Jones et al v. Lamkin

Filing 18

ORDER denying 7 Motion to Dismiss and Lifts the stay of discovery in this case. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 6/29/17. (cmr)

IN THE UNITED

FOR THE

STATES

DISTRICT

COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

MALLORY

C.

JONES

and

TROY A.

*

MOSES,

*
*

Plaintiffs,

*
•

v,

*

RAMONE LAMKIN, individually
and in his official capacity

117-003

*

as

CV

*

Marshal

of

the

Civil

and

Magistrate Courts of Richmond
County, Georgia, and AUGUSTA-

*
*

RICHMOND COUNTY,

*

GEORGIA,

Defendants.

*

ORDER

Plaintiffs
of

their

dismiss

First

allege

that

Amendment

Plaintiffs'

Defendants

rights.

fired

them

Defendant

complaint.

(Doc.

Augusta

7.)

claims

against

Augusta

to

proceed

and

violation
moves

Based

arguments made at this stage of the litigation,
the

in

on

to

the

the Court allows
DENIES

Augusta's

Augusta

Marshal's

motion.

I.

Plaintiffs

Office.

Lamkin

(Doc.

are

1,

Background

former

Compl.

challenged the

deputies

11

3-4.)

of

the

In

2016,

incumbent Marshal,

Steve

Defendant

Smith.

Ramone

(Id.

1

5.)

During

(Id.

SI

6.)

election,

the

campaign,

First

fired Plaintiffs.

that

Amendment

Lamkin's

actions,

as

and

and

now

moves

matter

(2)

that

Smith.

and following the

lawsuit

they

a

supported

11.)

Augusta

because

Augusta

cannot,

If 5,

filed this

Lamkin

rights

Smith.

Augusta

(Id.

Plaintiffs

alleging

supporting
that

openly

Lamkin ultimately defeated Smith,

In response,

§ 1983,

Plaintiffs

violated

fired

to

of

under

law,

42

U.S.C.

Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs

dismiss,
be

arguing

(1)

liable

for

held

Plaintiffs'

for

First

Amendment

rights were not violated.
II.

Legal Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
Court tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
Rhodes,

all

416 U.S.

facts

inferences

232,

236

(1974).

alleged in

the

complaint

in

Hoffman-Pugh
The

Court,

the
v.

light

Ramsey,

however,

312

Scheuer v.

The Court must accept as true

and construe

favorable
F.3d

need not

only well-pleaded facts.
79

most

the

1222,

accept

Ashcroft v.

to

the

1225

legal

all

reasonable

plaintiff.

(11th

Cir.

conclusions

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

See
2002).

as

662,

true,

678-

(2009) .

A

complaint

also must

"contain sufficient

factual matter,

accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.'"

550 U.S. 544,

Id. at 678

570

(2007)).

(citing Bell Atl.

Corp.

v.

Twombly,

The plaintiff is required to plead

"factual

content

inference

that

alleged."

that

Id.

^probability

the

allows

the

defendant

"The

court

is

but

draw

liable

plausibility

requirement,'

to

for

standard

it

asks

the

the

is

for

As noted,

more

cannot

not

a

be

Augusta argues that Plaintiffs'

final

Plaintiffs'

held

First,

liable

for

Lamkin's

policymaker

for

Augusta.

claims

fail

akin

than

to

a

a

sheer

Id.

Discussion

should be dismissed for two reasons.
it

misconduct

not

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."
Ill.

reasonable

because

claims against it

Augusta argues that

actions

because

Second,

Plaintiffs

it

could

Lamkin

argues

be

fired

is

that
based

on their political patronage.

A. Augusta's Municipal Liability

"The

Supreme

municipal
F.3d

has

1329

only

(11th

when

Cir.

the

Servs. , 436 U.S.

establishing
an

694

official

officially

unofficial

repeated

an

658,

2003)

Id.

acts of a

(en

on

Clayton Cty.,

335

"[A]

policy'

(citing Monell v.

policy:

promulgated

final

limitations

banc).

'official

(1978)).

custom or practice

strict

Grech v.

county's

constitutional violation."

"(1)

placed

liability under § 1983."

1326,

liable

Court

There are

a plaintiff
county

of the

policymaker

causes

a

Dep't of Soc.

two methods

can

policy

county

county 'is

show
or

for

either
(2)

an

shown through the

for the

county."

Id.

Under either approach, a plaintiff (1) must show that the local

government

"has

governmental

officials

local

function

who

speak

governmental

caused
at

authority

the

in

issue

with

final

entity

particular

and

responsibility

and

(2)

must

policymaking

concerning

constitutional

the

over

identify

authority

act

in

those

for

that

to

have

issue."

Id.

alleged

violation

the

1330.

Plaintiffs
policymaker
other
Office

contends
Marshal's

that

Lamkin

Augusta

for

hand,
and

allege

when

he

argues
thus

that,

cannot

that

like

it

be

under

Office

should hold

that

has

held

Georgia

fired
no

was

liable

law,

not

acting

them.

control
for

the

it would treat

Lamkin

was

a

over

the

Lamkin's

a

final
on

the

Marshal's

actions.

should

sheriff's

as

a

Augusta,

Court

acting

as

treat

office

final

It

the

and thus

policymaker

for Augusta when he fired Plaintiffs.

As Augusta points out, sheriffs are often too independent
from the
those

Grech,

counties they serve

counties.

for

See,

example,

e.g.,

the

to be considered policymakers
Grech,

Eleventh

335

F.3d

Circuit

at

for

1330-41.

addressed

In

whether

a

Georgia sheriff was a policymaker for the county he served when

performing certain law-enforcement duties.

The court looked at,

among other things,

how state law treats sheriffs in Georgia,

sheriffs'

in

functions

Georgia,

over sheriffs in Georgia.
court

concluded

that

the

and

See id.
sheriff

the

control

at 1332-38.

was

not

a

counties

In short,

county

have

the

policymaker

with

respect

state

closely

control
id.

to the

at

relevant

regulates

sheriffs'

law-enforcement

sheriffs,

performance

of

and

because

Assembly,

counties

law-enforcement

local

legislation

enacted

by

do

duties.

the
not
See

(Doc.

the

treated

Marshal's

Office

should

be

because the Marshal is elected,
because

he

contends that it
in

(Id. )

the

Georgia

General

Augusta argues that these "exact same principles apply

to the Office of the Marshal."

role

because

1332-1348.

Citing

and

duties

the

But

has

Court

Marshal is elected,
law-enforcement

law-enforcement

law

is

like

sheriff's

office

enforcement

unpersuaded

without

powers.

Augusta

control and absolutely no
duties

at

this

makes personnel decisions,

duties,

a

It argues that

because he chooses his deputies,

"has no authority or

Marshal's

the

some

7-1 at 4.)

more,

is

that he is not a policymaker for Augusta.

and

functions."

stage.

That

the

and performs some

insufficient

to

show

The Court thus DENIES

Augusta's motion on this issue.
B. Plaintiffs'

An

Political Patronage

elected

official

may

fire

an

employee

based

on

the

employee's political patronage only when "political affiliation
is

a

reasonably

question."

2012)

appropriate

requirement

for

the

job

in

Underwood v. Harkins, 698 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir.

(citing O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518

U.S. 712, 714

(1996)).

In a typical case, whether an employer

may

terminate

an

question of fact.
1338,

1349

approach

(11th

based

on

employee

based

on

political

Leslie v. Hancock Cty.
Cir.

2013) .

the

But

statutory

Bd.

courts

patronage

of Educ,

apply

authority

of

a

an

ego

and

thus

political views.

are

subject

to

"categorical

when

local law to

Id.

Augusta argues that deputy marshals
alter

a

720 F.3d

employee

the employee is empowered by the relevant state or
act as the alter ego of her employer."

is

serve as the Marshal's

dismissal

based

on

their

Augusta contends that the deputy marshals are

"empowered to enter into business transactions for the marshal,"
and

that

"[a]ny transaction within

the

scope

duties may be acted upon by his deputy."

Augusta

has

authority

not

pointed

providing

such

to

any

the

Marshal's

(Doc. 7-1 at 6.)

statute

broad-sweeping

of

or

powers.

other

But

binding

Although

the

legislature has indicated that deputy marshals carry out many of
the

Marshal's

Court

is

unconvinced,

categorical
motion

on

responsibilities,

approach.

this

issue.

without

see
more,

Accordingly,

1974
that

Ga.
it

Laws

2417,

should

the

apply

a

the Court DENIES Augusta's

IV.

The

Court

DENIES

Conclusion

Augusta's

motion

to

dismiss

(doc.

7)

and

LIFTS the stay of discovery in this case.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this ^^v^ciay of June,
2017.

J. KAWe^iTHALL/' CHIEF JUDGE
united/states DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA