genuine
56(a).
the
judgment
dispute
entitled
to
is
to
appropriate
any
as
material
a matter
of
only
fact
if
and
law."
"there
the
Fed.
is
no
movant
is
R.
Civ.
P.
Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of
suit
the
party,
U.S.
as
judgment
under
Liberty Lobby,
view
Summary-Judgment Standard
the
Inc.,
facts
in
governing
477 U.S.
the
light
Matsushita Elec.
574,
in [its]
587
(1986),
favor."
substantive
242,
248
most
favorable
Indus.
Co.
v.
law.
(1986).
to
Anderson
v.
The Court must
the
non-moving
Zenith Radio Corp.,
475
and must draw "all justifiable inferences
United States v.
Four Parcels of Real Prop.,
941
F.2d
1428,
1437
(11th
Cir.
1991)
(en
banc)
(internal
punctuation and citations omitted).
In
this
action,
the
Clerk
of
the
Court
gave
the
parties
notice of the motions for summary judgment and informed them of
the
summary-judgment
other materials
(Docs.
25,
in
26.)
v. Wainwright,
the
opposition,
Therefore,
right
to
file
affidavits
and the consequences of
or
default.
the notice requirements of Griffith
772 F.2d 822,
are satisfied.
expired,
rules,
825
(11th Cir.
1985)
The time for filing materials
(per curiam),
in opposition has
and the motions are now ripe for consideration.
IV.
Solo
requests
that
Discussion
the
Court
modify
the
portion
of
the
arbitrator's award requiring it to provide Ms. Wells with a sitdown
forklift.
award
as
attorneys'
matter
it
The
is.
fees,
to
Union
The
costs,
arbitrator
jurisdiction
over
the
seeks
Union
and
to
to
have
also
asks
prejudgment
calculate
matter
for
the
Court
the
enforce
Court
interest,
back
award
remand
pay,
enforcement
to
and
purposes.
the
the
retain
The
Court addresses the parties' arguments below.
1. Standard for Modifying an Arbitral Award
Litigants wishing to modify an arbitral award face a high
hurdle
award
because
is
"[a]
extremely
federal
narrow."
court's
review
IMC-Agrico
7
Co.
of
v.
an
arbitration
International
Chemical Workers
(internal
Council,
quotation
171
marks
F.3d 1322,
omitted).
1325
(11th Cir.
Indeed,
"as
long
1999)
as
the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract
and acting within the
convinced
he
scope of
committed
serious
overturn his decision."
v.
Misco,
Inc.,
Steelworkers
("[C]ourts
v.
[]
authority,
error
that
does
a
not
U.S.
American
no
29,
Mfg.
38
Co.,
business
(1987);
363
see
U.S.
suffice
is
to
weighing
also
United
568
(1960)
564,
the
merits
grievance,
considering whether
there
is
equity
claim,
determining
there
is
particular
or
court
United Paperworkers International Union
484
have
his
whether
in
a
of
the
particular
language
the written instrument which will support the claim."
in
(footnote
omitted)).
A court may vacate an arbitral award only when the award is
irrational,
"draw
its
is
outside
essence"
See IMC-Agrico Co.,
the
from
arbitrator's
the
171 F.3d at 1325
authority,
collective bargaining
as
the
arbitrator's
to
agreement.
exceeds the scope of the
or fails to draw
agreement."
fails
("A court may not vacate an
its
(citation
quotation marks omitted)); see also Misco,
long
or
collective-bargaining
arbitral award unless it is irrational,
arbitrator's
authority,
award draws
essence
omitted)
from the
(internal
484 U.S. at 36 ("As
its
essence
from the
collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely his own brand
of industrial
justice,
the
award
8
is
legitimate."
(citation
omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
2 . Analysis
Solo
claims
essentially
two
that
the
reasons.
usurped Solo's power to
Solo
to
provide
Solo claims,
Ms.
First,
should
it
argues
be
with
the arbitrator's
a
sit-down
award was not
agreement.
Second,
modified
that
implement new equipment
Wells
collective-bargaining
award
the
for
arbitrator
when i t ordered
forklift.
That
is,
authorized under the
Solo
maintains
that
the arbitrator's award was not authorized under the ADA.1
a. Whether
the
arbitrator's
award
was
authorized
under
the
collective-bargaining agreement
Solo
argues
that
the
collective-bargaining
agreement
did
not authorize the arbitrator to order Solo to provide Ms.
Wells
with
hand,
a
maintains
sit-down
that
interpretation
forklift.
The
the
arbitrator's
of
the
Union,
award
on
the
represents
collective-bargaining
other
a
permissible
agreement.
The
Court agrees with the Union.
1
In its response in opposition to the Union's motion for summary
judgment and in its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment, Solo
also argues that it never consented to the arbitrator determining a specific
accommodation.
But the parties stipulated that the arbitrator would frame
the
issues
to be decided,
and he
framed them as:
"Did the Company violate
provisions of the parties' collective bargaining agreement and/or any
provisions of Federal law when it separated the Grievant, Ms. Tamela R.
Wells, from employment on October 10, 2014.
If so, what is the remedy?"
(Doc. 24-4 at 24.)
In fact,
two issues, one being: "Was
in its first post-hearing brief, Solo proposed
Grievant discriminated against because of her
alleged disability in violation of Article 27 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement ("CBA"), and, if so, what shall be the remedy?"
(Doc. 23-2 at 3.)
Solo did not specify that it sought to limit possible remedies, and the
arbitrator clearly determined that awarding a specific accommodation was an
appropriate remedy.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Solo's argument that it
did not consent to the arbitrator ordering a specific accommodation.
As noted,
a
as long as an arbitrator is "arguably construing"
collective-bargaining
disturbed.
Misco,
484
entirely
to
the
contract
no
matter
is."
"an
marks
how
Id.
at
a
his
38.
not
1088
In
[they]
Trades
ignore
1087
the
(citation
an
collective-bargaining
See id.
think
Council
should
courts
interpretation
essence,
modify the agreement.
decision
Indeed,
837 F.3d 1083,
may
omitted) .
interpret
at
wrong
Metal
Inc.,
arbitrator
contract."
U.S.
arbitrator's
Wiregrass
Infrastructure,
agreement,
of
v.
omitted)
be
defer
underlying
interpretation
Shaw
(11th Cir.
plain
"must
the
that
not
Envtl.
2016).
language
(internal
arbitrator
is
agreement,
but
of
&
But
the
quotation
permitted
he
may
to
not
("The arbitrator acts within her
authority when she even arguably interprets a contract,
and she
exceeds her authority when she modifies the contract's clear and
unambiguous
terms.").
That
said,
a
collective-bargaining
agreement need not contain ambiguous terms for it to be open to
interpretation.
interpretation
See
when
id.
it
("A contract may
is
not
facially
be
susceptible to
ambiguous.").
In
interpreting a collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator is
permitted
agreement.
An
to
"discover"
apply
implied
moreover,
is not
required
at 1091-92.
Thus,
arbitrator
terms
in
the
Id.
arbitrator,
reasoning.
and
Id.
fails
to
specifically
10
to
explain
in some cases,
state
his
reasoning
his
when an
for
an
award,
the
or as
must
award may be
a modification.
resolve
the
reasonably viewed as
See
id.
ambiguity
In those
by
finding
an
instances,
that
the
interpretation of the contract and enforcing it."
Here,
Solo
unequivocally
it
used
in
argues
vested
the
that
it
the
with
facility.
"the court
award
the
right
Solo
to
change
claims,
modified
provide Ms.
agreement
the
equipment
therefore,
the
lengthy
background
decision,
facts
of
the
the
case
when
he
an
that
ordered
the
Wells with a sit-down forklift.
his
agreement
is
Id. at 1092.
collective-bargaining
arbitrator
In
the
interpretation
arbitrator
and
the
Solo
recited
in
parties'
to
detail
positions,
summarized the pertinent provisions of the collective-bargaining
agreement
of
the
(including Article
ADA,
explicitly
and
rely
interpretation
issued
on
or
5), articulated his
his
any
award.
He
particular
specifically
did
interpretation
not,
however,
of
contract
principle
state
why
the
collective-
bargaining agreement permitted him to issue the award he chose.
Rather,
had
he acknowledged that Article 5 "provides that management
the
leased
right,
for
sit-down
forklifts,"
whatever
forklifts
(doc.
reason,
to
the
to move
use
of
from the
self-owned
use
of
stand-up
24-4 at 29), but nevertheless ruled that Solo
was required to accommodate Ms. Wells with a sit-down forklift.
Solo
face
believes
of
reason
that
the
because
arbitrator's
his
11
decision
"[r]ecognition
flies
of
in
the
Solo's
incontrovertible
altogether
that
Solo
could
continue
as
period
(Doc.
rights
easily
of
view
a
13.)
the
sit-down
and therefore
sit-down
under Article
arbitrator's
permissibly
stated
5,
a
style
his
lack of
when it
reasoning
a
(or
as
While one
infringing
explanation
is
thereof)
bargaining
on
just
of
837 F.3d at
^not apparent'
lack
some
for Ms.
interpretation
is
collective
for
forklift
award
permissible
that,
interpreted
order mandating
retain —
See Wiregrass Metal Trades Council,
("The rule ... is
forklifts
But the Court disagrees.
arbitrator's
as
style
reconciled with an
time —
perceived
contract.
92
eliminate
to provide,
24-1 at
arguably
Solo's
to
simply cannot be
indefinite
Wells."
right
the
1091-
from the
whether
she
agreement
or
impermissibly modified it, and one can plausibly read the award
either way, the court must resolve the ambiguity by finding that
the award is an interpretation of the contract . . . .").
First,
rights
under
statement
that
the
he
potential
fact
Article
about
that
5
Solo's
reviewed
supports
rights
Article
conflict
the
5
between
arbitrator
the
under
and
Union's
Article
Article
these
recognized
27
Solo's
position.
His
arguably
shows
5
and
provisions.
analyzed
any
Following
his
analysis, he may have determined that Solo could not shrug off
its
responsibility
to
Article 27 (and the ADA)
accommodate
a
disabled
by relying on Article 5.
worker
under
Indeed,
the
ADA specifically provides that a reasonable accommodation may
12
include "acquisition or modification of equipment."
§ 12111(9) (B).
though
Solo
Thus,
had
the
the
arbitrator
general
may
power
to
have
42 U.S.C.
concluded
manage
its
that,
equipment,
Article 5 did not obviate the possibility that Article 27 could
require
Solo
employee.
of
the
to
While
introduce
Solo may
agreement,
it
is
unique
disagree
not
so
equipment
with
such
implausible
an
for
a
single
interpretation
that
it
warrants
vacating or modifying the award.
Second,
Solo's
arbitrator's
agreement.
interpretation
during
of
arbitration
the
support
the
collective-bargaining
Although Solo argued at arbitration that it had the
power under Article
that
arguments
accommodating
5 to
Ms.
change
Wells
its
with
equipment,
a
sit-down
it
also
forklift
argued
would
amount to an undue hardship and a pose a direct threat under the
ADA,
see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111,
12112.
In its post-hearing brief,
Solo stated that "[t]he ultimate decision on the reasonableness
of reintroducing a sit-down lift to the work environment fell to
[Solo's] Leave and Disability Management Manager," and it argued
that
"the
risk
of reintroducing the sit-down lift
to the work
environment posed enough risk that doing so would pose an undue
hardship."
could
(Doc.
have
providing
a
23-2 at 24-25.)
plausibly
sit-down
accommodation and,
determined
forklift
therefore,
From this,
that
was
a
Solo
the arbitrator
conceded
possible
that
reasonable
that Article 5 did not preclude
13
him
from
ordering
Solo
to
provide
Ms.
Wells
with
a
sit-down
forklift.
Third,
the
arbitrator's
interpretation
of
the
collective-
bargaining agreement is also supported by the fact that Solo had
previously
accommodated
forklift.
According
another
to
the
employee
with
arbitrator's
a
sit-down
decision,
another
employee suffered ankle and knee problems after Solo began using
stand-up
forklifts
and
Solo
permitted
forklift on a temporary basis.
arguments
could
Solo
have
made
relied
acquiesced to the
accommodation.
1089
("[A]n
on
see
also
arbitrator's
upon
Food
and
brief,
information
award
that
reliable
to
the
appears
Like the
arbitrator
infer
that
Solo
a possible
837
contrary
evidence
of
Brotherhood
of
738 F.2d 1564,
the
parties'
Electrical
1568
F.3d at
to
the
Workers
International
(11th Cir. 1988), to support its position.
intent.");
Workers,
(11th Cir.
Solo relies heavily on Bruno's,
Commercial
sit-down
agreement may nevertheless be valid if it
Co. of Fla.,
Furthermore,
a
24-4 at 32.)
post-hearing
this
use
See Wiregrass Metal Trades Council,
International
United Tel.
its
(See Doc.
to
idea that a sit-down forklift was
express terms of the
is premised
in
her
Union,
v.
1984).
Inc. v. United
858
F.2d
1529
There, a collective-
bargaining agreement vested the employer with "[t]he right to
establish and maintain reasonable rules and regulations covering
the operation of the stores . . . ."
14
Id. at 1530.
Under this
authority,
the
employees
employer
would
receive
violations.
A
challenged
their
arbitration.
been
to
void,
that
it
The
struck
Eleventh
the
than
Bruno's,
rules
of
without
and he
and
policy
punished
the
cause
that
and
court
existing
vacated
policy
affirmed.
including
operating
omitted).
for
under
this
and
an
arbitrator,
to
had
the
procedures."
Accordingly,
the
award
employer's
the
"bar[red]
Id.
court
to
held,
a
new
one.
found
anyone
other
1532
the
extent
court
setting
at
employer
the
implemented
from
policy
employees
the
Specifically,
rule
proceeded
that
the
which
certain
outlined a new policy for the
collective-bargaining agreement
and
under
parties
determined
just
district
the
a
suspensions
employees
arbitrator
Circuit
that
one-day
suspensions
The
follow.
The
number
disciplined
policy was
implemented
up
store
(footnote
arbitrator's
decision to "write and impose[]" a new policy violated the plain
terms of the agreement.
Id.
Bruno's is distinguishable from this case.
there struck down an entire policy and
to
follow
one
he
created.
Here,
The arbitrator
instructed the
the
arbitrator
employer
expressly
acknowledged Solo's right to implement new equipment.
But he
determined that it must still provide reasonable accommodations
to
disabled
employees,
equipment when necessary.
including
providing
individualized
He did not invalidate Article 5's
grant of power in Solo to change its equipment.
15
He did not
overrule Solo's decision to use stand-up forklifts.
not replace Solo's decision with his own.
that
providing
Ms.
Wells
with
a
Rather,
sit-down
And he did
he determined
forklift
was
a
reasonable accommodation for her disability.
Because
the
Court
arguably
construing
agreement,
see
Misco,
is
satisfied
the
484
that
parties'
U.S.
at
the
motion
for
summary
38,
judgment
was
collective-bargaining
the
Court
motion for summary judgment on this issue.
Union's
arbitrator
to
DENIES
Solo's
The Court GRANTS the
the
extent
it
requests
that the Court enforce the award on these grounds.
b. Whether
the
arbitrator's
award
was
authorized
under
the
ADA
Solo argues that the
arbitrator's award should be modified
because it was not authorized under the ADA.
claims that,
under the ADA,
Specifically,
Solo
"disabled employees are not entitled
to the specific accommodation of their choice."
(Doc.
24-1 at
18. )
Solo is correct that a disabled employee is not necessarily
entitled
Sec'y,
to
the
of
her
choice.
Dep't of Veterans Affairs Agency,
(11th Cir. 2012)
an
accommodation
employee
(alteration
Justice,
in
in
See
489 F.
Dickerson
v.
App'x 358, 360
("[A]n employer is not required to accommodate
any
manner
original));
No. 7:12-CV-24,
in
which
Copeland
that
v.
2013 WL 1296778,
16
Ga.
employee
Dep't
at *11
desires."
of
Juvenile
(M.D.
Ga. Mar.
27,
2013)
("Plaintiff
accommodation,
that
an
not
entitled
only a reasonable one.").
employee
accommodation.
allowing Ms.
is
is
Here,
Wells
accommodation.
to
never
the
her
entitled
arbitrator
to
her
clearly
sit-down
preferred
But that does not mean
use
a
the
That
to
forklift
accommodation
is
preferred
determined
was
a
the
by
reasonable
one
erred
that
Ms.
Wells
preferred does not invalidate it.
Solo
specific
that
also
instructed
29
failed
Solo
First,
the
arbitrator
Instead,
Solo
accommodate
engage
in
an
§ 1630.2 (o) (3),
Ms.
argues,
Wells,
interactive
to
while
he
the
the
was
arbitrator
framed
provisions
of
once
he
he
the
a
found
should
process
determine
the
arbitrator
parties
not
the
to
required
issues
parties'
may
have
(Doc.
been
decide
on
to
so.
as:
do
"Did
collective
an
have
with
Ms.
appropriate
permitted
to
accommodation
As
the
noted,
Company
bargaining
and/or any provisions of Federal law . . . ?
remedy?"
ordering
The Court disagrees.
instruct
themselves,
to
to
C.F.R.
accommodation.
simply
that
accommodation.
Solo
Wells,
claims
the
violate
agreement
If so, what is the
24-4 at 24 (emphasis added).)
And he decided
that the appropriate remedy was to order Ms.
Wells reinstated
and provided with a sit-down forklift.
Moreover,
to the extent the arbitrator contemplated leaving
the determination of the specific accommodation to the parties
17
to decide,
his refusal to do so makes sense.
numerous
other
Wells
take
But
to
Solo
accommodations
breaks
rejected
Accordingly,
existed,
and moving
similar
her
requests
including
to
a
to
because
may
have
Ms.
Wells.
it
accommodate
different
prior
broadly
instruct
resulted
That
Solo
to
to
in
Solo
the
is,
Solo
that
an
abstract
instruction
comply
once
was
with the ADA prior to the arbitration.
think
allowing
Ms.
position.
arbitration.
it would not have been especially efficient for the
arbitrator
to
Solo argues that
again
the
is
the
refusing
required
There
from
with
to
ADA
to
comply
little reason
arbitrator
would
have changed what Solo viewed as reasonable accommodations.
Because
the
arbitrator's
award
was
authorized
under
the
ADA, the Court DENIES Solo's motion for summary judgment on this
issue.
To
the
extent
the
Union
seeks
to
enforce
the
award
on
these grounds, the Court GRANTS its motion for summary judgment.
3. Retention of Jurisdiction, Remand, and Attorneys'
The
Unions
asks
the
Court
to
remand
this
Fees
matter
to
the
arbitrator to calculate back pay, to retain jurisdiction, and to
award attorneys'
fees,
costs,
and prejudgment
interest.
The
Court addresses each of these issues below.
First, with respect to remanding this matter, Solo consents
to this case being remanded to the arbitrator.
Court GRANTS this request.
Accordingly, the
This matter shall be REMANDED to the
arbitrator to calculate back pay.
18
Second,
Court
the
retaining
Union
provides
jurisdiction.
keep this case pending on
no
And
legal
the
basis
Court
its docket.
justifying
sees
no
Accordingly,
reason
the
to
the Union's
request is DENIED.
Finally,
costs.
When
award
the
a
Court
party
attorneys'
declines
challenges
fees
when
faith,
vexatiously,
Steel,
Paper and Forestry,
Industrial
LLC,
807
and
F.3d
the
to
an
award
arbitral
when
1258,
Rubber,
Workers
1275
least
challenge . . . ."
least
a
award.
DENIED.
plausible
some
Id.
Manufacturing,
Cir.
Moreover,
on
the
the
the
Wise
(citation
argument
Court
for
is
for attorneys'
extent
to
fees,
United
Allied
Alloys,
omitted)
fees are not
supported
satisfied
Solo
bad
that
challenge
the
at
the
therefore,
is
interest
is
prejudgment
the Union may address that issue with
remand.
V.
For
"in
Energy,
v.
or
court may
acts
But attorneys'
existed
request
to
2015)
plausible
Here,
argument
The Union's
arbitrator
party
International
(11th
appropriate in this case,
the
a
fees
wantonly or for oppressive reasons."
Service
"at
award,
challenging
(internal quotation marks omitted).
proper
attorneys'
reasons
stated
Conclusion
above,
Solo's
motion
for
summary
judgment is DENIED, and the Union's motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
19
This matter is hereby
REMANDED
TERMINATE
to
Arbitrator
all motions
ORDER ENTERED
January,
William
A.
and deadlines
at
Augusta,
Dealy
Jr.
and CLOSE
Georgia
The
this
this
Clerk
shall
case.
-^\J^
day
of
2017.
J.
STATES
RANDAL
HALL
DISTRICT
JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
20
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