Evans v. Strayer University
Filing
39
ORDER granting 30 Motion for Summary Judgment. This case stands closed. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 3/14/2018. (pts)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
STACIE ELAINE EVANS,
Plaintiff,
CV 115-196
V.
STRAYER UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before
judgment.
by
the
{Doc. 30.)
Plaintiff
Defendant
Court
in
of
is
motion
for
summary
The present action concerns allegations
sexual
violation
Defendant's
discrimination
of
Title
Vll.
and
retaliation
by
Because
Plaintiff
has
failed to present sufficient evidence to support her claims, the
Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant is a private higher education institution with
campuses located throughout the country.
In February 2014,
Defendant hired Plaintiff as a part-time Academic Assistant for
its Augusta, Georgia campus location.
As an Academic Assistant,
Plaintiff would report directly to the campus dean. Dr. Culver.
Plaintiff began work on March 3, 2014.
On
June
9,
2014,
Plaintiff
emailed
Stacy
Reeder-Decker,
Defendant's Employee Relations Specialist, to complain that Dr.
Culver
was
harassing
her
and
discriminating
against
her.
Plaintiff claimed that "Dr. Culver: 1) expected her to perform
her job duties without proper training and reprimanded her in
front of staff and students; 2) waited for her outside of the
restroom; 3) told her that she looked nice one day; 4) discussed
her private life with other staff members; 5) counseled her on
following the dress code and 6) asked her to look him in the
eyes when he spoke to her."
(Doc. 30-2, 1 14.)
Ms. Reeder-
Decker investigated Plaintiff's allegations but ultimately could
not substantiate them.
On
August
12,
2014,
Defendant
terminated
Plaintiff's
employment.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated her in
retaliation
for
her
complaints
to
Ms.
Reeder-Decker.
But
Defendant counters that Plaintiff's termination was part of a
2013
company-wide
restructuring
Plaintiff's employment.
Assistant
and
the
plan
developed
prior
to
As part of this plan "the Academic
Admissions
Coordinator
positions
would
be
consolidated into a new Campus Coordinator position," and "[t]he
Academic Assistant position was to be phased out."
SI 4.)
(Doc. 30-2,
Defendant notes that "[b]etween January 2014 and March
2015, each of [Defendant's] 52 Academic Assistant positions were
eliminated."
the
Part-Time
(Id. SI 5.)
Academic
According to Defendant, "[i]n Georgia,
Assistant
position
was
eliminated
on
August
12,
2014"
and
"[t]he
Full-Time
Academic
position was eliminated on . . . January 9, 2015."
Assistant
(Id. ^ 6.)
On December 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this
Court
asserting
claims
of
hostile
work
environment
and
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
Defendant challenges both claims.
II. Standard of Review
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
only
if
^^there
is
no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
56(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Facts are ''material" if they could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing substantive law, and a dispute is
genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party."
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty
The Court must view
factual disputes in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "all justifiable inferences
in
[the
non-moving
party's] favor."
United
States
v.
Four
Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
should
not
weigh
the
evidence
or
determine
The Court
credibility.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the
Court, by reference
motion.
Because
Celotex
the
to materials on file, the basis for the
Corp.
standard
v. Catrett,
for
summary
477
U.S.
judgment
317, 323 (1986).
mirrors
that
of
a
directed verdict, the initial burden of proof required by either
party depends on who carries the burden of proof at trial. Id.
at 323.
When the movant does not carry the burden of proof at
trial, it may satisfy its initial burden in one of two ways — by
negating an essential element of the non-movant's case or by
showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to
the non-movant's case.
See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929
F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) and Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
317).
The movant cannot meet its initial burden by merely
declaring that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at
trial.
Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.
If — and only if — the movant carries its initial burden,
the non-movant must ''demonstrate that there is indeed a material
issue of fact that precludes summary judgment."
Id.
When the
non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant
must tailor
its
response
to the
carried its initial burden.
method
by
which
the
movant
If the movant presented evidence
affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant "must
respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict
motion at trial on the material fact sought to be
negated."
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir.
1993).
If the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material
fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains
evidence that was ^^overlooked or ignored" by the movant or ^^come
forward
directed
with
additional
verdict
evidence
motion
evidentiary deficiency."
at
sufficient
trial
based
Id. at 1117.
to
on
withstand
the
a
alleged
The non—movant cannot
carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating
conclusory allegations contained in the complaint.
See Morris
V. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981).
Rather, the
non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
In this action, the Clerk of Court gave Plaintiff notice of
the motion for summary judgment and informed her of the summary
judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or other materials
in opposition, and the consequences of default.
(Doc. 31.)
Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright,
772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), are satisfied.
The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, and the
motion is now ripe for consideration.
III. DISCUSSION
1.
Hostile Work Environment
To
succeed
with
a
plaintiff must demonstrate:
hostile
work
environment
claim,
a
(1) that he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) that
the
employee
has
been
subject
to
unwelcome
sexual
harassment, such as sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature; (3) that the
harassment
must
have
been
based
on
the
sex
of
the
employee; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working
environment;
and
(5)
a
basis
for
holding
the
employer
liable.
Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th
Cir. 2010)(en banc).
Courts do not assess workplace conduct in isolation, but
consider the evidence of harassment ''both cumulatively and in
the totality of the circumstances."
Id.
Additionally, "either
severity or pervasiveness is sufficient to establish a violation
of
Title
VII."
Id.
(emphasis
in
original).
Thus, "[i]n
evaluating allegedly discriminatory conduct, [courts] consider
its
frequency;
its
severity;
whether
it
is
physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether
it
unreasonably
interferes
with
an
employee's
work
performance." Id. at 808—09 (citations and quotations omitted).
When assessing hostile work environment claims, courts must
remember that "not all objectionable conduct or language amounts
to discrimination
under
Title
VII."
Id. at 809.
Title
VII
"forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment."
"Title VII is not a general civility code."
Id.
Id.
Put succinctly,
Here,
Plaintiff
provides
no
evidence
in
any
form
(deposition testimony, affidavit, interrogatory answers, etc.)
that she
was ^^subject to
unwelcome
sexual
harassment," that
"[the] harassment must have been based on [her sex]," or "that
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
terms and conditions of [her] employment."
808.
Reeves, 594 F.3d at
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce
sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in her favor,
and
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's
hostile work environment claim.
2.
Retaliation Claim
A
claim for
retaliation
under
Title
VII that
circumstantial evidence follows the McDonnell
shifting analysis.
relies on
Douglas burden-
Brown v. Ala. Dept. of Transp., 597 F.3d
1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010).
Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, "[t]o make a prima facie case for retaliation, the
plaintiff must show: 1) a statutorily protected expression; 2)
an adverse employment action; 3) a causal link between the
protected expression and the adverse action."
Sullivan v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1999).
If
a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the finder of
fact must presume retaliation and the defendant has the burden
to
produce
action.
Id.
a
legitimate
reason
for
the
adverse
employment
"If the defendant offers legitimate reasons, the
presumption of retaliation disappears," and the plaintiff must
show
that
retaliation.
the
proffered
Id.
reasons
were
merely
pretext
for
If the plaintiff offers sufficient proof of
pretext, she is entitled to a jury trial if she has provided
enough evidence by which a rational jury could conclude the
defendant retaliated against her.
See Chapman v. AI Transport,
229 F.3d 1012, 1025 n.ll (11th Cir, 2000).
Plaintiff provides
no evidence
in
any form
(deposition
testimony, affidavit, interrogatory answers, etc.) to support a
causal link between her protected conduct and her termination.
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facia case of
retaliation.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
produce
sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in her favor,
and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's
retaliation claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
"^[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.'"
Earley v. Champion Intern.
Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23).
'MS]ummary judgment is the 'put up
or shut up' moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what
0vidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept
8
its
version of events."
Johnson
F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003).
v.
Cambridge
Ind., Inc., 325
Because Plaintiff provides no
evidence to support her version of events, she has not shown
that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict in her favor.
Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
(Doc. 30).
The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case, TERMINATE all
deadlines, and ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant and against
Plaintiff.
9k
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this
n
day of March,
2018.
'hall', chief judge
UNITEDy^TATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTBERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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