Rice v. James
Filing
39
ORDER granting in part and denying in part the City's 30 Motion to Dismiss. The City's motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim; denying Judge James' 35 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 05/10/2018. (jlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
ANGELA RICE,
*
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
V.
*
CV 117-039
*
HARRY B. JAMES III,
*
Individually and in his Official *
Capacity as Judge of Richmond
*
County Probate Court, and
*
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA,
*
*
Defendants.
*
ORDER
Before
the
Court
are
Plaintiff's amended complaint.
Defendants'
motions
(Docs. 30, 35.)
a response in opposition to both motions.
to
dismiss
Plaintiff filed
(Docs. 33, 37.)
Accordingly, Defendants' motions are fully briefed and ripe for
review.
I.
This
suit
involves
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's
termination
employment with the Richmond County Probate Court.
from
her
Plaintiff
claims that her firing was due to her race in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (^^Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Plaintiff began her tenure at the Richmond County Probate
Court
as
an
administrative
Director of Probate Court.
assistant
and
eventually
became
(Am. Compl., Doc. 23, H 20.)
On
January 1, 2013, Defendant Judge Harry B. James III ("Judge
James") was elected Chief Judge of the Richmond County Probate
Court.
Judge
(Id. H 21.)
James
began
Plaintiff claims that upon taking office,
a
Caucasian employees.
pattern
of
discrimination
against
his
(Id. H 33.)
Plaintiff asserts that Judge James restructured his office
to "implement his strongly held racist beliefs," and Defendant
Augusta,
Georgia
(the
"City"),
facilitated
this
approving Judge James' "Budget Transfer Request."
40,
42.)
Within
five
months
of
taking
office.
process
by
(Id. t 38,
Judge
James
allegedly fired or forced two Caucasian employees to quit and
subsequently
employees.
filled
(Id.
M
both
33-34.)
vacancies
with
African-American
On July 31, 2013, Judge James
announced that the Director of Probate Court position would be
eliminated and replaced by a "Chief Clerk."
(Id. K 46.)
Judge
James then selected Felecia Bray, an African-American employee
who
was allegedly less qualified than Plaintiff, to serve as
Chief
Clerk.
(Id.
HH
46, 51.)
Consequently, Plaintiff
was
demoted to the level of administrative assistant. (Id. 1 47.)
Judge James assured Plaintiff that her demotion was not due to
her work performance and that she had ^^nothing to fear."
(Id. K
55.)
Judge James also created the position of ''Deputy Chief
Clerk."
(Id. H 44.)
application
On August 3, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an
to serve
as Deputy Chief
Clerk.
(Id. f
58.)
However, Joy Daniels, an African-American employee with fewer
years
of
position.
had
been
experience
than
(Id. H 62.)
passed
over
Plaintiff,
was
selected
for
the
On August 22, after learning that she
for
the
Deputy
Chief
Clerk
position.
Plaintiff met with the director of the City's Equal Employment
Office
("EEO")
to complain about
Judge
James'
discriminatory
conduct.^ (I^ H 76.)
Plaintiff claims that Judge James learned about Plaintiff's
EEO complaint on or before September 9, 2013, and sxibsequently
began to engage in retaliatory conduct.
(Id. H 92.)
Despite
Judge James' initial insistence that Plaintiff's demotion was
not due to her work performance, on September 23, Judge James
told the City's Director of Human Resources that Plaintiff was
demoted due to her "inability to supervise other staff."
101.)
(Id. H
On another occasion. Judge James chastised Plaintiff for
calling the I.T. Department,
which presumably prevented Judge
James from accessing the court's calendar.
(Id. H 96.)
He told
^ Although the Richmond County Probate Court and the City are separate
entities. Judge James allegedly adopted the City's discrimination policy and
agreed to be subject to its terms,
(Id. H 75.)
Plaintiff "*not to call the Information Technology Department,
Human Resources, or anyone else again.'"
Plaintiff
defended
her
actions.
(Id. H 96.)
Judge
James
When
sarcastically
responded ''[yjeah, nothing makes me madder than to be accused of
something not true."
(Id. H 100.)
Judge James also retaliated against Plaintiff by reducing
her salary.
Despite her demotion. Plaintiff did not see an
immediate reduction in salary.
(Id.
about
charge,
Plaintiff's
discrimination
H 88.)
After learning
however.
asked the City to reduce Plaintiff's pay.
Judge
James
(Id. H 93.)
On
September 30, 2013, the City informed Plaintiff that her pay
would
be
lowered
by
$15,000
per
year.
(Id.
H
105.)
Furthermore, allegedly at the behest of Judge James, Plaintiff's
salary reduction was retroactively applied to begin on September
12, 2013.
from
(Id. H 106.)
Plaintiff's
salary.
paycheck
to
offset
the
difference
in
(Id. H 105.)
On
James'
next
Accordingly, the City deducted $1,153
November
Office,
employee
were
15,
2013,
where
present.
Ms.
Plaintiff
Bray
(Id.
and
was
called
another
108.)
into
Judge
African-American
Judge
James
scolded
Plaintiff for not changing her voicemail to indicate that she
was no longer Director of Probate Court.
(Id.)
In that vein.
Judge James told Plaintiff ''[o]h, you're going to be a Director
alright . . . the Director of Traffic!"
(Id. ^ 109.)
On January 14^ 2014, Judge James issued Plaintiff a written
reprimand for not "being a team player," making improper gender
references
in
court
pleadings,
demeanor" in the workplace.
and
not
(Id. H 117.)
having
a
"pleasant
The next day, during
Plaintiff's annual review. Judge James allegedly told Plaintiff
she should quit because no one liked her.
(Id. H 122.)
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination regarding Judge
James' conduct with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
on November 13, 2013.
(Id. H 83.)
On March 4, 2014, during a
staff meeting v/ith Plaintiff in attendance. Judge James read
aloud from Plaintiff's EEOC Charge in front of her colleagues.
(Id. H 124.)
Judge James then pointed his finger at Plaintiff
and said "I don't trust you I" and that "change was going to come
real soon."
(Id. H 131, 133.)
Judge James also announced that
staff meetings would be suspended until his office became "more
cohesive and trustworthy."
Judge
(Id. H 134.)
After the meeting.
James called Lacey Grantham, the only other Caucasian
employee at the Richmond County Probate Court, into his office.
(Id.
H
135.)
After
speaking
with
Judge
James,
Ms.
refused to have further communication' with Plaintiff.
Gratham
(Id. f
136.)
Plaintiff was terminated on March 17, 2014.
138.)
(Id.
137,
Plaintiff alleges that she had not engaged in or been
punished for any misconduct beyond the written reprimand she
received
in
Plaintiff's
notice.
January.
exit
(Id.
interview
(Id. H 144.)
f
where
140.)
she
The
received
City
her
conducted
termination
Plaintiff's termination notice indicated
that she was ineligible for rehire at any City department.^
(Id.)
Plaintiff initiated this action on April 6, 2017.
1.)
(Doc.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in intentional
discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII and §
1983.
On October 5, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to
amend her complaint over Judge James' objection.^
(Doc. 22.)
Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
a complaint to contain "a short plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," which gives a
defendant notice of the claim and its grounds.
Bell Atl. Corp.
V.
suirvive
Twombly,
12(b)(6)
550
motion
U.S.
to
544,
dismiss,
555
(2007).
a
complaint
To
must include
a
Rule
enough
facts that demonstrate the plaintiff's right to relief is more
than speculative, and those facts must state a plausible claim
to relief.
Id. at 570.
While a complaint does not need to be
^ Plaintiff's termination notice was later amended to reflect that she was
eligible for rehire. (Am. Compl. H 146.)
^ Judge James moved to amend his response to Plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend her complaint.
(Doc. 20.)
Because the Court has already granted
Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint, Judge James' motion (doc. 20) is
DENIED AS MOOT.
bursting with factual allegations, there must be something more
than a bare bone recital of the elements of a cause of action.
Id. at 555.
However, a complaint should not be denied "unless it appears
beyond
a
doubt
circumstances
that
that
the
would
plaintiff
entitle
can
him
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
to
prove
no
relief."
set
of
Conley
v.
The Court must accept all
factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
Belanger v. Salvation Amy, 556
F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009).
III.
As
a
preliminary
DISCUSSION
matter,
the
City
moves
to
dismiss
Plaintiff's amended complaint for failing to comply with Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
8(a)
and
10(b).
Complaints
that
violate Rules 8(a) or 10(b) are "often disparagingly referred to
as shotgun pleadings."
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's
Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
either
rule
is
only
appropriate
where
Dismissal under
"it
is
virtually
impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to
support which claim(s) for relief."
(internal
quotations
omitted).
Id. (emphasis in original)
The
Eleventh
Circuit
has
identified four types of shotgun pleadings; (1) "a complaint
containing
multiple
counts
where
each
count
adopts
the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive
count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint"; (2) ''a complaint .
replete
with
conclusory,
vague,
and
immaterial
facts
not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action"; (3) a
complaint that fails to "separate[e] into a different count each
cause of action or claim for relief"; and (4) a complaint that
"assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which
acts or omissions,
brought against."
or
which of
the
Id. at 1321-23.
defendants the
claim
is
"The unifying characteristic
of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail . . . to
give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them."
Id.
Plaintiff's amended complaint seems to fit under the first
category of shotgun pleadings.
Every count in the amended
complaint adopts the allegations of the preceding counts.
Am. Compl. HH 162, 197, 231, 244.)
(See
Yet Plaintiff provides a
detailed factual basis for her claims and this is not a case
where "failure to more precisely parcel out and identify the
facts relevant to each claim materially increased the burden of
understanding the
factual
allegations
See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324.
that
it
cannot
understand
the
underlying
each count."
Moreover, the City's contention
factual
basis
of
Plaintiff's
claims is belied by the accurate recitation of those facts in
the City's motion to dismiss.
not ''virtually
impossible"
(Doc. 30, at 4-5.)
to
know
which
Because it is
allegations
support
which claim for relief, dismissal under Rules 8(a) or 10(b) is
not appropriate.
A.
''Employer" Under Title VII
Both the City and Judge James move to dismiss Plaintiff's
Title VII claims.
The City argues that it was not Plaintiff's
employer and therefore cannot be held liable under Title VII.
Judge James similarly claims that he is not an employer under
Title VII because the Richmond County Probate Court had fewer
than fifteen employees.
Plaintiff responds that the City and
Judge James should be treated as single or joint employers for
Title VII purposes.
Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year . . . ."
20002e(b).
42 U.S.C. §
Although a plaintiff must show that the defendant
had more than fifteen employees, the term "employer" should be
construed liberally.
834
F.2d
930,
construction,
"look
933
the
beyond the
McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home,
(11th
Eleventh
Cir.
1984).
Circuit
has
nominal independence
Consistent
with
instructed
courts
of
an entity and
that
to
ask
whether
two
treated
as
or
a
more
ostensibly
single,
separate
integrated
entities
enterprise
when
should
be
determining
whether a plaintiff's 'employer' comes within the coverage of
Title VII."
Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 166 F.3d 1332,
1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999).
The Eleventh Circuit has identified
three situations where it is appropriate to aggregate different
entities and treat them as a single employer for the purposes of
Title VII: (1) the single employer - where the two entities are
highly integrated with respect to ownership and operations; (2)
joint employers -
where the two entities contract with each
other and one entity has sufficient control over the terms and
conditions of the other's employees; and (3) the agency test -
where
an employer delegates control over its employees
third party.
to a
Id. at 1341.
Where two entities have been declared separate under state
law,
however,
there
is
a
presumption
separate for Title VII purposes.
that
the
Id. at 1344.
entities
are
To overcome the
presumption of separateness, a plaintiff must establish that the
purpose of maintaining separateness is to elude Title VII, or
identify
other
circumstances
entities are integrated.
includes
considering
that
clearly
Id. at 1344-45.
factors
such
10
as:
the
indicate
that
the
The latter method
ability
to
hire,
transfer, promote, or fire; authority to establish schedules or
assignments; and the obligation to pay.
Id. at 1345.
Here, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to show that the
City and Judge James should be treated as a single employer.
Plaintiff claims that the City was involved in many of Judge
James' employment decisions.
(Am. Compl. H 75, 101, 144, 146.)
Additionally, Plaintiff claims that she was paid by the City and
that Judge James needed the City's permission before changing
Plaintiff's salary.
(See Am. Compl.
94, 105.)
While the
Court recognizes that Plaintiff bears a heavy burden to prove
that aggregation is appropriate, aggregation is a fact-specific
inquiry that is often better left to summary judgment.
See
Williams v. Ga. Stevedore Ass'n, Inc., 2013 WL 1130741, at **5-6
(S.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2013); Walker v. Sumter Cty. Comm'n, 2008 WL
11377746, at *14 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing Mack v. Ala.
Dept. of Human Resources, No.
(M.D. Ala. Jul. 28, 2003)).
CIV.A.OO-D-1435, Doc. 86, at 8
Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a
claim against the City and Judge James under Title VII.
B.
Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
Both
Plaintiff's
the
§
City
1983
and
Judge
claims.
James
Judge
entitled to qualified immunity.
also
James
move
argues
to
that
dismiss
he
is
The City, on the other hand,
argues that it had no control over Judge James and therefore
cannot be held liable for his conduct under § 1983.
11
I. . Judge James' Qualified Immunity
Judge James argues that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is barred
by qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects government
officials from suit so long as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.
Morris
V. Town of Lexington; 748 F.3d 1316, 1321 n.l5 (11th Cir. 2014).
To invoke the defense, the defendant must first establish that
he was acting within his discretionary authority.^
Holloman ex
rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004).
The
burden
then shifts
to the
plaintiff
qualified immunity is not appropriate.
1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002).
who must show
that
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
To survive a motion to dismiss, a
plaintiff must (1) allege facts that establish a constitutional
violation
and
(2)
demonstrate
that
the
right
clearly established when the violation occurred.
violated
was
Id.
Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated from her job due
to Judge James' racial animosity.
The Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that the right to be free from intentional racial
discrimination extends to public employment.
See Brown v. City
of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1478-79 (11th Cir. 1991).
Furthermore, that right was clearly established when Plaintiff
was terminated.
See, e.g.. Boggle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347,
1355 (11th Cir. 2003); Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., Inc., 956
^ Plaintiff concedes that Judge James was acting within his discretionaryauthority.
12
F.2d 1056, 1064
{11th Cir. 1992); Brown, 923 F.2d at 1478-79.
Taking the facts alleged by Plaintiff as true, the Court cannot
conclude that Judge James is protected by qualified immunity.
2.
The City's Control Over Judge James
The City argues that it had no control over Judge James and
therefore cannot be held liable for his actions pursuant to §
1983.
A local government cannot be liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.
U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
Monell v. Dep^t of Soc. Servs., 436
Instead, the plaintiff must establish
that the constitutional deprivation she suffered resulted from
an official policy, or an unofficial policy or custom shown
through the repeated acts of a final policymaker.
Plaintiff
does
not
allege
that
Judge
according to the City's official policy.
show
the
City ''has
constitutional
practice
is
a
custom
violation]
the
moving
or
and
force
[the
[behind]
James
was
acting
Thus, Plaintiff must
practice
that
Id.
of
permitting
City's]
the
custom
[a
or
constitutional
violation."
Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th
Cir. 2003).
This will in turn require showing that the City had
authority over Judge James.
Turquitt v. Jefferson Cnty., 137
F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
If, under Georgia law, the
City had no control over Judge James' actions, the City cannot
be held liable under § 1983.
Id.
13
Here, Plaintiff claims that Judge James subjected himself
to the City's authority by adopting its discrimination policy.
Under Georgia law, however, the probate judge is an elected
constitutional officer that is independent from a municipality.
Ga.
Const,
art.
IX,
§
I,
para.
III.
The
power
to
remove
or
discipline a probate judge is within the purview of the Judicial
Qualification Commission, not the local governing authority.
Const, art. VI, § I, para. VI.
Ga.
Additionally, Judge James could not
give the City this power by contract because a probate judge is
not
the
kind
of
entity
that
intergovernmental agreement.
I.
is
allowed
to
execute
an
See Ga. Const, art. IX, § III, para.
Accordingly, the City had no control over Judge James and
therefore cannot be held liable for his actions under § 1983.^
IV.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's amended complaint complies with Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 10(b).
Plaintiff has also alleged
facts that support treating the City and Judge James as a single
employer
for
Plaintiff's
Title
right
VII
to
purposes.
be
free
Additionally,
from
intentional
because
racial
discrimination was clearly established when she was fired, the
Court cannot conclude that Judge James is protected by qualified
^ This finding does not contradict the Court's single employer analysis under
Title VII.
Unlike § 1983, Title VII allows courts to look beyond state law
to determine whether the two entities act as a single employer.
166 F.3d at 1345.
See Lyes,
Accordingly, the City may be liable for Judge James'
conduct under Title VII even if the City is not liable under § 1983.
14
immunity.
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the City, however,
must be dismissed because the City had no control over Judge
James' conduct.
Upon due consideration, the City's motion to dismiss (doc.
30) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Judge James'
motion to dismiss (doc. 35) is DENIED.
The City's motion to
dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
ORDER
ENTERED
at
Augusta,
Georgia
this
day
of
. 2018
J. RAl^m HALL/ CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED >BTATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
15
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