Augusta National, Inc. v. Green Jacket Auctions, Inc.

Filing 75

ORDER denying 37 Motion to Dismiss and denies alternative motion to transfer; granting in part and denying in part 19 Motion to Seal Document, in which Defendant is Ordered to submit under seal redacted list for the Court's approval; finding as moot 25 Defendant's original motion to dismiss and Plaintiff's 49 Motion for Venue and related Discovery. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 02/08/2018. (jlh)

IN THE UNITED

FOR THE

STATES

DISTRICT

COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

AUGUSTA NATIONAL,

*

INC.,

*

Plaintiff,
*

v.

CV

GREEN JACKET AUCTIONS,

117-096

*

INC.,

*
*

Defendant.

ORDER

Before

to

the

dismiss

alternative
(doc.

37);

Court

for

DENIES

motion

It

to

are

three motions:

improper

motion
and

transfer.

Court

(3)

to

venue

transfer

Plaintiff's

Defendant's

GRANTS

IN

to

PART

(doc.
the

motion

motion

and

(1)

to

Defendant's

37);

(2)

District
to

seal

dismiss

DENIES

IN

Defendant's

of

New

(doc.

Jersey

19).

and

PART

motion

motion

The
to

Plaintiff's

seal.

I.

Plaintiff owns

(''Augusta National")

BACKGROUND

and operates the Augusta National

and the Masters Tournament

Golf Club

(the "Masters") .

Defendant is an online auctioneer of golf memorabilia that has a

history

Masters.

\\

of

selling

items

On August 2,

related

2011,

to

Augusta

National

and

the

Defendant listed for auction on its

website

the

National

following pieces

and

"Butler

the

Jacket,"

(collectively,

Plaintiff's
and

a

Masters

belt

flag logo

On

the

memorabilia

(collectively,

"Nelson

the

map

also

and

bearing

"Items") :

and

(2)

flag

related to Augusta

the

Jacket,"

"Jackets");

trademarked
buckle

of

the

"King

silverware

logo

Plaintiff's

(the

August

14,

various

Jackets

bearing

trademarked map

2017,
causes

Plaintiff
of

filed

action.

suit

(Doc.

in

1.)

and

the

Silverware.

(Id.

at

this

Silverware

Buckle.

Fifth,

making

and

demanded

trademark
(Id.)

related

to
it

their

Fourth,

sought

return.

infringement

Defendant's

false

it

asserted

of

injunction

statements

about

at

to

the

related

marketing

"an

(Id.

a

false

the

Contemporaneously with its

for

complaint,

(Doc. 4.)

auction

of

at

Defendant

using

it

the

claim

16.)
from

[Plaintiff's]

(Id. at 18.)

Plaintiff also

preliminary injunction to prohibit

auctioning the Items.

Third,

(Id.

it

and the

advertising

prohibiting

it

Second,

11.)

Items.

[Plaintiff],

Court

issue of title

10.)

trademarks, and selling [Plaintiff's] property."

a motion

and

First,

asserted a claim for trover with respect to the Jackets

asserted

Jacket"

"Silverware");

requested declaratory relief with respect to the
the

the

(the "Buckle").

asserting

to

(1)

Defendant

On August 17, 2017,

filed

from

this Court

held a hearing on the motion and granted the

requested relief.

(Doc.

Plaintiff to

16.)

It

also

heard an

oral motion by

seal

certain documents entered into evidence by Defendant.
granted Plaintiff's oral motion,

but ordered Plaintiff to file a

written motion for its consideration.
On September

11,

2017,

25.)

In

transfer

the

District

of New

also

the

case

requested

the

Jersey
the

filed a motion to dismiss

Defendant

United

States

("New Jersey").

Court

15.)

Rule of Civil

alternative,

to

(Doc.

Defendant

for improper venue under Federal

(Doc.

dismiss

any

Procedure

requested

District

(Id.

at

potential

Plaintiff might have asserted in its complaint.1
On

(Doc.

October

31.)

respect

Third,

First,

to

trademark

the

it

2017,

Plaintiff

alleges
website

filed

an

12 (b) .

the

Court

9.)

Court

for

the

Defendant

dilution

claim

(Id. at 16.)

amended

complaint.

Plaintiff alleges trademark infringement with

Items.

dilution

Defendant's

Fourth,

2,

The Court

with

(Id.

at

respect

to

trademark
and

social

13.)
all

Second,
Items.

infringement
media

it
(Id.

with

marketing.

alleges
at

15.)

respect
(Id.

at

to
19.)

it requests declaratory relief to determine title to the

Jackets and the Silverware.

(Id.

at 22.)

tort of trover with respect to the Items.

Fifth,

(Id.

it alleges the

at 23.)

Sixth,

it alleges false advertising against Defendant under the Lantham
Act.

(Id.)

Seventh,

it

requests

an

injunction

Defendant "from making false statements about

to

prevent

[Plaintiff],

using

1The Court notes "potential" dilution claim because Plaintiff did not allege a
separate cause of action for dilution or even cite the dilution statute.
Rather, it referred to dilution only in its paragraph setting forth subject
matter jurisdiction and in the prayer for relief.

[Plaintiff's]
(Id.

trademarks,

selling

[Plaintiff's]

property."

filed

motion

at 25.)

On

October

dismiss

in

16,

improper venue,

Jersey.

dilution

2017,

response

Defendant

37.)

New

and

to

once
or,

It

Defendant

Plaintiff's
again

amended

sought

to

in the alternative,

did

not,

however,

a

new

complaint.

dismiss

the

to

(Doc.

case

for

to transfer the case to

move

to

dismiss

Plaintiff's

claim.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion -to Dismiss for Improper Venue
Defendant

first

asks

this

improper

venue.

Venue

§

Section

1391(b)(1)-(3)

1391.

in

Court

this

to

case

dismiss

is

this

governed

establishes

action

by

three

28

for

U.S.C.

categories

of

districts in which a plaintiff may properly bring suit:
(1)
if

a

all

judicial district
defendants

district

are

in which any defendant

residents

of

the

State

in

resides,
which

the

is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or a substantial part of property that is the subject of
the action is

(3)

if

situated;

there

is

no

or

district

in

which

an

action

may

otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any
judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the
court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
Venue

is

always

proper

in

any

district

that

requirements of either the first or second categories.

fits

the

Venue is

proper in a district that fits the third category, however, only

when

no

other

categories.
Dist.

of

category
then

Atl.

Tex.,

is

fits

the

S.

Ct.

fallback

will

Co.

568,

lie

in

^any

to

the

v.

578

option:

subject

is

requirements

Marine Constr.

134

"a

venue

defendant
Id.

district

If

of

U.S.

Dist.

(2013).

no

court's

first

Court

Thus,

other

judicial

the

district
personal

for W.

the

venue

is

in

two

third

proper,

which

any

jurisdiction.'"

(emphasis in original).
Plaintiff

chose

Georgia,

therefore

District

is

that

its

a

"resides"

in

substantial
occurred

proper

of

this

part

in

challenges

the

proper

choice

to

file

Court

venue

is

District

this

the

must
§

because

under

events

The

Plaintiff

(1)

1391(b)(1);

§

rise

in

this

this

asserts

and

to

finds

of

Defendant
(2)

the

claims

1391(b)(2).

Court

"resides"

whether

because:

§

under

District

determine

giving

District

Defendant

Southern

1391(b).

proper

assertions.

both

the

first

under

venue

of

in

a

Defendant

that

venue

District

is

under

§ 1391(b)(1).

Section

states

that

defendant,

in

1391(c)

a

defines

corporation

any

residency

"shall

be

judicial district

for

venue

deemed

in

which

to

purposes.

reside,

It

if

such defendant

a

is

subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the
civil

action

Plaintiff

in

asserts

question
that

.

.

.

Defendant

."

28

waived

U.S.C.

its

right

§

1391(c)(2).
to

challenge

this Court's personal jurisdiction when it omitted that defense

in its

first Rule

12 motion challenging venue.

According to Plaintiff,

in this

District under §

argues

that

defenses,

not

thus

at 7.)

and thus Defendant "resides"

1391(b)(1).

and

"waiver

automatically

48

Defendant's waiver makes it "subject to"

this Court's personal jurisdiction,

venue

(Doc.

(Id.)

personal

of

a

jurisdiction

personal

constitute

a

Defendant,

however,

are

separate

jurisdiction defense

waiver

regarding

venue."

does

(Doc.

37 at 4.)

As

an

initial

waived

its

party's

right to

party

fails

motion,

to

other

Oldfield v.

(11th Cir.
not

right

matter,

to

challenge

Court

agrees

personal

that

assert

that

responsive

objection

pleading

2009) (citing

Fed.

personal

R.

Civ.

jurisdiction

preliminary

injunction

or

challenging

venue.

Thus,

jurisdiction

and

in

either

Defendant
is

in

or

S.A.,

subject

its

first

of

the

its

waived
to

this

Rule

12

appearance."

F.3d 1210,

12(h)).

at

"[A]

waived if the

general

558

P.

Defendant

jurisdiction.

dispute personal jurisdiction is

Pueblo De Bahia Lora,

challenge

personal

the

1218 n.21

Defendant
hearing

Rule

any

12

did

for

motions

challenge

Court's

a

to

personal

jurisdiction.

The question,

personal

then,

is

whether a defendant who consents to

jurisdiction by virtue

of

waiver

is

"subject

to"

that

court's personal jurisdiction for purposes of section 1391(c)(2)
and thus "resides" in that court's district under §

1391(b)(1).

The

Prod.

in

begins

with

the

v.

Burton,

549

U.S.

Co.

course,
that

Court

a

with

the

corporation

court's

action

in

1391(c) (2)

"shall be

personal

question
says

"subject to"
that

a

of

84,

91

statutory text.").

any judicial district

the

text

which

.

.

.

."

28

about

Section

U.S.C.

corporation

how

or

when

a

in

a

court's

action

in

personal
question"

jurisdiction
However

jurisdiction

with

obtained.

Accordingly,
courts,

that

an

court's

personal

means

respect

this

"subject

to

Whenever

with

the

to

civil

is

subject to

to

the

must

Thus,

become

states
if

only

it

is

"subject to

to

the

court's

action

civil

Section

district

the

states

defendant,

It

respect

of

a

party

jurisdiction.

resides

start,

1391(c)(2).

subject to the court's personal jurisdiction.
the

if

respect
§

BP Am.

1391(c)(2)

reside,

with

See

("We

such defendant

court's personal

defendant

1391(c).

(2006)

deemed to

jurisdiction

nothing

the

in

§

in

civil

personal

question."

obtained.

Court

out-of-state

jurisdiction

holds,

as

have

corporation

which

See

959

consented

(D.

to

S.D.

2016)

personal

Hillshire Brands Co.,

("And

because

jurisdiction

in

the

South

also consented to venue in South Dakota as

the

court's

personal

"subject

a

court's personal jurisdiction for purposes of § 1391(c)(2).

945,

is

to

that

LLC v.

waiver

consents

other

to"

Dakota Provisions,

by

numerous

jurisdiction

with

226 F.

Supp.

defendants

Dakota,

they are

respect

to

they

3d

have

have

^subject to

the

civil

action

in

question.'

South

Dakota

under

28

v.

Cal.

and are

U.S.C.

Teliax,

personal

11,

venue.");

("But,

this

waived

it

at

*5

right

Mut.

Cas.

Apr.

do

so.

14,

Great

00683,

Wolf

Lodge

of

2015 WL 6082105,

Defendants

failed to

in a timely manner,

Kansas
at *2

is

in this

Tire

*3

any

Defendants
Court

under

& Rubber Co.,

(N.D.

Ind.

argument

Dec.

or

(W.D.

LLC,

Mo.

Oct.

raise the defense

personal

("EMC
Rule

subject

Civil
15,

No.

2015)

of personal

has

not

12(h)(1),
to

this

Brenneman
4:15-cv("Because

jurisdiction

they have waived their objection to personal

jurisdiction in this Court.
1391(c),

City,

contest

to

Court's personal jurisdiction in this civil action.");
v.

(N.D.

CV-15-112-BLG-CSO,

under

it

*2

Corp.

of establishing

2016)

and,

in

Dakota

AT&T

not

^subject

Co.,

Thus,

South

did

for the purposes

jurisdiction

to

in

4241910,

Teliax

therefore

(D. Mont.

Court's

its

is

^reside'

omitted));

2016 WL

because

Emp'rs

venue

(citations

district

v.

defendants

to

16-cv-01914-WHO,

in this

Underberg

challenged
has

No.

the

subject

1391(b)(1)."

2016)

1466506,

each of

properly

jurisdiction,

jurisdiction'

2016 WL

§

Inc.,

Aug.

Thus,

^reside'
28

No.

8,

As a result,
in Missouri.

U.S.C.

§

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Thus,

1391(b)(1).");

2:14-CV-232-PPS-JEM,

affidavit

contesting

the Northern District of Indiana,

lack of personal jurisdiction.

venue is proper
Timm v.

2014

2014) ("Harley-Davidson

personal

§

WL

has

Goodyear

6909015,

not

at

provided

jurisdiction

in

thereby waiving the defense of

The Court concludes that Harley-

Davidson is
thus

subject to this Court's personal jurisdiction and is

deemed

pursuant
venue

to

to

reside

28

U.S.C.

pursuant

dismissal

or

to

Practice § 3811.1

the

1391(c)(2),

U.S.C.

are

Defendant

jurisdiction

this

under

this

an

of

Indiana

appropriate

Accordingly,

neither

see

Federal

also

14D

it

has

ipso

to

facto consented to

this

Court's

personal

it is "subject to" this Court's personal

section

1391(c)(2)

and

Therefore,

thus

resides

in

this

venue is proper in this

and the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss.

Motion

the

case

obtained.

1391(b).

consented

District under § 1391(b)(1).

In

making

appropriate.");

jurisdiction,

jurisdiction by waiver,

B.

§

District

[section 1391].")

Because

District,

Northern

("[I]f an entity defendant waives its right to

object to personal
venue under

§

28

transfer

in

to Transfer Venue

alternative,

to

New

First,

Defendant

Jersey.
the

party

asks

Transfer,

this

Court

however,

seeking transfer

is

has

to

transfer

not

the

easily

burden

establishing that transfer is warranted.

In re Ricoh Corp.,

F.2d 570,

a

573

(11th Cir.

1989).

Second,

"'plaintiff's

of
870

choice

of forum should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed

by other

considerations,'

inconvenience

outweigh

the

from

the

plaintiff's

S.E.C. v. Lauer,

and a transfer that
defendant

choice

to

for

would only shift

the

plaintiff

Section

1404(a)

478 F. App'x 550, 554

(11th Cir.

does

not

purposes."

2012)

(quoting

Robinson v.

1996) );

New

Giarmarco & Bill,

see

also

Frontier

Fla.

Trinity

Media,

2010);

Rice

(N.D.

Ga.

2013);

(N.D.

Ga.

2011).

when

deciding

Rowland v.

whether

Thompson Indus.,

Under
civil

to

F.

F.3d 253,

Ctr.

of

Supp.

Inc.,

260

Santa

(11th Cir.

Ana,

Inc.

v.

2d

1328-29

(M.D.

F.

975

1322,

Supp.

2d 1364,

1374

Int'l Paper Co.,

2011 WL 1457194,

*3

the district court has broad discretion

to

Inc.,

Section

action

761

PetEdge,

Third,

74

Christian

Inc.,

v.

P.C.,

transfer

a

856 F.2d 1518,

1404(a),

case.

1520

"a district

any other district

or

England

(11th Cir.

v.

ITT

1988).

court may transfer any
division

where

it might

have been brought" if transfer is based upon the convenience of
the

of

parties,

the

justice.

courts

have

to

been

28

convenience

U.S.C.

answer

two

brought

in

Smithkline

Beecham

(S.D.

2001).

Fla.

convenience

of

§

the

the

witnesses,

1404(a).

questions.

Section
The

proposed

Clinical
The

the

of

Labs.,

second:

parties;

transferee

Do the

(2)

1404

first:

146

the

F.
§

or

interest

thus

requires

Could

2d

Plaintiff

could

Nevertheless,

a

proper

have

the Court

venue,

originally
finds that,

transferring

weighing the § 1404(a)

venue

factors.

10

1355,

of

and (3) the interests of justice — warrant transfer?

v.

1359

(1)

the

witnesses;
Id.

a venue

brought

action

Mason

factors -

convenience

The parties dispute whether New Jersey is

the

court?

Supp.

1404

the

this

in which
action.

even assuming New Jersey is

would

not

be

proper

after

1.

Convenience of the Parties

"A

defendant

original

would

forum

not

be

moving

is

for

inconvenient

substantially

Federal Practice,

transfer

§ 3849;

for

must

show

both

and

that

the

it

inconvenienced by

see Lauer,

a

that

the

plaintiff

transfer."

478 F. App'x at 555

15

(noting

that transfer not required when transfer would inconvenience the
other

parties

to

the

case) .

Defendant

has

failed

to

show

either.

a.

This District Is Not Inconvenient for Defendant

Defendant

because:

parties

as

that

"New Jersey

(1)

argues

is

the

warehouse

this

District

a more

is

convenient

containing

the

inconvenient

location for the

[Items]

are

stored

in

New Jersey and the contracts with the consigners who have title
to

the

[Items]

[Defendant's]
(Doc.

are

principals

37 at 16.)
First,

that

this

the

in

New

maintains

Jersey";

a

and

(2)

"each

in

New

Jersey."

presence

of

The Court finds neither argument persuasive.
location

District

significance

there.

performed

is

because

of

Defendant's

inconvenient.

Defendant

has

warehouse

The
chosen

does

warehouse
to

store

not

show

only
the

has

Items

Although this might have significance in the context of

other

legal

disputes,

which

district

is

this

District

is

more

it

has

no

significance

convenient.

exceedingly

easy

overnight with minimal expense.

11

in

Transferring

and

can

be

determining

the

Items

to

accomplished

Second,

Defendant

offers

no

explanation

as

to

why

the

contracts between Defendant and the consignors support transfer.
The

issues

rightful

in

this

possession

anything,

to

do

case

of

involve

the

with

the

Items.

perfectly

capable

of

They

consignment

Defendant and the consignors.

is

trademark

And,

infringements

have

very

contracts

little,

signed

even if they did,

interpreting

the

and

if

between

this Court

consignment

contracts

under New Jersey law.

Third,
Jersey

that Defendant's principals have a "presence" in New

does

not

transfer.

establish

Only

Jersey.

one

(Doc.

contends

principal,

39.)

Massachusetts.

The

(Doc.

that

inconvenience

other,

38.)

Plaintiff

Robert

sufficient

Zafian,

Michael

better

afford

lives

Carey,

Additionally,

can

to

it

no

any

evidence

undue

Defendant

expense

give

place an undue

time

demands

words,

that

financial
that

in this

its

litigating

it,

principals

has
but

shown
it

or

that
has

District is truly inconvenient.

12

District

difficulties.

strain on its business

on

for

or

evidence

Defendant

convenient

litigating

this

operations

other
New

not

in

given

to

in

New

Defendant

would
Neither

District

cause
does
would

through excess

employees.
Jersey

New

Defendant

travel

Jersey than Defendant can afford to travel to Augusta,

gives

in

lives

while
to

warrant

might

evidence

In

other

be

more

that

this

b. New Jersey Would Be Substantially Inconvenient for
Plaintiff

Defendant

makes

no

argument

substantially

inconvenienced by

ignores

fact

the

convenient

District,

live

in

for

its

employees

this

These

District

might

and

Plaintiff

transfer.

Plaintiff

who

District,

is

be

any

is

and

documents

parties

ownership which underlies

documents

would

Rather,

demonstrably

to

more

in

relating

be

be

this

testify mostly

District.

will

not

Defendant

headquartered

called

likely housed in this

witnesses

evidence when the

a

this

Plaintiff.

policies are most

21.)

that

that

to

(Doc.

key

its

48 at

pieces

of

attempt to establish the question of
Plaintiff's

trover

claim.

Because

so

many crucial pieces of

evidence and party witnesses are located

in

Court

this

District,

substantially

the

concludes

inconvenienced

by

Defendant

not

that

transferring

Plaintiff

this

would

case

to

be

New

Jersey.
In

sum,

inconvenient —
parties.

15

has

shown

or that New Jersey is

Federal Practice § 3849

that

more

this

convenient —

shows,

inconvenience

F.

App'x

at

at

best,

only

that

a

transfer

against transfer.

Thus,

the

for the

convenience

Defendant's

would

from the defendant to the plaintiff."

554.

is

(§ 1404 (a)'s convenience of

the parties factor refers "to all of the parties").

evidence

District

"shift

Lauer,

478

of

the

parties

weighs

See Garay v. BRK Elecs.,

755

F. Supp.

1010,

13

1012

(M.D. Fla.

1991)

(finding that

the

convenience of parties

weighed against transfer because the defendant did not establish
that the transferee district was more convenient).
2.

Convenience of Witnesses

The

convenience

important

witnesses

of

the

to

witnesses,

particularly

resolution of

the

case,

nonparty

may be

the

single most important factor to consider on a motion to transfer

under § 1404(a).
Mut.

Cas.

Co.

Cir.

2010)

15 Federal

v.

Practice § 3851;

Bartile Roofs,

Inc.,

618

see

F.3d 1153,

1169

(10th

("The convenience of witnesses is the most important

factor in deciding a motion under § 1404(a).");
v.

also Emp' rs

Power-One,

Inc.,

510 F. Supp.

2d 634,

plaintiff's

own

("[A]side

from

important

factor

in

§

is

convenience

1404(a)

Cooper Tire

the

the

& Rubber

passing

Co.,

choice

on

a

of

the

2011 WL

637-38

of

motion

Bartonics,
(S.D.

forum,

to

*5

(M.D.

2007)

the

transfer

witnesses.");

2669469,

Ala.

Inc.

most

under

LaPenna

Ala.

v.

2011)

("[T]he most important factor in passing on a motion to transfer
venue under §

1404(a)

is the convenience of the witnesses.").

When evaluating the convenience of witnesses

consider

the

transferee

witnesses

trial,
Federal

"relative

district

at

to

trial,"

and the

cost

Practice

§

abilities
secure

the

of
3851.

cost

of

the

of

the
live

forum and the
testimony

willing

employee witnesses
A

court's

14

factor,

of

witnesses

to

courts

proposed
important

to

attend

attend trial.

evaluation,

however,

15

should

be "qualitative,
or

material

not quantitative."

witness

may

important witnesses."

In

its

request

(Doc.

convenience

"should

not

agents of

(Id.

at

of

for

be

intends

at

afforded

number

of

less

Defendant

argues

that

the

to call

It

who

great

do

do

not

also

argues

reside

weight

as

reside

in

they

that

this

are

in this

District

hand-picked

Defendant

just as

argues

traveling to

New

if not more convenient,

convenient,

that

for

all of the "important, identifiable non-party witnesses."
Defendant's arguments fail,
that

New

that

New

Jersey might
Jersey

is

the

and should be treated as party witnesses."

Finally,

Jersey would be

"one important

great

13-14.)

witnesses

[Plaintiff]

15.)

a

transfer,

it

37

the

outweigh

Thus,

Id.

majority of witnesses

District.

Id.

be

however,

just as

more

because they show only

convenient

convenient

for

(Id.)

for witnesses,

witnesses.

not

Defendant

identifies multiple witnesses who live outside of this District,

but

only one

might

be

Defendant

witness

within
fails

who

driving
to

lives

in

distance

address

the

New
to

Jersey and only one who

New

fact

Jersey.

that

many

Furthermore,
of

Plaintiff's

witnesses live in this District and that these witnesses play an

important
claim:

in

proving

ownership of the

evidence

is

role

more

that

this

convenient

a

Jackets.

District

for

key

is

element

of

In short,
inconvenient

witnesses.

15

Thus,

Plaintiff s
Defendant
or

the

that

Court

trover

offers no
New

Jersey

finds

that

the convenience of witnesses factor weighs against transfer.
Garay,

755

F.

Supp.

at

1012

(finding

that

the

See

convenience

of

witnesses weighed against transfer because the defendant did not
establish that the transferee district was more convenient).
3.

Interest of Justice

The interest of justice prong under § 1404(a)
amorphous

and

Nevertheless,

subjective.
courts

have

15

Federal

identified

Practice

several

helpful when determining whether transfer is
justice."

These factors include:

likely

receive

allow

to

a

consolidation

speedy

of

with the relevant law;

the

controversy;

In

2 011);
Inc. ,

Miss.

re

Research
626

F.3d

Chem.

Defendant
Defendant

claims

in Augusta,

978

(6)

417

(3)

are

"in the interest of

whether

the

transfer

relative

will

familiarity

(7th

offers

only
"[it]

costs

to

each

party

of

any obstacles to a fair trial.
F.

Inc.

App'x.

v.

Cir.

119 F.3d 688,

that

which

696

one
cannot

947,

949

(Fed.

Schrader-Bridgeport

2010);

Terra

Int'l,

(8th Cir.

for

Int'l,
Inc.

v.

1997).

argument

Cir.

receive a

this

prong.

fair trial by jury

Georgia against Plaintiff due to pretrial publicity

and jury bias."
Plaintiff

and

Automation,

Corp,

3854.

where the litigant is more

(2)

comparative

Stanley,

973,

factors

§

(4) the relationship of each community to

(5)

Morgan

trial;

litigation;

litigating in each forum;
See

(1)

is admittedly

has

(Doc. 37 at 20.)
such

a

large

Defendant argues that because
economic

16

impact

in

Augusta,

"[p]otential

jurors —

land

and

owners

[Plaintiff]
the

cashiers

—

have

owners

an

and

economic

taxi

drivers

incentive

to

to
see

prevail in a case which would only serve to increase

grandeur

(Id.

from business

of

[the

Masters]

and

stimulate

local

economies."

at 21.)

In
cites

support

the

prejudice

of

its

"presumed

prejudice"

standard,

inflammatory,

pretrial

"Vhere

publicity

argument,

standard.

a

Under

[party]

Defendant

the

adduces

presumed

evidence

of

prejudicial pretrial publicity that so pervades or

saturates the community as to render virtually impossible a fair
trial

by

prejudice
bias.'"

an
is

impartial

Coleman

presumed

reserved

for

drawn

assumed and there
v.

(quoting Mayola v.

"The

jury

Kemp,

an

778

Alabama,

prejudice

is

no

F.2d

623

that

further

1487,

is

duty

to

establish

(5th Cir.

at

1537

1985)

1980)).

applicable,

Id.

jury

(11th Cir.

997

rarely

situation."

community,

1490

F.2d 992,

principle

extreme

from

and

is

(internal

quotations and citations omitted).

The

apply

to

presumed

civil

prejudice

cases.

Defendant

in

support

addresses

pretrial

criminal

trial.

211-193,

2012

second

case

WL

Coleman,

of

the

publicity

778

F.2d

at

3886094,

at

cited

by

standard,

however,

the

is

and

bias

1539.

*1

Defendant
17

And

(S.D.

in

not

case

cited

first

standard,

jury

might

a

McRae

Ga.

by

habeas

case

in

underlying

v.

Sept.

support

even

of

an

Perry,

6,

the

that

No.

2012),

CV

the

standard,

applies

the

whether

it

presumed
applies

Additionally,
court

prejudice

standard to

But

as

own

well

research

without

as

not

Coleman,

civil

opinions

civil

criminal

revealed

trials.

no

district

trials

nor

any Eleventh Circuit

that

or

actually applying the presumed prejudice

trials.

that

evidence"

the

of

presumed

prejudice

"inflammatory,

"pervades

identify
778

analyzing

analyzing the propriety of applying the presumed

assuming

publicity"

no

standard

Defendant has failed to establish it.

"adduce

did

civil

Court's

standard to

Supreme Court

apply,

to

this

opinions

prejudice

a

F.2d

single
at

or

1490.

In

evidence of pretrial publicity,

Despite needing to

a

pretrial

community,"

Defendant

discussing

other

does

prejudicial

saturates

article

standard

words,

the

present

Defendant

case.

produced

much less pretrial publicity

that was "inflammatory" or "prejudicial."

Defendant's argument of the potential for actual bias among

jurors also fails.

Defendant introduced no

how many potential

jurors

how many potential

jurors might have

sufficient

the

to

outcome

consider

of

the

Plaintiff employs

them

case,

as

or

having

why

no

Miller,

Inc.,

(finding "insufficient

821

F.

Supp.

or

contracts

a connection to
an

economic

other

District could not supply unbiased jurors.
Herman

evidence indicating

1476,

interest

division

(N.D.

evidence to show prejudice
18

Plaintiff

in

See Haworth,
1481

with,

this

Inc.

Ga.

in

v.

1992)

or pecuniary

bias

to

Action

Mar.

the
No.

prospective

juror pool");

2:14cvll67-MHT,

12, 2015)

2015

WL

Bell

v.

1120271,

Rock-Tenn,
at

*4

Civil

(M.D.

("When a party alleges that he will not receive a

fair and impartial jury in a more convenient forum due to
jurors'

pecuniary

demonstrate

Ala.

the

interest

probability

in

the

outcome,

of

actual

that

prejudice

. . .

party

with

must

evidence

and cannot rely on mere speculation.").

Defendant

also

provides

no

selection procedures will be
jurors.

548,

right

554

to

evidence

insufficient

See McDonough Power Equip.,

(1984)

a

("Voir

fair trial]

and unknown,

dire

that

Court's

v.

Greenwood,

serves

to

jurors.

464 U.S.

protect

by exposing possible biases,

on the part of potential

jury

to expunge any biased

Inc.

examination

the

both

[the

known

Demonstrated bias

in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror
being excused for cause;

challenge

for

peremptory

cause

hints of bias not sufficient to warrant

may

assist

challenges.");

("Ordinarily,

efficiency,

and

parties

Bell,

particularly

justice,

2015

where

in

exercising

WL

all

1120271

other

their
at

factors

*4

of

and convenience weight heavily in favor or

litigating in a forum allegedly subject to concerns of a biased
jury pool,

such

concerns

can

be

quite

adequately

addressed by

the use of voir dire in the jury selection process.");

Biofuels,
2009

WL

LLC v.
918459,

Hawaiian Elec.
at

*6

(N.D.

Co.,

Tex.

19

Inc.,

Apr.

3,

No.
2009)

BlueEarth

3-08-CV-1779-L,
("If

the

case

proceeds to trial,

dire

techniques

the court and the lawyers can use proven voir

to

eliminate

potential

jurors

with

any

actual

bias.").

After weighing all the 1404(a)
that

Defendant

forum

is

has

"clearly

not

factors,

established

outweighed by

that

other

the Court concludes

Plaintiff's

choice

considerations."

of

Lauer,

478

F. App'x at 554.

Defendant has not shown that this District

is

inconvenient

either

for

convenient for witnesses,

in

this

motion

C.

to

Motion

The

District.

that

New

Jersey

is

more

or that it cannot receive a fair trial

Accordingly,

the

Court

DENIES

Defendant's

transfer.

to

Seal

final

Permanently
19.)

party,

Seal

Exhibit

presumably,

issue

1

before

the

Defendant's
(the

"List")

all Green Jackets

Court

Exhibit
is

a

is

1

Plaintiff's

to

Document

working

Motion

12.

inventory

to

(Doc.

list

of,

kept on Plaintiff's property.

It

contains allegedly sensitive information,

such as: the first and

last

the manufacturer,

size,

names

of

Augusta

coat

and serial number of each jacket; the date each member was

charged for their
(Doc.

National members;

12-1.)

jacket;

Defendant

and the date alterations
submitted

the

List

as

were made.

evidence

that

"Plaintiff did not own a single green jacket that was produced

prior to 1967."

(Doc.

preliminary injunction,

11 at 3.)

During the hearing on the

Plaintiff made an oral motion to seal
20

the

List

on

information

the

basis

and

was

issue.

the

The

Plaintiff s

In

it

illicitly

hearing oral argument,
instructed

that

obtained

highly

by

confidential

Defendant.

After

the Court temporarily sealed the List but

parties
Court

contained

to

now

file

written

GRANTS

IN

the

public

briefs

PART

and

addressing
DENIES

IN

the
PART

motion.

civil

proceedings

has

a

presumptive

right

under the common law to review and copy documents filed with the

courts.

See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Brigdestone/Firestone,

263 F.3d 1304,

as

the

"common

"material
motion

(11th Cir.

law

filed

right

in

unrelated

dispositive

invoke its
Co.,

1311

or

operations

common

of

discovery"

affect
1245

law

the

of

and

acknowledges

need

the

and

as

to

the

v.

Warner

Commc'ns,

judicial

1050

desire

also Shane Group,

Inc.

v.

Inc.,

any

pretrial

any

motion,

court

Romero v.

to

Drummond,

recognizes

that

conduct

judges

of

Id. at 1244
(2d Cir.

of

435

U.S.

1995)).

citizens

589,

"Athe

are

(quoting United

watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.'"
Nixon

to

2007).

access

F.3d 1044,

applies

substantive

"presented

matters of utmost public concern.'"
71

It

well

its decision."

right

States v. Amodeo,

any

as

(11th Cir.

courts

Id.

with

non-dispositive,

power or

This right is referred to

access."

connection
to

480 F.3d 1234,

The

of

2001).

Inc.,

598

to

It also

"Akeep

a

Id. (quoting
(1978);

see

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825
21

F.3d

299,

305

(6th

Cir.

2016)

("[T]he

public

is

entitled

to

assess for itself the merits of judicial decisions.").

Thus,

it

is

[and]

is

"an

essential

instrumental
process."

in

component

of

securing

the

Chicago Tribune,

To overcome

the

our

system

of

integrity

justice

of

1246.

common law's presumption of public access,

confidential

outweighs

accessing that information.

When

balancing

party's

factors,

Romero,

480 F.3d

"Good cause" exists when a party's interest in keeping

information

moving

judicial]

263 F.3d at 1311.

the moving party must establish "good cause."
at

[the

the

privacy

including:

public's

interest

in

Id.

public's

interests

(1)

the

right

of

courts

"whether

access

consider

allowing

access

against

a

the

variety

would

court functions or harm legitimate privacy interests";

of

impair

(2)

"the

degree of and likelihood of injury if the information were made

public";

(3)

"the reliability of the

information";

(4)

"whether

there will be an opportunity to respond to the information";
"whether

the

concerns";
to

sealing

information

(6)

concerns

public

"the availability of a less

the

documents";

and

(7)

proprietary interest in information."

Applying these

has

shown

good

factors,

cause

to

"a

officials

onerous
party's

or

(5)

public

alternative
privacy

or

Id.

the Court concludes that Plaintiff

exclude

the

public

from

accessing

members' names, but not any other information in the List.
22

1.

Member's

With

regards

Plaintiff's
access.

Names

to

right

First,

the

of

first

privacy

redacting

public interest.

and

last

outweighs

the members'

names

the
names

of

its

members,

public's

right

does

harm the

not

of

The heart of the right of access is the belief

that "the public has an interest in ascertaining what evidence and
records

Shane,

[courts] have relied upon in reaching

825 F.3d at 305.

In this case,

[their] decisions."

with the exception of the

three members who wore the jackets put up for auction, the names of
Plaintiff's members are irrelevant to the issues before the Court.

Defendant produced the List to prove that Plaintiff did not own
Green Jackets issued prior to 1967.

The List's evidentiary value,

therefore, lies in the records concerning the number of jackets in

Plaintiff's

inventory

entered the
members'

and

inventory,

names

do

the

date

in

which

not in the members'

not

help

the

public

they

names.
assess

potentially

Thus,
this

the

Court's

decisions, and redacting them will not harm the public interest.
Second,

Plaintiff has a legitimate and significant privacy

interest in protecting its members'

names.

that

keep the

it

"has

always

endeavored

to

Plaintiff asserts

content

of

its

documents, such as [the List], private and not subject to public
disclosure."

(Doc.

Plaintiff

copies

filed

28

at

2.)

To

support

of confidentiality

its

assertion,

agreements

that

it

claims all employees were required to sign in the years 1999,
23

2006,

and

2016.

(Id.)

should not disclose,

or

guests

and

the

The

agreements

among other details,

fact

that

such

state

that

employees

the "names of members

persons

are

members

guests at the Club,

personal information about members,

Tournament

or

players

concerning members',
or

business

filed

an

their

families;

by

..."

its

(Id.

at

Human Resource

7.)

guests,

businesses

Plaintiff

Manager

or

information

guests', or Tournament players'

transactions.

affidavit

respective

of

that

also

asserts

"the privacy and confidential atmosphere of the club is valuable
[sic]

asset of [Plaintiff]."

(Doc. 28-1 at 2. )

Thus, based on

Plaintiff's extensive efforts to keep confidential its members'
names

and

that

its

business

Plaintiff

has

a

interest

privacy

in

the

same,

interest

the

Court

significant

finds

enough

to

outweigh the public's interest in access.

Finally,

the

Court's

balancing

test

is

"sensitive appreciation of the circumstances

List's production.
Nixon,

435

Defendant

U.S.

Chicago Tribune,
at

acquired

598,

the

Plaintiff

illicitly.

by

a

that led to'" the

263 F.3d at 1311

602-603).

List

"informed

(Doc.

(quoting

asserts

19

that

at

1.)

Plaintiff's Human Resource Manager stated in her affidavit that

"[Plaintiff]

has never authorized any employee to disclose any

information about

Ryan Carey,
'confidential

Green Jackets

or Bob Zaffian.
Club

to

Green Jacket Auctions,

Inc.,

Any employee's disclosure of any

information'
24

would

be

a

violation

of

the

Confidentiality Agreement each employee had signed."
12.)

In response,

Defendant claims

Affidavit of Ryan Carey,

to Mr.

Carey."

(Doc.

[the List]

23 at

1.)

that

(Doc. 28-1 f

"[a]s detailed in the

was provided by

But

Defendant

[Plaintiff]

has

offered no

sworn testimony that Plaintiff authorized any of its employees to
disclose the List.

[List]

."

Mr.

Carey's affidavit states only that "the

was provided to

(Doc. 12 f 23.)

[Defendant]

by Plaintiff s employee.

It makes no sworn allegation that Plaintiff

authorized the employee to give Mr. Carey the List.
the Court

finds

production

that

the

when

document

of

an

. .

the

List

"circumstances that

-

that

employee

Defendant

violated

(Id.)

led to"

likely

his/her

Thus,

Defendant's

obtained

the

confidentiality

agreement with Plaintiff - weigh against allowing the public to
access the members'
2.

names contained in the List.

All Other Information

With regards to all other information in the List,
the

Court

finds

Plaintiff's

that

right

the

of

public's

privacy.

right

First,

of

access

sealing

however,
outweighs

any

other

information would harm the public's ability to assess this Court's
decisions.

The

assertion that

other

Plaintiff

information

is

relevant

to

Defendant's

did not own any jackets prior to 1967.

Without it, the public would have a difficult time assessing the

propriety

of

this

Court'

preliminary

injunction

potentially any future orders concerning the Jackets.
25

order

and

Second,

Plaintiff's

information
maker,

is

not

the dates,

privacy

significant.

no

protected

explanation

or

in

Plaintiff

the

additional

asserts

that

"the

and the physical location of the Green Jackets

are all highly protected."
offers

interest

why

(Doc. 28 at 5.)

for

releasing

this Court supply one.

why

that

Plaintiff, however,

information

it would be

is

harmful.

highly

Neither

can

The List is over ten years old, and the

additional information - particularly without any connection to
a named member -

of access,

is,

at best,

mundane.

Plaintiff must make

specific argument.

See Romero,

a more

To overcome the

compelling and factually

480 F.

3d at 1247

"stereotyped and conclusory statements"
cause);

Shane,

therefore

must

(noting that

do not establish good

825 F.3d at 305-06

("The proponent

analyze

document

propriety of secrecy,

in

detail,

right

by

of sealing

document,

the

providing reasons and legal citations."

(citations and quotations omitted)).

In sum, Plaintiff has shown that its privacy interest in its

member's

names outweighs

the public's

interest

in access,

Plaintiff has not shown that its privacy interest

information

access.

in

Thus,

the

list

outweighs

the

public's

the Court finds that partial

document is an acceptable,
the entire document.

but

in any other

interest

in

redaction of the

less onerous alternative to sealing

Romero, 480 F.3d at 1246.

Accordingly, the

Court ORDERS Defendant to redact the first and last name of all
26

members

on the List as

well

as

any other entry or notation that

may contain any individual's name.

Defendant

SHALL then submit

under seal the redacted list for the Court's approval.

Court's approval,

Upon the

Defendant SHALL file the redacted list with the

Court.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss for improper

venue

(doc.

District

§

to

37)

as

because it

defined

1391(b)(1).

The

transfer

to

in

§

finds that Defendant resides in this
1391(c)(2)

Court DENIES

New

Jersey

and

venue

Defendant's

(doc.

37)

is

proper

under

alternative motion

because

it

finds

that

Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiff's choice of forum is

clearly
§

outweighed

14 04(a).

The

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff

Court

motion

has

by

to

overcome

regards to the members'

the

considerations

GRANTS
seal

the

IN

PART

(doc.

19)

common

names

listed

and

DENIES

because

it

law

right

in the List.

of

in

IN

PART

finds

that

access

with

Accordingly,

the

Court ORDERS Defendant to redact the first and last name of all

members on the List as well as any other entry or notation that

may contain any individual's name.
seal

the

Court's

redacted

approval,

the Court.

permanently

list

for

the

Defendant SHALL submit under
Court's

approval.

Upon

the

Defendant SHALL file the redacted list with

The Clerk SHALL keep the original List

sealed.

Finally,
27

the

Court

(doc.

DENIES

as

12-1)

MOOT

Defendant's original motion to dismiss

(doc.

motion for venue related discovery (doc.

ORDER
February,

ENTERED

at

Augusta,

25)

and Plaintiff's

49) .

Georgia

O

this

day

of

2018.

HALL,
STATES

DISTRICT

COURT

rHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

28