Johnson v. Columbia County, GA et al

Filing 32

ORDER granting in part and remanding this case to the Superior Court of Columbia County re Defendants' 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 01/23/2018. (jlh)

IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

FLORRIE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

*
*

*

COLUMBIA COUNTY, GEORGIA; CLAY
N. WHITTLE, Columbia County
Sheriff

in his

Official

CV

116-165

*
*
*

Capacity; JOHN DOES 1-6; JANE
DOES 1-6; and XYZ Corporation,
Defendants.

*
*
*

ORDER

Before the Court is

a motion for summary judgment filed by

Defendants Columbia County,

N.

Whittle,

in

his

County

gave

official

(collectively,

Court

Georgia

("Columbia County")

capacity

"Defendants").

Plaintiff

timely

notice

as

Sheriff

(Doc.
of

17.)

affidavits

consequences

of

or

other

default.

materials

(Doc.

20.)

requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright,

in

Columbia

The Clerk of

Defendants'

judgment motion and the summary judgment rules,
file

of

and Clay

of the right to

opposition,

Therefore,

772 F.2d 822,

Cir. 1985) (per curiam), have been satisfied.

summary

and

the

the

notice

825 (11th

Plaintiff filed a

response in opposition and Defendants filed a reply in support.
(Docs. 27,

30.)

The time for filing materials in opposition has

expired,

and

the

consideration

parties'

of

motion

the

is

ripe

for

consideration.

evidence

briefs,

respective

of

record,

relevant

law,

Defendants'

motion

Upon
and

for

the

summary

judgment is GRANTED IN PART.

I.

On

the

evening

of

BACKGROUND

September

13,

2014,

Sergeant

Bobby

Bradford of the Columbia County Sheriff's Office responded to a

complaint in Martinez, Georgia regarding a hit and run accident
involving

a

drunk

Plaintiff's

driver.

Response

to

(Bradford
Defendants'

Decl.,

Statement

Material Facts ("PRDSMF") , Doc. 28,1 SI 2.)
his

investigation,

Sergeant

which

Sergeant

an

(Bradford

Decl.

SI

bench

6;

Plaintiff

SI

and

SISI 4-6; PRDSMF SISI

warrant

PRDSMF

3;

During the course of

(Bradford Decl.

outstanding

SI

Undisputed

Bradford ran a background check on

revealed

arrest.2

18-3,

of

Bradford encountered

requested her identification.
3-4.)

Doc.

for

4. )

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff's

He

arrested

Plaintiff based on the bench warrant and transported her to the

Columbia

County

(Bradford Decl.

Detention

Center

(the

"Detention

Center").

SI 7; PRDSMF SI 5. )

1 (Compare with Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Doc. 19.)
2 On or about September 18, 2013, the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia
issued

a

bench

warrant

appear in that court.
admits

that

the

bench

for

Plaintiff s

(Doc.

18-1,

warrant

was

arrest

at 20;
issued,

for

her

she

denies

appear in court and asserts that its issue was improper.
27-1,

at 31-33;

PRDSMF 11 1, 4.)
2

alleged

PRDSMF 1 1.)

failure

to

While Plaintiff

that

she

failed

to

(Johnson Dep., Doc.

Upon

her

arrival

at

1:12 am on September 14,

cell

in

PRDSMF

the
SISI

8-9.)

Plaintiff

-

different

her

booking

is

medications

sugar

Detention

2014,

area.

After

who

blood

the

(Woods

diabetic

level

hours

and

this

Decl.,

was

and

tested

51.)

This

Plaintiff

was

level

38.3

of

testing

immediately

(Id. )

retested

a

51,

53,

65;

this

holding

a

medical

female

blood

and

female

indicated

number

Doc.

left

the

of
had

using

27-1,

of

blood

diabetic seizure.

see also PRDSMF SI 10.)

-

level
a

3-4;
cell,

officer

sugar

officer

SISI

issues

(Johnson Dep.,

Plaintiff subsequently experienced a
38-39,

18-4,

prescribed

revealed a

This

approximately

Doc.

in

other

by

Plaintiff's blood glucose monitor.

37-39,

at

Plaintiff was placed in a holding

several

for

Center

at

78;

sugar

area
(Id.

and
at

Plaintiff managed to

press the call button in the holding cell for help and expressed
that

she

"needed something because

(Johnson Dep.

into

the

at

65;

holding

[her blood]

PRDSMF SI 11.)

cell

and

66;

see also

PRDSMF SISI 15,

17-18.)

low."

Nurse Jennifer Sturkey came

attempted

medication, which Plaintiff refused.4

sugar was

to

give

(Johnson Dep.

Plaintiff

at 62,

65-

Nurse Sturkey believed that

3 Plaintiff testified that the blood sugar level she tries to maintain ranges

between 90 (a "fasting level") and 190 (where it should be "two hours after a
meal").
(Johnson Dep. at 47; see also PRDSMF 1 27.)
Plaintiff further
testified that a blood sugar level of 38 is a "comatose level."
(Johnson
Dep.

at 38. )

4 Nurse Sturkey was employed by Southern Health Partners, a private company
contracted to provide medical care for inmates in the Detention Center.
(Woods Decl. 1 7; PRDSMF 1 12.)
Plaintiff testified that Nurse Sturkey was

attempting to give Plaintiff improper medication (i.e., medication that would
lower - as opposed to raise - her blood sugar level) by "cram[ming it] down
[her]

throat."

(Johnson Dep. at 62,

65-66.)
3

Plaintiff

was

Plaintiff was
at 66,

69;

despite

not

actually

"just

fine,

her

on

continued

the

strength

to

Detention
apple

she's

distress

call

Center

juice

and

sugar level.

diabetic

for

guard
two

it."

at

70.)

but

help

again.

(Id.)

came

into

area

the

an

left

and

Plaintiff laid in a

floor

in

that

(Johnson Dep.

"everybody

cell's

oranges

remarked

Plaintiff testified that,

seizure,

(Johnson Dep.

holding

and

just faking

see also PRDSMF SISI 19-23.)

slammed the door."

stupor

in

was

able

to muster

In

and

attempt

to

response,

gave

the
a

Plaintiff

raise

her

blood

(Id^ at 44-45, 51-52, 70-71; PRDSMF SI 24.)

Plaintiff was subsequently placed on medical segregation so
that

her

(PRDSMF

medical

M

25,

responsible

for

condition

28-29.)

preparing

could

be

more

Deputy

Jailer

Plaintiff

for

closely

Miriam

PRDSMF SISI 29-30.)

(Johnson Dep.

SISI 31-35.)

in

(Woods Decl.

As part of this preparation,

took Plaintiff to the booking area's showers,

delousing agent,

Dunne

confinement

Detention Center's medical segregation area.
11;

supervised.

was

the
SISI 9,

Deputy Dunne

sprayed her with a

and then allowed her to wash herself briefly.

at 53-65;

Dunne Dep.,

Doc.

21-2,

at 55-58;

PRDSMF

Deputy Dunne sprayed Plaintiff in the face with the

delousing agent but did not provide her with sufficient time to
5 Plaintiff testified that while she was preparing to undress, a male officer,

Gilbert Lopez, was present and pulled her pants down from behind.
(Johnson
Dep. at 53-54.)
Officer Lopez left the room shortly thereafter but Deputy
Dunne held the door to the shower area open:, which allowed another male
officer and a male inmate to view Plaintiff in a state of undress.
(Id. at

55, 57-59, 61-62.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Deputy Dunne laughed, made
offensive comments, and "kept snapping her fingers like [Plaintiff] was a
dog" while Plaintiff showered.
(Id. at 55-56, 62-65.)
4

wash

her

face

medication,

at

44,

written

(Id. at 88-89.)
an

grant

her

requests

a

Benadryl

55-57,

59-61,

grievances

75,

while

78,

at

86,

the

or

other

and blister.6

148.)

Plaintiff

Detention

Center.

At approximately 9:00 pm on September 14, 2014,

officer with the Richmond County Sheriff's Office arrived at

the

Detention

Center

Dep., Doc. 21-4,

and

took

custody

2016,

1983

as

complaint,
(ii)

indifference

well

as

action

to

various

Plaintiff

this

medical

(Mosley

named as

defendants:

(iii)

Court

on

John

(Id.)

Does

alleging a claim for

needs

law claims.

XYZ corporation.
to

her

Georgia,

state

Sheriff Whittle;

(v)

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff initiated this action in the

Superior Court of Columbia County,
deliberate

of

at 25 & Ex. 3; see also PRDSMF SI 37.)

On August 24,

and

for

which caused her skin to turn red

(Johnson Dep.

submitted

or

1-6;

under

(Doc.

(i)

42

U.S.C.

1-5.)

Columbia

(iv)

Jane

§

In her

County;

Does

1-6;

Defendants timely removed this

September

30,

2016,

asserting

federal

question jurisdiction exists over Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim
and supplemental jurisdiction exists over her state law claims.
(Doc. 1.)

requesting

On April 6 and May 19,

leave

to

substitute

2017,

party

Plaintiff filed motions

defendants,

which

United States Magistrate Judge denied on July 5, 2017.7
6 Plaintiff testified that, as a result of this incident,

the

(Docs.

her skin peeled and

was painful for approximately two weeks and that she has permanent scarring
on her face.

(Johnson Dep.

at 107-10.)

7 Notably, in the Scheduling Order dated November 10, 2016, the Magistrate
Judge set November 29, 2016 as the deadline for filing motions to amend or
add parties.
(Doc. 8, as subsequently amended by Doc. 13.)
In her postdeadline motions

for leave

to substitute party defendants,

Plaintiff sought

11,

15,

22.)

On June

16,

2011,

motion for summary judgment.

II.

Summary
genuine

dispute

as

(Doc.

SUMMARY

judgment

is

to

Defendants
17.)

JUDGMENT

STANDARD

appropriate

any

only

material

Court

depositions,

together

shall

grant

summary

the

affidavits,

if

any,

and

"there

no

movant

the

is

is

Fed. R. Civ.

judgment

answers to interrogatories,

with

if

fact

entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

The

filed their present

"if

the

P.

56(a).

pleadings,

and admissions on file,

show

that

there

is

no

genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party

is

matter

entitled

Corp.

v.

2004);

N.

to

summary

judgment

Crossarm Co.,

Fed. R. Civ. P.

357

56(c).

as

a

F.3d 1256,

of

1259,

law."

1260

Hickson

(11th Cir.

The "purpose of summary judgment is

to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see
whether
Indus.

there
Co.

v.

is

a

genuine

Zenith

need

Radio

for

Corp.,

trial."
475

Matsushita

U.S.

574,

587

Elec.
(1986)

(internal citation omitted).

"[The]

initial
basis

party

seeking

responsibility

for

its

motion,

of

summary

informing

and

judgment

the

identifying

always

district
those

bears

the

court

of

the

portions

of

the

to substitute Nurse Sturkey and Deputy Dunne for Jane Does 1 & 2 and Officer

Lopez for John Doe 1.
the Magistrate Judge

(Docs. 11, 15.)
In its Order denying these motions,
concluded that Plaintiff had not shown good cause

sufficient to amend the aforementioned deadline and that -

even if good cause

were demonstrated - the proposed amendments would be futile because the
statute of limitations had run on her claims against the proposed substitute
defendants (as the claims against them would not relate back to the time of
filing of her complaint).
(See Doc. 22, at 4-8.)
6

[record

before

the

court]

absence of a genuine

Catrett,

477

movant

U.S.

carries

it

believes

demonstrate

fact."

Celotex Corp.

issue of material

317,

its

which

323

(1986).

If

initial

burden,

-

the

and

only

non-movant

if

the

-

may

v.

the

avoid

summary judgment by demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine
issue

as

Clark,

to

the

Inc.,

"material"

material

929

if

F.2d

they

facts

604,

could

608

242,

^genuine'

248

(1986).

its

(11th

affect

the governing substantive law.
477 U.S.

of

the

case.

Cir.

Clark

v.

1991).

outcome

of

Coats

Facts

the

&

are

suit

under

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc.,

A dispute of those material facts "is

. . . [only] if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
When

ruling

on

the

motion,

the

Court

evidence in the record in the light most

must

Id.

view

favorable to

all

the

the non-

moving party and resolve all factual disputes in the non-moving
party's

favor.

Matsushita,

475

U.S.

at

587.

also avoid weighing conflicting evidence.
255;

McKenzie

934

(11th

v.

Cir.

Davenport-Harris
1987).

Anderson,

Funeral

Nevertheless,

The

Home,

the

Court must
477 U.S. at

834

F.2d

non-moving

930,

party's

response to the motion for summary judgment must consist of more
than conclusory allegations, and a mere "scintilla" of evidence
will

not

Cir.

1990);

1989).

suffice.

Pepper

Walker

v.

v.

Coates,

Darby,

911

F.2d

1573,

887 F.2d

1493,

1498

1577

(11th

(11th Cir.

"The non-moving party cannot create a genuine issue of

material

fact

through

is

'merely colorable'

v.

Dougherty Cty.

speculation,

2010)
Cir.

(quoting
2008);

or

Sch.

Shiver

Sys.,

v.

and Anderson,

Plaintiff's

In

her

382

Chertoff,
477 U.S.

U.S.C.

that

§

1983.

their

to

alleged

549

914,

F.3d

917

(11th Cir.

1342,

1343

(11th

at 249-50).

alleges

her medical

rights

(Doc.

App'x

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff

indifferent

constitutional

F.

Bryant

1983 Claim

complaint,

deliberately
her

Section

or evidence that

'not significantly probative.'"

III.

A.

conjecture,

and

1-5,

M

seeks

16-21,

liability

for

that

Defendants

needs

money

in

violation

damages

45-49.)

were

under

of
42

Defendants assert

Plaintiff's

aforementioned

claim is premised solely upon theories of respondeat superior or
vicarious

liability and that they therefore are not

the alleged unconstitutional actions
subordinates

30,

under

at 2-4.)

While

entities8

8 "Though

1983.

of their employees and/or

(See

Doc.

18,

at

13-17;

Doc.

The Court agrees with Defendants.

counties,

may

respondeat

Section

liable for

be

subject

superior

Sherriff

municipalities,

and

[Whittle]

to

liability

vicarious

is

and other

the

named

local

under

liability

defendant,

government

Section
are

'a

not

suit

1983,
viable

against

a

governmental official in his official capacity is deemed a suit against the
entity that he represents.'" See Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1335
n.4 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Neumann, 188 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th
Cir. 1999) (per curiam)); see also Brown, 188 F.3d at 1290 n.l ("[A] suit

against a government officer in his official capacity is simply a suit
against the relevant governmental entity." (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S.

159

(1985)).
8

theories

thereunder.

(11th Cir.

1335

2004);

(11th

(1)

that

v.

Brown,

see also Goodman v.

Cir.

liability on a

McDowell

2013).

392

F.3d

Kimbrough,

Rather,

"to

[county or] municipality,

1283,

718

impose

1289

F.3d 1325,

Section

1983

a plaintiff "must show:

[her] constitutional rights were violated;

(2)

that the

[county or] municipality had a custom or policy that constituted
deliberate

indifference

to

that

constitutional

right;

that the policy or custom caused the violation."
392

F.3d

U.S.

at

378,

1289
388

against

a

Section

1983,

City

(1989)).

county

constitutional

(citing

a

of

Canton,

Similarly,

sheriff

sued

plaintiff

deprivation

in

must

as

to

his

that

result

v.

Harris,

*(1)

489

liability

capacity

[s]he

of:

(3)

See McDowell,

establish

official

"prove

the

Ohio

and

under

suffered

an

a

action

taken or policy made by an official responsible for making final

policy in that area of the
or

(2)

[d]epartment's business;

a practice or custom that is so pervasive,

functional

equivalent

policymaker.'"

(quoting Hale v.
1995)).

Goodman,

it

is

for

a

policy

(quoting Wayne v.

1999); see also Craig v.

adopted

718 F.3d at 1335

necessary

McDowell,
Jarvis,

to

as to be the

by

the

final

(alterations omitted)

50 F.3d 1579,

a plaintiff to

"generally

wide-spread practice.'"

Cir. 2011)

of

Tallapoosa Cty.,

"In order

custom,

2004)

[s]heriff's

1582 (11th Cir.

demonstrate

show

a

a policy or

persistent

and

392 F.3d at 1290 (11th Cir.

197 F.3d 1098, 1105

Floyd Cty.,

(11th Cir.

643 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th

("A single incident of a constitutional violation is

insufficient to prove a policy or custom even when the incident

involves several employees of the municipality.");
of

St.

Marys,

random

acts

787

or

F.2d

isolated

a custom or policy."

Here,

with

aware

any

had,

of

incidents

admits

Plaintiff

(11th
are

Cir.

1986)

insufficient

"Sheriff

on

Whittle

September

specific medical

("Normally

to

establish

14,

need that

had

2014"

no

and

direct

"was

[P]laintiff might

not
have

and he was not directly involved in any decision regarding

[P]laintiff's

Plaintiff
medical

all

1499

(citations omitted)).

Plaintiff

dealings

1496,

Depew v. City

medical

admits

care

to

inmates

services

by

it

was

all

are

care."

official

inmates

[to

medically

(PRDSMF

be]

in

policy

the

provided

trained

SISI

59-60.)

"to

Detention

with

Further,

provide
Center"

health

personnel."

adequate
and

and

(Id.

II

"that

medical

39,

46.)

Plaintiff also admits official policy "specifically prohibit[ed]
the abuse of inmates at

personal

abuse,

Moreover,

policy

personal

Plaintiff

to

necessary"

deny
or

harassment."

the Detention Center" including "acts of

admits

an

to
(Id.

Nevertheless,

injury,
that

inmate

"subject
SISI 53,

and harassment."
it

would

medication
an

inmate

be

a

that
to

(Id.

1

40.)

"violation

was

abuse,

of

medically
injury,

or

58.)

Plaintiff

asserts

that

her

deliberate

indifference claim remains viable because "official policies are

not always followed as they should be."
asserts

County,

she has demonstrated a litany of incidents
that

"in

[sic]

[her]

dealings

alone

at 10.)

further

jail policies

that

(Doc. 27,

with

She

Columbia

where the

were not followed by Columbia County
10

jail

employees."

aware

that

of

these

were

(Id.)

She

issues"

taken

because

against

the

reported by [Plaintiff]."
Plaintiff,

any

however,

unconstitutional

has

series

be

Indeed,
of

she

constitutional

inferred."

citations

which

"has

See

omitted).

is,

at

at

Rather,

liability

under

Section

citations,

and

evidence

she

from

1312

which

of

personally

insufficient

See Craig,
any

were

at 89).)

any

those

present

actions

643

F.3d at

evidence

of

a

indifference

can

quotations

and

(internal

she "relies on her own experience,

of

and

a

See

id.

omitted) ;

1331-33

single

therefore

1983.

alterations

F.3d 1312,

to

proof

activity"

provide

than

and

procedures

which by itself is

violations

unconstitutional

Cty. , 510

other

failed

most,

to

Defendants.

id.

and

(citing Johnson Dep.

2014,

to impose liability against

"Columbia County was

policies

failed

activity

that

"[t]he mistreatments

jail

(Id.

suffered on September 14,

1311.

submits

inadequate

(internal

see

(11th Cir.

incident

also

2007)

to

of

impose

quotations,

Goebert

v.

Lee

(summary judgment

granted to sheriff sued in his official capacity where there was
no evidence that

sheriff had actual

knowledge that his policies

were being implemented in way that ignored a detainee's medical
needs

or

that

constructive

Gwinnett

violation

knowledge

Cty. ,

(plaintiff's

own

657

could

F.

(same).

Moreover,

policies

be

App'x

experience

against county); Barr v.
2011)

of

Gee,

were

imputed

856,

to

while
11

widespread

sheriff);

860

insufficient

437 F.

so

(11th

to

App'x 865,

Plaintiff

Coons

Cir.

impose

that

v.

2016)

liability

875 (11th Cir.

testified

that

she

submitted written grievances during her confinement,
provided any evidence regarding,
those

written

those

written

indifference
her

grievances;

(ii)

grievances;

of

submission

which
of

she

and

whether

complains

any

occurred

grievances.

deliberate

subsequent

to

Accordingly,

of

adopted -

by Defendants that constituted deliberate indifference

her

custom,

constitutional

entitled to

summary

or

rights.9

judgment

on

action

of

existence

policy,

an

had notice

has

to

demonstrate

the contents of

Defendants

(iii)

written

(i)

Plaintiff

a

to

whether

now

those

failed

inter alia:

she has not

practice

held

Therefore,
Plaintiff's

taken

or

-

or

the

otherwise

Defendants

are

claim of deliberate

indifference under Section 1983.10

9 While

Plaintiff

did

not

pursue

claims

against

Sheriff

Whittle

in

his

individual capacity,
she would fare no better had she done so because
supervisory officials sued in their individual capacities "are not liable
under §

1983 for

the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis

of respondeat superior or vicarious liability."

Cottone v.

1352,

Rather,

1360

(11th Cir.

2003)

(citations omitted).

Jenne,

326 F.3d

a supervisor may be

individually liable where "the supervisor personally participates in the
alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between
the actions of [the] supervising official and the alleged constitutional
deprivation."
Id.
This "causal connection" may exist where: (a) "a history
of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to
correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do;" (b) the "supervisor's

custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional
rights/" or (c) "the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully
or

knew that

the

subordinates

would act

unlawfully

and

failed

to

stop them

from doing so."
Id.
(internal guotations,
citations,
and alterations
omitted).
As previously noted,
Plaintiff has failed to cite to any
particular part of materials in the record that demonstrates that the alleged
violations of her constitutional rights were caused by Sheriff Whittle's: (i)

personal participation; (ii) failure to correct a history of widespread
abuse;
(iii) official or adopted customs, policies, or practices;
(iv)
directives to his subordinates; or
(v)
failure to stop unconstitutional
activity of which he was aware.
10 Because Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 fail, so does her related

reguest for attorney's fees.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C § 1988(b). Plaintiff also
explicitly withdrew her claim for punitive damages.
(Doc. 27, at 11.)
12

B.

Plaintiff's

In

State Law Claims

addition

asserted

several

jurisdiction

to

on

Section

law

these

having

judgment

declines

her

state

over

Nevertheless,
summary

to

state

found

See 28 U.S.C.

may

to

dismissed all
see

also

Cir.

remaining
been

("We
state

dismissed

2016)

v.

v.

prior

when,

to

federal

to

as

735

district

654

courts

state

claims

1367.

entitled

claim,

to

the

Court

Plaintiff's

state

if

it

has

original jurisdiction);

370

F.3d

L.A.

App'x

to

removal

which

&

Cir.

411

cases

(11th

claims

Draper

(11th

408,

1089

dismiss

federal

428

over

1086,

courts

the

414,

in

§

(indicating that a court

(citing

F.

U.S.C

are

law

also

supplemental

jurisdiction

here,

F.2d

County,

28

resolve

Co.,

trial.")

Inc.,

dismiss,

Ins.

has

Defendants

encouraged district

claims

Broward

than

that

supplemental

Allstate

have

("[F]ederal

rather

claims.

§ 1367(c)(3)

exercise

Wheelabrator-Frye,

McDuffie

law

Plaintiff

Court

claims under which it has

Raney

2004)

claim,

The

jurisdiction

law claims.
decline

claims.

Plaintiff's

exercise

1983

have

Son

v.

1984));

(11th

must

they

any

Cir.

remand,

decline

to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction." (citations omitted)).

IV.

Based
concludes

upon
that

Plaintiff's

the

foregoing

Defendants

federal

CONCLUSION

law

are

and due
entitled

claim.

The

13

consideration,
to

Court

summary
declines

the

Court

judgment
to

on

exercise

supplemental
claims.
motion

jurisdiction

Accordingly,
for

Clerk is

over

IT

summary judgment

IS

Plaintiff's
HEREBY

(doc.

directed to REMAND this

17)

remaining

ORDERED
is

that

GRANTED

case to the

state

law

Defendants'

IN PART.

The

Superior Court of

Columbia County.11

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta,
January,

Georgia,

>lrd<this c^^lrC^ day of

2018.

,, 'CHIEF JUDGE
TSTATES

JRN

11 Florrie Johnson v. Columbia County, Georgia, et al.r
Columbia County, Georgia, Civil Action No. 2016-ECV-0068.
14

DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

Superior Court

of