Arrington v. Warden
Filing
67
ORDER dismissing without prejudice Claims One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Seven of Petitioner's petition for failure to meet the fact-pleading requirements of Federal Habeas Rule 2. The Court dismisses with prejudice Claim Eight because it is not a cognizable claim in habeas proceedings. The Court requires no action by Respondents with regard to Claim Six because Respondents have already voluntarily filed an answer in this case. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 09/14/2017. (thb)
IN THE
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF
COURT
FOR THE
GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
*
ROBERT OWEN ARRINGTON,
*
Petitioner,
*
v,
WARDEN,
CV
117-022
*
GDCP,
*
Respondent,
*
ORDER
Presently
before
the
Court
is
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Court
DISMISSES
Five,
and
WITHOUT
Seven
sufficient
facts.
failure
state
of
to
Petitioner's
It
a
PREJUDICE
Robert
(Doc.
Claims
1.)
claim cognizable
Two,
for
Three,
failure
PREJUDICE
in
Arrington's
Upon review,
One,
petition
DISMISSES WITH
Owen
habeas
Claim
to
the
Four,
plead
Eight
for
proceedings.
It
allows Claim Six to proceed.
I. Background
In
May
County,
2004,
Georgia,
sentenced
to
a
jury
in
convicted
death.
From
the
the
Superior
Petitioner
time
of
of
his
Court
of
murder.
conviction
Richmond
He
until
was
the
filing of the current petition, Petitioner has sought relief from
various
state
courts
on
direct
appeal
and
in
habeas
actions.
Petitioner now petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
II.
Under
Habeas
petition,
must
Corpus
"promptly
Discussion
Rule
4,
the
examine
Court,
it."
"If
upon
it
receiving
plainly
a
appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that
the petitioner
is not
the judge must
entitled to
relief in the
dismiss the petition . . . ."
the
petition,
answer,
other
"the
motion,
action
judge
district court,
Id.
must
If the judge does not dismiss
order
the
respondent
to
or other response within a fixed time,
the
judge may order."
this case to proceed,
Id.
Thus,
file
an
or to take
before
allowing
the Court must first determine whether the
petitioner "is [plainly] not entitled to relief."
The
Court
concludes
that
seven
of
the
eight
Petitioner's petition do not entitle him to relief.
Two,
Three,
Four,
standards
of
U.S.
65.5-56
644,
Five,
Habeas
and
Corpus
(2005).
Seven
Rule
fail
2(c).
to
See
Claim Eight
is
meet
Mayle
not
claims
in
Claims One,
the
v.
pleading
Felix,
545
a cognizable claim
in habeas proceedings.
The
Rule
Five,
Court
2(c).
and
Finally,
it
It
first
then
Seven
discusses
explains
do
not
explains
why
the
why
Claims
satisfy
Claim
fact-pleading
the
Eight
One,
Two,
standards
Three,
fact-pleading
cannot
be
of
Four,
standard.
asserted
in
a
habeas proceeding.
A.
Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c)
Under
pleading
Rule
2(c),
requirements."
"[h]abeas
petitions
McFarland v.
must
Scott,
meet
512
U.S.
heightened
849,
856
(1994) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 Rule 2(c)).
While complaints in a
civil case must contain only "a
short and plain statement of the
claim
is
showing
Civ.
P.
grounds
facts
8(a),
for
pleader
petitions
relief
habeas
'notice
1265
the
for
available
(11th
petitions must
pleading.'"
Cir.
entitled
habeas
to
the
supporting each ground."
words,
to
that
to
corpus
relief,"
must
petitioner"
Habeas
Corpus
"specify
and
Rule
2.
v.
2014) (internal
GDCP
Warden,
quotation
marks
the
In other
as
759
R.
all
"state
contain "'fact pleading'
Hittson
Fed.
opposed
F.3d
and
1210,
citations
omitted).
The model form made available to prisoners seeking to file a
petition
states,
stresses
the
fact
pleading
requirement.
The
form
in boldface:
(9) CAUTION: You must include in this petition all the
grounds for relief from the conviction or sentence that you
challenge.
And you must state the facts that support each
ground.
If you fail to set forth all the grounds in this
petition, you may be barred from presenting additional
grounds on a later date.
Petition for Relief From a Conviction or Sentence by a Person in
State
Custody,
(emphasis
petitioner,
in
Habeas
Corpus
original) .
Rules,
Any
Forms
App.,
petitioner,
even
28
U.S.C,
a
pro
se
is therefore put on ample notice that facts must be
used to support his petition.
810
(11th Cir.
the
§ 2254
2011)(
Rules
"If,
See Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785,
for example,
Rule 2(c)(1)
should cause a petitioner
doubt what the words
(or his
'specify all grounds' and
and
(2)
of
counsel)
to
'state the facts
supporting each ground'
(9) of the
The
'Instructions'
purpose
of
civil plaintiffs,
has
access
supporting
them
to,
afterward."
at
the CAUTION contained in paragraph
should remove such doubt.").
fact
pleading
evidence
two-fold.
necessary
collateral
claim;
course
the
the
is
First,
unlike
"the habeas petitioner ordinarily possesses or
the
his
during
F.3d
mean,
Hittson,
810).
of
759
unlike
1265
a
establish
the
necessarily became
criminal
F.3d at
Thus,
he
to
prosecution
n.63
civil
facts
aware
or
sometime
(quoting Borden,
plaintiff,
of
a
646
habeas
petitioner should be able to state the facts supporting his claim
with relative precision and without any need for discovery.
Borden,
for
a
646
F.
3d at
so-called
810 n.31
fishing
("[A]
habeas
expedition
via
case
is not
discovery,
an
See
a vehicle
effort
to
find evidence to support a claim.").
Second,
fact
pleading
helps
the
district
court
to
comply
with Rule 4's command that it determine whether the petitioner is
not entitled to relief.
fails to allege facts,
plainly appears
not
entitled
to
Mayle,
545 U.S.
at 656.
If a petitioner
the district court cannot determine if "it
from the
relief
petition
from
the
. . . that
district
the petitioner
court."
Id.
at
is
656
(quoting Habeas Corpus Rule 4) (internal quotation marks omitted) .
Thus,
'real
"the petition is
possibility
expected to
of
state
constitutional
Committee's Notes on Habeas Corpus Rule 4
of Maine,
431 F.2d 688,
689
(1st Cir.
facts
that point to
error.'"
a
Advisory
(citing Aubut v. State
1970)).
To properly fact
particularized
relief
for
facts
each
plead,
"a petitioner must
which entitle him or
ground
specified.
These
her
state specific,
to
facts
habeas
must
sufficient detail to enable the court to determine,
of the petition alone,
corpus review."
1990).
consist
from the face
allegations
897 F.2d 332,
which
are
not
334
(8th Cir.
supported
statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief."
v. Borg,
24
F.3d 20,
Because
decipher,
cases —
comes
such
26
the
one deficient
from
cited the
(9th Cir.
academic
however,
Hittson
v.
following
are
examines
two
often
James
In
ineffective
difficult
pleadings
and one sufficient.
GDCP.
habeas
counsel
Hittson,
assistance
The deficient
the
of
failed
to
Eleventh
counsel
pursue
claims
"substantial"
be
which
and which
litigated
in
Mr.
have
obvious
state
habeas
conviction counsel unreasonable
Undersigned
belief,
counsel
that
Mr.
Hittson
"some merit"
example
Circuit
claims
avenues
are
available
proceedings
[sic]
represents,
Hittson!s
believes
were
but
to
post
failed to raise them.
upon
original
information
habeas
and
attorneys
performed no investigation beyond the limited investigation
performed by
Mr.
Hittsonfs
trial
attorneys
into
Mr.
Hittson1s background.
In fact,
original habeas counsel
appear to have raised only claims which were apparent from
a
review
the
of
record
the
in
trial
order
transcript,
to
determine
failing
whether
to
look beyond
Mr.
trial attorneys failed to discover, for instance,
and
compelling mitigation
evidence.
Further,
to
from actual
of
investigation,
resulting
in
a
failure
to
raise
meritorious and potentially meritorious claims. Ineffective
Assistance
a
1994).
standards
Court
by
falling below the fact-pleading standard:
[S]tate
of
whether the petition merits further habeas
Adams v. Armontrout,
"Conclusory
corpus
Hittson1s
available
original
as
habeas counsel failed, absent any reasonable explanation,
to bring a claim which was apparent from the record.
Mr. Hittson was Deprived of the Effective Assistance
Counsel Due at Motion For New Trial and Direct Appeal.
of
Mr. Hittson Was Deprived of the Effective Assistance Of
Counsel by His Counsel's Failure to Independently Discover
Exculpatory Material Suppressed by the State.
In
his
motion
for
new
trial
proceeding
and
direct
appeal . . . [c]ounsel failed to fully research, raise,
brief and support with evidence the meritorious claims that
could
and
should
have
occurred during Mr.
759
F.3d
Circuit
at
1264-72.
declared
insufficient
in
been
raised
based
on
the
errors
that
Hittson's capital trial.
In
that:
habeas
rejecting
"such
cases,"
these
claims,
generalized
id.
at
1265;
the
Eleventh
allegations
"[n]owhere
in
are
these
generalized claims does Hittson allege any facts that would allow
a court to find
xthat there is a reasonable probability that,
for counsel's unprofessional errors,
would
have
been
not allege[]
different,'"
id.
the result of the proceeding
at
any facts to support
1271;
and
[Petitioner's]
the
sufficient
example
4:09-cv-00251-KOB-TMP,
2012) .
In
Taylor,
comes
2012
the
WL
district
from
4479151
court
Taylor
(N.D.
claims
v.
Id. at 1265.
Culliver,
Ala.
Sept.
concluded the
"satisfied Rule 2(c)'s threshold requirement."
"did
allegations that
his state habeas counsel were incompetent . . . ."
The
but
Id.
The petition
Ground
III:
The
prosecutor
engaged
in
racial
discrimination in jury selection in violation of Batson v.
476 U.S.
79
(1986).
26,
petitioner
included the following claims:
Kentucky,
No.
Supporting Facts:
The prosecutor used his peremptory
challenges
to
strike
three
of
the
five
available
African-American
jurors
(TR765) .
In
defense
of
his
disproportionate pattern of strikes, the prosecutor offered
pretextual reasons.
As to Jeremiah Turner, the prosecutor
claimed that
the
venire member
stated that he would not go
along with the death penalty
(TR768) .
As
to Beverly
Brewster, the prosecutor claimed that she stated that she
was not for the death penalty and stared out the window,
appearing "flat out bored" (TR769).
These reasons are
contradicted
by
the
record
(Turner:
TR658,
679-680;
Brewster:
TR240,
250,
259,
280) .
Moreover,
the prosecutor
disparately applied his stated concern regarding hesitancy
to impose the death penalty to white and African-American
venire members
567,
573-574,
(see TR393-394, 398, 413, 465, 562-563,
580-581,
659-660,
680-683,
769-771).
566For
example, the prosecutor declined to strike a white venire
member,
whose
responses
actually
indicated
greater
reluctance to impose the death penalty, and other white
venire
members
whose
responses
were
similar
to
the
challenged African-Americans'
(TR398,
413,
562,
566-567,
580-581,
Ground
573-574,
IV:
The
680-683).
trial
court's
restrictions
on
voir
dire
examination of prospective jurors denied Mr. Taylor a fair
trial by an impartial jury and a reliable
sentencing
determination in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Supporting Facts:
The trial court
failed to
conduct
individual
questioning
of
prospective
jurors.
Such
questioning was essential in this case, where sixty-three
of the seventy-nine potential jurors, eighty percent of the
venire members, had heard about the case through the media
or discussed it with others in the community (see TR233759) .
Ground VIII: The trial court allowed photographs of the
Moores
and
testimony
and
comment
emphasizing
the
photographs' gruesome nature in violation of Mr. Taylor's
rights
to
a
fair
trial
and
a
reliable
sentencing
determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Supporting Facts: During the guilt phase, the trial court
allowed the prosecutor to introduce sixty-seven photographs
of the Moores, eleven taken at the murder scene and fiftysix during their autopsies (State's Exhibits 6-10, 48-51,
59-65, 73-121) . This evidence was wholly irrelevant: There
was no dispute as to the cause of death or nature of the
injuries and, before the penalty phase hearing, the defense
stipulated to the aggravating circumstance that the crime
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
During
the
medical
examiner's
trial
testimony,
he
remarked on the photograph's gruesome nature and described
each one in discussing the autopsy procedure, including the
external examination, weighing, cleaning, evisceration of
the abdomen and chest, cutting and peeling back of the
scalp, sawing and removing the skull cap and brain.
The
jurors
examined
each
photograph
(TR985-1005).
The
prosecutor
referred
to
the
photographs
as
"horrible"
(TR798),
"gruesome"
(TR341,
404,
672),
"bloody"
(TR404,
672), and "as gory or gross as anything you'll ever see in
any horror movie"
(TR277),
and encouraged the jury to
examine them again during its deliberations (TR1112-1113,
1123,
1135-1136).
During the penalty phase, the prosecutor told the jury
that he would not exhibit the photographs again: "I've got
a hunch that
you will
probably carry them with
you
throughout the rest of your life.
There's nothing in the
world that can ever wipe off or wipe out of your minds the
faces
and
violent
deaths
of
Ernie
and
Lucille
Moore"
(TR1350-1351).
Pet.
for Habeas Corpus,
The
differences
Taylor petition,
claim
names,
and
is
in
unlike
out
statistics,
petitioner
which,
lays
4:09-cv-00251-KOB-TMP,
a
the
petitions
detailed
factual
testimony
entitled to
relief.
obligatory,
a
preliminary
clear
picture
judgment
constitutional
error"
that
about
exists.
It
basis
show
obvious.
states
for
also
The
each
legal
it.
It
court
the
why
uses
evidence that
pleading fact, not merely opinion.
paints
to
1.
are
the Hittson petition,
and
although not
two
Doc.
record
uses
the
cites,
the petitioner is
In short, the Taylor petition
allows
whether
the
"a
court
real
to
make
possibility
a
of
B.
Petitioner's
The
is
Court
Petition
must
now
determine
whether
Petitioner's
petition
sufficiently well plead to survive the Court's initial Rule 4
review.
The
Court
addresses
claims
One
through
Seven to
explain
why each claim meets or fails to meet the fact pleading standard.
It
then
entitle
1.
addresses
Petitioner
Claim
Claim
to
His
Eighth,
Constitution,
Related
explains
why
it
does
not
relief.
first
Right
Trial And On Appeal,
Sixth,
and
1
Petitioner's
Deprived Of
Eight
And
claim
To The
states
that
"Petitioner
Effective Assistance
Of
Was
Counsel At
In Violation Of His Rights Under The Fifth,
Fourteenth
Strickland v.
Precedent."
(Doc.
Amendments
Washington,
1 at
3. )
To
The
466 U.S.
In
support
United
668
of
States
(1984),
this
And
claim,
Petitioner makes several allegations including:
Trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate pretrial
investigation into the State's case and defenses available
to Petitioner at trial, including medical, psychological,
psychiatric,
and
other
defenses
affecting
Petitioner's
mental state before, during, and after his participation in
the crimes for which he was charged.
(Id. SI 12 (a) )
Counsel
witnesses
failed
to
numerous
locate,
interview,
individuals
who
and
had
present
as
compelling
mitigating evidence regarding Petitioner, including but not
limited to, evidence regarding Petitioner's background, his
interactions with the victim on the day of the crime, and
his ability to adapt to and contribute to the safety of a
prison environment.
Counsel
admission
failed to
of
(Id. St 12(h))
adequately object to
statements
and
evidence
and litigate the
obtained
from
Petitioner's person and dwelling prior to law enforcement's
obtaining
Petitioner's
consent
and
prior
to
law
enforcement's
advising
Miranda v. Arizona,
Petitioner
384 U.S.
of
his
436 (1966).
rights
(Id.
under
St 12 (n) )
Counsel failed to object to the admission of several
items of evidence and testimony offered by the State during
the trial and permitted the jury to receive and consider
evidence
that
was
improper,
inadmissible,
prejudicial,
irrelevant, and/or false;
(Id. St 12 (ff) )
These
allegations
Claim One.
are
representative
of
all
the
allegations
in
They are also the definition of conclusory and do not
meet the fact pleading requirements of Rule 2(c).
To
to
properly
the
law.
Corpus
Rule
fact
plead,
Advisory Committee's
2
("[I]t
is
the
claims that is important.").
of
counsel,
petitioners
a
petitioner
must
Notes
on
relationship
connect
Subd.
of
(c)
the
the
of
facts
Habeas
facts
to
the
To establish ineffective assistance
must
show
that
his
counsel's
conduct
"'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,'" and that,
"'but
for
counsel's
unprofessional
errors,
proceeding would have been different.'"
give
"a
strong presumption that
result
Hittson,
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).
must
the
of
the
759 at 1262
Additionally, courts
counsel's
conduct
falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," and
for a petitioner to overcome that presumption, he must "establish
that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his
counsel did take."
IcL_ at 1263
citations
Petitioner,
omitted).
(internal quotation marks and
therefore,
must
plead specific
facts that demonstrate why his counsel's actions fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness and why the outcome would
10
have been different absent the alleged error.
He cannot merely
allege that counsel should have done things differently.
("With unlimited time and the benefit of hindsight,
can
come
up
ineffective
with
assistance
any
number
claims
of
that
a petitioner
potentially
he
now
wished
See id.
meritorious
his
collateral
counsel had raised.").
Petitioner
facts.
In
facts
the
why
what
made
an
have
changed
investigate,
how
what
that
or
the
were
how
have
to evidence admitted at trial,
Petitioner failed to "state specific,
specified."
The
Adams,
Court
objected
corpus
elements
of
would
no
counsel
they
facts
failed
to
the
trial.
And
he
to
the
or why his
admitted
evidence.
particularized facts
relief
for
each
ground
897 F.2d at 334.
stresses
that
Petitioner
that he i_s entitled to habeas relief.
possibility
had
states
what that evidence was,
habeas
was
failed to adequately object
Thus,
[him]
found
no
they would have provided,
counsel
entitle
have
states
information
trial
trial
which
should
have
He
affected
showing how counsel
specific
investigation
that
trial.
that
any
Petitioner
would
mitigating evidence
would
with
pretrial
counsel
of
law
above,
counsel's
witnesses
evidence
states no facts
his
result
the
the
described
investigation,
the
who
connect
information
adequate
detailing
to
examples
explaining
inadequate,
or
failed
constitutional
11
not
have
to
prove
He must only prove "a real
error,"
of each claim might be met.
does
i.e.,
that
Petitioner,
the
legal
however,
can
only
prove
a
Unfortunately,
standard.
2.
real
Petitioner's
Thus,
Team
second
And
Constitutional
Violation
The
1
at
using
claim has
real
not met
facts.
this minimum
Claim Two
Prosecution
To
first
by
the Court DISMISSES Claim One of his petition.
Petitioner's
His
possibility
Of
The
United
17.)
allegations,
Other
Rights
Fifth,
States
In
claim
alleges
State
To
Due
Sixth,
Agents
Eight,
of
Claim
2,
"Misconduct
Deprived
Process
Constitution And
support
that
And
And
A
By
The
Petitioner
Fair
Trial,
Related
Precedent."
Petitioner
makes
(Doc.
several
including the following:
suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of
the guilt/innocence and penalty phases of Petitioner's
trial and Petitioner's direct appeal, in violation of Brady
v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 84-86 (1963), and Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-38 (1995).
(IdL_ 1 20)
The State elicited false and/or misleading testimony from
State
witnesses
at
trial,
in
violation
of
Napue
v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) and in contravention of
Petitioner's rights under Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
112-13
(1935).
The
State
knowingly
or
negligently
presented
false
testimony
in
pretrial
and
trial
proceedings, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony affected the judgment of the trial
court
and/or the jury at both phases of the trial.
See United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
The misconduct
the
State
includes,
but
is
not
limited
to,
mischaracterizing
mitigating
evidence
to
the
jury,
misrepresenting and exaggerating aggravating evidence or
lack thereof, making wholly unsupported, impermissible and
inflammatory future dangerousness arguments, and failing to
produce Mr. Arrington Brady and Giglio evidence regarding
the State's witnesses, including James Griffin.
12
In
Fourteenth Amendments
The State suppressed information favorable to the defense
at both phases of the trial.
The materiality of the
of
Of
(Id. 1 24)
During voir dire,
the prosecution improperly used its
peremptory strikes to systematically exclude jurors on the
basis of race and/or gender.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex.
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S.
79,
84
(1986).
(IcL
St 25)
The jury bailiffs and/or sheriff's deputies and/or other
court personnel
and State agents who
interacted with
jurors,
including
the
judge,
engaged
in
improper
communications with jurors which deprived Petitioner of a
fair trial and reliable sentencing.
Like
Petitioner's
allegations
are
allegations
conclusory,
in
(Id. 1 29)
Claim
One,
and Petitioner
however,
has
these
failed to plead
specific and particular facts.
Petitioner
states
no
facts
detailing
the
favorable
information suppressed by the State; the false testimony elicited
by the State; or the false testimony presented by the State.
Nor
does Petitioner state facts explaining why the materiality of the
evidence undermines the outcome of
improperly
used
communications
Indeed,
its
peremptory
occurred
Petitioner
the case;
does
between
not
strikes;
court
even
how the prosecution
or
personnel
allege
which
what
and
improper
the
court
jury.
personnel
engaged in the improper communications: "The jury bailiffs and/or
sheriff's deputies and/or other court personnel.
. . ." (emphasis
added).
cannot
Without
fact-pleading
these
facts,
requirements
of
the
Petitioner
Rule
2(c).
Thus,
meet
the
the
Court
DISMISSES Claim Two.
3.
Claim Three
Petitioner's third claim states that "Misconduct On The Part
Of
The
Jurors
Violated
Petitioner's
13
Rights
Under
The
Fifth,
Sixth,
Eight,
And
Fourteenth
Amendments
Constitution And Related Precedent."
To
(Doc.
The
United
1 at 21.)
States
Petitioner
supports his claim with a single paragraph allegation:
Misconduct on the part of the jurors included, but was
not
limited
to,
improper
consideration
of
matters
extraneous to the trial, improper racial attitudes which
infected the deliberations of the jury, false or misleading
responses of jurors on voir dire,
which
infected
their
improper biases of jurors
deliberations,
improper
exposure
to
the
prejudicial
opinions
of
third
parties,
improper
communications with third parties, improper communications
with jury bailiffs, improper ex parte communications with
the
trial
judge,
and
improper
prejudging
of
the
guilt/innocence and penalty phases of Petitioner's trial.
(Id.
1
32)
Petitioner's
to meet
Rule
Claim Three,
2(c)'s
like
the
claims
before
fact-pleading requirement.
it,
fails
Petitioner does
allege which jurors committed misconduct, how he came to discover
the misconduct,
were.
or what
the
specific details
of
the
misconduct
Nor does he allege what specific improper biases infected
jury deliberations; what false or misleading responses were made
on
voir
dire;
or
what
improper
jurors and third parties.
communications
These facts, however, are required by
Rule 2(c)'s fact-pleading standard.
the
Court
frivolous.
to
determine
occurred between
whether
They are also necessary for
Petitioner's
petition
is
Because Petitioner has failed to include any specific
or particularized facts, the Court DISMISSES Claim Three.
4.
Claim Four
Petitioner's
fourth
claim
states
that
"The
Trial
Court's
Improper Rulings And Other Errors Deprived Petitioner Of A Fair
14
Trial And Reliable Sentencing In Violation Of The Fourth,
Fifth,
Sixth,
States
Eight,
And
Fourteenth
Amendments
Constitution And Related Precedent."
To
(Doc.
The
United
1 at 22.)
Petitioner
alleges the following errors:
Failing
to
provide
adequate
funding
trial counsel to marshal a defense.
and
(Id.
time
to
allow
St 35(b))
Failing to strike for cause several venirepersons whose
attitudes towards the death penalty would have prevented or
substantially impaired their performance as jurors.
The
trial court erred by phrasing its voir dire questions in a
manner which suggested to jurors who gave neutral responses
that they were or should be in favor of the death penalty.
The court erred in its rulings on motions to challenge
prospective jurors for cause based on their attitudes about
the death penalty and stated biases, engaged in improper
voir dire,
and allowed fair and impartial jurors to be
struck for cause.
(Id.
SI 35(d))
Allowing
the
State
to
introduce
illegally
and
unconstitutionally obtained statements and evidence, which
should have been suppressed.
Failing
(Id.
to
allow
into
(Id. St 35(e))
the
record
admissible
evidence.
SI 35(o) )
Failing to possess and employ an accurate and proper
understanding of the law, including but not limited to,
what constitutes mitigating evidence and what constitutes
aggravating evidence; the duties of counsel under Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); and the defendant's right to
solicit and utilize relevant experts' opinions under Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
(Id^_ SI 35(y))
Impermissibly injecting argument during the testimony of
witnesses and questioning witnesses regarding improper and
prejudicial subjects.
(Id. SI 35 (gg) )
Petitioner's
fourth
claim
requirements of Rule 2(c).
fails
to
meet
the
fact-pleading
Petitioner states no facts about what
funding the Court provided, what funding Petitioner requested, or
why
the
lack
of
funding
created
15
a constitutional
violation.
Additionally,
Petitioner
gives
no
facts
court should have struck for cause,
them to
in
be
struck for cause,
"improper
admissible
voir
dire."
evidence
failed to
or
understand the
Rule
4
or
fact-pleading
DISMISSES
5.
determination,
requirements
the
been
Petitioner
admitted,
what
injected into witness testimony.
Court's
jurors
the
what they said that required
does
have
law,
which
how the judge otherwise engaged
Nor
should
about
argument
state
what
the
judge
how
he
impermissibly
Such facts are critical to the
and
of
their
Rule
exclusion
2(c).
violates
Thus,
the
the
Court
Claim Four.
Claim Five
Petitioner's
fifth
Conviction
And
Fourteenth
Amendments
Portions
Of
Sentence
The
claim
Violate
To
The
Georgia
states
The
U.S.
Fifth,
"Petitioner's
Sixth,
Constitution
Constitution
Materially Misleading Evidence."
that
(Doc.
Because
Eighth,
And
Analogous
They
1 at 30.)
And
Rely
Petitioner's
sole allegation in support of this claim states:
Petitioner's
sentence
is
based
on
materially
inaccurate
evidence, including but not limited to, the allegation that
Petitioner posed a threat of future danger in prison, which
influenced
the
jury's
decision-making
in
both
the
guilt/innocence and sentencing phase of Petitioner's trial.
The fact that the jury heard such evidence and was urged to
consider
it
Petitioner's
in
their
rights
under
deliberations
both
the
is
Georgia
violative
and
the
of
U.S.
Constitutions because it renders the proceedings against
him unreliable.
Johnson v. Mississippi,
486 U.S.
578
(1988).
Further,
the
jurors'
consideration of
inaccurate
evidence heightened the risk that the death sentence in
this matter
was
imposed arbitrarily.
Id.
at
587.
Petitioner's
of
conviction and sentence cannot
such evidence.
16
On
stand in light
(Id.
at
St
38.)
Once
specific facts.
again,
however,
Petitioner
fails
to
Petitioner states that his sentence was based on
"materially inaccurate evidence" but makes no mention,
other than
that he was accused of posing a future danger in prison,
the inaccurate evidence was,
his
sentence
conclusory
pleading
plead
was
based
allegations
requirement.
why it was materially false,
on
do
of what
that
not
Thus,
evidence.
comply
the
Such
with
Court
Rule
or how
vague
2(c)'s
DISMISSES
and
fact-
Petitioner's
Claim Five.
6.
Claim Six
Petitioner's
sixth
claim
states
that
"Petitioner
Was
Denied
Due Process Of Law By The Instructions Given To The Jury At Both
Phases
Of His
Eighth,
Capital Trial,
And
Fourteenth
In Violation Of
Amendments
To
The
The
Fifth,
United
Constitution And Related Precedent."
(Doc.
of
jury instructions
this
claim,
Petitioner
cites
the
Sixth,
1 at 31.)
States
In support
given
the trial judge as well as the case law supporting his claim.
also
makes
several
instructions
concludes
could
that
other
this
cites
violated
have
record
the
claim pled
Claim
Was
facts
to
how
The
He
the
Court
survive the
Thus, Claim Six may proceed.
Seven
Petitioner's
Sentence
demonstrate
Constitution.
sufficient
Rule 2(c) fact-pleading standard.
7.
that
by
seventh
Imposed
claim
states
Arbitrarily
17
And
that
"Petitioner's
Disproportionately
Death
And
Amounts
To
Under The
United
38.)
Cruel
Fifth,
States
And
Unusual
Sixth,
Violating
His
Rights
Eighth And Fourteenth Amendments
Constitution
Petitioner
Punishment,
offers
And
in
Related
support
of
Precedent."
this
To
(Doc.
claim the
The
1
at
following
allegations:
Georgia's statutory death penalty procedures, as applied,
do not result in fair, nondiscriminatory, or proportional
imposition of the death penalty, and therefore violate the
Eighth
(Id.
Amendment
to
the
United
States
Constitution.
St 44(a) )
The death penalty is imposed arbitrarily, capriciously,
and discriminatorily in the State of Georgia, and was so
imposed in Petitioner's case.
(Id. SI 44(b))
Georgia
cases similar to that of Petitioner's with
regards to both the nature and circumstances of the
offense, prior record, culpability and life and character
of the
death.
accused, have
(Id^ SI 44 (d) )
resulted
in
lesser
punishments
than
Georgia cases more aggravated than that of Petitioner's
with regards to both the nature and circumstances of the
offense, prior record, culpability, and life and character
of the
death.
accused, have
(Id^ SI 44 (e) )
There
exists
in
resulted
Georgia
prosecuting authorities,
on the
whether
in
a
lesser
pattern
courts,
punishments
and
than
practice
of
and juries discriminating
basis of race, gender, and poverty in deciding
to seek or impose the death penalty in cases
similar
to
that
of
Petitioner's,
thereby
making
the
imposition of the sentence of death against Petitioner a
violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth
(Id.
Once
pleading
Amendments
to
the
United
States
Constitution.
SI 44(h) )
again,
Petitioner's
requirements
allegations
raising
of
Rule
serious
claim fails
2(c).
questions
to
meet
Petitioner
of bias
on
the
fact-
makes
broad
a statewide
level, but Petitioner offers no facts to support his allegations.
18
The
Court
case,
needs
why
different
what
cases
cases
were
outcome
shows
the
The
Court
alleges
practice of
damning
know
those
capricious.
Petitioner
to
that
were
similar,
Georgia
must
also
"there
have met the
without
on
in
is
what
Georgia
Petitioner's
Petitioner's
arbitrary
factual
a
and
basis
pattern
and
Petitioner cannot launch such
factual
support
fact pleading requirement of
Court DISMSISSES
to
why
system
exists
any
and
know
. . . discrimination."
allegations
similar
Rule
and
expect
2(c).
Thus,
to
the
Claim Seven.
8. Claim Eight
Petitioner's
final
claim
states
that
"The
Execution
Of
Petitioner By Lethal Injection,
And As Implemented By The Georgia
Department
Cruel
Violation
Of
Of
Corrections,
His
Rights
Is
Under
The
Fourteenth Amendments To The U.S.
Petitioner's
claim,
habeas proceeding.
however,
govern
727 F.3d
the
punishment.
conditions
of
Fifth,
is
not
Punishment
Sixth,
cognizable
Eighth,
(Doc.
in
In
And
1 at 4 5.)
a
federal
Habeas cases govern the constitutionality of
1334,
circumstances
Id.
Unusual
Constitution."
a prisoner's conviction or sentence.
of Corr.,
And
1344
of
Because
confinement,
and
McNabb v. Comm'r Ala. Dept.
(11th Cir.
confinement
execution
not
the
2013).
or
They
do not
imposition
procedures
go
to
constitutionality of
of
the
the
conviction, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that "[a] § 1983
lawsuit, not a habeas proceeding, is the proper way to challenge
lethal injection procedures/'
Id. ; see also Tompkins v.
19
Sec'y,
Dep't.
of
Corr.,
557
F.3d
1257,
1261
(11th
Cir.
2009).
Petitioner's claim challenges the lethal injection procedure,
the
constitutionality
of
his
conviction.
Thus,
the
not
Court
DISMISSES Claim Eight.
III.
Conclusion
"The role of federal habeas proceedings,
assuring
and
that
constitutional
limited."
Barefoot
"Federal
courts
trials,"
and
defendant
Thus,
are
federal
v.
not
rights
Estelle,
forums
habeas
in
review
are
observed,
463
U.S.
which
is
while important in
not
to
"a
is
880,
secondary
887
(1983).
relitigate
means
by which
is entitled to delay an execution indefinitely."
"[t]he
procedures
adopted
to
facilitate
state
the
a
Id.
orderly
consideration and disposition of habeas petitions are not legal
entitlements that a defendant has a right to pursue irrespective
of
the
contribution
constitution error."
these
Id.
procedures
make
toward
uncovering
at 887-88.
An important part of the "procedures adopted to facilitate
the orderly consideration and disposition of habeas petitions" is
the
fact-pleading
facilitates
the
requirement
expeditious
Mayle, 545 U.S. at 655-56.
of
review
Rule
of
2(c).
habeas
Fact
pleading
petitions.
See
It ensures that the petitioner will
give the court the meat of his argument up front so that the
court can quickly separate the wheat from the chaff.
in turn,
ensures
that
the
Court
can
quickly
Id.
This,
provide
either
finality to the state court decision or relief to the wronged
20
petitioner.
Thus,
when
petitioners
fail
to
fact
plead,
they
hinder the Court's ability to efficiently review habeas petitions
and diminish its capacity to provide swift relief to those claims
which might be meritorious.
1924,
1942-43
See McQuiggin v.
(2013) (Scalia,
J.,
Perkins,
dissenting) ("[F]loods
133
S.Ct.
of
stale
frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket of lower
courts and swell our own .... It must prejudice the occasional
meritorious applicant to be buried in a flood of worthless ones."
(internal
citations
justice,
omitted)).
in addition to the
Habeas Corpus,
Therefore,
commands
set
for
the
forth in the
sake
of
Rules
of
courts cannot allow to proceed petitions that fail
to make a factually specific claim for relief.
The
Court
concludes
that
almost
all
of
Petitioner's
suffer from a deficiency of facts and must be dismissed.
claims
Thus,
after reviewing the Petitioner's petition in accordance with Rule
4,
the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Claims One,
Four,
Five,
and Seven of Petitioner's
meet the fact-pleading requirements
(Doc.
he
1.)
requirements
merits.
(Doc.
Three,
for failure to
of Federal Habeas Rule 2.
If Petitioner chooses to refile any of these claims,
is warned that
because
petition
Two,
of Rule
Next,
it
1.)
a second failure to
is
2(c)
will
result
follow the
fact pleading
in a dismissal
on the
the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Claim Eight
not
Finally,
a
cognizable
claim
in
habeas
proceedings.
the Court requires no action by Respondents
21
with
regard
to
Claim
Six
because
Respondents
have
already
voluntarily filed an answer in this case.
ORDER ENTERED
September,
at Augusta,
Georgia,
this _/^; day of
2017.
J.
RANDAL
HALL
UNITED feTATES DISTRICT JUDGE
IsOUTHElW DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
22
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