Solo Cup Operating Corporation v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 528

Filing 33

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 23 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter is hereby Remanded to Arbitrator William A. Dealy Jr. The Clerk shall terminate all motions and deadlines and Close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 1/4/17. (cmr)

IN THE UNITED
FOR THE

STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

SOLO CUP

OPERATING

*

CORPORATION,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*
*

v.

*
INTERNATIONAL

BROTHERHOOD

LOCAL 528,

115-185

*

OF TEAMSTERS,

CV

*

Defendant.

*

ORDER

"Everyone
arbitration

supposedly

goes

badly."

Covad Commc'ns Co.,

In this

case,

loves

560 F.

Saturn

seeks

arbitrator's

At

least

Servs.,

until

Inc.

v.

(S.D. Fla. 2008).

the parties arbitrated whether Plaintiff Solo Cup

bargaining agreement.
now

Telecomms.

Supp. 2d 1278, 1279

Operating Corporation ("Solo")

it

arbitration.

to

collective-

The arbitration went badly for Solo,

modify

decision

violated the parties'

the

arbitrator's

represents

an

award.

arguable

Because

interpretation

and
the
of

the parties' collective-bargaining agreement, the Court will not
disturb

his

award.

I.

This
Solo,

matter

the

Factual Background

arises

termination

out
of

of Tamela

her

Wells's

employment,

and

employment
the

with

arbitration

that ensued following the end of her employment.
1. The Parties'
While

Collective-Bargaining Agreement

employed

bargaining

unit

at

Solo,

Ms.

represented

Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Wells

by

Local 528

was

a

member

Defendant

of

International

("the Union").

Solo and the

Union were parties

to a collective-bargaining agreement.

Article

agreement,

5

of

that

the management

of

the

rights:

following

methods

of

the business,

operations,

24-3 at 10.)

Solo was

change

equipment

or

(Id.

(Id.

at 17.)

under

the

at 18.)

existing

Article

11

was

(Id.

final

terms"

of

the

And,

at 18.)

under

and

Although

binding

on

the

subtract from

collective-bargaining

agreement.

Article 27 of the collective-bargaining agreement

specifically prohibited "discrimination by either [Solo]

Union against any employee because of race,

sex,

(Doc.

unable to resolve

the arbitrator had "no power to add to,

modify

limited to,

eliminate

grievances that the parties were

arbitration

or

or

not

Article 10 of the agreement established procedures

amicably would proceed to arbitration.

parties,

but

facilities . . . ."

for filing and resolving grievances.

Article 11,

Under

"vested exclusively with

including,

... to

a

disability,

or national origin,

creed,

or the

color,

age,

in the administration and

application" of the collective-bargaining agreement.

at

37.)

claims
the

The
for

parties

disability

Americans

unlawful

agree

with

to

that,

discrimination,

Disabilities

fail

with

to

Act

Article

("ADA") .

accommodate

individual with a disability.

respect

an

(Doc. 24-3

to

arbitrating

27

incorporated

The

ADA makes

otherwise

See 42 U.S.C.

it

qualified

§ 12112.

2 . Ms . Wells's Employment
Ms.

working

Wells worked for Solo from 1982 until 2014.

as

a

forklift

operator

in

position until her employment was
overwhelming

Wells

majority

operated

a

of

her

sit-down

1990,

and

she

terminated in

time

as

forklift.

a

in

held

2014.

forklift

But

She began

that

For

the

driver,

Ms.

after

Dart

2013,

Container Corporation acquired Solo, Solo transitioned to using
stand-up

forklifts.

Ms.

forklift in March 2014.
health issues:

Wells

began

Soon thereafter,

operating

a

stand-up

she began experiencing

she suffered from swollen ankles,

back pain,

and

tingling and numbing in her feet.

Ms.

Wells

chiropractor
condition."

sought medical

diagnosed
(Doc.

24-4

her
at

treatment for these

with

a

5.)

She

issues.

"degenerative
eventually

Her

arthritic
visited

an

orthopedist who recommended that she be permitted to return to

using

a sit-down

forklift.

Ms.

Wells

provided Solo with a

written statement from this doctor requesting that she either be
allowed

to

use

a

sit-down

forklift

or

take

a

fifteen-minute

break for every hour she spent on the stand-up forklift.
agreed

to

minutes

accommodate

performing

her

other

by

allowing

duties

after

her

spend

hour

every

to

she

Solo
fifteen

spent

on

the stand-up forklift.

Subsequently,
recommended that

forklift.

the

Wells's

take

a

forklift.

Wells

to

seek

Wells

reported

primary-care

physician

also

she be permitted to return to using a sit-down

Alternatively,

allowed to
on

Ms.

he

recommended

thirty-minute break
Solo denied both

additional

that

no

options

other

for

from

Ms.

every hour

requests

her

possible

Solo terminated her employment.

that

and

Wells
she

spent

instructed Ms.

doctor.

When

accommodations

In response,

be

Ms.

existed,

the Union filed a

formal grievance on Ms. Wells's behalf, which Solo denied.

The

parties thus proceeded to arbitration.
3. The Arbitration

The

parties

jointly

selected

preside over the arbitration.
aside

from

the

restrictions

arbitrator

would

placed

International

Dealy

Jr.

to

the

on

the

arbitrator

by

the

"they were not restricting the

(Id. at 4.)

determine

A.

The parties also stipulated that,

collective-bargaining agreement,

Arbitrator in any way."

William

And they agreed that the

issues

to

be

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

LLC, 803 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2015)

decided.
v.

Verizon

See
Fl.,

("[W]here - as here -

the parties refuse to stipulate to the issues at arbitration,

the arbitrator is

^empowered'

to frame and decide all the issues

in the grievance as he sees them.").

At

the

arbitration

and

in

its

post-hearing

briefs,

Solo

argued that the decision to implement the stand-up forklifts was
within

its

agreement,
a

powers

that providing Ms.

reasonable

providing

accommodation

her

accommodation,

direct

threat

things,

that

forklift was

After

under Article

a
it

under

the

reasonable

hearing

under

the

to

ADA.

allowing Ms.
a

Wells

sit-down
amounted

5 of

Wells

the

collective-bargaining

a sit-down forklift was not

the

ADA,

forklift
an

undue

and

that,

were

a

hardship

The

Union

to

return

if

reasonable
and

argued,

to

even

posed

among

using

a

a

other

sit-down

accommodation under the ADA.

evidence

and

reviewing

the

briefs,

the

arbitrator determined that he was tasked with deciding:

Did the Company violate provisions of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement and/or any provisions
of Federal law when it separated the Grievant, Ms.
Tamela R. Wells, from employment on October 10, 2014.
If so,

what is the remedy?

(Doc. 24-4 at 24.)

the

The arbitrator determined that Solo violated

collective-bargaining

agreement

(and

the

ADA)

providing Ms. Wells with a reasonable accommodation.

by

not

He awarded

Ms. Wells back pay, ordered her reinstated, and ordered Solo to
provide her with a sit-down forklift.

II.

Following

action

in

modify

the

and

the

arbitrator's

November

filed

Procedural Background

2015

by

arbitrator's
a

ruling,

filing

award.

counterclaim

a

to

initiated

complaint

(Doc.

seeking

Solo

1.)

The

enforce

the

to

vacate

Union

or

answered

award.

Both parties now move for summary judgment.

15.)

this

(Doc.

Solo asks the

Court to modify the portion of the award ordering it to provide
Ms.

Wells

enforce

with

the

arbitrator

a

sit-down

award

to

in

forklift.

its

calculate

The

entirety,

back pay,

Union

to

remand

and to

asks

the

award

the

Court

case

to

attorneys'

to

the

fees

and costs.

Ill.

Summary

genuine

56(a).
the

judgment

dispute

entitled

to

is

to

appropriate

any

as

material

a matter

of

only

fact

if

and

law."

"there

the

Fed.

is

no

movant

is

R.

Civ.

P.

Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of

suit

the

party,
U.S.

as

judgment

under

Liberty Lobby,

view

Summary-Judgment Standard

the

Inc.,

facts

in

governing

477 U.S.

the

light

Matsushita Elec.

574,

in [its]

587

(1986),

favor."

substantive

242,

248

most

favorable

Indus.

Co.

v.

law.

(1986).

to

Anderson

v.

The Court must

the

non-moving

Zenith Radio Corp.,

475

and must draw "all justifiable inferences

United States v.

Four Parcels of Real Prop.,

941

F.2d

1428,

1437

(11th

Cir.

1991)

(en

banc)

(internal

punctuation and citations omitted).

In

this

action,

the

Clerk

of

the

Court

gave

the

parties

notice of the motions for summary judgment and informed them of
the

summary-judgment

other materials
(Docs.

25,

in

26.)

v. Wainwright,

the

opposition,

Therefore,

right

to

file

affidavits

and the consequences of

or

default.

the notice requirements of Griffith

772 F.2d 822,

are satisfied.
expired,

rules,

825

(11th Cir.

1985)

The time for filing materials

(per curiam),

in opposition has

and the motions are now ripe for consideration.

IV.

Solo

requests

that

Discussion

the

Court

modify

the

portion

of

the

arbitrator's award requiring it to provide Ms. Wells with a sitdown

forklift.

award

as

attorneys'
matter

it

The
is.

fees,

to

Union
The

costs,

arbitrator

jurisdiction

over

the

seeks

Union

and
to

to

have

also

asks

prejudgment
calculate

matter

for

the

Court

the

enforce

Court

interest,

back

award

remand

pay,

enforcement

to

and

purposes.

the

the

retain

The

Court addresses the parties' arguments below.
1. Standard for Modifying an Arbitral Award

Litigants wishing to modify an arbitral award face a high
hurdle

award

because

is

"[a]

extremely

federal

narrow."

court's

review

IMC-Agrico
7

Co.

of

v.

an

arbitration

International

Chemical Workers

(internal

Council,

quotation

171

marks

F.3d 1322,

omitted).

1325

(11th Cir.

Indeed,

"as

long

1999)

as

the

arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract
and acting within the
convinced

he

scope of

committed

serious

overturn his decision."
v.

Misco,

Inc.,

Steelworkers

("[C]ourts

v.

[]

authority,

error

that

does

a

not

U.S.

American

no

29,

Mfg.

38
Co.,

business

(1987);
363

see

U.S.

suffice

is
to

weighing

also

United

568

(1960)

564,

the

merits

grievance,

considering whether

there

is

equity

claim,

determining

there

is

particular

or

court

United Paperworkers International Union

484

have

his

whether

in

a

of

the

particular

language

the written instrument which will support the claim."

in

(footnote

omitted)).

A court may vacate an arbitral award only when the award is
irrational,
"draw

its

is

outside

essence"

See IMC-Agrico Co.,

the

from

arbitrator's
the

171 F.3d at 1325

authority,

collective bargaining

as

the

arbitrator's

to

agreement.

exceeds the scope of the

or fails to draw

agreement."

fails

("A court may not vacate an

its

(citation

quotation marks omitted)); see also Misco,
long

or

collective-bargaining

arbitral award unless it is irrational,

arbitrator's

authority,

award draws

essence

omitted)

from the

(internal

484 U.S. at 36 ("As

its

essence

from the

collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely his own brand

of industrial

justice,

the

award
8

is

legitimate."

(citation

omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

2 . Analysis
Solo

claims

essentially

two

that

the

reasons.

usurped Solo's power to
Solo

to

provide

Solo claims,

Ms.

First,

should

it

argues

be

with

the arbitrator's

a

sit-down

award was not

agreement.

Second,

modified

that

implement new equipment

Wells

collective-bargaining

award

the

for

arbitrator

when i t ordered

forklift.

That

is,

authorized under the

Solo

maintains

that

the arbitrator's award was not authorized under the ADA.1
a. Whether

the

arbitrator's

award

was

authorized

under

the

collective-bargaining agreement

Solo

argues

that

the

collective-bargaining

agreement

did

not authorize the arbitrator to order Solo to provide Ms.

Wells

with

hand,

a

maintains

sit-down

that

interpretation

forklift.

The

the

arbitrator's

of

the

Union,

award

on

the

represents

collective-bargaining

other

a

permissible

agreement.

The

Court agrees with the Union.

1
In its response in opposition to the Union's motion for summary
judgment and in its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment, Solo
also argues that it never consented to the arbitrator determining a specific
accommodation.
But the parties stipulated that the arbitrator would frame
the

issues

to be decided,

and he

framed them as:

"Did the Company violate

provisions of the parties' collective bargaining agreement and/or any
provisions of Federal law when it separated the Grievant, Ms. Tamela R.
Wells, from employment on October 10, 2014.
If so, what is the remedy?"
(Doc. 24-4 at 24.)
In fact,
two issues, one being: "Was

in its first post-hearing brief, Solo proposed
Grievant discriminated against because of her

alleged disability in violation of Article 27 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement ("CBA"), and, if so, what shall be the remedy?"
(Doc. 23-2 at 3.)
Solo did not specify that it sought to limit possible remedies, and the
arbitrator clearly determined that awarding a specific accommodation was an
appropriate remedy.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Solo's argument that it
did not consent to the arbitrator ordering a specific accommodation.

As noted,
a

as long as an arbitrator is "arguably construing"

collective-bargaining

disturbed.

Misco,

484

entirely

to

the

contract

no

matter

is."

"an

marks

how

Id.

at

a

his

38.

not
1088

In

[they]

Trades

ignore

1087

the

(citation
an

collective-bargaining

See id.

think

Council

should

courts

interpretation

essence,

modify the agreement.

decision

Indeed,

837 F.3d 1083,

may

omitted) .

interpret

at

wrong

Metal

Inc.,

arbitrator

contract."

U.S.

arbitrator's

Wiregrass

Infrastructure,

agreement,

of

v.

omitted)

be

defer

underlying

interpretation
Shaw

(11th Cir.

plain

"must

the

that

not

Envtl.
2016).

language
(internal

arbitrator

is

agreement,

but

of

&
But

the

quotation

permitted

he

may

to

not

("The arbitrator acts within her

authority when she even arguably interprets a contract,

and she

exceeds her authority when she modifies the contract's clear and

unambiguous

terms.").

That

said,

a

collective-bargaining

agreement need not contain ambiguous terms for it to be open to

interpretation.

interpretation

See

when

id.

it

("A contract may

is

not

facially

be

susceptible to

ambiguous.").

In

interpreting a collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator is
permitted
agreement.

An

to

"discover"

apply

implied

moreover,

is not

required

at 1091-92.

Thus,

arbitrator

terms

in

the

Id.

arbitrator,

reasoning.

and

Id.
fails

to

specifically
10

to

explain

in some cases,

state

his

reasoning

his

when an
for

an

award,

the

or as

must

award may be

a modification.

resolve

the

reasonably viewed as
See

id.

ambiguity

In those

by

finding

an

instances,

that

the

interpretation of the contract and enforcing it."
Here,

Solo

unequivocally

it

used

in

argues

vested

the

that

it

the

with

facility.

"the court

award

the

right

Solo

to

change

claims,

modified

provide Ms.

agreement

the

equipment

therefore,

the

lengthy

background

decision,

facts

of

the

the

case

when

he

an

that

ordered

the

Wells with a sit-down forklift.

his

agreement

is

Id. at 1092.

collective-bargaining

arbitrator

In

the

interpretation

arbitrator

and

the

Solo

recited

in

parties'

to

detail

positions,

summarized the pertinent provisions of the collective-bargaining

agreement
of

the

(including Article

ADA,

explicitly

and

rely

interpretation

issued

on

or

5), articulated his

his

any

award.

He

particular

specifically

did

interpretation
not,

however,

of

contract

principle

state

why

the

collective-

bargaining agreement permitted him to issue the award he chose.
Rather,

had

he acknowledged that Article 5 "provides that management

the

leased

right,

for

sit-down

forklifts,"

whatever

forklifts

(doc.

reason,

to

the

to move

use

of

from the

self-owned

use

of

stand-up

24-4 at 29), but nevertheless ruled that Solo

was required to accommodate Ms. Wells with a sit-down forklift.
Solo

face

believes

of

reason

that

the

because

arbitrator's

his
11

decision

"[r]ecognition

flies

of

in

the

Solo's

incontrovertible
altogether
that

Solo

could

continue

as

period

(Doc.

rights

easily

of

view

a

13.)
the

sit-down

and therefore

sit-down

under Article

arbitrator's

permissibly

stated

5,

a

style

his

lack of

when it

reasoning

a

(or

as

While one

infringing

explanation

is

thereof)

bargaining

on

just

of

837 F.3d at

^not apparent'

lack

some

for Ms.

interpretation

is

collective

for

forklift

award

permissible

that,

interpreted

order mandating

retain —

See Wiregrass Metal Trades Council,

("The rule ... is

forklifts

But the Court disagrees.
arbitrator's

as

style

reconciled with an

time —

perceived

contract.
92

eliminate

to provide,

24-1 at

arguably

Solo's

to

simply cannot be

indefinite
Wells."

right

the
1091-

from the

whether

she

agreement

or

impermissibly modified it, and one can plausibly read the award

either way, the court must resolve the ambiguity by finding that
the award is an interpretation of the contract . . . .").

First,

rights

under

statement
that

the

he

potential

fact

Article

about

that

5

Solo's

reviewed

supports
rights

Article

conflict

the

5

between

arbitrator

the

under

and

Union's
Article

Article

these

recognized

27

Solo's

position.

His

arguably

shows

5

and

provisions.

analyzed

any

Following

his

analysis, he may have determined that Solo could not shrug off
its

responsibility

to

Article 27 (and the ADA)

accommodate

a

disabled

by relying on Article 5.

worker

under

Indeed,

the

ADA specifically provides that a reasonable accommodation may
12

include "acquisition or modification of equipment."
§ 12111(9) (B).
though

Solo

Thus,

had

the

the

arbitrator

general

may

power

to

have

42 U.S.C.

concluded

manage

its

that,

equipment,

Article 5 did not obviate the possibility that Article 27 could

require

Solo

employee.

of

the

to

While

introduce
Solo may

agreement,

it

is

unique

disagree

not

so

equipment
with

such

implausible

an

for

a

single

interpretation

that

it

warrants

vacating or modifying the award.

Second,

Solo's

arbitrator's

agreement.

interpretation

during

of

arbitration

the

support

the

collective-bargaining

Although Solo argued at arbitration that it had the

power under Article
that

arguments

accommodating

5 to
Ms.

change

Wells

its

with

equipment,
a

sit-down

it

also

forklift

argued
would

amount to an undue hardship and a pose a direct threat under the

ADA,

see 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12111,

12112.

In its post-hearing brief,

Solo stated that "[t]he ultimate decision on the reasonableness

of reintroducing a sit-down lift to the work environment fell to
[Solo's] Leave and Disability Management Manager," and it argued
that

"the

risk

of reintroducing the sit-down lift

to the work

environment posed enough risk that doing so would pose an undue

hardship."
could

(Doc.

have

providing

a

23-2 at 24-25.)

plausibly

sit-down

accommodation and,

determined

forklift

therefore,

From this,
that

was

a

Solo

the arbitrator
conceded

possible

that

reasonable

that Article 5 did not preclude
13

him

from

ordering

Solo

to

provide

Ms.

Wells

with

a

sit-down

forklift.

Third,

the

arbitrator's

interpretation

of

the

collective-

bargaining agreement is also supported by the fact that Solo had

previously

accommodated

forklift.

According

another

to

the

employee

with

arbitrator's

a

sit-down

decision,

another

employee suffered ankle and knee problems after Solo began using
stand-up

forklifts

and

Solo

permitted

forklift on a temporary basis.
arguments
could

Solo

have

made

relied

acquiesced to the
accommodation.

1089

("[A]n

on

see

also

arbitrator's

upon

Food

and

brief,

information

award

that

reliable

to

the

appears

Like the
arbitrator

infer

that

Solo

a possible
837

contrary

evidence

of

Brotherhood

of

738 F.2d 1564,

the

parties'

Electrical

1568

F.3d at

to

the

Workers

International

(11th Cir. 1988), to support its position.

intent.");
Workers,

(11th Cir.

Solo relies heavily on Bruno's,

Commercial

sit-down

agreement may nevertheless be valid if it

Co. of Fla.,

Furthermore,

a

24-4 at 32.)

post-hearing

this

use

See Wiregrass Metal Trades Council,

International

United Tel.

its

(See Doc.

to

idea that a sit-down forklift was

express terms of the

is premised

in

her

Union,

v.

1984).

Inc. v. United
858

F.2d

1529

There, a collective-

bargaining agreement vested the employer with "[t]he right to
establish and maintain reasonable rules and regulations covering

the operation of the stores . . . ."
14

Id. at 1530.

Under this

authority,

the

employees

employer

would

receive

violations.

A

challenged

their

arbitration.
been

to

void,

that

it

The

struck

Eleventh
the

than

Bruno's,

rules

of

without

and he

and

policy

punished
the

cause

that

and

court

existing

vacated

policy

affirmed.

including

operating

omitted).

for

under

this

and

an

arbitrator,

to

had

the

procedures."

Accordingly,

the

award

employer's

the

"bar[red]

Id.

court

to

held,

a

new

one.

found

anyone

other

1532

the

extent

court

setting

at

employer

the

implemented

from

policy

employees

the

Specifically,

rule

proceeded

that

the

which

certain

outlined a new policy for the

collective-bargaining agreement

and

under

parties

determined

just

district

the

a

suspensions

employees

arbitrator

Circuit

that

one-day

suspensions

The

follow.

The

number

disciplined

policy was

implemented

up

store

(footnote

arbitrator's

decision to "write and impose[]" a new policy violated the plain
terms of the agreement.

Id.

Bruno's is distinguishable from this case.
there struck down an entire policy and
to

follow

one

he

created.

Here,

The arbitrator

instructed the

the

arbitrator

employer
expressly

acknowledged Solo's right to implement new equipment.

But he

determined that it must still provide reasonable accommodations

to

disabled

employees,

equipment when necessary.

including

providing

individualized

He did not invalidate Article 5's

grant of power in Solo to change its equipment.
15

He did not

overrule Solo's decision to use stand-up forklifts.
not replace Solo's decision with his own.
that

providing

Ms.

Wells

with

a

Rather,

sit-down

And he did
he determined

forklift

was

a

reasonable accommodation for her disability.
Because

the

Court

arguably

construing

agreement,

see

Misco,

is

satisfied

the
484

that

parties'

U.S.

at

the

motion

for

summary

38,

judgment

was

collective-bargaining
the

Court

motion for summary judgment on this issue.
Union's

arbitrator

to

DENIES

Solo's

The Court GRANTS the

the

extent

it

requests

that the Court enforce the award on these grounds.
b. Whether

the

arbitrator's

award

was

authorized

under

the

ADA

Solo argues that the

arbitrator's award should be modified

because it was not authorized under the ADA.

claims that,

under the ADA,

Specifically,

Solo

"disabled employees are not entitled

to the specific accommodation of their choice."

(Doc.

24-1 at

18. )

Solo is correct that a disabled employee is not necessarily
entitled

Sec'y,

to

the

of

her

choice.

Dep't of Veterans Affairs Agency,

(11th Cir. 2012)

an

accommodation

employee

(alteration
Justice,

in
in

See

489 F.

Dickerson

v.

App'x 358, 360

("[A]n employer is not required to accommodate

any

manner

original));

No. 7:12-CV-24,

in

which

Copeland

that

v.

2013 WL 1296778,

16

Ga.

employee
Dep't

at *11

desires."

of

Juvenile

(M.D.

Ga. Mar.

27,

2013)

("Plaintiff

accommodation,

that

an

not

entitled

only a reasonable one.").

employee

accommodation.
allowing Ms.

is

is

Here,

Wells

accommodation.

to

never
the

her

entitled

arbitrator

to

her

clearly

sit-down

preferred

But that does not mean

use

a

the

That

to

forklift

accommodation

is

preferred

determined
was

a

the

by

reasonable

one

erred

that

Ms.

Wells

preferred does not invalidate it.

Solo
specific
that

also

instructed
29

failed

Solo

First,

the

arbitrator

Instead,

Solo

accommodate

engage

in

an

§ 1630.2 (o) (3),

Ms.

argues,
Wells,

interactive
to

while

he

the

the
was

arbitrator

framed

provisions

of

once
he

he

the

a

found

should

process

determine

the

arbitrator

parties
not

the

to

required
issues

parties'

may

have

(Doc.

been

decide

on

to

so.

as:

do
"Did

collective

an

have

with

Ms.

appropriate

permitted

to

accommodation
As

the

noted,

Company

bargaining

and/or any provisions of Federal law . . . ?

remedy?"

ordering

The Court disagrees.

instruct

themselves,

to

to

C.F.R.

accommodation.

simply

that

accommodation.

Solo

Wells,

claims

the

violate

agreement

If so, what is the

24-4 at 24 (emphasis added).)

And he decided

that the appropriate remedy was to order Ms.

Wells reinstated

and provided with a sit-down forklift.

Moreover,

to the extent the arbitrator contemplated leaving

the determination of the specific accommodation to the parties
17

to decide,

his refusal to do so makes sense.

numerous

other

Wells

take

But

to

Solo

accommodations
breaks

rejected

Accordingly,

existed,

and moving

similar

her

requests

including

to

a

to

because

may

have

Ms.

Wells.

it

accommodate

different

prior

broadly

instruct

resulted
That

Solo

to

to

in

Solo

the

is,

Solo

that

an

abstract

instruction

comply

once
was

with the ADA prior to the arbitration.
think

allowing

Ms.

position.

arbitration.

it would not have been especially efficient for the

arbitrator

to

Solo argues that

again

the

is

the

refusing

required

There
from

with

to

ADA
to

comply

little reason

arbitrator

would

have changed what Solo viewed as reasonable accommodations.
Because

the

arbitrator's

award

was

authorized

under

the

ADA, the Court DENIES Solo's motion for summary judgment on this
issue.

To

the

extent

the

Union

seeks

to

enforce

the

award

on

these grounds, the Court GRANTS its motion for summary judgment.
3. Retention of Jurisdiction, Remand, and Attorneys'
The

Unions

asks

the

Court

to

remand

this

Fees

matter

to

the

arbitrator to calculate back pay, to retain jurisdiction, and to

award attorneys'

fees,

costs,

and prejudgment

interest.

The

Court addresses each of these issues below.

First, with respect to remanding this matter, Solo consents

to this case being remanded to the arbitrator.

Court GRANTS this request.

Accordingly, the

This matter shall be REMANDED to the

arbitrator to calculate back pay.

18

Second,
Court

the

retaining

Union

provides

jurisdiction.

keep this case pending on

no

And

legal
the

basis

Court

its docket.

justifying

sees

no

Accordingly,

reason

the
to

the Union's

request is DENIED.

Finally,
costs.

When

award

the
a

Court

party

attorneys'

declines

challenges

fees

when

faith,

vexatiously,

Steel,

Paper and Forestry,

Industrial

LLC,

807

and

F.3d

the

to

an

award

arbitral

when

1258,

Rubber,

Workers

1275

least

challenge . . . ."
least

a

award.
DENIED.

plausible

some

Id.

Manufacturing,

Cir.

Moreover,

on

the

the

the

Wise

(citation

argument

Court
for

is

for attorneys'
extent

to

fees,

United
Allied
Alloys,

omitted)

fees are not

supported

satisfied

Solo

bad

that

challenge

the
at
the

therefore,

is

interest

is

prejudgment

the Union may address that issue with

remand.

V.

For

"in

Energy,

v.

or

court may

acts

But attorneys'

existed

request
to

2015)

plausible

Here,

argument

The Union's

arbitrator

party

International

(11th

appropriate in this case,
the

a

fees

wantonly or for oppressive reasons."

Service

"at

award,

challenging

(internal quotation marks omitted).

proper

attorneys'

reasons

stated

Conclusion

above,

Solo's

motion

for

summary

judgment is DENIED, and the Union's motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
19

This matter is hereby

REMANDED
TERMINATE

to

Arbitrator

all motions

ORDER ENTERED
January,

William

A.

and deadlines

at

Augusta,

Dealy

Jr.

and CLOSE

Georgia

The
this

this

Clerk

shall

case.

-^\J^

day

of

2017.

J.
STATES

RANDAL

HALL

DISTRICT

JUDGE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

20