Riles v. Augusta-Richmond County Commission et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss and 11 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 08/21/2017. (thb)

IN THE

UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT

OF

COURT

FOR THE

GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

JAMES D.

RILES,

*
•

Plaintiff,

*
*
*

vs.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
CV

116-214

•

AUGUSTA-RICHMOND

COMMISSION,

COUNTY

*

ROBERT LEVINE,

JOANIE SMITH,

*

and RONALD

*

HOUCK,

*
*

Defendants.

*

ORDER

Before

separate

the

Court

motions

to

in

the

dismiss

captioned

filed

by

matter

Defendants

are

three

Augusta-

Richmond County Commission,1 Joanie Smith, and Ronald Houck.
While

the motions

Plaintiff's

to dismiss purport to

entire

complaint,

the

seek dismissal of

arguments

address certain of Plaintiff's claims.

therein

only

The motions have been

fully briefed and are ripe for consideration.

1

Through its motion to dismiss, Defendant Augusta-Richmond
County Commission states that it has been misidentified,

contending

that

"Augusta,

Georgia"

is

the

proper

party

defendant. It appears from the complaint that Plaintiff is
suing his employer, the body politic - Augusta-Richmond

County.

The Court will not change the caption or direct the

substitution of a party name except upon motion. For purposes
of the instant motion, however, the Court will refer to this
Defendant as "the County."

I.

On December 27,

counsel,

BACKGROUND

2016,

Plaintiff James D. Riles,

through

filed the instant employment discrimination case.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff has been an employee of
the

County

for

11

years

Facilities Department.

with

the

Recreation,

(Compl., H 10.)

Parks,

and

Plaintiff applied for

but was denied the position of Facilities Supervisor on or

about February 6, 2014.

(IcL 111 11-12.)

Plaintiff, a black

male, claims he was qualified for the position but was denied
because of his race.

(Id. UK 13-16,

19.)

On February 19,

2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Augusta-Richmond

(Id. % 29.)

County Equal Employment Opportunity Office.

Plaintiff further alleges that thereafter, he was denied other

positions

within

the

Recreation,

Parks,

and

Facilities

Department because of his race and in retaliation for filing
the first EEO complaint.

(Id.

UK 20-27,

34.)

Plaintiff

further claims he was denied other positions in retaliation

for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in June 2014.

(Id. UK 38-40.)

Upon these allegations, Plaintiff alleges a violation of
42

U.S.C.

§ 1983

and the

Equal

Protection

Clause

of

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

§ 44.)

Nevertheless,

the
(Id.

in the introductory paragraph of the

complaint, Plaintiff cites not only to § 1983 and the Equal

Protection Clause but also "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq." and "Title I

of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 - 42 U.S.C. § 1981."
at 1.)

(Compl.

Through their motions to dismiss, Defendants seek to

dismiss any claims under Title I of the Civil Rights Act of
1991,

which is codified at 42 U.S.C.

Moreover,

the

dismissal

of

individual

the

Defendants,

official

§ 1981a,

Smith and Houck,

capacity claims

against

duplicative of the claims against the County,
dismissal

of

capacities.

any

claims

against

and § 1981.2

them

in

seek

them as

and they seek

their

individual

The Court will now resolve these issues.

II.

LEGAL

STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) does not test whether the plaintiff will ultimately

2

Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is codified at 42

U.S.C.

§ 1981a.

It

is unclear from the complaint whether

Plaintiff was referring to § 1981a when he listed "Title I of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 - 42 U.S.C. § 1981" or whether he
was referring to both § 1981a and § 1981.
See Olmstead v.
Taco Bell Corp.,
141 F.3d 1457, 1462
(11th Cir. 1998)

(acknowledging the potential for confusion in differentiating
between the amendments to Title VII embodied in § 1981a and
the cause of action created in § 1981).
Because Defendants

have interpreted the language to state claims under § 1981a
and § 1981,

the Court will address both herein as well.

Of note, Plaintiff all but concedes that he does not have

an independent claim under either statute, stating that his
complaint is "based primarily upon Defendants' collective
violations of Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment."

Resp. in Opp'n to Mots, to Dismiss, Doc. 16, at 2.)

(PL's

prevail on the merits of the case.
sufficiency of the complaint.

236

(1974) .

Therefore,

Rather, it tests the legal

Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

the

court must accept as

true all

facts alleged in the complaint and construe all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See

Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey, 312 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002).
The

court,

however,

need not

conclusions as true,

Iqbal,

556 U.S.

accept

the

complaint's

only its well-pled facts.

legal

Ashcroft v.

662, 677-79 (2009).

A complaint also must "contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted

as

true,

xto

state

plausible on its face.'"
v.

Twomblv,

550

U.S.

a

claim

Id. at 678

544,

570

to

relief

that

(citing Bell Atl.

(2007)).

The

is

Corp.

plaintiff

is

required to plead "factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the

misconduct

alleged."

Id.

Although

probability requirement at the pleading
beyond
Twombly,
Broudo,

.

.

. mere

550

U.S.

544

U.S.

possibility
at

336,

556-57
347

.

.

there

stage,

. must

be

When,

no

"something
alleged."

(citing Durma Pharm.,

(2005)).

is

Inc.

however,

v.

on the

basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the

factual allegations of the complaint will support the cause of
action,

dismissal

of

the

complaint

is

appropriate.

See

Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin Cntv. , 922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th
Cir.

1991).

III.

A.

42

U.S.C.

§

LEGAL ANALYSIS

1981

Section 1981 provides that

u [a]11 persons

. . . shall

have the same right in every State and Territory to make and

enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens."
However,

§

1981

does

not

provide

action against state actors.
F.3d 891,

894

(11th Cir.

an

independent

cause

Butts v. Cnty. of Volusia,

2000).

Rather,

42 U.S.C.

of

222

§ 1983 is

the exclusive federal remedy for violations by state actors of
the rights guaranteed by § 1981.

Bryant v. Jones,

575 F.3d

1281, 1288 n.l (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Butts, 222 F.3d at 89495) .

Plaintiff's complaint sets forth a § 1983 claim wherein

he claims that Defendants have violated his equal protection

rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

to

bring

merges

Defendants'

Any § 1981 claim Plaintiff has attempted

into

his

§

1983

claim.

Accordingly,

motions to dismiss any § 1981 claim are hereby

GRANTED.

B.

42

U.S.C.

Section

§

§

1981a

1981a

broadened

the

remedies

available

to

successful Title VII litigants. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, 2000e-

5(g).

It does not provide an independent cause of action.

Satterfield

6916828

v.

(N.D.

Bd.

Ala.

of

Feb.

Trustees

26,

of

2016);

Univ.

of

King v.

Ala.,

2016

WL

Fulton Cnty.

of

Ga.,

2009 WL 1322341

Defendants'

(N.D. Ga. May 11,

2009).

Accordingly,

motions to dismiss any § 1981a claim are hereby

GRANTED.

C.

Individual Capacity Claims

In this case,

Plaintiff

has

it is unclear from the complaint whether

asserted

a

claim

against

the

individual

Defendants, Smith and Houck, in their individual capacities.
The

word

However,

"individual"
Plaintiff

does

seeks

not

appear

punitive

in

the

damages,

complaint.

which are

only

recoverable against government officials in their individual
capacities.
U.S. 247,

See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,

268-70 (1981); see also Scott v.

2d 1260, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 1999)

liable

for

punitive

Accordingly,

damages

Estes,

Inc.,

453

60 F. Supp.

(holding that county cannot be

under

Title

VII

or

§

1983) .

the Court will presume that Plaintiff is suing

Smith and Houck in their official and individual capacities
under Title VII and §

With

respect

1983.

to

Plaintiff's

claims

under

Title

VII,

individual capacity suits are inappropriate because the relief
granted

under

individual

Title

employees

violation of Title VII.
&

Mental

Retardation,

VII

is

whose

against

actions

the

employer,

would

not

constitute

a

Cross v. Ala. Dep't of Mental Health
49

F.3d

1490,

1504

(11th

Cir.

1995)

(holding liability under Title VII is limited to official

capacity claims); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772
(11th Cir.

1991) .

Contrary to Title VII,

individual employees can be held

liable for discrimination under § 1983.

And at this point,

Defendants have presented no legal argument or authority to
dismiss Plaintiff's individual capacity claims under § 1983

for violation of his equal protection rights.
Upon the foregoing, Defendants Smith and Houck's motions
to

dismiss

the individual capacity claims against them are

GRANTED with respect to

Plaintiff's Title VII claims.

The

individual capacity claims against Defendants Smith and Houck
under § 1983 remain.

D.

Official Capacity Claims

Defendants

Smith

and

Houck

also

move

to

dismiss

Plaintiff's Title VII and § 1983 claims against them in their
official capacities.

With

respect

to

Defendants

Smith

and

Defendants

contend

against the County.

Plaintiff's
Houck

that

in

§

their

they are

1983

official

redundant

The Court agrees.

claims

of

against

capacities,

his

claims

See Busby, 931 F.2d at

776 (holding that § 1983 suits against a municipal officer in
his official capacity are functionally equivalent to suits
against the municipality);

Owens v. Fulton Cnty.,

877 F.2d

947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) ("For liability purposes, a suit

against

a

considered

public

official

a

against

suit

in

the

his

official

local

capacity

government

entity

is

he

represents."); M.R. v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty.,
2012 WL 2931263, *2 (S.D. Ala. July 18, 2012)

("Plainly, then,

extensive authorities illustrate the well-entrenched principle
that suits against both an official in his or her official
capacity and the entity that official represents are redundant
and unnecessary.")

Plaintiff

(cited sources omitted).

points

out

that

he

is

seeking

prospective

relief in the form of reinstatement and front pay,

claims against Defendants Smith and Houck may stand.

thus,

his

While it

is true that official capacity claims for prospective relief
are not treated as actions against the state for purposes of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159,

167 n.14

(1985),

there is no rule that a court make a

distinction between the types of damages sought in assessing
whether a claim for relief is duplicative under Busby.
Alabama

existed,

district

court

observed:

"If

such

a

As the

distinction

one would expect courts applying Busby to dismiss

only the money-damages claims against the government officials
in their official capacities, while allowing the injunctive
and declaratory claims to proceed to trial."
2931263,

at *3 .

This is not the case however.

M.R., 2012 WL
Simply put,

Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendants Smith

and Houck are redundant of his claims against the County no

matter the damages sought.3

For this reason, Defendants Smith

and Houck's motions to dismiss Plaintiff's official capacity
claims against them under § 1983 are GRANTED.

Further,

as stated previously,

the relief granted under

Title VII is against the employer,

not individual employees

whose

actions

Busby,

would

constitute

931 F.2d at 772.

i.e., the County.

Here,

a

violation

Title

VII.

Plaintiff named the employer,

Thus, official capacity claims against his

supervisors are unnecessary and duplicative.
v. United Techs.

of

Corp.,

916 F. Supp.

1217,

See, e.g., Lynn
1219

(M.D. Ala.

1996).

Accordingly, Defendants Smith and Houck's motions to

dismiss

Plaintiff's Title VII claims against them in their

official capacities are also GRANTED,

IV•

CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing, Defendant County's motion to dismiss
(doc. 9)

3

is GRANTED.

Plaintiff

More specifically,

cites Welch v.

Lanev,

57

Plaintiff's claims

F.3d 1004

(11th Cir.

1995), for the proposition that his official capacity claims
for injunctive relief should stand.
However, in Welch, the
entity that the individual defendants represented was not a

party to the lawsuit.

That is, the Welch plaintiff was able

to maintain his official capacity claims against the Sheriff
and the Chief Deputy Sheriff for injunctive relief because the

entity they represented was not a party.
Welch is inapposite as the County has
defendant in the instant action.

For this reason,
been named as a

under

§

1981a

discrimination

remain.
10

&

and
and

§

1981

are

retaliation

dismissed;
under

§

his

1983

and

claims
Title

of
VII

Defendants Smith and Houck's motions to dismiss (doc.

11)

are

GRANTED

IN

PART

and

DENIED

IN

PART.

More

specifically, Plaintiff's claims under § 1981a and § 1981 are

dismissed.
Houck

in

dismissed,
under

§

Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Smith and
their

individual

but his
1983

will

capacities

under

Title

VII

are

individual capacity claims against them
stand.

Plaintiff's

claims

against

Defendants Smith and Houck in their official capacities under
Title VII and § 1983 are dismissed.

Finally, the Court exercises its discretion to not award
attorney's fees and costs associated with filing the motions
to dismiss to Defendants as requested.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta,
August,

Georgia,

this C>< ** day of

2 017.

J.^RM^fKL HALL, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

10